MGNREGA so far...

This post is a summary of Amita Sharma's discussion paper (Rights-based legal guarantee as development policy), April 2010. I could not find a link to the full discussion paper but here is a presentation on the same. NREGA (they renamed it to Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act [MGNREGA] this fiscal year) is doing a phenomenal job in rural India at a cost below one percent of GDP. Specifically, the cost was around 0.6 percent of GDP last year. The total number of employment provided to households was over 45 million. Here is major highlights of NREGA. Intro here.

How the districts under different phases were selected?

Districts under phase I, II, and III were 200, 130, and 285 respectively. Mahatma Gandhi NREGA was implemented in phase I districts on February 2, 2006, phase II on April 2007, and phase III on April 1, 2008. The phase implementation was based on a criterion of backwardness, which included a mix of demographic, social and economic indices, formulated by the NPC.  This ranking was used to select 150 districts for the National Food for Work Programme (NFFWP) launched in 2004. However, the districts selected for phase I were not selected serially but to represent all states under NREGA. The districts chosen for phase I were dominantly tribal, low productivity districts, among which almost 50 percent are designated as Drought Prone Areas Programme (DPAP).

Early trends and outcomes

• Increase in employment: SRGY and NFFWP together generated 0.82 billion persondays. Mahatma Gandhi NREGA generated 2.16 billion person-days in 2008-09. Around 50 million households have got employment. Also, a large number of skilled manpower is employed as engineers, village assistants (22063), IT personnel (6056), and accountants (5000) at the block level.
• Enhancing income: Increase in minimum wages of unskilled agricultural workers. The average wage rate rose from INR 65 (US$1.4) per day to INR90 (US$2) per day from 2006 to 2010.
• Targeting: Participation of women has been above 33 percent as required. This year women participation was close to 50 percent. Women have been drawn to work due to equal wages for men and women, flexibility to drop in and out of the program, availability of work in their locality, and no work requirement except willing to do ‘unskilled manual labor.’ Incomes from NREGA have been used to support food and consumer goods needs of households and education of children. Participation of women in local meeting has been increasing. In Kerala, savings of women have increased from US$14.97 million to US$25.61 million between 2008 and 2010. Furthermore, participation of SC/ST has increased. Most of them come from the backward classes.
• Stemming migration: There is evidence of decrease in out-migration in places such as Narmada, Dang, Banaskantha, Dahod, Sabarkantha and Panch Mahals of Gujarat. A study (Will NREGA ensure security against hunger?) conducted by Paulomee Mistry and Jaswal Anshuman (2007) shows that migration from Dungarpur and Udaipur (Rajasthan), Jhabua and Dhar (Madhya Pradesh) and Nandurbar and Dhule (Maharashtra) declined from 1650 persons per year to 682 per year.
• Augmenting productivity: By focusing on natural resource regeneration, NREGA is augmenting productivity. Survey respondents agreed that NREGA had led to increased water availability and a positive impact on agriculture through improved access to irrigation. Moreover, problems of drinking water scarcity have been addressed by NREGA works to some extent. There has been an increase in areas of land used for production. There has been restoration of ecological assets.
• Expanding connectivity: Roads have connected markets, schools and health services. There has been increasing financial inclusion as workers are being paid through banks and postal offices. So far, around 88 million people have opened ban and post office accounts under NREGA. Meanwhile, ICT expansion in rural areas has increased transparency and accountability.

Revised MGNREGA wages and inflation

The Indian government is planning to increase minimum wages under the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (MGNREGA) by between 17 percent and 30 percent from the current IRs 100 a day. It will cost the government an additional IRs 3,500 crore (total budget allocation for this fiscal year is IRs 40,100 crore) in the current fiscal year itself. Good for the workers, but bad for local employers who employ low-skilled laborers, and for food prices and inflation. NREGA (renamed MGNREGA in  FY 2010/11) is a flagship rural employment generation and livelihood program of the UPA government in India. This social welfare program guarantees one hundred days of employment per year at the prevailing minimum wage rate for unskilled labor. When NREGA was implemented in 2006, eleven states saw a rise in minimum wages. The new revised wages, to be adjusted with CPI, is set to increase wages in twenty states.

