Saturday, October 15, 2011

Great Convergence after Great Divergence?


Greg’s mill was part of a revolution in industry that would profoundly alter the world’s pecking order. The new technologies—labour-saving inventions, factory production, engines powered by fossil fuels—spread to other parts of western Europe and later to America. The early industrialisers (along with a few late developers, such as Japan) were able to lock in and build on their lead in technology and living standards.

The “great divergence” between the West and the rest lasted for two centuries. The mill at Styal, once one of the world’s largest, has become a museum. A few looms, powered by the mill’s water wheel, still produce tea towels for the gift shop, but cotton production has long since moved abroad in search of low wages. Now another historic change is shaking up the global hierarchy. A “great convergence” in living standards is under way as poorer countries speedily adopt the technology, know-how and policies that made the West rich. China and India are the biggest and fastest-growing of the catch-up countries, but the emerging-market boom has spread to embrace Latin America and Africa, too.

[…]Economic catch-up is accelerating. Britain’s economy doubled in size in the 32 years from 1830 to 1862 as increased productivity spread from cotton to other industries. America’s GDP doubled in only 17 years as it overtook Britain in the 1870s. The economies of China and India have doubled within a decade.

This is cause for optimism. An Indian with a basic college education has access to world-class goods that his parents (who might have saved for decades for a sputtering scooter) could only have dreamed of buying. The recent leap in incomes is visible in Chinese cities, where the cars are new but the bicycles look ancient, and in the futuristic skyline of Shanghai’s financial district.

[…]No country, or group of countries, stays on top forever. History and economic theory suggest that sooner or later others will catch up. But this special report will caution against relying on linear extrapolation from recent growth rates. Instead, it will suggest that the transfer of economic power from rich countries to emerging markets is likely to take longer than generally expected. Rich countries will be cursed indeed if they cannot put on an occasional growth spurt. China, for its part, will be lucky to avoid a bad stumble in the next decade or two. Emerging-market crises have been too quickly forgotten, which only makes them more likely to recur.

[…]The force of economic convergence depends on the income gap between developing and developed countries. Going from poor to less poor is the easy part. The trickier bit is making the jump from middle-income to reasonably rich. Can China and others manage it?


For more, read The Economist’s special report on catch-up. Dani Rodrik argues that convergence is not automatic and it might not happen altogether any time soon. He argues that convergence depends on bridging the productivity levels/gap. And exploiting it needs sustaining rapid structural change in the direction of tradables such as manufacturing and modern services. But, the policies that successful countries have used to achieve this are hard to emulate.

Thursday, October 13, 2011

State of Hunger in South Asia, 2004-2009 (Global Hunger Index 2011)

IFPRI has just published 2011 Global Hunger Index report titled The Challenge of Hunger: Taming Price Spikes and Excessive Food Price Volatility. It calls for action to curtail high and volatile food prices and to protect the poor from rising food prices. Conforming the outcome of other reports by the FAO and other organizations, the new report argues that  the main causes of high and volatile food prices are growing demand for biofuels, extreme weather and climate change, and increased financial activity through commodity futures markets. Worse, these challenges are exacerbated by historically low levels of grain reserves, export markets for staple commodities that are highly concentrated in a few countries, and lack of timely, accurate information on food production, stock levels, and price forecasting, which can lead to overreaction by policymakers and soaring prices.

In order to identify hunger levels and hot spots, the Global Hunger Index scores countries based on three equally weighted indicators: the proportion of people who are undernourished, the proportion of children under five who are underweight, and the child mortality rate. According to the 2011 Index, 26 countries have levels of hunger that are alarming or extremely alarming, and all those with extremely alarming levels—Burundi, Chad, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and Eritrea—are in Sub-Saharan Africa.

