Sunday, August 23, 2020

The impact of COVID-19 on Africa

Paul Collier explains how four shocks (drop in commodity prices, remittances, tourism, and international capital) due to the overarching COVID-19 shock are threatening Africa's progress.


Two in three jobs in sub-Saharan Africa are in the informal sector. There are no economies of scale or specialisation. Small is not beautiful, it is unproductive. Africa needs more companies capable of organising a workforce into specialised, collaborative teams, disciplined by competition. Yet even the firms that Africa has are bleeding from the economic impact of coronavirus.

This shock is not predominantly a result of Africa’s health crisis. The causes are the sharp downturns in advanced economies. Commodity prices have dropped and Africa is a major net exporter.

Senegal and Ethiopia are major recipients of remittances from citizens working abroad. Normally, these rise during a domestic crisis, but in this global emergency Africa’s diaspora are losing their jobs. This also hits the most desperate places such as Yemen.

Finally, the retreat of international capital to safety is hitting hardest the countries that were most promising for investors. Ghana was attracting US pension fund money and major companies such as Volkswagen and Bosch. All four shocks are eroding Africa’s scarce organisational capital and are likely to persist for the medium term.


Impact of COVID-19 on the external sector

The IMF’s latest external sector report highlights the state current account balance amidst the global trade and supplies disruptions caused by the COVID-19 pandemic. The pandemic has sharply curtailed global trade, lowered commodity prices, and tightened external financing conditions. 

According to the report, the world had a current account surplus of about 2.9% of world GDP in 2019. About 40% of current account surpluses and deficits were excessive in 2019. Euro area had larger-than-warranted current account balances, but the US, the UK and Canada had lower-than-warranted current account balances. China’s external position remained unchanged and they were broadly in line with fundamentals and desirable policies. Currency movements were generally modest, but with preexisting vulnerabilities/fundamentals in EMDEs (large current account deficits, a high share of foreign currency debt, and limited international reserves or reserves adequacy). 


The IMF forecasts current account surplus narrowing by 0.3% of world GDP in 2020, thanks to large fiscal expansion but offsetting increases in private savings and lower investment (precautionary move by household and business sectors). Economies dependent on severely affected sectors such as oil and tourism, and remittances have been hit hard.  There was a sudden capital flow reversal and currency depreciations in EMDEs as financial market sentiment deteriorated during the initial days of the crisis. Unsurprisingly, global reserve currencies appreciated as investors looked for safe haven amidst the financial stress. There is some unwinding now though, reflecting exceptional monetary and fiscal policy support. 

Current account balances in 2020 will be affected by 

  • Contraction in economic activity (lower output/export and import demand)
  • Tightening in global financial conditions
  • Lower commodity prices (oil, metals, food, raw materials)
  • Contraction in tourism
  • Decline in remittances 

The number of export restrictions in 2020 is higher than during the global financial crisis, but the number of import restrictions is lower. Sectors such as pharmaceutical and medical supplies, made-up textile articles, wearing apparel, rubber products, and ethyl alcohol and spirituous beverages faced the most export restrictions.  

Some EMDEs with preexisting vulnerabilities (large current account deficits, a high share of foreign currency debt, and limited international reserves) might face high risk of an external crisis (with capital flow reversals and currency pressures) if risk sentiment deteriorates

A second wave of the pandemic could lead to tightening of global financial conditions, narrow the scope of EMDEs to run current account deficit, further reduce current account balances of commodity exporters, and deepen the decline in global trade. Up to now, swift response of central banks (policy rate cuts, liquidity support, asset purchase programs, and swap lines offered by the US Federal Reserve) and expansionary fiscal policy have contributed to an easing in global financial conditions. EMDEs experienced sudden capital flow reversals in late February and march but then stabilized in most cases with even modest inflows in selected economies. 

Near-term priority

The near-term priority should be to provide relief and promote economic recovery. 

  • Flexible exchange rates should be allowed to adjust as needed to absorb external shocks (especially a fall in commodity prices or tourism). 
  • Official financing to ensure continued healthcare spending is required for those economies experiencing disruptive balance of payments pressures and without access to private external financing. 
  • Tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade, especially on medical equipment and supplies, should be avoided. 
  • Countries with adequate forex reserves could engage in exchange rate intervention to avoid disorderly market conditions and limit financial stress. 
  • Countries with limited reserves and facing reversals of external financing, capital outflows management measures could be useful (but these should be used to substitute the warranted macroeconomic and structural policy actions).

Medium-term priorities

Preexisting economic and policy distortions may persist or worsen over the medium-term.

