Showing posts with label Climate Change. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Climate Change. Show all posts

Friday, May 12, 2023

Ecuador seals debt-for-nature swap selling blue bond (Galapagos Bond)

Ecuador has sealed a debt-for-nature swap selling a new 'blue bond' of $656 million (Galapagos Bond) with 5.645% coupon. Ecuador sovereign bonds currently yield 17%-26%. It means the country brought back roughly $1.6 billion of debt at a near 60% discount. Ecuador will invest at least $12 million a year into conservation of the Galapagos Islands and an additional $5 million a year into a fund that will last decades.

Excerpts from a Reuters news report:

Ecuador sovereign bonds currently yield from 17% to 26%, but the new bond has an $85 million 'credit guarantee' from the Inter-American Development Bank and $656 million of political risk insurance from the U.S. International Development Finance Corp (DFC), effectively making it less risky. Debt-for-nature swaps have proved successful in Belize, Barbados and the Seychelles in recent years, but Ecuador's deal is by far the largest to date, cutting the country's debt by over $1 billion once the $450 million of total conservation spending is taken into account. The driver has been the remote Galapagos Islands, some 600 miles (970 km) off Ecuador's mainland coast, that inspired Charles Darwin's Theory of Evolution.

While Quito will pocket more than $1 billion worth of savings from the buyback for other purposes, the key appeal has been the environmental benefits and the hope it will be a catalyst for other highly indebted but nature-rich countries. 

Conservation funding there now protects a 200-mile (322-km) radius around the archipelago. It has helped revive local tuna and other fish stocks, but also increased catches further out where local fishing is still allowed. The hope is for similar results from a new 11,500-square mile (30,000-sq km) reserve Ecuador set up last year between the Galapagos and Costa Rica's maritime border used as a migratory corridor by sharks, whales, sea turtles and manta rays.

Friday, December 9, 2022

Ricardo Hausmann on six themes to keep in mind for green growth

Here is Ricardo Hausmann advising a finance minister from a developing country to plan for decarbonization and focus on six themes to exploit the opportunities and threats:


It would be a grave mistake not to consider climate change as an important aspect of your job. Change is sweeping across the global economy as countries recognize that the world must slash emissions to prevent a climate catastrophe. Decarbonization will reduce demand for dirty goods and services and increase demand for those that are cleaner and greener. The question is not what you can do to reduce your country’s emissions but how you can supercharge your country’s development by breaking into fast-growing industries that will help the world reduce its emissions and reach net zero.

Your country‘s history has been fundamentally shaped by the development of the few products it is able to make at home and sell abroad. Successful economies in east Asia and eastern Europe have sustained decades of high growth by upgrading their areas of comparative advantage, from garments to electronics to machinery and chemicals. They did not remain stuck in industries bequeathed by the past. If your country is to create jobs that pay higher wages, it will have to find new industries that can grow and export competitively even with higher wages.

Pessimists say that opportunities may have been there in the past for countries like Japan, Korea, or China, but those paths to development are now closed. Decarbonization will, however, create new opportunities—especially for those that move fast. The paths that are opening up have not been trod by many predecessors. Some are still virgin. Decarbonization will require significant greenfield investments, and plants will have to find new places to locate. This could be a great opportunity for your country, but to assess it, you must understand the changing landscape.

1. Embrace global electrification. To decarbonize, the world needs to electrify the things we currently do with fossil fuels and generate that electricity from green sources such as wind and solar. This will require massive amounts of solar panels, wind turbines, electrical cables, and capacitors as well as mechanisms to store energy, such as lithium-ion batteries. Electrolyzers and fuel cells will be needed as well to convert electricity into hydrogen and back. All these products are highly intensive in metals and rare earth elements. Production of these minerals will have to expand by several multiples if the world is to achieve net zero. So net zero requires a mining boom.

Mining itself is a highly energy-intensive industry. The future is likely to demand that the energy used in mining be green, too. [...]In addition, these minerals must be processed into the capital goods needed by the electrification process. This involves long manufacturing global value chains. [...] While some industries will grow as the world decarbonizes, others will shrink. Some may be in your country. You must identify export industries that will face headwinds because they are high emitters or supply high-emitting value chains. Vested interests at home will dismiss global warming as a hoax and mobilize against greening policies. But they will be impacted nonetheless by these global trends. Sooner than you think, your companies in these industries will struggle to access financing because capital markets will fear that the assets they fund will be stranded. Find ways to redeploy capabilities to more promising prospects.

2. Capitalize on proximity to renewable energy. The sun shines and the wind blows in many countries, but some (including Namibia, Chile, and Australia) are working hard to use these resources to produce green energy products. This may be a first step to an even more promising future. [...]Countries with a lot of sunshine produce solar energy for less than $20 a megawatt hour. To move the energy a long distance, it must be stored in a molecule such as ammonia. But the conversion will increase the cost of energy sixfold (not counting the cost of transport). This creates enormous incentives to use renewable energy in situ. Energy-intensive industries will move toward places rich in green energy.

3. Keep the cost of capital low. The sun shines, the wind blows, and the rain falls for free. Most of the cost of renewable-energy production is the fixed cost of the equipment, including the cost of the capital to buy it. How much are you paying? [...]Good institutions and macroeconomic management that keep country risk low are critical determinants of the cost of capital and hence your country's ability to be competitive in green energy. The world is full of countries that have squandered their natural endowments because of failures in macroeconomic and mining-sector governance.

4. Manage technological risks. Technological uncertainty has always been with us. Who would have thought the smartphone would displace the alarm clock, the camera, the CD player, and even the personal computer? [...] On the road to net zero, we do not know which technologies will win the race. But we are aware of many of the technologies in the running. They first appear as ideas in scientific papers and patents. They then move on to pilot and eventually commercial plants. You should be aware of the bets being placed across the world.[...]Technological surveillance is done regularly by industry, but few governments do enough of it. Israel and Singapore have chief scientists in their economy ministries to anticipate changes that may be coming and decide the most promising R&D bets.

5. Explore carbon sinks. Net zero is not gross zero. The difference is carbon capture, and the future is likely to create markets for it. You may be able to obtain carbon credits by reforesting deforested areas or by protecting existing forests.[...] In a well-functioning market, carbon prices should be equalized globally because the atmosphere is global. But markets cannot trust that carbon captured by trees this year is not going to return to the atmosphere next year when somebody clears the land for cattle. For this reason, your carbon credits trade at a huge discount, if at all. You need to develop the institutions for credible carbon credits.[...]You must define property rights on these geological formations so that investment can take place and you can collect a rent from storage space.

6. Plan to learn. No country today excels at the technologies and industries that will shape the future. But some will learn and others will not. What will you do to make sure your country is in the first group? [...]growth has never been just about focusing on current areas of comparative advantage. It is also about evolving that advantage. [...]Who will develop the capacity to manufacture electrolyzers competitively? Who will transform their sunshine and wind into a source of advantage? It will be those that focus on attracting strategic investments and global talent, on facilitating technological adoption by supporting research programs at universities and beyond. It can seldom be done by closing off the domestic market.


Monday, July 18, 2022

How to build support for climate change policies?

