Monday, January 10, 2011

How to make migration a win-win-win strategy?

By ensuring that the whole initiation has

  • a sustainable migration management system that takes into account the interests of the various stakeholders involved;
  • a clear identification and articulation of objectives and interests in migration by key stakeholders, based on a common conceptual framework for migration and development:
  • regional and bilateral coordination mechanisms to balance these (potentially divergent) objectives and to reach compromise under labor agreements and policies; and
  • effective, evidence-based polices, and public and private sector interventions to achieve the objectives that are known and applied at the levels of sending, receiving, returning, and circulating.

Here is more by Holzmann and Pouget (2010). Quite a mouthful of recommendations! Win-win-win scenario is for labor, migrant’s country, and host country.

Is aid (development) THE problem in Nepal?

Jeremy Rappley thinks that aid/donors is the problem in Nepal’s development. He criticizes the aid industry for distorting Nepal’s development path by imposing their own models that have failed to produce tangible outcomes. He is critical of the development activities carried out in Nepal since the first development donor (apart from India and colonial Britain), i.e. USAID arrived here.

It is a very stimulating piece. I largely agree with his socio-political analysis. But, regarding econ, he’s got some explaining to do.


But, as with the earlier fall of the Ranas, Nepal’s own vision of its future – inclusion, democracy, equity – was quickly overtaken by international donor demands. By the late 1990s, Nepal’s own vision had all but been turned almost completely around: An exclusive focus on efficiency, cost-effectiveness and a consumer logic. In fact, from ‘citizen to consumer’ characterize rather well the two decades since Janaandolan. Again, consider education. The National Education Commission (1990-1992) inaugurated in the wake of Janaandolan stated that the goal was to create an educational system “consistent with the human rights enshrined in the constitution and the democratic values and norms as well as social justice.”

Ten years later, the main themes are decentralization and private schools – the exact same policies we see the donors promoting in every other country of the world. It is little wonder then that it has brought to Nepal the exact same results: A massive spike in inequality, growing exclusion along class lines and the breakdown of democracy.

[…] Loading-shedding has increased, fuel shortages, garbage piling up in the streets, traffic, pollution, and dance bars offering poor Nepali girls to rich Indian tourists. Considering what Kathmandu looked like 50 years ago, what will it look like 50 years in the future? And this is just Kathmandu, where most people still believe in ‘development’.

[…] Venture beyond the rim of the valley and that is where the real future of Nepal lies. It is here that the vast majority of the ‘twice-passed-by’ people live and they are losing patience. Fast. The genius of bikas is that it promised that inequalities would be lessened over time. This was true both within the country and across the world: Poor people were told by donors and local elites to wait patiently, do the right thing, and they would ‘catch-up’. Being twice-passed-by, however, has created a disbelief in ‘development’.


However, his claim that donor’s development agendas and funding resulted in “a massive spike in inequality, growing exclusion along class lines and the breakdown of democracy” does not hold much ground in terms of evidence. The efforts of donors might not have produced the desired outcomes, but this does not mean that the involvement of donors has led to massive spike inequality, exclusion and breakdown of democracy. First, inequality (measured by Gini coefficient) tends to rise, to some extent, with income per capita (remember Kuznets curve?) and it has got little to do with donors’ development agenda. Second, the claim that growing exclusion along class lines being engendered by aid/donors is dubious. Third, donors’ development agendas might have favored some political regimes, but I don’t think there is evidence that it has directly led to a breakdown of democracy in Nepal.

Furthermore, I don’t think the existing loading-shedding, fuel shortages, garbage, pollution, and dance restaurants have got too much to do with the aid industry and donors’ development agenda. We can make a case that the donors failed to fund the activities sorely needed by the country, but this does not mean that the present day economic ills are caused by donors’ development agendas and priorities. That said, I am not being wholly supportive of the donors as well; I have already been very critical of the aid industry in Nepal.