To tame food price volatility and protect the poor against future shocks, the report recommends addressing the drivers of food price volatility; tackling global market characteristics affecting volatility, including building up stocks by coordinating international food reserves and sharing information on food markets; and building resilience for the future. Specifically, it recommends to

  • curtail biofuels subsidies and mandates
  • discourage the use of food crops in biofuels production
  • regulate financial activity in food markets
  • reduce the incentives for potential excessive speculation in food commodities
  • invest in climate change adaptation and mitigation
  • safeguard smallholder farmers against extreme weather-related shocks
  • strengthen social protection systems
  • improve emergency preparedness
  • invest in sustainable small-scale agriculture

The 2011GHI reflects data from 2004 to 2009 – the most recent available country-level data on the three GHI components. It is thus a snapshot not of the present, but of the recent past. An increase in a country’s GHI score indicates that the hunger situation is worsening, while a decrease in the score indicates an improvement in the country’s hunger situation.

  • The 2011 world GHI fell by 26 percent from the 1990 world GHI, from a score of 19.7 to 14.6.
  • From the 1990 GHI to the 2011 GHI, 15 countries reduced their scores by 50 percent or more.
  • Between the 1990 GHI and the 2011 GHI, 19 countries moved out of the bottom two categories— “extremely alarming” and alarming.”
  • In terms of absolute progress, Angola, Bangladesh, Ethiopia, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Niger, and Vietnam saw the greatest improvements in their scores from the 1990 to 2011 GHI.
  • In terms of percentage decrease in GHI scores from the 1990 GHI to the 2011 GHI, the following countries saw the greatest improvements, beginning with the most improved: Kuwait, Turkey, Malaysia, Mexico, Islamic Republic of Iran, Albania, Peru, Nicaragua, Ghana, and Fiji.

State of hunger in South Asia:

  • South Asia has the highest regional 2011 Global Hunger Index (GHI) score—22.6 (worst than in Sub-Saharan Africa regional score).

  • The 2011 GHI score fell by 25 percent in South Asia compared with its 1990 score, and the 2011 GHI score in Southeast Asia decreased by 44 percent.

  • The South Asia region reduced its GHI score by more than 6 points between 1990 and 1996—mainly due to a large decline in underweight in children under five, but the fast progress was not maintained. South Asia has lowered its GHI score by only one point since 2001 despite strong economic growth. Social inequality and the low nutritional, educational, and social status of women, which is a major cause of child undernutrition in the region, have impeded improvements in the GHI score.

  • In Bangladesh—a country where 25 percent of the population is ultra-poor (living on less than USD $0.50 a day)—only about 7 percent of the population has access to social protection or safety net programs.

  • Bangladesh saw large gains in improving their GHI score between the 1990 GHI and the 2011 GHI, reducing its score by 36 percent.

  • Bangladesh and India have the highest prevalence—more than 40 percent—of underweight in children under five in South Asia.


Hunger in South Asia (Increase in GHI score means hunger situation is worsening)
Country 1990               (with data from 1988-92) 1996               (with data from 1994-98) 2001               (with data from 1999-2003) 2011               (with data from 2004-2009) Rank 2011
Bangladesh 38.1 36.3 27.6 24.5 70
India 30.4 22.9 24.1 23.7 67
Nepal 27.1 24.6 23 19.9 54
Pakistan 25.7 22 21.9 20.7 59
Sri Lanka 20.2 17.8 14.9 14 36

Out of 122 developing countries and countries in transition, Sri Lanka has the best ranking in South Asia (lower ranking is better). Compared to 1990, the state of hunger in 2011 has improved in all South Asian countries for which data is available. However, there has not been much improvement since 2001, i.e. though the score has changed, the state of hunger is pretty much unchanged. Nepal’s and Pakistan’s state of hunger has remained unchanged (“alarming”) since 1990.

Hunger in South Asia
Country 1990 1996 2001 2011
Bangladesh Extremely alarming Extremely alarming Alarming Alarming
India Extremely alarming Alarming Alarming Alarming
Nepal Alarming Alarming Alarming Serious
Pakistan Alarming Alarming Alarming Alarming
Sri Lanka Alarming Serious Serious Serious

Here is a related post on high food prices in South Asia.