 Abstract from a new NBER working paper:


Using new surveys on more than 40,000 respondents in twenty countries that account for 72% of global CO2 emissions, we study the understanding of and attitudes toward climate change and climate policies. We show that, across countries, support for climate policies hinges on three key perceptions centered around the effectiveness of the policies in reducing emissions (effectiveness concerns), their distributional impacts on lower-income households (inequality concerns), and their impact on the respondents' household (self-interest). We show experimentally that information specifically addressing these key concerns can substantially increase the support for climate policies in many countries. Explaining how policies work and who can benefit from them is critical to foster policy support, whereas simply informing people about the impacts of climate change is not effective. Furthermore, we identify several socioeconomic and lifestyle factors – most notably education, political leanings, and availability of public transportation – that are significantly correlated with both policy views and overall reasoning and beliefs about climate policies. However, it is difficult to predict beliefs or policy views based on these characteristics only.



Sunday, June 12, 2022

Effect of carbon tax on household welfare in Asia and the Pacific

Carbon pricing or taxation is a popular climate change mitigation strategy.  However, the distributional effect seems to be different depending on how heavily households rely on carbon-intensive energy sources. In a latest IMF working paper, Alonso and Kilpatrick (2022) argue for a wide range of country-specific policies that could be implemented to compensate households, reduce inequality, and build support for adoption. 

A carbon tax is a fee imposed on the burning of fossil fuels (e.g., natural gas, coal, oil) based on their carbon content. Carbon tax implementation is politically sensitive because of the general opposition to higher energy prices, displacement of workers, and social disturbances (price increases have led to riots in Haiti, France, Kazakhstan, Ecuador, etc). Studies show that a price of $75 per ton for advanced economies, $50 for high-income emerging market economies, and $25 for low-income emerging market economies set in place by 2030 will be needed to achieve the Paris Agreement’s target of limiting warming below 2°C.

They use household surveys and input-output (IO) tables to examine the effect of a carbon tax on households in Asia and the Pacific. The Asia and the Pacific region accounts for 27% of all emissions so far, equivalent to 452 billion tons of CO2, and the region’s global share in fossil fuel combustion emissions has risen from 30% to 49% between 2000 and 2019. 

Carbon prices in the region are low based on those standards. Of the current carbon prices in place in the region, the average is around $6 per ton and only covers an average of 0.3% of yearly emissions in each country

They use IO tables to compute how higher energy prices induced by a carbon tax would lead to higher consumer prices in non-energy goods (if higher energy costs are fully passed-through). They then combine this result with household surveys to quantify the negative impact on welfare based on household consumption bundle. They also examine the extent of possible labor income loss as the carbon tax tends to lower labor demand. They study the impact of a carbon tax of $50 per ton. They use household surveys for Australia, China, Hong Kong SAR, India, Indonesia, Japan, Kiribati, Korea, Mongolia, Myanmar, New Zealand, the Philippines, Singapore, and Taiwan, Province of China.

Major findings of the paper:

Based on higher prices and lower labor income, a carbon tax of USD 50 per ton would lead to substantial losses of welfare for households amounting to around 10 percent of initial consumption in Mongolia and 7 percent in Indonesia. In China and India, the average loss would be slightly above 3 percent. It would be 2.1 percent for the Philippines and lower than 2 percent in Kiribati and Myanmar. However, the distributional impact would also be quite different. The carbon tax would be regressive in China, Indonesia, and Mongolia, but it would be progressive in India, Kiribati, the Philippines, and Myanmar. Across the region, small groups of households employed by the energy sector would be heavily exposed to labor income losses. 

They argue that the household welfare loss produced by a carbon tax can be reverted and redistributed through relatively simple and cheap compensation schemes. A wide range of country-specific policies could be implemented to compensate households, reduce inequality, and build support for adoption. They find that cash transfer targeted to the poorest 40 percent of the households through realistic proxy-means testing would cost only 16 percent of the resources raised by a carbon tax to ensure that these households are on average not worse off after the reform. It would be as cheap as 8 and 11 percent for India and Kiribati, respectively. The ratio would be around 15 percent for China and Myanmar. It would reach 17 percent for the Philippines and 23 and 24 percent for Indonesia and Mongolia, respectively.

Providing a universal cash transfer or “carbon dividend” to all households to ensure that more than half of the households are better off after the reform would cost only 23 percent of the resources raised by a carbon tax in India and 33 percent in Myanmar.

In India, they find that the burden of a carbon tax due to higher prices would be mildly progressive for households. Consumers in the poorest quintile would experience a loss of around 3.2 percent compared to initial consumption, while the richest households would lose around 3.4 percent. It reflects a strongly progressive direct effect from higher energy prices, partially offset by a regressive indirect effect from higher prices on other goods. The richest households allocate relatively more of their expenditure towards electricity, gasoline, and LPG while the bottom quintile of households consume more kerosene and to a lesser degree coal. Electricity, gasoline, and LPG would see their prices rise by 20.5, 12, and 23.6 percent, respectively in response to the carbon tax. This would add up to a burden of 0.4 percent of initial consumption for the poorest quintile, but 1.5 percent for the richest quintile. This progressivity is mitigated by the effect of higher prices of kerosene and coal, which would lead to a burden of 1 percent of initial consumption for the poorest quintile and only 0.3 for the richest. In sum, the direct effect of higher energy prices would cost 1.4 percent of initial consumption for the poorest households and 1.8 percent for the richest. The implementation of a $50 carbon tax would raise fiscal revenues by about 2.5 percent of GDP.



Wednesday, August 11, 2021

Brief highlights from IPCC's Sixth Assessment Report

AR6 Climate Change 2021: The Physical Science Basis, the IPCC’s Sixth Assessment Report submitted by Working Group I is out now. The report includes the most updated physical understanding of the climate system and climate change, and includes regional climate simulations as well. It provides evidence on how and why climate has changed and the effects attributable to human actions. 

Excerpts from the report:

The evidence regarding human influence on warming of atmosphere, ocean and land is unequivocal. Widespread and rapid changes in the atmosphere, ocean, cryosphere and biosphere have occurred.  Observed increases in well-mixed greenhouse gas (GHG) concentrations since around 1750 are unequivocally caused by human activities. Each of the last four decades has been successively warmer than any decade that preceded it since 1850. Global surface temperature in the first two decades of the 21st century (2001-2020) was 0.99 [0.84-1.10] °C higher than 1850-1900. Global surface temperature was 1.09 [0.95 to 1.20] °C higher in 2011–2020 than 1850–1900. 

The likely range of total human-caused global surface temperature increase from 1850–1900 to 2010–2019 is 0.8°C to 1.3°C, with a best estimate of 1.07°C.

Globally averaged precipitation over land has likely increased since 1950, with a faster rate of increase since the 1980s (medium confidence). It is likely that human influence contributed to the pattern of observed precipitation changes since the mid-20th century, and extremely likely that human influence contributed to the pattern of observed changes in near-surface ocean salinity.

Human influence is very likely the main driver of the global retreat of glaciers since the 1990s and the decrease in Arctic sea ice area between 1979–1988 and 2010–2019 (about 40% in September and about 10% in March).

It is virtually certain that the global upper ocean (0–700 m) has warmed since the 1970s and extremely likely that human influence is the main driver. It is virtually certain that human-caused CO2 emissions are the main driver of current global acidification of the surface open ocean.

Global mean sea level increased by 0.20 [0.15 to 0.25] m between 1901 and 2018. It increased by .7 [3.2 to 4.2] mm yr–1 between 2006 and 2018 (high confidence). Human influence was very likely the main driver of these increases since at least 1971.

Global surface temperature has increased faster since 1970 than in any other 50-year period over at least the last 2000 years (high confidence). Temperatures during the most recent decade (2011–2020) exceed those of the most recent multi-century warm period, around 6500 years ago13 [0.2°C to 1°C relative to 1850–1900] (medium confidence).

