Monday, May 7, 2012

Cost of informality to Nepali economy

Published in Republica, May 5, 2012, p.8.


Cost of informality

The Ministry of Finance (MoF) and National Planning Commission (NPC) are busy sketching budget boundary for various ministries and allocating development expenditure for next fiscal year, which starts from July 16. The size of budget is expected to be over Rs 400 billion, up Rs 385 billion in 2011/12. The government meets its expenditure from domestic revenue, internal borrowing and foreign aid. The most important one here is domestic revenue, which is low at 15.2 percent of GDP (tax and non-tax revenue at 13.1 percent and 2.2 percent respectively of GDP). But, expenditure stands at 23 percent of GDP, with over half of it as recurrent expenditure. Hence, there is always a pressure to increase revenue to cover increasing expenditure. A slew of policy measures ranging from increasing taxes and customs tariff to widening tax net are implemented to achieve revenue target. However, a crucial aspect mostly ignored by policymakers is the inability to bring in informal sector inside the tax bracket and level the playing field for both formal and informal sector firms.

Now, you might be wondering what informality has to do with the economy at this point of time. Well, brining informal activities and transactions under the tax net would help increase tax revenue even when the existing tax rates are unchanged, create level playing field for formal sector firms, and boost industrial capacity and productivity. Informality is highest in services sector, particularly construction, wholesale and retail trade, hotel and restaurant, and real estate, renting and business activities, whose combined contribution to GDP is approximately 31 percent. Nepal Informal Survey 2009 shows that nearly half of informal firms produce or sell food and beverages and the rest engage in repairing, tailoring and furniture business, among others. Almost 67 percent of informal firms are in Central Development Region.

Firms operating in the informal sector have cost advantage as they avoid taxes and regulations, which the formal sector firms have to pay and abide by. They evade fiscal and regulatory obligations, including value-added tax (VAT), income taxes, labor market obligations (such as social-security deductions and minimum-wage requirements), and product market regulations (quality standards, copyrights, and intellectual-property laws).The evasion of taxes and infraction of regulations help them offset the cost of low productivity and small-scale production. [Here, let me emphasize that the tax evaders in the formal sector should not be spared in any pretext and be penalized according to the law.] The government should play an active role in bringing informal firms into the formal sector because even if the economy grows, it is less likely that the transition would happen automatically.

It is estimated that the size of informal economy (also termed “shadow economy”, which means all market-based legal production of goods and services that is deliberately concealed from public authorities) in Nepal was 37.5 percent of GDP in 2007, which is the third highest in South Asia. Sri Lanka has the highest size of shadow economy at 47 percent of GDP. No wonder formal sector investors complain that the biggest obstacle to investment climate in Sri Lanka is the unfair competition with large informal sector. A 2009 survey shows that 49.4 percent of firms compete against unregistered or informal firms and around 18 percent identify practices of competitors in the informal sector as a major constraint to doing business in Nepal. Furthermore, recent estimate of informal trade along the porous Nepal India border shows that the total value of informal imports of agriculture goods from India is approximately Rs 55 billion.

The large informal economy and trade means lower revenue receipts than the potential level, which would in turn heap additional burden on those who operate in the formal economy and also negatively impact economic growth. First, high degree of informality stifles economic growth rate, which has been suppressed below 5 percent. With ever-increasing expenditure, low tax receipts would mean either rise in taxes imposed on formal businesses or high internal borrowing. Raising taxes on formal businesses would discourage investors because they feel burdened when compelled to cough up extra money for the excesses of competitors in the informal sector. It means investment and employment generation below the potential level. Also, high internal borrowing would increase budget deficit, which stands at around 3.8 percent of GDP. Second, the high degree of informality means a weak industrial sector due to subscale and unproductive companies. Most of the informal sector companies cannot grow beyond a certain limit because of a lack of access to credit, marketing and managerial weaknesses, and absence of downstream linkages to both formal and informal firms. Worse, informal firms eat away market share of bigger and productive formal competitors as they have the advantage of avoiding taxes and regulations. It has been found that the informal companies operate at just half the average productivity level of formal companies in like sectors and have price advantage of over 10 percent. It distorts competition, leads to stunted growth of industrial sector, and restrains consolidation of firms that could have resulted in economies of scale and enhanced productivity. Also, labor rights are not guaranteed in the informal sector, workers are underpaid and working condition is much worse than in comparable formal sector firms. In 2009, average monthly salary in informal sector was Rs 3,944 while the formal manufacturing firms offered Rs 6,510 per month.