UPDATE (2011-11-16): Nepal’s state of hunger in 2011 is updated as serious from alarming. I misread the scale. [<= 4.9 is low; 5-9.9 is moderate; 10-19.9 is serious; 20-29.9 is alarming; and >= 30 is extremely alarming]

Monday, October 10, 2011

Nobel prize in economics to Thomas Sargent and Christopher Sims

This year's the Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel  goes to Thomas J. Sargent and Christopher A. Sims "for their empirical research on cause and effect in the macroeconomy". Below is the press release:


How are GDP and inflation affected by a temporary increase in the interest rate or a tax cut? What happens if a central bank makes a permanent change in its inflation target or a government modifies its objective for budgetary balance? This year's Laureates in economic sciences have developed methods for answering these and many of other questions regarding the causal relationship between economic policy and different macroeconomic variables such as GDP, inflation, employment and investments.

These occurrences are usually two-way relationships – policy affects the economy, but the economy also affects policy. Expectations regarding the future are primary aspects of this interplay. The expectations of the private sector regarding future economic activity and policy influence decisions about wages, saving and investments. Concurrently, economic-policy decisions are influenced by expectations about developments in the private sector. The Laureates' methods can be applied to identify these causal relationships and explain the role of expectations. This makes it possible to ascertain the effects of unexpected policy measures as well as systematic policy shifts.

Thomas Sargent has shown how structural macroeconometrics can be used to analyze permanent changes in economic policy. This method can be applied to study macroeconomic relationships when households and firms adjust their expectations concurrently with economic developments. Sargent has examined, for instance, the post-World War II era, when many countries initially tended to implement a high-inflation policy, but eventually introduced systematic changes in economic policy and reverted to a lower inflation rate.

Christopher Sims has developed a method based on so-called vector autoregression to analyze how the economy is affected by temporary changes in economic policy and other factors. Sims and other researchers have applied this method to examine, for instance, the effects of an increase in the interest rate set by a central bank. It usually takes one or two years for the inflation rate to decrease, whereas economic growth declines gradually already in the short run and does not revert to its normal development until after a couple of years.

Although Sargent and Sims carried out their research independently, their contributions are complementary in several ways. The laureates' seminal work during the 1970s and 1980s has been adopted by both researchers and policymakers throughout the world. Today, the methods developed by Sargent and Sims are essential tools in macroeconomic analysis.


Here (also here) is technical note that further describes the new laureates contribution.

Are Nepali workers underpaid in terms of salary and benefits?

Well, so claim the labor union leaders. That might be true. But it is unfair to ask for similar benefits for workers in Nepal like the workers (even Nepali) in South Korea, Malaysia and the Gulf get. It is fair to ask for a decent working condition, but most of the strikes are hinged on politics and salary hike only. Both the sides (industrialists and unions) are on fault here. That being said, there is no doubt that the unions are more politicized than warranted and this is more problematic than the complain about salary and compensation issue. Is there any cases where unions and industrialists (at central and firm level) sat down together, talked about working condition and productivity, and honestly did the necessary from their part to work on this regard?

Below is a piece by Prem Khanal who looks at both sides of the debate. My take on the issue here, here and here.


Embroiled in low pay and poor performance dispute

Prem Khanal

It needs no close scrutiny to discover the biggest obstacles to Nepal´s industrialization. Talk to any group of industrialists and you will hear scary accounts of militant extremism of Nepali workers.

Surya Garment, one of the largest apparels producing multinationals with annual turnover of over one billion rupees and providing employment to 700 workers, decided to fold down operations after it was compelled to call for police intervention to free three dozen officials locked for two days without food and water by workers in June. 

Another foreign venture, Fire and Ice, a famous Italian pizza restaurant located in downtown Kathmandu, and employing some 70 youths remained closed for six weeks after workers padlocked the restaurant demanding dismissal of a newly appointed manager. Undoubtedly, the two incidents speak volumes about how workers here have made Nepal an unsavory place for business.

Are the Nepali workers really so undisciplined? Absolutely not. Nepali youths in the Indian and British Armies have earned repute for hard work, bravery and obedience. By winning the best performance award for the two consecutive years in South Korea, Nepali youths have proved that they possess unparalleled qualities.

The South Korean government has announced to increase the quota for Nepali workers to 15,000 from 2012. What´s more, Japanese factories, which employ a large number of South East Asian and Chinese workers, have also started eyeing Nepali workers.

However, it is puzzling that the Nepali workers who are so notorious back home undergo a dramatic behavioral change when they are outside the country.