Earlier, the per day wages was set at IRs 100. The estimates below are based on IRs 100 per day wage. With budget amounting to mere 0.67 percent of GDP, the program provided employment to 53 million households and created around two million productive assets in fiscal year 2009-2010 (see Table 1 and 2). Meanwhile, employment given to women accounts for around 48 percent of the total persondays of employment. Similarly, employment given to backward groups (scheduled tribes and scheduled castes)—also the most vulnerable groups to income and climate related shocks—account for about 51 percent of the total persondays of employment created in fiscal year 2009-2010.

 

Table 1: NREGA budget
Fiscal year	2006-07	2007-08	2008-09*	2009-10**
Number of rural districts	200	330	615	615
NREGA/GDP	0.27	0.25	0.56	0.67
NREGA/Expenditure	1.94	1.68	3.33	3.83
NREGA/Revenue	2.60	2.21	5.34	6.36
Sources: Computed using data from Union Budgets, Economic Surveys and NREGA website; **budget estimate; *revised budget estimate

 

 

Table 2: Employment under NREGA (million)
Fiscal year	2006-07	2007-08	2008-09	2009-10
Households provided employment	21	34	45	53
Total persondays	905	1437	2163	2826
SCs persondays	230	394	634	863
STs persondays	330	421	550	586
Women persondays	368	611	1036	1374
Others persondays	346	622	980	1377

MGNREGA: Self-targeting, food prices, poverty, local capacity and jobs

Summary of latest papers on MGNREGA’s self-targeting ability, impact of food prices on poverty vis-à-vis income effect, capacity of local authorities to create enough jobs and workers’ incentives to take up MGNREGA jobs.

Jha, Bhattacharyya, Gaiha, & Shankar (2009) find that overall the size of landholdings is a negative predictor of participation in MGNREGA. A one standard deviation increase in landholdings (4.5 hectares) reduces the odds of MGNREGA participation by 1.3 fold (p.6). Specifically, they find a positive relation between size of landholdings and participation in Andhra Pradesh, and but the case is opposite in Rajasthan. They argue that program capture might be prevalent in Andhra Pradesh because of land inequality, political interference, and geographical remoteness.

Jha, Gaiha, & Pandey (2010) argue that the ratio of NREGS wage to agriculture wage, marital status, age, gender, and education determines employment in the rural employment guarantee program. Their conclusion is based on household level survey data from three states: Rajasthan, Andhra Pradesh, and Maharashtra.

• While it is broadly true that the selection of workers for NREGS favors illiterate workers and those from deprived backgrounds, female workers appear to have a lower chance of being selected. In two of the three states, the ratio of NREGS wage to agricultural wage has significant effects. Marital status and age also affect the chances of getting employment in NREGS. Within each state, workers in some districts have higher chances of being employed in NREGS.
• Once employed in NREGS, the duration of such employment is affected by social background or educational status. Factors relevant for selection for NREGS are not necessarily so for the duration of employment.

Ghose (2011) finds that MGNREGS, despite problems in implementation, has succeeded in providing substantial additional wage employment to the rural poor at a wage no lower than what prevails. It has thereby increased money incomes for this group of workers quite significantly. Yet, the program has not made a significant contribution to reduction of rural poverty. The reason is food price inflation to which the program has ended up contributing. While the MGNREGS increased the demand for food, this was not met by an increase in the supply of food in the short run. Ghose finds that the increase in wage income of rural households attributable to MGNREGA was 22.2 percent in 2009-10, up from 7.4 percent in 2006-07 (p.5).

In a case study of Birghum district in West Bengal, Mukherjee & Ghosh (2009) find:

• High inter-block variations in terms of average person-days created and utilization of NREGA funds. The blocks which have performed better also show significant variation across the Gram Panchayats within the block. There seems to be no clear relation between utilization of available funds and average person-days created either at the GP level or at the block level.
• The weak correlation observed between number of households with job card and availability of NREGA funds at the GP level suggests that GPs are not able to come up with adequate number of NREGA schemes to absorb the laborers demanding employment.
• There is also no evidence of NREGA getting better implemented in blocks with higher share of agricultural laborers or higher percentage of BPL households, which one would expect. Rather, blocks with higher share of BPL households show lower average person-days created under NREGA.
• Lack of technical skills and human resource seem to be the major reasons why the GPs are not able to develop adequate number of schemes under NREGA.
• Though NREGA allows scope for creating various types of durable productive assets at the community level (such as roads, improving rural infrastructure, drought-proofing, watershed development, water conservation etc), focus has remained on types of works which are easy to design (such as road construction and pond excavation).
• The GPs lack the capacity to design adequate number of schemes under NREGA which can be meaningfully linked with the livelihood and infrastructural development of the local economy. Therefore, greater efforts should be given for the capacity building of the GPs, especially the backward GPs.