It in the interest of government to reduce informality, increase revenue by broadening tax net rather than increasing taxes on the formal sector firms only, and create a level playing field to foster competition among firms in same sectors. However, doing so is a Herculean task for the Inland Revenue Department, the main agency to collect taxes for the government, because of its limited capabilities and resources. The major driving forces toward informality are high direct and indirect taxes, the regulatory capabilities of government along with the state of formal economy, and labor market regulations. There is a disincentive to comply with all legal obligations because of poorly staffed and organized government enforcement agencies, weak penalties for noncompliance, and ineffective judicial system. In 2009, approximately 46 percent of informal firms did not get registered because they saw no benefit from it. Moreover, the high cost of operating in the formal sector deters willing informal firms to comply with formal sector regulations. These include red tapes, high tax burdens, inadequate supply of infrastructure, and meeting costly product quality and worker-safety regulations. For instance, one of the major reasons behind the high informal imports from India is the red tapes and hassles at custom points.

The government could reduce informality by reducing the cost and burden of meeting formal sector regulations and by offering enticing incentives to those that operate in the formal sector. Some of these could be strengthening enforcement of laws and regulations, eliminating red tape, and cutting prohibitively high taxes. It could also enhance its audit capabilities, make court systems fast and efficient, avoid giving tax amnesties, hike penalties for tax evaders, collaborate with financial institutions to maximize monetary transactions of firms, streamline regulatory burden, introduce electronic tax filing, and simplify tax codes. Importantly, it could initiate steps in liking informal sector with formal one so that more firms are covered in the tax net and more revenue is generated to cover rising expenditure.


Friday, May 4, 2012

Petroleum product’s demand, supply, prices and never-ending queue at petrol pumps in Nepal

The long queue at petrol pumps, rationing of LPG, rising NOC’s losses due to increase in international prices on whose basis it purchases from the IOC, NOC’s inability of purchase enough fuel when the subsidy government is offering has to be shouldered by the corporation, and the MoF’s inability to either give sufficient funds to NOC or compel it to restructure (administration, leakages and prices) are recurrent issues. The web of interconnections among these baffles analysts and, as in many cases, beyond some point there is no logic to the fuel prices in market, losses to NOC and supply of fuel (thanks to politics!).

Anyway, here is how the prices of petroleum products are moving in Nepal. The increase in domestic prices do not entirely reflect the prices in the international market. On April 4, 1996, a liter of petrol cost Rs 31; Rs 40 on July 17, 1998; Rs 47 on October 14, 2000; Rs 67.25 on March 3, 2006; Rs 100 on June 9, 2008; Rs 77.5 on February 17, 2010; and Rs 120 now. The prices of diesel and kerosene have been fixed at the same rate since December 3, 2008, largely to stop adulteration. Currently, petrol and diesel prices are highest in Kathmandu and Surkhet (Rs 120 and Rs 89 per liter respectively). The lowest prices (Rs 118.50/L for petrol  and Rs 87.50/L for diesel) are in the border cities with India. [Fyi, POL means petroleum, oil and lubricants. One barrel is equivalent to 159 liters and 1 cylinder 14.2 kg.]

As of 2012-05-01, there is loss in sale of diesel and LPG, which are also the ones with the highest demand in the market. Before the prices were adjusted two months ago, the losses were even bigger than what are listed in the table below. The NOC currently owes Rs 23.17 billion to the government and various banks and financial institutions. Of the total loans, the NOC owes Rs 10.73 billion to the government, Rs 6.40 billion to the EPF, Rs 4.13 billion to the CIT and Rs 1.90 to banks and financial institutions.

Profit and loss as per IOC's rate as of 2012-05-01
Item Price
Petrol (MS) 3.71/Ltr
Diesel (HSD) -10.60/Ltr
Kerosene (SKO) 3.02/Ltr
LP Gas -598.34/cyl
Aviation Turbine Fuel (JET A-1) 14.39/Ltr (Duty Paid)
Aviation Turbine Fuel (JET A-1) 19.73/Ltr (Bonded)
Estimated total loss as of May 2012 - 1.1447 billion

Also be clear that the retail price of POL is high also because of high tariff (VAT, road tax and other charges), insurance and transportation charges, leakages, and NOC’s administrative costs. See the table below for the breakdown of costs for petrol, diesel, kerosene and LPG.