“It is the attractive incentive -- that is well over ten times -- that brings about this drastic transformation,” says Bishnu Rimal, president of General Federation of Nepalese Trade Unions (GEFONT). “When the monetary incentives you get from your job barely makes your ends meet, not only do commitments falter but even makes the workers hostile to the management,” he says.

On the top of the handsome incentives that Nepali workers enjoy in South Korea, they also get additional reward for hard work. This results in greater commitment to work and increased productivity, says Rimal, who has also authored a book “´Enhancing Decent Work Agenda in Workplace: Trade Unions Efforts through Social Dialogue in Nepal.

Padma Jyoti, former president of Federation of Nepalese Chambers of Commerce and Industry (FNCCI) and the Chairman of Jyoti Group of Companies, admits that low incentives instigate unrests. But he blames politicization of labor unions as the biggest obstacles to industrialization in Nepal.

“Frequent strikes in factories that provide good pay are the testimony that trade Unions instead of promoting workers´ welfare have become tools in the hands of political parties. This has posed a big challenge to Nepali industries,” Joyti says. Growing factionalism in political parties and the tendency of dishonoring agreements have made matters worse,” he said.

Rabi Bhakta Shrestha, former FNCCI president, says politicization of labor unions, has sounded death knell for Nepal´s industries. “The productivity of Nepali laborers has shrunk so dangerously in recent years that even the businesses with absolute comparative advantage have become financially unviable,” Shrestha says.

According to a study, the productivity of a Nepali garment worker is currently 9.6 pieces of shirts in an 8-hour shift whereas the same for the Chinese is 25.5, Bangladeshi 18.6 and Indians 16.

“How we can we increase the workers´ incentives in this situation,” questioned Shrestha, adding, “We are ready to double the salaries if the workers bring up their productivity on par with the South Asian average.

However, Rimal, a lawmaker with nearly two-decades of involvement in labor activism, rubbishes the claim that politicization is the only reason for low productivity of Nepali laborers. Apart from the non-labor related factors like power shortage, Rimal blames the industrialists themselves for low productivity of workers.

“How many factories pay enough to ensure workers a decent life, how many factories invest for trainings to enhance workers´ skills, and how many factories have a healthy working environment,” he questions.

Dr Shiva Sharma, General Secretary of National Labor Academy, concurs and attributes low pay scale for poor productivity. “Low pay scale has forced Nepali workers to opt for jobs in Malaysia though they are not very lucrative,” Sharma said.

Sharma also blames factory owners for politicization of labor unions. When workers feel that the employers are indifferent toward their grievances, it is natural for them to seek help from political parties, he said.

Rimal claims that the factories that have addressed workers´ grievances have not suffered strikes for many years. He also blames the factory owners for allowing political clout inside the factories. Instead of making efforts to win workers´ confidence by addressing their genuine concerns through regular dialogues, many factory owners opt for fast track solutions by using political connections to suppress labor unrest.

As a result, the mistrust between the workers and factory management has been widening like never before. Workers see employers as oppressors, whereas owners feel that laborers are least concerned with the growth their workplace.

“The desperation of workers for higher incentives in Nepali factories so high that there is hardly any resistance to calls made by any unions of any political hue to go for strikes,” says Sandeep Gautam, president of Labor Union of Him Electronic Nepal.

Jyoti acknowledged that some employers seek the support of political parties to deal with labor disputes and said such practices have made political leaders the de facto owner of Nepali factories. Shrestha further added that the practice has become so prevalent that an employer needs political connections to bring the workers back to work even after meeting their demands.


Sunday, October 9, 2011

Globalization, Technology and Culture

This picture does a very good job of describing how globalization has pushed our personal and cultural frontiers and technology has been a crucial part of this process.

Source: Ekantipur. The caption reads: “Parents from Kathmandu put Tika to their family members living in Orebro, Sweden via “video call” on Saturday to mark Dashami—the 10th day of Dashain festival. Many Nepali residing abroad received the blessings via computers and internet.”