Human-induced climate change is already affecting many weather and climate extremes in every region across the globe. Evidence of observed changes in extremes such as heatwaves, heavy precipitation, droughts, and tropical cyclones, and, in particular, their attribution to human influence, has strengthened since AR5. It is virtually certain that hot extremes (including heatwaves) have become more frequent and more intense across most land regions since the 1950s, while cold extremes (including cold waves) have become less frequent and less severe, with high confidence that human-induced climate change is the main driver of these changes.

The frequency and intensity of heavy precipitation events have increased since the 1950s over most land area for which observational data are sufficient for trend analysis (high confidence), and human-induced climate change is likely the main driver. Human-induced climate change has contributed to increases in agricultural and ecological droughts15 in some regions due to increased land evapotranspiration (medium confidence).

Decreases in global land monsoon precipitation from the 1950s to the 1980s are partly attributed to human-caused Northern Hemisphere aerosol emissions, but increases since then have resulted from rising GHG concentrations and decadal to multi-decadal internal variability (medium confidence). Over South Asia, East Asia and West Africa increases in monsoon precipitation due to warming from GHG emissions were counteracted by decreases in monsoon precipitation due to cooling from human-caused aerosol emissions over the 20th century (high confidence).

Heating of the climate system has caused global mean sea level rise through ice loss on land and thermal expansion from ocean warming. Thermal expansion explained 50% of sea level rise during 1971–2018, while ice loss from glaciers contributed 22%, ice sheets 20% and changes in land water storage 8%. The rate of ice sheet loss increased by a factor of four between 1992–1999 and 2010–2019. Together, ice sheet and glacier mass loss were the dominant contributors to global mean sea level rise during 2006-2018.

Global surface temperature will continue to increase until at least the mid-century under all emissions scenarios considered. Global warming of 1.5°C and 2°C will be exceeded during the 21st century unless deep reductions in CO2 and other greenhouse gas emissions occur in the coming decades. Global warming of 1.5°C relative to 1850-1900 would be exceeded during the 21st century under the intermediate, high and very high scenarios considered in this report (SSP2-4.5, SSP3-7.0 and SSP5-8.5, respectively).


Many changes in the climate system become larger in direct relation to increasing global warming. They include increases in the frequency and intensity of hot extremes, marine heatwaves, and heavy precipitation, agricultural and ecological droughts in some regions, and proportion of intense tropical cyclones, as well as reductions in Arctic sea ice, snow cover and permafrost. Every additional 0.5°C of global warming causes clearly discernible increases in the intensity and frequency of hot extremes, including heatwaves (very likely), and heavy precipitation (high confidence), as well as agricultural and ecological droughts in some regions (high confidence).

Monsoon precipitation is projected to increase in the mid- to long term at global scale, particularly over South and Southeast Asia, East Asia and West Africa apart from the far west Sahel (high confidence). A warmer climate will intensify very wet and very dry weather and climate events and seasons, with implications for flooding or drought (high confidence). It is very likely that rainfall variability related to the El Niño–Southern Oscillation is projected to be amplified by the second half of the 21st century.


From a physical science perspective, limiting human-induced global warming to a specific level requires limiting cumulative CO2 emissions, reaching at least net zero CO2 emissions, along with strong reductions in other greenhouse gas emissions. Strong, rapid and sustained reductions in CH4 emissions would also limit the warming effect resulting from declining aerosol pollution and would improve air quality.

The likelihood of an outcome is expressed in the following way: virtually certain 99–100% probability, very likely 90–100%, likely 66–100%, about as likely as not 33–66%, unlikely 0–33%, very unlikely 0–10%, exceptionally unlikely 0–1%. Additional terms such as extremely likely 95–100%, more likely than not >50–100%, and extremely unlikely 0–5% are also used. A level of confidence is expressed using five qualifiers: very low, low, medium, high and very high.

  • Heatwaves and humid heat stress will be more intense and frequent during the 21st century (medium confidence)
  • Both annual and summer monsoon precipitation will increase during the 21st
  • century, with enhanced interannual variability (medium confidence).
  • Over most of the Hindu Kush Himalayan region, snow cover has reduced since the early 21st century, and glaciers have retreated and lost mass since the 1970s.
  • The Karakoram glaciers have remained either in a balanced state or slightly gained mass. During the 21st century, snowcovered areas and snow volumes will decrease in most of the Hindu Kush Himalayan, and snowline elevations will rise and glacier volumes will decline (high confidence).
  • A general wetting across the whole Tibetan Plateau and the Himalaya is projected, with increases in heavy precipitation in the 21st century.
  • Extreme precipitation is projected to increase in major mountainous regions (medium to high confidence, depending on location), with potential cascading consequences of floods, landslides and lake outbursts in all scenarios (medium confidence).
  • With few exceptions, mountain glaciers have retreated since the second half of the 19th century (very high confidence). This retreat has occurred at increased rates since the 1990s, with human influence very likely being the main driver. This behaviour is unprecedented in at least the last 2,000 years (medium confidence). Furthermore, glaciers will continue to lose mass at least for several decades even if global temperature is stabilized (very high confidence).
  • Mountain glaciers will continue to shrink and permafrost to thaw in all regions where they are present (high confidence). Mountain glaciers are projected to lose more mass in higher greenhouse gas emissions scenario over the 21st century (medium confidence).
  • It is virtually certain that snow cover will decline over most land regions during the 21st century, in terms of water equivalent, extent and annual duration.

Saturday, September 20, 2014

Mainstreaming environment for economic growth and poverty reduction in Nepal

This blog post is adapted from Macroeconomic Update, August 2014, Vol.2, No.2. Here are earlier blog posts on real sector, fiscal sector, monetary sector, external sector, and FY2015 growth and inflation outlook.


Mainstreaming environment for economic growth and poverty reduction in Nepal[1]

I. Introduction

Nepal is endowed with rich natural resources (abundant water resources, forest and fertile lands, and unique landscape), a strategic geographical setting[2], and physical, biological, and cultural diversities. One of the major challenges for the government is to not only achieve high and inclusive economic growth, but also to ensure that it is environmentally sustainable, crucial for accelerating poverty reduction and sustaining the gains of the last. Economic activities without due consideration for environmental sustainability may start tapering off in the medium-term, undermining prosperity in the long run. Hence, high and sustainable economic growth becomes vital for sustained poverty reduction and creation of productive employment.

Nepal’s gross domestic product (GDP) growth pattern has so far has been minimally damaging to the environment as the industrial sector’s contribution to growth has been relatively low at one-tenth of the overall growth. The services sector's contribution has been the largest, but a majority of the goods are manufactured outside of Nepal and are imported for consumption, which is financed by remittance income. Agricultural sector’s contribution to GDP growth is dependent on the monsoon rains and the timely availability of agricultural inputs, most notably chemical fertilizers.

As investments are ramped up to generate increased electricity, develop infrastructure, and expand manufacturing activities in the short to medium term to achieve higher growth rate and create jobs, a key challenge would be to ensure that these activities are environment-friendly so that the resulting growth is not only high and inclusive, but also sustainable. Else, haphazard construction of infrastructure— including roads, water supply, irrigation, and hydro power plants— without the necessary due diligence for environmental sustainability may result in high socioeconomic costs to the country in the long run. In addition to these economic activities, the country's traditional agricultural practices also need to balance the need to boost land productivity and the optimal use of inputs.