NRs Petrol/L Diesel/L Kerosene/L LPG/cylinder
Buying price as of May 1, 2012 from Raxaul 73.94 77.55 76.38 1530.32
Tariff 33.55 14.78 2.04 241.84
Interest on NOC's loan 1.47 1.47 1.47 20.87
Transportation cost and insurance 2.15 2.15 2.15 105.81
NOC's administrative charge 0.50 0.50 0.50 7.10
Technical leakage 0.98 0.59 0.50 1.39
Dealer commission 2.74 1.75 1.97 56.00
Insurance and transportation charge of dealer 1.24 0.82 0.97 50.00
Total price 116.29 99.60 85.98 2013.34
Retail price in Kathmandu 120.00 89.00 89.00 1415.00
Total monthly sales (KL, cylinder)   17,000     65,000               6,000      1,200,000


Load-shedding, petro demand and inflation

The link between international petroleum prices and inflation in Nepal has been strong since 2007, the same year when load-shedding increased substantially and demand for petroleum products skyrocketed. A recent study by the IMF economists showed that almost a third of the variability in domestic inflation can be attributed to the prices in India and movements of international oil prices. The study found that the responsiveness of food price inflation was significant and quick to spillovers from India’s food prices and the global oil price fluctuations before 2007. However, after 2007 the impact of fluctuating oil prices is more persistent than the spillovers of food prices prevalent in the Indian economy. Even though petroleum prices do not change readily in our economy as they do in the international market, the price fluctuations are seen directly and indirectly in the cost of imported inputs (and final products) used by agricultural, industrial and service sectors.

The consumption of diesel has increased by over 100 percent between 2007/08 and 2010/11 (from 3 lakhs KL to 6.5 lakhs KL). The increase in demand comes mainly from the industries as a result of drastic increase in load-shedding hours. The peak demand for electricity in 2007 and 2011 was 648.39 MW and 946.1 MW respectively. The available energy (NEA hydro, NEA thermal, purchase from IPP and India) in 2007 and 2011 was 3051.82 GWh and 3858.37 GWh respectively. While the average annual average growth of peak demand for electricity between 2007 and 2011 was 9.44 percent, the annual average growth of available energy was 6.98 percent. There is a huge electricity demand and supply gap (on an average the demand is 650-900 MW but supply is around 450 MW). Furthermore, driven by the increasing purchasing power and expansion of trading business (mostly commercial), thanks to remittances, the additional number of consumers has also drastically increased between 2007 and 2008 (from 1.3 million to 2.05 million). The increase in consumption of petroleum fuel (especially diesel and LPG) is inversely related to the supply of electricity (load-shedding hours) in Nepal.

Nepal imported about Rs 51 billion of petroleum products in 2009/10, which increased to Rs 75 billion in 2010/11 (a solid jump of about 45 percent). It is expected to surpass Rs 100 billion in 2011/12. Fyi, the total merchandise export of Nepal was just Rs 64 billion in 2010/11.

What is the solution?

Saving myself from repeating the same arguments on how to handle the situation, let me direct readers to my earlier detail piece on the sorry state of state-owned enterprises, including NOC. Brief points are listed below:

  • Adjust domestic prices with international prices (find other means to rein in on the impact of rising petroleum prices on inflation—NRB, MoCS, MoF, and NPC need to step up their efforts)
  • Minimize leakages, including offering freebies to staff and MoCS guys, and lay off unnecessary staff at NOC
  • Minimize political meddling in management, and improve governance and accountability
  • Let private players join the market
  • End syndicates and cartels in fuel transport
  • Increase storage facility, mainly to partially tame price volatility. The present storage capacity of 71,558 kiloliters is just enough for 15 days (based on the projected sales for 2009).


This is what happens when you ration products that have high demand in the market—it leads to a thriving black market. Petrol in mineral water bottles!

Wednesday, May 2, 2012

Current State of Nepali Economy

Here are the slides from a presentation on current state of Nepali economy held at Shanker Dev Campus, MBS 2nd year, Kathmandu.


Tuesday, May 1, 2012

How ready is Nepal for change?–Not so much!

According to a new index (Change Readiness Index) that provides insight into which countries are better able to manage and mitigate the risks associated with change and capitalize on the new resulting opportunities, it looks like Nepal is ranked (overall) 50 out of 60 countries, meaning that it is well below the average in terms of its readiness to cope with change. Lower rank means better readiness for change.

Specifically, the ranking in economic sub-index (relating to economic policies and frameworks), governance sub-index (relating to the capacity of government and the institutional arrangements that have been established) and social sub-index (relating to the characteristics of a society, such as literacy, social support networks and civil society) is 50, 38,  and 57 respectively.

The top five countries in the CRI are Chile, Tunisia, Taiwan, Jordan and Kazakhstan. The bottom five countries are Venezuela, Honduras, Zimbabwe, Mozambique, and Bolivia. In South Asia, Sri Lanak is ranked at 22, followed by India at 23, Bangladesh at 45, Nepal at 50 and Pakistan at 54.