Dutta, Murgai, Ravallion, & van de Walle (2012) argue that poorer families tend to have more demand for work on the scheme, and that (despite the un-met demand) the self-targeting mechanism allows it to reach relatively poor families and backward castes.

• Participation rates on the scheme are higher for poor people than others.
• Targeting performance varies across states. Some of those living above the official poverty line in better-off states will no doubt be relatively poor, and need help from the scheme. The overall participation rate seems to be an important factor in accounting for these inter-state differences in targeting performance, with the scheme being more pro-poor and reaching scheduled tribes and backward castes more effectively in states with higher overall participation rates.
• While the scheme is clearly popular with women—who have a participation rate that is double their participation rate in the casual labor market—the rationing process does not appear to be favoring them. We also find evidence of a strong effect of relative wages on women‘s participation—both wages on the scheme relative to the market wage and the male-female differential in market wages. As one would expect, poor families often choose whether it is the man or the woman who goes to the scheme according to relative wages.
• For India as a whole, we find that the scheme‘s average wage rate was roughly in line with the casual labor market in 2009/10. This might look like competitive labor market equilibrium, but that view is hard to reconcile with the extensive rationing we find. Interestingly, we do find a significant negative correlation between the extent of rationing and the wage rate in the casual labor market relative to the wage rate on the scheme. Although this is suggestive, on closer inspection we are more inclined to think that other economic factors are at work. Indeed, the correlation largely vanishes when we control for the level of poverty. Poorer states tend to see both more rationing of work on the scheme and lower casual wages—possibly due to a greater supply of labor given the extent of rural landlessness.

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References:

Dutta, P., Murgai, R., Ravallion, M., & van de Walle, D. (2012). Does India's Employment Guarantee Scheme Guarantee Employment? World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 6003, 1-34.

Ghose, A. K. (2011). Addressing the Employment Challenge: India's MGNREGA. ILO Employment Working Paper No. 105, 1-40.

Jha, R., Bhattacharyya, S., Gaiha, R., & Shankar, S. (2009). Capture of Anti-Poverty Programs: An Analysis of the National Rural Employment Guarantee Program in India. Journal of Asian Economics 20(4), 456-464.

Jha, R., Gaiha, R., & Pandey, M. K. (2010). Determinants of Employment in India’s National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme. ASARC Working Paper 2010/17, 1-34.

Mukherjee, S., & Ghosh, S. (2009). What Determines the Success and Failure of 100 Days Work at the Panchayat Level? A Study of Birbhum District in West Bengal. IDSK Occasional Paper 16, 1-19.

Intro to National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (NREGA)

NREGA is a flagship rural employment generation and livelihood program of the UPA government in India. This social welfare program guarantees one hundred days of employment per year at the prevailing minimum wage rate for unskilled labor.

The Act[1] came into force on February 2, 2006 with an aim to “directly touch lives of the poor and promote inclusive growth.” Along with the objectives of boosting rural economy and enhancing overall (inclusive) economic growth, this public works program was also designed to prop up purchasing power of poor people; stabilize their household income; assure livelihood security to the most marginalized groups; accelerate the pace of meeting the MDGs; and strengthen natural resource management through works that address causes of chronic poverty like drought, deforestation and soil erosion. One of the objectives of the program is to make the process of employment generation sustainable.