  • Fiscal consolidation over the medium term would promote debt sustainability, reduce current account gap, and facilitate raising international reserves. Note that excess current account deficits in 2019 partly reflected larger-than-desirable fiscal deficits. 
  • Productivity-enhancing reforms would benefit economies with low export competitiveness. 
  • For countries with large current account surpluses after the COVID-19 pandemic, prioritizing reforms to encourage investment and discourage excessive private savings are warranted. In some instances, economies with large current account surpluses could discourage excessive precautionary savings by expanding the social safety nets. 
  • For economies with some fiscal space, emphasis on greater public sector investment would be helpful to narrow excess surpluses and to stimulate economic activities. 

Outlook for 2021

The outlook for 2021 is highly uncertain. Under a scenario where a second major global outbreak occurs in early 2021 (disruptions to economic activity is assumed to be half the size of the baseline in 2020, financing tightening of about one-half of the increase in sovereign and corporate spreads since the outbreak began in EMDEs, and relatively limited tightening of sovereign premiums for advanced economies),

  • Global trade is projected to decline by an addition 6%, global GDP decline by 5%, and oil prices to be higher by 12% compared to the baseline. 
  • Recovery in global trade will be underpinned by the need to rebuild the capital stock (investment goes up), and higher import intensity of exports. 
  • Emerging market economies will face higher borrowing costs, lower oil prices and subdued domestic demand – it will raise current account balances toward surplus. 
  • Net oil exporters will face lower oil prices, which will reduce their current account balances.
  • Advanced economies will face relatively limited tightening in external financing conditions and greater fiscal policy space will mean lesser import compression than among EMs, leading to lower current account balances. 
  • So, capital will flow from EMs to AEs, highlighting the unequal impact of the crisis and the need for a global policy response. 
  • Under a faster recovery scenario, global trade rises by 4% in 2021 compared to the baseline. 

The report notes that the historical relationship between trade and the components of GDP/aggregate demand (or import-intensity-adjusted measure of aggregate demand, which basically is a weighted average of aggregate demand components in which the weights are the import content of each component computed from national accounts input-output tables) fully explains the expected global decline in trade of goods. A part of the impact of lower economic activity on trade is felt through global value chains. After the global finance crisis circa 2009, residual factors such as rising protectionism explained part of the fall in trade in goods and services as they could not be fully explained by the fall in economic activity alone. Services trade contraction in 2020 is more severe than what could be expected based on the historical relationship between services trade and aggregate demand, suggesting the role of special factors such as travel restrictions. 

The IMF determines excessive current account balances by comparing the actual current account (stripped of cyclical and temporary factors) and the current account balance that is consistent with fundamentals and desirable policies. The resultant gap reflects policy distortions (e.g., higher current account balance than implied by fundamentals and desirable policies correspond to a positive current account gap, whose elimination is desirable over the medium-term). The IMF also considers REER that is normally consistent with the assessed current account gap. A positive REER implies an overvalued exchange rate. Other indicators that are considered are financial account balances, international investment position, reserve adequacy, and other competitiveness measures such as the unit-labor-cost-based REER and staff views on the current account gap using country-specific trade elasticities. 

On economic and financial fundamentals, and desired policies, advanced economies with higher incomes, older population, and lower growth prospects have positive current account norms. EMDEs tend to have negative current account norms because they are expected to import capital to invest and exploit their higher growth potential.

Wednesday, August 19, 2020

Restructuring stressed loans and higher government borrowing to stimulate economy

Restructuring stressed loans in India

Ramal Bandyopadhaya writes in Business Standard that the RBI's decision to allow restructuring of stressed bank loans will help to lower gross NPAs in the banking system. Some 80% of the loans in the banking system qualify for restructuring. 

None could miss the collective sigh of relief from the bankers’ community on the Reserve Bank of India’s (RBI) decision to open a restructuring window for stressed loans. Those accounts, which had been in default for not more than 30 days as on March 1, 2020, can be restructured if the borrowers are unable to service them because of their businesses being affected by the Covid-19 pandemic. The loans can be restructured, among others, by funding interest, converting part of debt into equity and giving the borrowers more time to pay up.

The banks must disclose such recast and set aside 10 per cent of the exposure to make provision for the restructured loans. In June 2019, the RBI had framed norms for loan restructuring, making it mandatory for banks to treat restructured, stressed loans as sub-standard unless there was a change in ownership of the borrowing company. Now, the banks can treat the restructured loans for Covid-19-affected companies as a standard asset even if there is no change in ownership.

[...]Going by one estimate, at least 80 per cent of the loans in the banking system will be eligible for such restructuring. One way of looking at this is that it will delay the inevitable by two years. Also, the 10 per cent provision requirement seems to be low as the banks’ unrealised but booked interest income from stressed borrowers is far higher. By RBI’s estimate, the gross bad loans of the banking system, which dropped to 8.5 per cent in March 2020, could rise to 14.7 per cent by March 2021. The restructuring window may not allow such a spike. The one-time forbearance was the need of the hour, particularly when all banks are not adequately capitalised. The good news is the presence of enough caveats to prevent misuse by the banking industry. In absence of this, many banks would have resorted to the tried and tested method of ever-greening — giving fresh loans to the stressed borrowers to keep the accounts good.