Notice few interesting stuff in this picture:

  • Globalization and technology are pushing our cultural frontiers. Globalization and technology are ever evolving, but culture at the core remains as it is. Economic agents try to strike an equilibrium between the benefits of globalization and their culture. Technology is bridging that gap in some way.
  • Cost of communication is way cheaper. It was unimaginable few years back to do video chat or communicate using internet. People had to depend on the good old ISD/STD phone booths, which are evaporating these days. Owning a cell phone in 2004 was a big deal. Now, you can have it and use the 3G technology within minutes. Back in 2000, you had to wait for about two years to get a landline connection. There was a quota system by district. Now, people hardly want to have landline, expect in offices and home (least preferred by people living on rent or in an apartment).
  • The digital divide: Look at the internet speed (the red bars). Developing countries still have low internet speed (and reach), which is expanding though, than the developed countries. Is technological convergence (sans innovation) or catch-up happen?
  • Culture is one of the few factors that binds people across generations and nations. People adapt this to globalization to the extent possible.
  • And, come on ekantipur,  could you please at least redact names of the people in the picture? Readers get the core message without the names as well!

Monday, October 3, 2011

Links of Interest (2011-10-03)-- Export, FDI, Growth, Social Protection, Economics Blog

Key takeaways regarding trade finance during the 2008–09 trade collapse (Trade finance was not the main driver during the trade collapse in 2008, but the shortfall in finance did have some impact. But, tighter trade finance had “significant adverse effects on trade flows”. Inter-firm trade credit may be more resilient than bank-intermediated trade finance in times of crisis. Trade finance among supply chains affect output during crisis but recovery fast during recovery. SMEs have been particularly vulnerable to the tightening of trade finance conditions.

Foreign Direct Investment under Weak Rule of Law: Theory and Evidence from China (If you have strong economic fundamentals, then it trumps over weak rule of law in attracting FDI)


This paper develops a self-enforcing contract model to show that better economic fundamentals can help when there is weak rule of law---but with order---to attract foreign direct investment, whereas lowering taxes does not necessarily help. Using a cross-region Chinese dataset, the analysis finds evidence consistent with the theoretical analysis. Regional variations in tax rates and the perceived quality of formal contracting institutions are not correlated with regional inflows of foreign direct investment, but leadership characteristics are. Most conventional economic factors have the predicted effects on foreign direct investment. The finding that foreign direct investment is lower in locations where domestic private firms have better access to finance and where the air quality is poor is new to the literature.


The Impact of Economics Blogs


There is a proliferation of economics blogs, with increasing numbers of economists attracting large numbers of readers, yet little is known about the impact of this new medium. Using a variety of experimental and non-experimental techniques, this study quantifies some of their effects. First, links from blogs cause a striking increase in the number of abstract views and downloads of economics papers. Second, blogging raises the profile of the blogger (and his or her institution) and boosts their reputation above economists with similar publication records. Finally, a blog can transform attitudes about some of the topics it covers.


Applying the Growth Identification and Facilitation Framework: The Case of Nigeria


This paper applies the Growth Identification and Facilitation Framework developed by Lin and Monga (2010) to Nigeria. It identifies as appropriate comparator countries China, India, Indonesia, and Vietnam, and selects a wide range of industries in which these comparator countries may be losing their comparative advantage and which may therefore lend themselves to targeted interventions of the government to fast-track growth. These industries include food processing, light manufacturing, suitcases, shoes, car parts, and petrochemicals. The paper also discusses binding constraints to growth in each of these value chains as well as mechanisms through which governance-related issues in the implementation of industrial policy could be addressed.


Temporary trade barriers database (see which countries imposed trade barriers during the crises)

The Rise of Emerging Markets Requires a New WTO (“In the midst of a rapidly-changing global economic order, the World Trade Organization (WTO) must adapt its role and its tools if it is to stay relevant and help facilitate meaningful reform on trade” argue Uri Dadush and William Shaw)

Export Quality Diverges between Rich and Poor Countries (rich countries have high quality products and faster export growth rate, impacting growth and development)