It started with a pilot project in the state of Maharashtra in 1965 with an aim to provide relief to poor farmers during famine and drought. An Employment Guarantee Scheme (EGS) Act was passed in 1979 by the state legislature, widening the reach of the pilot program to the entire state. The federal government picked upon the success of the program and implemented (under Phase I) it in 200 of the most backward districts on February 2, 2006. It was expanded to cover an additional 130 districts in 2007/2008 (under Phase II) and the remaining (under Phase III) 285 districts (in total 615 rural districts) on April 1, 2008.[2] In 34 states, a total of 45,019,215 households (as of September 2, 2009) were provided employment in 2008/09.[3]

Main features:

• It guarantees employment within 15 days if a qualified person applies for employment application at a local administrative authority. The person should be willing to work on a piece-rate basis, which is fixed so that an average person working diligently for seven hours a day would earn an amount equal to the minimum wage.
• Adult members of a rural household willing to do unskilled manual work should have to apply for registration to the local Gram Panchayat, which, after verification, will issue a Job Card to the household. The Job Card has photographs of all adult members of the household who are willing to work under the Act. The Job Card holding household has to submit a written application for employment (with time and duration of work sought) to the Gram Panchayat, which then provides employment for up to at least 15 days.
• Work has to be provided within 5 km radius of the village or else extra wages of 10 percent have to be paid to workers. Moreover, working and living facilities (safe drinking water, shade for children and periods of rest for workers, first-aid box for emergency treatment and minor injuries, and safety equipments and measures for health hazards connected with work) have to be provided.
• The cost structure is designed in such a way that state governments have an incentive to offer unskilled manual work to qualified applicants; else they have to cover unemployment allowance if they fail to provide work within 15 days of application for work. The central government covers wage payment of unskilled manual workers, and three-fourths of material cost, wages of skilled and semi-skilled workers. The central government also bears administrative expenses, salary, and allowances of Program Officers, his supporting staff and worksite facilities. State governments should meet the cost of unemployment allowance, one-fourth of material cost, wages of skilled and semi-skilled workers, and administrative cost of State Employment Guarantee Council.
• One-third of the work is reserved for women.
• Works should be specifically geared toward rural development: water conservation and harvesting, affforestation, rural connectivity, flood control and protection, repair of embankments, construction of drinking water facilities like digging new ponds/tanks and building dams, and micro-irrigation facilities, among others.
• Wages have to be consistent with the Minimum Wages Act 1948 for agricultural labors in the State, unless the federal government notifies a wage rate, which should not be less than Rs 60 per day. The average daily wage of agricultural labors under NREGA has risen from Rs 65 in 2006 to Rs 83 in 2008. Wages are paid on a weekly basis and should not exceed a fortnight in case of delay in payment.
• Each district is allowed to prepare a shelf of projects (see below for the list of permissible works). At least 50 percent of works have to be allotted to Gram Panchayats for execution and a 60:40 wage to material ratio has to be maintained. The use of contractors and labor displacing machinery are prohibited. The Gram Sabha is responsible for social audit.

Permissible works:

• Water conservation and water harvesting
• Drought proofing (including afforestation and tree plantation)
• Irrigation canals including micro and minor irrigation works
• Provision of irrigation facility to land owned by SC/ST/beneficiaries under Indira Aawas Yojana (which was launched in 1997-78 with the aim to help construction of new dwelling units as well conversion of unserviceable weak houses to solid houses for use by the marginalized sections of the society who are living below the poverty line)
• Renovation of traditional water bodies including desalting of tanks
• Land development
• Flood control and protection works including drainage in water logged areas
• Rural connectivity to provide all weather access
• Other works notified by the Central/State government

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[1] On October 2, 2009, NREGA was renamed as Mahatma Gandhi Rural Employment Guarantee Act.

[2] "Employment guarantee quickening India’s march towards MDGs." UNDP. www.undp.org.in/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=536&Itemid=593 (accessed September 3, 2009).

[3] NREGA Implementation Status Report for the financial year 2008-2009 (http://nrega.nic.in/writereaddata/mpr_out/nregampr_0809.html). A total of 45430187 households demanded employment in 2008-2009.

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Impact of NREGA:

• The increase in wage earning has led to strengthening of livelihood resource base of the rural poor. A total of 45112792 households were provided jobs in 2008-2009 and 21632.48 lakhs persondays of employment were generated. Women participation equaled to 10357.27 lakhs persondays of work.

• Some states saw rise in minimum wages after the implementation of NREGA (see below).