II. State of the Environment: An Overview

As an indication of the overall low level of industrialization, Nepal’s per capita carbon dioxide (CO2) emission has been generally low, registering an average growth of just 7% in the last decade. In fact, Nepal’s per capita CO2 emission (in metric tons) is just 2.7% of China’s and the lowest among the regional economies (Figure 41). This also reflects the fact that Nepal’s GDP growth is largely driven by rain-fed agriculture production and services underpinned by remittance-induced demand for imported goods. Together these two sectors contribute about 90% of the GDP growth[3]. Hence, at this initial stage of development and the still relatively low level of environmental risks, Nepal has an opportunity to pursue industrialization in an environmentally sustainable manner by adopting the latest green industrial technology. However, there is a growing and emerging threat from the rate of loss of forests, particularly for habitat, illegal timber trade, forest fire, overgrazing, and uncontrolled extraction of medicinal plants.

This trend also indicates that the existing pattern of environmental challenges has little to do with the pace of economic growth. It is more affected by factors such as poor engineering and safeguards in unplanned infrastructure development, deforestation, haphazard solid waste management, land degradation, unsustainable and indiscriminate use of pesticides and agrochemicals, and unplanned urbanization. Even though these do not directly and significantly impact economic growth in the short term, they have the potential to indirectly decelerate the pace of growth in the medium to long term. The World Bank estimates that environmental degradation costs between 5% and 10% of GDP in Nepal, India, Bangladesh and Pakistan.[4]

The diversified biological resources, besides maintaining ecosystem equilibrium, provide ecological goods to local people and have great economic value to the rural population. Unfortunately, there is a steady degradation of forests over the last five decades. While the total forest area comprised 43.8% of total land in FY1965, it declined to 37.3% in FY2013 (Figure 42), with significant deforestation happening along the mid-hills and Terai belts. Forest areas have been encroached to expand farmland, settlement, infrastructure development and at times for timber trade. Nepal lost 2.7 million hectares of forest between 1965 and 2013, with an average annual de-vegetation of 56,710 hectares. Altogether 0.96 million hectares of total forest and shrub land is estimated to be lost to farming, urban, and infrastructural development over 1965-2013. The major causes of forest degradation are clearing trees for meeting household fuel wood demand, unstructured semi-processing of agriculture products, illegal in-country or trans-boundary timber sales, overgrazing, uncontrolled extraction of medicinal and aromatic plants (MAPs) and non-timber forest products (NTFPs), and forest fire. Poaching and illegal hunting of wildlife and their declining habitat has adversely affected wildlife population and their biodiversity value.

The rate of loss of forests is alarming, which has affected natural habitat, biodiversity and ecosystem. This has happened despite there being twenty protected areas, comprising of 10 national parks covering 1.08 million hectares, 3 wildlife reserves of 0.1 million hectares, 1 hunting reserve of 0.13 million hectare, and 6 conservation areas of 1.54 million hectares. These collectively cover 19.4% of the total area. Furthermore, approximately 1.23 million hectares of forest is managed by 17,685 community forest user groups. In addition, there are 9 Ramsar sites covering a total area of 34,445 hectares of land.

Land degradation is also an issue in all geographical areas of Nepal, affecting land productivity. Land degradation is primarily caused by water induced erosion, landslide, surface exposure, top soil erosion, riverbank cutting, floods, silt deposition, water logging, deforestation, and wind erosion. About 45.4% (6.7 million hectares) of the country’s total land area is affected by water induced erosion and about 4.0% (0.6 million hectares) by wind erosion. The area affected by flood is estimated to be about 8,987 sq. km and by waterlogging about 7,297 sq. km. The vulnerability to inundation and water logging in Tarai plains bordering India has increased due to the embankment of along the East-West highway dykes and barrages both within and across the border. Overall, about 2.2% of total land area (0.6 million hectares) is uncultivable due to flooding or soil erosion, up from 1.2% of total land in 2001 (0.3 million hectares). The Tarai belt and Far-western development region bear thet burnt of flooding or soil erosion leading to uncultivable land (Figure 43). Of the total uncultivable land, soil erosion, chemical degradation, and physical degradation contributed 65.6%, 3.4% and 31%, respectively in 2011 (Figure 44).

 


  

Meanwhile, higher stocking rates, uncontrolled grazing and haphazard lopping of fodder trees have reduced average productivity of grazing area in subtropical and temperate zones. The subalpine grasslands, mainly used for seasonal pasturage, are losing their productivity due to high stocking rates and overgrazing, lack of good management practices, and the invasion of non-herbage shrub and other non-edible species that are gradually replacing palatable grass species.

Nepal is second richest country for water availability in the world, possessing about 2.3% of the world water resources. Nepal possesses 12 BCM of groundwater, of which 5.8 BCM can be extracted annually, both in shallow and deep aquifers, without any adverse effects. Altogether 38 rivers have been dammed till early 2014 with an installed capacity of 700 MW. The Government of Nepal and the private sector installed, until 2012, micro hydropower plants (22 MW installed capacity; potential 100 MW), solar photovoltaic home system (300,000 no. equivalent to 6.78 MW; potential 4.5 kWh/m2/day), biogas plants (280,000; potential 1.9 million), improved cooking stoves (663,000; 2.5 million), improved water mills (7,600; potential 30,000), and wind power plants (10 kW; potential 3,000 MW). There is potential of producing 1.1 million ton biofuel (Jatropha curcas) in the country. The rivers in lower Siwaliks and rivulets in Middle Mountain and High Mountain regions have been partially dammed for surface irrigation with total command area of 0.96 million ha in the wet season.

Despite these potentials, there is acute water shortage in the urban centers because of unplanned urbanization, encroachment of water sources, and degradation of land as well as forests. For instance, static water level (SWL) and pumping water level (PWL) have depleted in Kathmandu Valley as a result of overuse, lack of water conservation practices, and haphazard construction. While SWL and PWL were 48.1 meters and 67.6 meters in 1976, respectively, in Bansbari of Kathmandu, it went up to 80.6 meters and 136.1 meters, respectively, in 1999.[5] This most likely has increased further in the last one-and-a-half decade given the rapid urbanization and increase in settlement areas in Kathmandu Valley.

The unplanned urbanization along with large-scale rural to urban migration has strained resources in major urban centers, resulting in rise in pollution and waste. It is further compounded by the misuse of pesticides and agrochemical, thus endangering the public’s health. For instance, the continued migration to Kathmandu Valley, unplanned urbanization and the resulting noise level has led to average recorded noise level higher than the on recommended by World Health Organization (WHO). In Kathmandu Valley, major centers such as Kupandole, Putalisadak, Thamel, Kalanki, Balaju industrial area, Maitighar, and Suryabinayak have day time noise level above the one prescribed by the WHO (Figure 45).

With just 0.6% of total area, Kathmandu Valley accounted for 9.5% of total population in 2011 and had a population density of 2,800 person per sq.km. In 2001, Kathmandu Valley accounted for 7.1% of total population and had a population density of 1,830 persons per sq.km. The lack of adequate measures to address air and water pollution affects economic growth as it negatively impacts public health, thus reducing productivity and escalating health costs. As a result of the air pollution in Kathmandu Valley, a disproportionate number of patients suffering from respiratory and cardiovascular ailments are admitted to hospitals each day.[6]

The Environmental Performance Index (EPI) 2014 ranks 139 out of 178 countries. Specifically, even when compared to countries with similar per capita income, on air quality[7], Nepal ranks 177 out of 178 countries (Figure 46). Furthermore, air quality in Kathmandu fails to meet WHO guidelines for safe levels. Air quality is represented by annual mean concentration of particulate matter of less than 10 microns of diameter (PM10) [ug/m3] and of less than 2.5 microns (PM2.5) in cities.[8] Mechanical processes such as construction activities, road dust re-suspension and wind produce PM10 and combustion sources (wood and biomass fuels) mostly produce PM2.5. Kathmandu’s annual average air quality levels stood at 50 μg/m3 and 114 μg/m3 for PM2.5 and PM10, respectively. These are far higher than the WHO guidelines of 10 μg/m3 and 20 μg/m3 for PM2.5 and PM10, respectively. While most of the regional cities in South Asia as well as other major cities in Asia fail to meet the WHO guidelines, the levels in Kathmandu is particularly high relative to these cities as well (Figure 47).