Country export quality (measured by unit values) is correlated with income level suggesting that studying quality dynamics potentially offers insights into the development process. This paper uses highly disaggregated trade data to explore the export quality (unit value) dynamics of goods exported to the United States over the 1990-2000 period. In addition to finding considerable heterogeneity in the relative quality of exports across countries and across goods within countries, the authors find that the rate of quality growth varies substantially across countries, as well. Specifically, the fastest growth is seen in exports from the richer (OECD) countries, implying an evolving divergence in product quality across regions. This divergence obtains despite evidence of conditional convergence in quality over time- goods with lower initial relative quality levels experience faster growth in quality. The data suggest that part of this divergence is driven by the product mix itself -- OECD exported products experience intrinsically higher growth rates. This is consistent with the argument of Hausmann, Hwang and Rodrik (2007) that what countries export does matter for growth. However, it is partly driven by a higher growth rate of quality in the richer countries independent of convergence effects, suggesting that other country-specific factors impeding overall convergence are at work. Finally, there is very limited technological "leap-frogging" by countries across product lines as the relative quality of new exports, on average, is roughly the same as incumbent exports, both in richer countries and elsewhere.


Is Infrastructure Productive? (long-run elasticity of output with respect to the synthetic infrastructure index ranges between 0.07 and 0.10)


How much does public infrastructure capital contribute to aggregate productivity and output? Such quantitative assessments are critical, especially for policymakers considering investments in public infrastructure. In a new working paper, César Calderón Enrique Moral-Benito, and Luis Servén devise a new approach that overcomes the constraints faced by previous research. They estimate the aggregate production function of all infrastructure using a framework that includes infrastructure assets, human capital and non-infrastructure physical capital for 88 countries in 1960-2000. The authors use physical measures, not monetary ones such as investment or capital stock figures, to estimate infrastructure stocks. Why? First, public expenditure may not reflect trends in public capital stock, especially when inefficiency and corruption plague project selection and government procurement practices. Second, the authors want to measure the impact of infrastructure capital due to government spending, as well as the accompanying increased participation by the private sector, in global infrastructure since the 1990s. The authors' estimate of the output elasticity of infrastructure, between 0.07 and 0.10, is robust to changes in economic specification and the synthetic index of infrastructure. The finding implies that observed differences in the ratio of aggregate infrastructure to output across countries offer a useful guide to the differences in the marginal productivity of infrastructure.


Making the Transition: From Middle-Income to Advanced Economies (secret: investing early in improving the quality of education and inducing high investment in research and development. By opening up to world trade and using tax incentives and access to subsidized credit, successful countries were able to attract foreign direct investment in high-technology sectors, argue Alejandro Foxley and Fernando Sossdorf)

Making globalization socially sustainable (social protection, investment in public goods and well-functioning markets are vital to make globalization socially sustainable)

Sunday, October 2, 2011

Middlemen are manipulating agriculture market in Nepal

[This piece was published in Republica, October 2, 2011, p.6]


Manipulation of Food Market

The Department of Commerce (DoC) has been actively monitoring markets to check food adulteration, compliance with consumer safety regulations, and market manipulation by sellers whose only goal seems to be to shovel in quick profits, irrespective of meeting set standards. With the recent revelation of market mischief and closure of various retail outlets and restaurants, consumers are stunned to find that they were/are consuming substandard goods. While the DoC’s new found energy to monitor quality of goods is highly commendable, it should also actively monitor food prices manipulation by middlemen and, to some degree, retailers who are distorting the price-incentive-output mechanism in the agriculture sector.

Strict supervision of quality and prices of food is even more vital during the festival season. Usually, there is a surge in demand during this time, but middlemen and retailers deliberately jack up prices higher than what the demand surge would warrant. Given the cultural and institutional obligations deeply embedded in our religion, consumers try to find resources, often by diverting allocated household expenditure for other headings, to finance food demand during festival season. They complain about high prices but cannot stop purchasing food items. It implies that the demand for food items during festival season is pretty much price inelastic. Tapping on this obligation of the consumers, middlemen and retailers jack up prices calculatedly. At the household level, it affects household savings and discretionary expenditure. At the macro-economy level, it affects our domestic saving, investment, and general price of goods and services.