1. -Maharashtra (Rs 47 to Rs 72)
2. -Utter Pradesh (Rs 58 to Rs 100)
3. -Bihar (Rs 68 to Rs 81)
4. -Karantaka (Rs 62 to 74)
5. -West Bengal (Rs 64 to Rs 75)
6. -Rajasthan (Rs 73 to Rs 100)
7. -Madhya Pradesh (Rs 58 to Rs 85)
8. -Himachal Pradesh (Rs 65 to Rs 75)
9. -Nagaland (Rs 66 to Rs 100)
10. -Jammu & Kashmir (Rs 45 to Rs 70)
11. -Chhattisgarh (Rs 58.73 to Rs 72.23)

• The program has high work participation of marginalized groups like Scheduled Caste/ Scheduled Tribe (SC/ST) and women. In FY 2008-2009, the SCs, STs, and women were provided with 6335.9 and 5501.64 and 10357.27 persondays (in lakhs) of work respectively.

• It has strengthened natural resource base of rural India. Water conservation and water harvesting, provision of irrigation facility to the land owned by labors, and rural connectivity were the top physical assets constructed in FY 2008-2009.
• The central government has tried to include the poor into the financial system by encouraging states to make wage payment through bank and post office accounts of wage seekers. A total of 33027094 and 5361037 individual and joint bank accounts respectively were opened in FY 2008-2009. Similarly, a total of 28137985 and 2073898 individual and joint post office accounts respectively were opened last fiscal year. In total, Rs 1083270 lakhs were disbursed through bank and post office accounts.
• The government claims that NREGA has led to enhancement of agricultural productivity (through water harvesting, check dams, ground water recharging, improved moisture content, check in soil erosion, and micro-irrigation), stemming of distressed migration, increased access to markets and services through rural connectivity works, supplementing household incomes, increase in women workforce participation ratios, and the regeneration of natural resources.

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Concerns about NREGA:

• Assets created by the poor people might be used primarily by elites, thus benefiting the poor little from the projects they themselves created.
• Public assets created by the program might simply crowd out or substitute private investment, thus net benefit might be very small.
• Participation rates are low because of the nature of projects undertaken, elaborate registration procedures, long distances to work-sites and low financial outlays[4].
• Potential benefits of assets may not be fully realized because there is no follow-up maintenance.
• A larger funding allocation to the poorest regions would help improve targeting, as well as confer substantially larger income stabilization benefits.

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[4] ODI, Inter-Regional Inequality Facility. "The Maharastra Employment Guarantee Scheme." ODI Policy Brief 6 (2006): 1-4.; Note that if employment place is not within a radius 5 km, transport allowance and 10 percent extra living allowance is provided. This also deters women from actively participating in the program.

Latest on India’s largest poverty alleviation and rural employment generation program: MGNREGS is working

In a new working paper, Dutta, Murgai, Ravallion, and van de Walle argue that poorer families tend to have more demand for work on the scheme, and that (despite the un-met demand) the self-targeting mechanism allows it to reach relatively poor families and backward castes. The extent of the un-met demand is greater in the poorest states — ironically where the scheme is needed most. Labor-market responses to the scheme are likely to be weak. The scheme is attracting poor women into the workforce, although the local-level rationing processes favor men.

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We do not find that the local-level processes determining who gets work amongst those who want it are generally skewed against the poor. There are sure to be places where this is happening (and qualitative field reports have provided examples). But it does not appear to stand up as a generalization. We do find evidence that the poor fare somewhat less well when it comes to the total number of days of work they manage to get on the scheme. However, despite the pervasive rationing we find, it is plain that the scheme is still reaching poor people and also reaching the scheduled tribes and backward castes.

Participation rates on the scheme are higher for poor people than others. This holds at the official poverty line, but the scheme is also reaching many families just above the official line. It is only at relatively high consumption levels that participation drops off sharply. This should not be interpreted as indicating that well-off families in rural India are turning to MGREGS. There may well be shocks that are not evident in the household consumption aggregates. And there may be individual needs for help that are not evident in those aggregates.

Targeting performance varies across states. Some of those living above the official poverty line in better-off states will no doubt be relatively poor, and need help from the scheme. The overall participation rate seems to be an important factor in accounting for these inter-state differences in targeting performance, with the scheme being more pro-poor and reaching scheduled tribes and backward castes more effectively in states with higher overall participation rates.