  

Furthermore, chemical fertilizer use has increased drastically since FY2010. After ending chemical fertilizers subsidy due to high fiscal costs and heavy leakages, the government again introduced such subsidies in FY2008. Over time, this led to the ‘crowding-out’ of private sector even though the government’s subsidy covered just 25% of total fertilizer demand. A large portion of the fertilizer demand is met through informal supply (estimated to be about two-thirds of total use and often sub-standard ones) from bordering Indian cities, where fertilizer is subsidized by the Indian government as well.[9] With no official private sector suppliers, the government supplied 185,000 metric tons of chemical fertilizers (urea, DAP and potash) in FY2013 (Figure 48) and provided partial subsidy equivalent to NRs 6 billion. The chemical fertilizer usage was 57 kg per hectare in FY2013, up from 47 kg per hectare in FY2012.[10]

III. Key Challenges

The key environmental issues faced by the country are: (i) unharmonious, outdated and ineffective environment related policies and guidelines; (ii) seemingly irreversible degradation as a result of the increasing human pressure on land, water and forests; (iii) poorly engineered or totally non-engineered rural roads and infrastructure causing watershed degradation, landslides and soil loss; (iv) increasing desertification in the Trans-Himalayan region due to deforestation; (v) climate change induced drying up of water sources; (vi) lack of national digitized hazard maps for disaster risk management planning; (vii) extensive clearing of forest and uncontrolled extraction of river bed materials from Siwalik; (viii) risk of land subsidence due to over extraction of groundwater, particularly in Kathmandu Valley; (ix) increasing level of air and water pollution, solid waste management, and sanitation and health hazards in rapidly growing urban areas; (x) lack of institutional capacity and technical knowhow within the department of environment; and (xi) weak coordination among disaster management related agencies, low level of preparedness, rudimentary early warning system, and lack of post disaster rehabilitation programs.

The major key challenges directly related to boosting economic activities are as follows:

Environmentally weak infrastructure development: The growth of the rural as well as semi-urban road networks, often either with poor or no engineering at all, has helped in the establishment of new towns, and linked with or opened up new market centers. However, these kinds of road construction have also come at a cost, particularly the non-engineered rural roads in the hills and mountains, which have been noted to have accelerated landslides, gully erosion, and loss of forest resources and natural habitats. Investment in hydropower is growing with both public and private sector investment. Even in hydropower projects, especially the small size ones developed particularly by the private sector, environmental sustainability of the infrastructure in terms of cumulative impacts through strategic and realistic environmental assessment is seldom conducted. Furthermore, large leakages in electricity distribution reduce net supply, forcing households to opt for pollution-intensive sources of energy.

Unplanned urbanization: The improved connectivity and the decade-long conflict caused large-scale migration from rural to urban areas, increasing urban population to about 17.1% in 2011 from 13.9% in 2001. Subsequently, urban and semi-urban towns have emerged rapidly and without much planning. The erratic, unplanned, and haphazard expansion of such town has led to undersupply of urban amenities, putting tremendous pressures on the available resources. Furthermore, the lack of public awareness on the benefits of planned urbanization and poor municipal management has compounded the problem, leading to intensified soil, air and water pollution, degraded land and vegetation, and unsanitary waste disposal. The annual population growth rate in Kathmandu Valley alone was 4.3%, much higher than 1.4% average for the entire country over 2001-2011. In 2011, Kathmandu Valley had a population of 2.5 million (Figure 49) and population density of 2,800 persons per sq.km. Urban amenities and municipal management have not grown proportionally to the growth in urban population and the pressure on the available resources.

Misuse and indiscriminate use of pesticides and agrochemicals: The use of pesticides, insecticides and herbicides, various growth hormones and other agrochemicals has considerably increased in commercial agriculture and animal husbandry. However, their improper application has caused environmental and health hazards such as respiratory and skin diseases, and demise of critically endangered birds and mammals after scavenging dead livestock or insects treated with chemicals. Furthermore, it has also caused environmental problems following the seepage of pesticides to and contamination of water bodies. A total of 1,098 pesticides were registered in Nepal in 2013, up from 651 in 2010. Recently, there have been growing instances of inedible fresh vegetables and food products due to the overuse of pesticides and agrochemicals. A strict market monitoring mechanism and public awareness on the optimal usage of such production as agricultural inputs are required to lower the risks of health hazard. Furthermore, proactive promotion organic farming would also be useful.

Improper solid waste management (SWM): A huge amount of solid water is generated in the municipalities, most notably 457 metric tons per day in FY2012, up from just 29.9 metric tons per day in FY2007, by Kathmandu. Unfortunately, only 6 municipalities dispose of waste in sanitary landfill sites, which also not properly managed. Municipalities spent an average of 10% of their total budget on SWM, of which 60-70% is used for street sweeping, 20-30% for transport, and rest for final disposal. The lack resources and proper planning have been constraining municipalities’ capability to manage the increasing waste. In the absence of proper landfill sites, most of the municipalities directly dump the collected waste in rivers, forest or agriculture fields, increasing not only health hazards but also productivity of land. Furthermore, no separate arrangement exists to manage hazardous and medical wastes. Interventions including policy formulation, adoption of 3R (reduce, reuse and recycle) principle, capacity building of local bodies, public participation and public-private partnership are few interventions that may be helpful in developing an effective SWM program.

IV. Government’s Strategy

The concept of environmental protection and conservation has been embedded in the periodic national development plans since 1962. Till the 6th periodic plan (1980-85), the government prioritized forest conservation and watershed management, wildlife conservation, water and sanitation, and urban management. Since 1985, major environmental mainstreaming initiatives were undertaken, environment-friendly policies were introduced, and environment management strategies were integrated into the sector plans. Thus far, Nepal is a signatory to 21 environment related international conventions.

Currently, the environmental priorities of the government include: (i) forest conservation and management through community participation; (ii) wildlife and biodiversity conservation through establishing protected areas; (iii) reducing vulnerability to the impacts of climate change; (iv) disaster relief and risk management; (vi) environmental sustainability in development projects; (vii) achieving the Millennium Development Goals; (viii) improving air quality and waste management in urban areas; (ix) use of alternate renewable energy and energy efficient technology in rural areas; (ix) watershed management –ecological restoration in fragile Siwalik range; and (x) improved drinking water and sanitation.

Environment Protection Act (EPA), 1997 and Environment Protection Rule (EPR), 1997 (amended in 2007) are the two major legal provisions aimed at minimizing the adverse environmental impact due to development activities, and integrating environmental sustainability into development projects. These legislations have made either Initial Environment Examination (IEE) or Environment Impact Assessment (EIA) mandatory for government and private sector projects, safeguarding environmental and social issues in all development projects. However, the weak government capacity for effective implementation and monitoring of IEE/EIA recommended mitigation measures has been a long running issue in Nepal. There is also a need for updating the one-and-a-half decade old EPA and EPR in the context of emerging environmental and climate change issues.