There are widespread price manipulation and market failures in the agriculture sector. The food prices, which have been sticky at high level, have not responded to production changes. For instance, this year cereals output is expected to increase by 1.2 percent. Specifically, output of wheat, coarse grains and rice is expected to be 2.2 million tons, 2.4 million tons, and 4.5 million this year. These figures are either an increase or of the same level recorded in the past three years. Now, the question is how can food prices keep increasing continually when output level is still stable.

It is true that there has been an increase in demand for food and a decline in productivity growth. But it still does not fully account for high food prices as we have been importing food items at an increasing scale. Nepal imported approximately 359,000 tons of food and received 46,000 tons of food aid last year alone. We are expected to import far less food this year due to increase in domestic production following favorable weather and enhanced supply of agricultural inputs. Yet food prices are high in the domestic market. In fact, current retail prices of wheat and rice in Nepal are third and fourth highest respectively in South Asia. Overall, food and beverage prices have been increasing at a rate of approximately 15 percent each year.

The argument that supply shocks (decrease in output) are pushing up domestic food prices does not hold much ground either given the total increase in output and imports. Supply shocks played a role at the global level, but not in Nepal. When global food prices skyrocketed in 2007/08 our domestic food prices also increased. However, when the global food prices went down starting mid-2008, the same did not happen in Nepal. Here, the domestic food prices were deliberately maintained high.

One might wonder: If prices are so high, why are farmers not increasing production and productivity at the same rate? Usually, when prices rise, output also rises as producers follow price signal. Unfortunately, this crucial incentive mechanism is missing in our agriculture market, especially in vegetables market where prices are rising unabated and are extremely volatile. Farmers are not getting true price for their produce and direct access to markets. For instance, recently farmers in Sapahi village of Janakpur went on a strike demanding that the government punished middlemen who created artificial shortage of chemical fertilizers, seeds and pesticides. They also demanded right market for their produces. One may ask vegetables producers in Bhaktapur if they get prevailing price in wholesale market when they sell their produce to middlemen running Kalimati Fruits & Vegetable Markets. Their answer will most likely be no.

One of the reasons for the apparent incoherence in retail prices, farm prices and output is market manipulation by middlemen or agents. There are many cases where middlemen are raking in profits by forcefully erecting barriers to market entry for new players, by artificially jacking up prices and controlling supply, and by distorting incentives. It is impeding commercialization of agriculture sector and the development of agro-processing industry, which has strong backward and forward linkages to both agriculture and non-agriculture sectors. The private investors are disinclined to enter the food market which is tightly controlled by agents who neither produce food in farms nor sell them in retail markets directly. Instead, they directly purchase food from farmers at a fixed rate and sell it to wholesalers to rake in huge profits. This is the first round of artificial rise in prices. It is followed by wholesalers selling the same produce to retailers by keeping a comfortable margin. This is the second round of artificial rise in prices. It is leading to incoherence between prices and output in agriculture sector. The middlemen are acting both as monopsonists (only they purchase food from farmers) and monopolists (only they sell food to wholesalers). Competition is stifled and farmers are deprived of true price.

Market manipulation is also the reason why standard policy tools to tame rise in food prices are ineffective. Monetary policy involving change in interest rates does not have much traction on food prices because people do not purchase food items on credit. Also, since our currency is pegged with the Indian rupee and almost 60 percent of our trade happens with India, it is expected that our domestic prices follow prices in the Indian market. However, it is just one way movement. When prices rose in India, ours rose too. But, when it moderated in India, we did not see that happening in Nepal. Again, the disconnect points to manipulation of agriculture market and a force intent on deliberately keeping food prices high.

Combing back to the DoC’s new found energy, it is high time the government clamped down on the factors that are depriving our farmers of true price for their produce and are exogenously reaping huge profits by acting both as monopolists and monopsonists. Understandably, these middlemen are also associated with various political parties. They cannot be rooted out instantly and institutional and market reforms cannot be enacted overnight. However, the DoC should at least try to encourage competition in the agriculture market and, if required, directly procure food items from farmers. It will have more impact on taming high food prices than simply setting up fair price shops by purchasing food from middlemen. Not only improvement in supply and quality in retail market, but also supply at low prices that reflect true costs of production would mean a lot to both consumers and producers this festival season.

[Published in Republica, October 2, 2011, p.6]