While the allocation of work through the local-level rationing process is not working against the poor, there are clearly many poor people who are not getting help because the employment guarantee is not in operation almost anywhere (Himachal Pradesh, Rajasthan and Tamil Nadu could be counted as the exceptions, where 80% or more of those who want work got it). And other potential benefits of the scheme to poor people are almost certainly undermined by the extensive rationing, notably the empowerment gains and the insurance benefits. The first-order problem for MGNREGS is the level of un-met demand.

While the scheme is clearly popular with women—who have a participation rate that is double their participation rate in the casual labor market—the rationing process does not appear to be favoring them. We also find evidence of a strong effect of relative wages on women‘s participation—both wages on the scheme relative to the market wage and the male-female differential in market wages. As one would expect, poor families often choose whether it is the man or the woman who goes to the scheme according to relative wages.

It has been claimed by some observers that the scheme is driving up wages for other work, such as in agriculture; some observers see this as a good thing, others not. For India as a whole, we find that the scheme‘s average wage rate was roughly in line with the casual labor market in 2009/10. This might look like a competitive labor market equilibrium, but that view is hard to reconcile with the extensive rationing we find. Interestingly, we do find a significant negative correlation between the extent of rationing and the wage rate in the casual labor market relative to the wage rate on the scheme. Although this is suggestive, on closer inspection we are more inclined to think that other economic factors are at work. Indeed, the correlation largely vanishes when we control for the level of poverty. Poorer states tend to see both more rationing of work on the scheme and lower casual wages—possibly due to a greater supply of labor given the extent of rural landlessness.

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NREGA is a flagship rural employment generation and livelihood program of the UPA government in India. This social welfare program guarantees one hundred days of employment per year at the prevailing minimum wage rate for unskilled labor.

The Act came into force on February 2, 2006 with an aim to “directly touch lives of the poor and promote inclusive growth.” Along with the objectives of boosting rural economy and enhancing overall (inclusive) economic growth, this public works program was also designed to prop up purchasing power of poor people; stabilize their household income; assure livelihood security to the most marginalized groups; accelerate the pace of meeting the MDGs; and strengthen natural resource management through works that address causes of chronic poverty like drought, deforestation and soil erosion. One of the objectives of the program is to make the process of employment generation sustainable.

It started with a pilot project in the state of Maharashtra in 1965 with an aim to provide relief to poor farmers during famine and drought. An Employment Guarantee Scheme (EGS) Act was passed in 1979 by the state legislature, widening the reach of the pilot program to the entire state. The federal government picked upon the success of the program and implemented (under Phase I) it in 200 of the most backward districts on February 2, 2006. It was expanded to cover an additional 130 districts in 2007/2008 (under Phase II) and the remaining (under Phase III) 285 districts (in total 615 rural districts) on April 1, 2008. In 34 states, a total of 45,019,215 households (as of September 2, 2009) were provided employment in 2008/09.

For more on NREGA, see this. It looks like cost of Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (MGNREGA), the largest employment guarantee public works program in the world, is coming down. Its cost as a share of GDP, total expenditure and revenue receipts is decreasing and is expected to be 0.45 percent, 3.19 percent, and 5.08 percent respectively in fiscal year 2011-2012. Here is more on MGNREGA.

NREGA budget (Rs Crore)
	2006-07	2007-08	2008-09**	2009-10**	2010-2011*	2011-2012*
GDP, current prices#	4,293,672	4,986,426	5,582,623	6,550,271	7,877,947	8,980,860
Total expenditure	583,387	712,671	900,953	1,020,838	1,108,749	1,257,729
Revenue receipts	434,387	541,864	562,173	614,497	682212	789892
NREGA allocated budget	11,300	12,000	30,000	39,100	40,100	40,100
NREGA/GDP	0.26	0.24	0.54	0.60	0.51	0.45
NREGA/Exp	1.94	1.68	3.33	3.83	3.62	3.19
NREGA/Rev	2.60	2.21	5.34	6.36	5.88	5.08

Source: Calculation based on data from Union Budgets; *estimate; **revised estimate'; # Economic Survey 2010-11

In FY 2010-2011, 5.49 crore households were provided employment (100 days employment  on demand to each household during lean season). The total persondays of employment created was 257.15 persondays (crore). Of this, the share of SCs, STs, and women accounted for 30.63%, 20.85%, and 47.73% respectively.