Progress on effective environment protection and management is hampered by weak governance, political instability, and slack implementation of environment related Acts and Rules. Deforestation, degradation in Siwalik Range and lower hills, over harvesting of medicinal plants and non-timber forest products, use of explosives and chemicals for fishing in rivers, excessive groundwater abstraction, unwarranted mining in riverbed and on fragile area, environmental degradation in urban areas (air and water pollution, solid wastes), conversion of fertile arable land into built-up areas are the results of weak enforcement of the existing legislation.

V. Recommendations

Some of the major recommendations to stimulate environment-friendly inclusive economic growth are as follows:

  • Strengthen the country safeguards system
  • Promote environment friendly infrastructure development
  • Promote planned and regulated urban growth
  • Encourage environment-friendly and climate resilient agriculture
  • Stop land degradation and desertification
  • Protect terrestrial and aquatic ecosystem and biodiversity
  • Mainstream climate change risks
  • Scale up renewable energy
  • Effective disaster risk management (DRM)

VI. Conclusion

Currently, one of the major challenges faced by the country is to ensure not only a high and inclusive economic growth, but also to make it environment-friendly. Economic activities without due consideration for environmental sustainability may start tapering off in the medium-term, and then possibly retard prosperity in the long term. Thus far, since growth is largely driven by exogenous factors such as monsoon-fed agriculture production and remittances-induced services sector growth, economic activities have been at best minimally damaging to the environment. This is also reflected in the declining share of industrial sector in GDP. However, as a major push for electricity generation, infrastructure development and stimulation of manufacturing activities takes place in the short to medium term to achieve a high growth rate and to create productive employment opportunities, the challenge would be to ensure that these activities are made environment-friendly so that the resulting growth is not only high and inclusive, but also sustainable.

The low per capita carbon dioxide emission compared to other regional economies and the shrinking of industrial sector means that the existing pattern of environmental challenges has little to do with the pace of economic growth. It is affected more by other factors such as poor engineering and safeguards embedded in infrastructural undertakings, deforestation, haphazard solid waste management, land degradation, unsustainable and indiscriminate use of pesticides and agrochemicals, and unplanned urbanization. In effect, these point to the lack of implementation of existing safeguards, obsolete legal frameworks, and institutional slackness as well as weakness. The existing pattern of environmental challenges has to potential to decelerate the pace of growth in the medium to long term.

Overall, Nepal’s forest area is depleting, land degrading, groundwater is drying up, pollution is increasing in major urban areas, and the use of pesticides and agrochemicals is increasing. This poses a number of challenges directly affecting economic activities: (i) environmentally weak infrastructure development; (ii) unplanned urbanization; (iii) misuse and indiscriminate use of pesticides and agrochemicals; and (iv) improper solid waste management. Though the government introduced a number of key legislations, which may need updating to reflect the present context, and embedded environment protection and conservation in its periodic plans, the implementation aspect has been rather disappointing— resulting in delays in the implementation of development projects.

The government could take a number of measures to stimulate environment-friendly inclusive economic growth such as: (i) strengthen the country safeguards system; (ii) promote environment-friendly infrastructure development; (iii) promote planned and regulated urban growth; (iv) encourage environment-friendly and climate resilient agriculture; (v) cease land degradation and desertification; (vi) protect terrestrial and aquatic ecosystem and biodiversity; (vii) mainstream climate change risks; (ix) scale up renewable energy; and (x) prepare effective disaster risk management. 


[1] This section was written in collaboration with Deepak Bahadur Singh, Senior Environment Officer at NRM. It draws in supporting information from a forthcoming report titled Country Environment Note Nepal 2014.

[2] Although Nepal lies near the northern limit of the tropics, because of rugged topography, there is a wide range of climates experienced from the summer tropical heat and humidity of the lowlands to the colder dry continental and alpine winter through the middle and northern mountainous region. The remarkable differences in climatic conditions are due to the enormous range of altitude within a short north-south distance. Nepal possesses eight ecological zones: lower tropical zone, upper tropical, subtropical, temperate, subalpine, alpine, Trans-Himalayan and Nival (Tundra and Arctic). The tropical and subtropical zones occupy 58%, temperate zone 12%, subalpine 9%, alpine 8%, Trans-Himalayan 8% and Nival 5% of the country’s land area.

[3] ADB. 2013. Macroeconomic Update Nepal August 2013. Vol1. No.2. Kathmandu.

[4]http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/environment/publication/environment-strategy-toward-clean-green-resilient-world

[5] CBS. 2014. Environment Statistics of Nepal 2013. Kathmandu: Central Bureau of Statistics.

[6] A. Lodge. 21 March 2014. Has Air Pollution Made Kathmandu Unlivable?. The Guardian. http://www.theguardian.com/cities/2014/mar/21/air-pollution-kathmandu-nepal-liveable-smog-paris

[7] It is a composite of three indicators: (i) air pollution- average exposure to PM2.5 (fine particulate matter); (ii) PM2.5 exceedance; and (iii) household air quality – indoor solid fuel usage.

[8] WHO. 2005. Air Quality Guidelines for Particulate Matter, Ozone, Nitrogen dioxide, and Sulfur dioxide - Global Update 2005. Geneva: World Health Organization. http://www.who.int/phe/health_topics/outdoorair/outdoorair_aqg/en/

[9] The Agriculture Sector Performance Review estimates that about two-thirds of total fertilizer demand in Nepal met by supplies through informal sources. Total chemical fertilizer demand is estimated to be about 0.6 metric tons.

[10] MOF.2014. Economic Survey 2012/13. Kathmandu: Ministry of Finance.

Wednesday, August 20, 2014

Costs of climate change and adaptation to Nepal

A new ADB report on the costs of climate change and adaptation (full report here) argues that Nepal would see economic losses equivalent to up to 2.2% of annual GDP by 2050, widening to 9.9% by the end of the century. If mitigation and adaptation steps are taken, the damage could be limited to around 2.4% of GDP by 2100.



The report states that Nepal’s agriculture sector may reap short-term gains from warmer temperatures and melting snow and ice, (annual rice production could increase by as much as 16% in Nepal’s hills and mountains by 2080) but the glacial retreat and uncertainty about the summer monsoon’s start and end dates may reduce crop yields, causing food insecurity. Furthermore, melting glaciers, if suddenly breached, could cause catastrophic flooding downstream, posing risks to both human settlements and hydropower systems. In mountainous areas, landslides are likely to increase, threatening lives and infrastructure. Deteriorating and dwindling forests will result in habitat losses for some of the country’s rich flora and fauna, including snow leopards, undermining the country’s appeal for ecotourists.
  • The regional climate model projections indicate temperature increases of 1.6°C -2.0°C in 2030, 2.3°C–2.9°C in 2050, and 3.4°C–5.0°C in 2080.
  • For the terai region, the temperature change is likely to be 1.9°C in 2030, 2.5°C in 2050, and 4.6°C in 2080.
  • The ensemble mean from GCMs indicates a temperature change of about 3.0°C–4.0°C by the end of the 21st century with high agreement (high confidence level).
  • The country is likely to have negative precipitation departure over the three periods: –3.9% to –5.0% in 2030, –1.7% to –2.0% in 2050, and –0.9% to +2.9% in 2080.
  • The A1B scenario indicates that precipitation departure for the terai region is likely to be –2.60% in 2030, –0.04% in 2050, and +3.72% in 2080.
  • Precipitation projections for the 21st century from the GCM ensemble mean indicate wide variations and low level of agreement among models. Hence, there is very little confidence in the rainfall projections for the country.
In South Asia, the Maldives and Nepal would be the hardest hit, losing up to 12.6% and 9.9% of their economies, respectively, every year, by 2100. Meanwhile, Bangladesh would lose 9.4%, India 8.7%, Bhutan 6.6%, and Sri Lanka 6.5%.