Current economic contraction is different from previous ones

Harish Damodaran argues in The Indian Express that arresting the current demand slowdown requires government investment and that debt concerns should not be overead. Despite fiscal slippages, yields on 10-year government bonds have dropped to 5.9% for the center and about 6.4% for states. This may fall further if banks are not able to lend the money they have collected as deposits.

That makes the current contraction totally different from the previous ones which were “supply-side” induced. There’s no shortage today of food, forex or even savings: Aggregate deposits with commercial banks as of July 31 were Rs 14.17 lakh crore or 11.1 per cent higher than a year ago. The closest parallel one could draw is with the 2000-01 to 2002-03 period of the Atal Bihari Vajpayee-led government. The Food Corporation of India’s (FCI) grain stocks in July 2002 were 2.6 times the buffer norm and the country ran current account surpluses in 2001-02 and 2002-03. But the economy didn’t contract then; growth merely fell from 8 per cent in 1999-2000 to an average of 4.5 cent during the next three years.

What we now have is a classic “western-style” demand slowdown that post COVID-19 has turned into a full-fledged recession bereft of consumption and investment demand. Households have cut spending as they have suffered income, if not job, losses. Even those with jobs are saving more than spending because they aren’t sure when their luck would run out. The same goes with businesses. Many have shut or are operating at a fraction of their capacity and pre-lockdown staff strength. The ones still making profits are conserving cash. If at all they are investing, it is to buy out struggling competitors and not to create new capacities. Just as households are uncertain about jobs and incomes, firms don’t know when demand for their products will really return.

This demand-side uncertainty and the resulting economic contraction is something new to India. And it stands out in a situation where food stocks and forex reserves are at record highs. Meanwhile, banks are also facing a problem of plenty. While their deposits are up 11.1 per cent, the corresponding credit growth has been just Rs 5.37 lakh crore or 5.5 per cent. With very little credit demand, the bulk of their incremental deposits are being invested in government securities, which have increased year-on-year by Rs 7.21 lakh crore or 20.3 per cent.

Monday, August 17, 2020

INR 1 trillion Agriculture Infrastructure Fund in India

On August 9, PM Modi launched the Rs 1 lakh crore Agriculture Infrastructure Fund (AIF) to be used over the next four years. 

This article in Mint explain what it is about: 

The scheme will provide better warehousing and cold storage facilities for farmers, Modi said, adding, new jobs will be created as food processing and post-harvest facilities are set up in rural areas. The scheme will enable startups to scale up their operations and India to build a global presence in organic and fortified food, he said. The fund was launched with ₹1,128 crore of new loans disbursed to more than 2,200 cooperative societies. During the event, the Prime Minister also transferred ₹17,100 crore to farmers under the PM-Kisan direct income assistance scheme.

Under the infrastructure scheme—part of the federal government’s Atmanirbhar Bharat package announced in May—banks and financial institutions will provide ₹1 trillion in loans to cooperative societies, farmer producer companies, self-help groups, entrepreneurs, startups and infrastructure providers. The objective is to provide medium to long-term debt financing for setting up of post-harvest infrastructure and community assets for marketing of farm produce. According to the guidelines, all loans up to ₹2 crore will be disbursed with a 3% interest subsidy. The loans will be disbursed over four years— ₹10,000 crore in 2020-21, and ₹30,000 crore in the next three years.

This article in The Indian Express explains how it will be implemented and the potential roadblocks.

The fund will also be used to provide loans, at concessional rates, to FPOs and other entrepreneurs through primary agriculture credit societies (PACs). NABARD will steer this initiative in association with the Ministry of Agriculture and Farmers Welfare.

“The fund is a major step towards getting agri-markets right,” writes Ashok Gulati, the Infosys Chair Professor for Agriculture at ICRIER. But he points out some missing parts of the puzzle. Firstly, unless NABARD ensures that FPOs get their working capital at interest rates of 4 to 7 per cent — like farmers get for crop loans — the mere creation of storage facilities will not be enough to benefit farmers. “Currently, most FPOs get a large chunk of their loans for working capital from microfinance institutions at rates ranging from 18-22 per cent per annum. At such rates, stocking is not economically viable unless the off-season prices are substantially higher than the prices at harvest time,” he writes. The second missing item is the future of the agri-futures markets. A vibrant futures market is a standard way of hedging risks in a market economy. Several countries — be it China or the US — have agri-futures markets that are multiple times the size of those in India.