Change Readiness Index (CRI) captures government capability and the capability of a country as a whole - including the private sector and civil society - to manage and respond effectively to change. The Index combines data from a number of existing indicators with new measures that have been identified to capture specific elements of change readiness that are not currently being captured, including risk management capabilities, efforts to promote economic diversification, strong governance, and social safety nets. The study also considered the impact of recent food, fuel, and financial crises on countries around the world to asses country’s change readiness. The assumption is that a country’s capability for managing change might be an important factor in supporting sustained growth in the long term.

Dimensions of capability to manage change:

Economic capabilities

  • Macro framework
  • Investment climate
  • Economic openness
  • Labor markets
  • Economic diversification

Governance capabilities

  • Public administration
  • Financial regulation
  • Risk management
  • State business relations

Social capabilities

  • Entrepreneurship
  • Safety nets
  • ICT and innovation
  • Human capital
  • Civil society

While the report gives a sense of a country’s capabilities to cope with change and exploit the resulting opportunities, it also states that “when assessing growth prospects, this data must be viewed in combination with other information on issues that will affect economic prospects such as political stability, sovereign debt, sustainability or endowments of capital, labor and natural resources”.

Monday, April 30, 2012

Can storage help ensure food security?

Larson et al. argue that it can if the target is set high and reserves are adequate. Here is the abstract from their paper:


In times of highly volatile commodity markets, governments often try to protect their populations from rapidly-rising food prices, which can be particularly harsh for the poor. A potential solution for food-deficit countries is to hold strategic reserves, which can be called on when international prices spike. But how large should strategic stockpiles be? This paper develops a dynamic storage model for wheat in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region, where imported wheat dominates the average diet. The paper uses the model to analyze a strategy that sets aside wheat stockpiles, which can be used when needed to keep domestic prices below a targeted price. This paper shows that if the target is set high and reserves are adequate, the strategy can be effective and robust. Contrary to most interventions, strategic storage policies are counter-cyclical and, when the importing region is sufficiently large, a regional policy can smooth global prices. This paper shows that this is the case for the MENA region. Nevertheless, the policy is more costly than the pro-cyclical policy of a targeted intervention that directly offsets high prices with a subsidy similar to food stamps.


Meanwhile, Gouel and Sebastien recommend an activist policy to stabilize the impact of high food prices. They argue that the optimal trade policy for a single low-income country is to subsidize imports when domestic availability is low and tax exports when world prices are high, which will benefit consumers at the expense of producers, because it reduces the likelihood of high prices. Meanwhile, a pure storage policy might have an opposite effect: it raises the average domestic price because of the increased stock accumulation, and is detrimental to consumers. They argue that to protect consumers from food price volatility in an efficient way, storage policies need to be complemented by trade policies, which would provide some isolation from the world market.

Sunday, April 29, 2012

Evolution of industrial policy in India, China and Germany

The economies that liberalized early on with strategic support to boost capabilities and competitiveness of industries also achieved high growth rate and high prosperity. Germany liberalized in 1950s, China in 1978, and India in 1992. [Nepal is trailing far behind in comparison to these economies—even when compared to the Indian economy as it liberalized its economy in tandem with the liberalization drive in the Southern neighbor. Here and here are two articles related to industrial policy in Nepal.]


 



  

Chart source is WEF


This statement by Dani Rodrik is highly relevant here: “The right model for industrial policy is not that of an autonomous government applying Pigovian taxes or subsidies (i.e. lump sum taxes or subsidies), but of strategic collaboration between the private sector and the government with the aim of uncovering where the most significant obstacles to restructuring lie and what type of interventions are most likely to remove them.”

Thursday, April 26, 2012

Determinants of manufacturing competitiveness

Here is a nice chart that shows the determinants of manufacturing competitiveness. A combination of government action, manufacturing capabilities, market forces, and resources is needed for successful enhancement of manufacturing competitiveness. It is based largely on exports sophistication and complexity of products.


 Government forces

  • Education policies
  • Energy policies
  • Economic, trade, labor, financial and tax policies
  • Science and technology policies
  • Manufacturing and infrastructure policies

Capabilities

  • Innovation
  • Technology
  • Process
  • Infrastructure

Market forces

  • Demographic
  • Macroeconomic

Resources

  • Human
  • Materials
  • Energy
  • Financial

By the way, Nepal’s manufacturing sector is going downhill. If you look at the list of determinants of manufacturing competitiveness, almost all of them are either missing or inadequately supplied in Nepal. Here is an earlier discussion on the state of Nepali economy, industrial sector, and exports.