Rather than the donors’ development agendas, it is the failure of our domestic institutions to deliver on the development promises, which the donors’ did little to help reform. It is not the loss of faith in development, but the loss of faith in domestic institutions that is forcing people to ‘exit’ the political system. Largely, the sorry state of the domestic institutions is our own (both politicians and citizens) bringing. Now, what is the solution? This is unanswered by Rappley.

The effectiveness of donors’ activities should be judged in terms of their contribution to poverty reduction, economic growth, and employment generation at the macro level. These objectives are always the aim of donors. In some, they have utterly failed, while in others they have pretty much shown satisfactory results. For instance, the progress in attaining primary and secondary education and reducing maternal mortality, among others, is pretty good. It wouldn’t have happened at this pace without donors’  assistance. But, they have also failed to counter health emergencies (remember a number of deaths due to diarrhea in Jajarkot in 2009?).

I like this:


[…] Blame is perhaps the only growth industry in Nepal; finger-pointing advances in lockstep with stagnation. So we must be careful. Nevertheless, donors need to bear some of the blame.

Yet, having seen this happen before, Nepali policymakers must also take responsibility. But the biggest finger needs to be pointed right back at many of the current readers, those who continue to believe in the idea of ‘development’ amid the obvious stagnation of the country. Those who try to carve out a ‘first world’ existence through private schools, luxury hotels, satellite television, and curtains on their SUVs to block out the putrefying stagnation of Nepal deserve the most blame because they are the ones educated enough to see things clearly. Here is the beginning of a solution: Viewing not the future ideal but the current reality of bikas in Nepal, coming to terms with the country’s place in the global economy, and recapturing some of the equity, inclusion, and social justice goals that Nepal committed itself to in 1950 and 1990. This may sound radical, but no more radical that what is likely to occur in the very near future if Nepali elites do not voluntary move in that direction.


A good analysis. Highly recommended to read the whole article.

Fiscal policy, private consumption & unemployment


This paper uses the old-Keynesian representative agent model developed in Farmer (2010b) to answer two questions: 1) do increased government purchases crowd out private consumption? 2) do increased government purchases reduce unemployment? Farmer compared permanent tax financed expenditure paths and showed that the answer to 1) was yes and the answer to 2) was no. We generalize his result to temporary bond-financed paths of government purchases that are similar to the actual path that occurred during WWII. We find that a temporary increase in government purchases does crowd out private consumption expenditure as in Farmer (2010b). However, in contrast to Farmer's experiment we find that a temporary increase in government purchases can also reduce unemployment.


Full paper by Farmer and Plotnikov here. Overall, they find that a temporary increase in government purchases crowds out private consumption expenditure, but also reduces unemployment.

Saturday, January 8, 2011

Revised MGNREGA wages and inflation

The Indian government is planning to increase minimum wages under the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (MGNREGA) by between 17 percent and 30 percent from the current IRs 100 a day. It will cost the government an additional IRs 3,500 crore (total budget allocation for this fiscal year is IRs 40,100 crore) in the current fiscal year itself. Good for the workers, but bad for local employers who employ low-skilled laborers, and for food prices and inflation. NREGA (renamed MGNREGA in  FY 2010/11) is a flagship rural employment generation and livelihood program of the UPA government in India. This social welfare program guarantees one hundred days of employment per year at the prevailing minimum wage rate for unskilled labor. When NREGA was implemented in 2006, eleven states saw a rise in minimum wages. The new revised wages, to be adjusted with CPI, is set to increase wages in twenty states.

Earlier, the per day wages was set at IRs 100. The estimates below are based on IRs 100 per day wage. With budget amounting to mere 0.67 percent of GDP, the program provided employment to 53 million households and created around two million productive assets in fiscal year 2009-2010 (see Table 1 and 2). Meanwhile, employment given to women accounts for around 48 percent of the total persondays of employment. Similarly, employment given to backward groups (scheduled tribes and scheduled castes)—also the most vulnerable groups to income and climate related shocks—account for about 51 percent of the total persondays of employment created in fiscal year 2009-2010.