The cost of climate change adaptation measures in South Asia will depend largely on how the global community tackles the issue, the report says, noting that if the world continues on its path, the region will need to spend at least $73 billion, or an average of 0.86% of its GDP, every year between now and 2100 to adapt to the negative impacts. On the other hand, if countries act together to keep the rise in global temperatures below 2.5°C, the cost of South Asia shielding itself from the worst of the impacts would be nearly halved to around $40.6 billion, or 0.48% of GDP.
The report does not provide detailed adaptation cost projections on a country basis, although in the energy sector it notes that a rising gap between demand and supply could see Nepal face an annual adaptation bill of over $118 million in the 2030s, rising by another $100 million in the 2050s.
Almost all areas of South Asia will suffer as temperatures rise. While farmers in some parts of the region may benefit from warmer weather, overall the impact on agriculture will be negative. Annual rice production could increase by as much as 16% in Nepal’s hills and mountains by 2080, but drop as much as 23% in Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, and Sri Lanka by that time.

Other highlights:
  • Without global deviation from a fossil-fuel-intensive path, South Asia could lose an equivalent 1.8% of its annual gross domestic product (GDP) by 2050, which will progressively increase to 8.8% by 2100 on the average under the business-as-usual (BAU) scenario.
  • The model suggests that the Maldives will be hardest hit in GDP loss, while Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Nepal, and Sri Lanka are projected to face 2.0%, 1.4%, 1.8%, 2.2%, and 1.2%, respectively, loss of annual GDP by 2050.
  • Should the global community take actions along the Copenhagen–Cancun agreements to keep the global mean temperature rise below or within 2oC, the region would only lose an average of 1.3% of GDP by 2050 and roughly 2.5% by 2100.

Tuesday, April 23, 2013

Renewable energy diffusion in Asia: Can it happen without government support?

Below is an abstract of one of my research papers (co-authored) recently published in Energy Policy journal:

Renewable energy diffusion in Asia: Can it happen without government support?


The dramatically increasing population of Asia necessitates equally as dramatic increase in energy supply to meet demand. Rapidly increasing energy demand is a major concern for Asian countries because the increase in demand is being met through the increased use of fossil fuel supply, largely domestic coal and imported fuel. Renewable energy supply presents a lower emission pathway that could be a viable option for steering off the higher emissions path. However, several market, economic, institutional, technical, and socio-cultural barriers hinder countries in moving from high to low emission pathway. Following a discussion on the rising demand for energy in Asia and the prospects of partly satisfying it with renewable energy, we outline the reasons for government support to tackle the barriers for widespread diffusion of grid-based renewable energy. Additionally, we also discuss workable models for strategic government intervention to support diffusion of grid-based renewable energy in Asia.


Thursday, November 22, 2012

Impact of a 4 degree hotter world

In its new report (Turn Down the Heat: Why a 4°C Warmer World Must be Avoided), the World Bank has warned of “a cascade of cataclysmic changes that include extreme heat-waves, declining global food stocks and a sea-level rise affecting hundreds of millions of people” if the global community fails to act on climate change, which might heat up Earth by 4 degree Celsius (4°C)— above pre-industrial levels—by end of this century. It says that the current greenhouse gas emissions pledges are insufficient to bring down projected temperature rise.

An interesting part of such studies is the key findings, which seeps into the policy document of development agencies, I/NGOs and governments. Anyway, here are some of the key findings:
  • Global temperature is now 0.8°C above preindustrial levels. It could cross 4°C by the end of the century in the absence of collective efforts by global community.
  • Extreme heat waves will be experienced during almost all summer months in many regions. Increase of 6°C or more would be expected in the Mediterranean, North Africa, Middle East and parts of the US.
  • Likely rise in sea level by 0.5 to 1 meter by 2100. Many small islands may not be able to sustain their populations.
  • Most vulnerable regions are in the tropics, sub-tropics and towards the poles.
  • Agriculture, water resources, human health, biodiversity and ecosystem services are likely to be severely impacted.
  • CO2 concentration has increased from 278 ppm in preindustrial time to 391 ppm in September 2012 with rate of rise now at 1.8 ppm per year.
  • Emissions of CO2 are at 35000 million metric tons per year and projected to rise to 41000 million metric tons per year in 2020.
  • Over the last decade the average rate of sea-level rise has increased to about 3.2 cm per decade. With this rate, it could be over 30 cm of additional sea-level rise in the 21st century. Limiting temperature to 2°C would likely reduce sea-level rise by about 20 cm by 2100 compared to a 4°C world.
  • Record minimum Arctic sea ice in September 2012, halving the area of ice covering the Arctic Ocean in summers over the last 30 years.
  • The heat wave of 2010 in Russia claimed 55000 lives. It also resulted in 25% crop failure, burned areas at more than 1 million hectares and cost US$15 billion. With 4°C rise in mean temperature, such heat waves are likely to be a normal feature.
  • The 202 drought in the US impacted about 80% of agricultural land, making it the most severe drought since the 1950s.
  • Substantial increases in stunting due to malnutrition are projected to occur with warming of 2°C to 2.5°C, especially in Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia, and this is likely to get worse at 4°C.
Earlier, there were studies that looked at the impact of climate change on growth and trade. By analyzing the historical fluctuation in temperature in 125 countries between 1950 and 2003, Dell, Jones and Olken (ungated version here) found that it does not have significant economic impact in rich countries, but in poor countries one standard deviation increase in mean annual temperature reduces economic growth by 0.69 percentage points. It impacts agriculture and industrial outputs, political stability, and leadership transitions.  In a research note, Canuto and Onder discuss three ways through with trade intensity affects emissions.
  1. Increased trade means increased production, which means increased emissions—scale effect
  2. Greater specialization on production and export of goods might lower or increase emissions depending on the production structure, i.e. if it is polluting or non-polluting economic activity (think of coal and hydroelectricity respectively)— composition effect
  3. Technology transfer might promote ‘cleaner’ ways to produce goods— technique effect
Additionally, a recent analysis of land-surface temperature by Berkeley Earth shows that the rise in average world land temperature is approximately 1.5°C in the past 250 years, and about 0.9°C in the past 50 years. Importantly, it shows that humans are responsible for the increase in temperature especially in the last 50 years.

Sunday, September 16, 2012

Post MDGs development priorities and assistance

Dani Rodrik assesses the relevant of MDG indicators and the global development or assistance framework in the post-MDG era:

Contribution of MDGs:


[…]Clearly, however, the MDGs were a public-relations triumph, which is not to belittle their contribution. Like all worthwhile PR efforts, the MDGs served to raise awareness, galvanize attention, and mobilize action – all for a good cause. They amplified the global conversation about development and defined its terms. And there is evidence that they got advanced countries to pay more attention to poor nations.

Indeed, the MDGs possibly had their clearest impact on aid flows from rich to poor countries. A study by Charles Kenny and Andy Sumner for the Center for Global Development in Washington, DC, suggests that the MDGs not only boosted aid flows, but also redirected them toward smaller, poorer countries, and toward targeted areas like education and public health. However, aid was not directly linked to performance and results, and it is much more difficult to know whether it had the desired impact overall.


Recommendations for the post-MDG development framework:


[…]First, a new global compact should focus more directly on rich countries’ responsibilities. Second, it should emphasize policies beyond aid and trade that have an equal, if not greater, impact on poor countries’ development prospects.

A short list of such policies would include: carbon taxes and other measures to ameliorate climate change; more work visas to allow larger temporary migration flows from poor countries; strict controls on arms sales to developing nations; reduced support for repressive regimes; and improved sharing of financial information to reduce money laundering and tax avoidance.

Notice that most of these measures are actually aimed at reducing damage – for example, climate change, military conflict, and financial crime – that otherwise results from rich countries’ conduct. “Do no harm” is as good a principle here as it is in medicine.

This kind of reorientation will not be easy. Advanced countries are certain to resist any new commitments. But most of these measures do not cost money, and, as the MDGs have shown, setting targets can be used to mobilize action from rich-country governments. If the international community is going to invest in a bold new public-relations initiative, it might as well focus on areas where the potential payoffs are the greatest.


On the post-MDG era, here is a link to a presentation based on Nepal country study for the forthcoming European Report on Development 2012/13.

Shashi Tharoor argues that the next focus should be in Goal 8, which calls for a “global partnership for development” with four specific targets: “an open, rule-based, predictable, non-discriminatory trading and financial system”; special attention to the needs of least-developed countries; help for landlocked developing countries and small island states; and national and international measures to deal with developing countries’ debt problems.”


[…]The time has come to reinforce Goal 8 in two fundamental ways. Developed countries must make commitments to increase both the quantity and effectiveness of aid to developing countries. Aid must help developing countries improve the welfare of their poorest populations according to their own development priorities. But donors all too often feel obliged to make their contributions “visible” to their constituencies and stakeholders, rather than prioritizing local perspectives and participation.

[…]We must change the way the world goes about the business of providing development aid. We need a genuine partnership, in which developing countries take the lead, determining what they most acutely need and how best to use it. Weak capacity to absorb aid on the part of recipient countries is no excuse for donor-driven and donor-directed assistance. The aim should be to help create that capacity. Indeed, building human-resource capacity is itself a useful way of fulfilling Goal 8.

Doing so would serve donors’ interest as well. Aligning their assistance with national development strategies and structures, or helping countries devise such strategies and structures, ensures that their aid is usefully spent and guarantees the sustainability of their efforts. Donors should support an education policy rather than build a photogenic school; aid a health campaign rather than construct a glittering clinic; or do both – but as part of a policy or a campaign, not as stand-alone projects.


Tuesday, September 4, 2012

Impact of temperature increase on economic growth

By analyzing the historical fluctuation in temperature in 125 countries between 1950 and 2003, Dell, Jones and Olken (ungated version here) found that it does not have significant economic impacts in rich countries, but in poor countries one standard deviation increase in mean annual temperature reduces economic growth by 0.69 percentage points.

A one degree rise in temperature is associated with a 2.66 percentage points reduction in growth of agricultural outputs. in poor countries (for rich countries it is 0.22 percentage points). Also, their results show that an additional 100mm of annual rainfall is associated with 0.18 percentage points higher growth in agricultural output in poor countries and 0.16 percentage points higher growth in agricultural output in richer countries.

Furthermore, high temperature negatively impacts industrial value-added and political stability. They find that a one degree higher temperature in poor countries is associated with 2.04 percentage points lower growth in industrial output.

Overall, higher temperature is associated with political instability in poor countries. Specifically, an additional one degree change in temperature in poor countries is associated with a 2.7 percentage points increase in the probability of any change in POLITY (i.e. Policy IV index which rates political system in each country annually from –10 as fully autocratic and +10 as fully democratic). Political instability impacts factor accumulation and productivity growth. Using another dataset of leadership change, they show that a one degree rise of temperature raises the probability of leader transitions by 3.1 percentage points in poor countries.

Below is the abstract from their paper:


This paper uses historical fluctuations in temperature within countries to identify its effects on aggregate economic outcomes. We find three primary results. First, higher temperatures substantially reduce economic growth in poor countries. Second, higher temperatures may reduce growth rates, not just the level of output. Third, higher temperatures have wide-ranging effects, reducing agricultural output, industrial output, and political stability. These findings inform debates over climate's role in economic development and suggest the possibility of substantial negative impacts of higher temperatures on poor countries.


Source: Dell, Jones and Olken (2012); Panels A and B plot the change in average annual growth against the change in average annual temperature between the periods 1970-1985 and 1986-2000, for rich and poor countries respectively.

Saturday, August 11, 2012

Linkages between trade and climate change

Here is how trade contributes to climate change: The reduction in average tariffs in major export destinations and the booming trade has also increased production and economic activities. This means it has also increased GHG emissions, which are the major causes of climate change as humans are mostly responsible for the increase in temperature especially in the last 50 years.

In a new research note (the above figure is extracted from the same paper), Canuto and Onder provide that three ways through with trade intensity affects emissions.

  1. Increased trade means increased production, which means increased emissions—scale effect
  2. Greater specialization on production and export of goods might lower or increase emissions depending on the production structure, i.e. if it is polluting or non-polluting economic activity (think of coal and hydroelectricity respectively)— composition effect
  3. Technology transfer might promote ‘cleaner’ ways to produce goods— technique effect

Here, 3 would reduce emissions; 2 would result in neutral outcome as, theoretically, if everyone specializes in production where they have comparative advantage, then one might focus on emission boosters and others emission reducers, leading to existing levels of emissions; 1 would increased emissions.

The questions faced by policymakers is: How to boost prosperity without increasing emissions and the lowest cost possible? Looks like 3 is the best option but then it might not be fully financially and technically viable when viewed from developing country perspective. The added cost of adopting such method of production at the country level (i.e. without international common standards) would mean decrease in price competitiveness and loss of export markets. Hence, the unwillingness of rapidly growing economies to comply with strict emission reduction standards.

Canuto and Onder argue that “trade may help mitigate climate change, as long as the temptation to resort to inappropriate trade policies is avoided.” For this, implementation mechanisms need to be very explicitly well defined in multilateral agreements. To make trade and climate change policies compatible, they say:


[…] multilateral investigations are necessary for jointly accepted trade and climate policies. Careful and detailed definitions of implementation tools and procedures are crucial in preventing the undesired protectionist consequences of trade policies.


Regarding Nepal’s emissions level, here are some stuff from a previous blog post:

As expected, emission levels are very low in Nepal. But, annual temperature change between 2045-2065 (relative to the control period 1961-2000) is projected to be higher than in even Bangladesh, China, India and the USA. Hot days and warm nights are expected to increase by 2.5 days and 8 days respectively between 2045-2065 (relative to the control period 1961-2000).

The figure below compares CO2 emissions, projected annual temperature change and projected change in hot days/warm nights (2045-2065).

And, here is how climate change will impact agriculture production and trade in South Asia:


Climate change affects agricultural yield, which in turn has a strong bearing on economy and livelihoods. It alters comparative advantage in the trade of agricultural goods. Due to an expected decline in yields, potential restrictions on food trade and food- price inflation, food insecurity might increase. Against such a backdrop, apart from attempts to reduce agricultural as well as non-agricultural emissions and smoothen trade flows, adequately funded and concerted adaptation measures have to be implemented in South Asia.