 

Table 1: NREGA budget

Fiscal year

2006-07

2007-08

2008-09*

2009-10**

Number of rural

districts

200

330

615

615

NREGA/GDP

0.27

0.25

0.56

0.67

NREGA/Expenditure

1.94

1.68

3.33

3.83

NREGA/Revenue

2.60

2.21

5.34

6.36

Sources: Computed using data from Union Budgets, Economic Surveys and NREGA website; **budget estimate; *revised budget estimate

 
 

Table 2: Employment under NREGA (million)

Fiscal year

2006-07

2007-08

2008-09

2009-10

Households provided employment

21

34

45

53

Total persondays

905

1437

2163

2826

SCs persondays

230

394

634

863

STs persondays

330

421

550

586

Women persondays

368

611

1036

1374

Others persondays

346

622

980

1377

Private inspection and trade facilitation


Private inspection of international shipments has been used over the last half-century for a variety of purposes. These include prevention of capital flight and improvement of import duty collection, among others. The existing literature has failed to find much impact of these inspection programs on collected tariff revenue or corruption at the border. This paper explores the "facilitation" effect of private inspection programs on trade. The results indicate that private inspection has a positive and significant trade-facilitation effect. These programs raise import volumes for countries using them by approximately 2 to 10 percent. The findings here also suggest that the benefit of private inspection of imports may be associated with reforms and best practices applied by private inspection firms. Private firms' inspection of cargo may promote faster clearance times and process reliability, rather than improved tax collection.


Full paper here. So they Vela, Aadot, and Wilson (2010) find that private inspection of international shipments positively and significantly affect trade facilitation, with a rise in import volumes for countries using them by approx 2-10 percent.

Friday, January 7, 2011

Energy cooperation in South Asia

Participants

Volume

India- Bhutan power trade

5,620 GWh

  • The present installed capacity is at 1,500 MW, of which approximately 350 MW are used for Bhutanese domestic consumption.
  • The government of India has agreed to import a minimum of 10,000 MW by 2020.
  • Such an increase will demand for a significant increase in transmission capacity through either AC or HVDC.

India-Nepal power trade

Annual 100-150 MW import from India

 

India-Bangladesh diesel

100,000 tons (2008) import from India

India-Nepal and Indi-Bhutan petroleum products

Nepal and Bhutan do not have refining capacities. Nepal imports 1.2 million ton (MT) per annum with annual increase by 20 percent from the Indian Oil Corporation. Bhutan imports 63,875 metric tons per annum

India-Bangladesh coal

3-4 million tons of coal import from India

Source: Olivia Gippner’s forthcoming discussion paper (to be published by SAWTEE)

Nepal being the most promising producer of hydropower actually imports it from India, who is seeking loads of power import to fuel its growth engine. Despite huge demand, both domestically and abroad, why is hydropower sector been such a slacker in Nepal? Blame political instability, bureaucratic hurdle, red tape, corruption, monopolistic market, and labor dispute, among others.

Nepali stakeholders identified the following as key obstacles to regional cooperation.

  • Political instability
  • Lack of economic argument (demand for energy)
  • India’s preference of bilateralism
  • NEA and Nepali policy-makers’ incapacity
  • Lack of trust on all levels
  • Electricity is not seen as a commodity
  • Politics in the power sector

Thursday, January 6, 2011

Food Price Index surpasses the spike in 2008

The FAO Food Price Index has surpassed the upper bound reached in 2008. Commodity-wise, price of sugar has been spiking since May 2009. Similarly, prices of cereals and oil & fats are also going up. Price of meat is stabilizing but still is higher than in December 2008. The price of dairy is reaching the level reached in December 2008. Here is an explanation of why we are not seeing riots and disruptions around the world as we saw in 2008: due to weak dollar as $ is used for world food prices, and people are used to higher food prices. Here is more on the FAO predicting the next food price shock.