Showing posts with label COVID-19. Show all posts
Showing posts with label COVID-19. Show all posts

Friday, June 4, 2021

Big budget, big promises

It was published in The Kathmandu Post, 02 June 2021. A detailed blog on the same issue here..


Big budget, big promises

Given that the pandemic is affecting economies everywhere, Nepal’s budget is exceptionally far-fetched.

Finance Minister Bishnu Prasad Poudel presented the 2021-22 budget on May 29 through an ordinance, owing to the dissolution of the federal Parliament and the announcement of fresh elections scheduled for November. The bloated budget includes big promises on expenditure, revenue mobilisation and deficit financing that are challenging to implement if elections are held—that too without fully vaccinating a sizable share of the population.

Nevertheless, the finance minister has rightly prioritised the most pressing challenge right now, i.e., testing, tracing, treatment, vaccination and upgrading healthcare infrastructure. The strategy seems to be the stabilisation and recovery of economic activities by addressing healthcare challenges, continuation of existing projects and relief measures for individuals and businesses, and propping up aggregate demand as well as the voter base by increasing allowances.

Large outlay, large deficit

The total expenditure outlay for 2021-22 is Rs1.65 trillion, which is 30.1 percent higher than 2020-21 revised estimate. Recurrent and capital spending allocations constitute 61 percent and 26 percent of the budget. Notably, the government started reporting recurrent and capital grants to subnational governments (SNGs) separately from the next fiscal. This gives a better picture of actual capital spending, because earlier the government used to argue that reported capital spending underestimates the actual figure as some fiscal transfers recorded under recurrent spending are used for financing capital projects by SNGs.

Total federal receipts (federal government’s share of revenue plus foreign grants) are estimated to be Rs1.09 trillion. The revenue mobilisation growth target is set at 20 percent. Considering the federal government’s expenditure and its share of revenue in total revenue mobilisation, the budget deficit turns out to be Rs559.3 billion, which is to be financed by foreign loans and domestic borrowing. The government expects foreign aid (grants and loans) to cover about a quarter of its expenditure needs. Overall, the fiscal deficit is projected to increase to about 7 percent of the GDP in 2021-22, up from about 5 percent in 2020-21.

About 45.1 percent of the planned recurrent budget is earmarked for SNGs in the form of recurrent fiscal transfer and unconditional recurrent grants. The other big-ticket item is social security, which takes up about a quarter of the recurrent budget. Social security includes allowances, social assistance (scholarship; rescue, relief and rehabilitation, medical assistance); and social benefit of employees (pension and disability allowances, retirees related gratuity and medical assistance). The increase in allowances by 33 percent, including for 70 years and above elderly people, has drastically increased allocation under this heading by 50 percent. Meanwhile, about 58 percent of the planned capital budget is going for civil works and 14 percent as capital grants to SNGs.

Major takeaways

The budget has been rolled out when the country is at a critical juncture. In fact, economic activities are estimated to have contracted by 2.1 percent in 2019-20 and will likely grow at around 2 percent in 2020-21, most of which will be due to a base effect anyway. Increase in social security allowances, the allocation for free vaccination, the continuation of refinancing facility and business continuity funding, and income tax relief for individuals and businesses are some of the notable features of the budget.

Without ascertaining resources, it is also redistributive in nature, particularly aimed at influencing the voter base ahead of the planned federal parliamentary elections. A larger increase in federal expenditure (30.1 percent) than an increase in federal receipts (14.5 percent) points to a challenging fiscal management task going forward. Against this backdrop, there six specific macroeconomic takeaways.

First, since the budget deficit is widening, and outstanding public debt and interest payments are increasing, it would have been good to anchor expenditure and revenue on medium-term expenditure and revenue frameworks. Outstanding public debt is also rising fast, particularly after 2014-15, reaching about 37 percent of GDP in 2019-20 from 22 percent barely five years ago. One also needs to tally how this budget falls in line with the 15th five-year plan and to what extent it includes projects listed in the National Project Bank.

Second, the revenue mobilisation growth target of 20 percent compared to the 2020-21 revised estimate is a bit ambitious at the moment. In fact, revenue growth has been consistently below 20 percent since 2016. Increasing excise duties on ‘sin’ goods and tinkering with administration reforms may not yield many benefits without an increase in the taxpayer base and better compliance. Large-scale, ad hoc tax exemptions are not helpful.

Third, most of the projected foreign loans may not be realised if project implementation is not drastically overhauled. Compared to the revised estimate for 2020-21, foreign loans are projected to increase by 87 percent, which is not realistic given the poor budget execution capacity and the fact that if elections happen in November, it will disrupt development activities. Meanwhile, domestic borrowing is projected to cross 5 percent of the GDP. Large domestic borrowing may sound okay, given the ample liquidity in the banking system and lack of investment opportunities for pension funds and institutional investors. However, as the situation normalises and capacity utilisation of firms improve along with demand for credit by individuals and businesses, there may be pressure on liquidity, leading to a rise in the inter-bank rate and then retail interest rates.

Fourth, the projection of foreign grants seems ambitious as sources of grants are drying up. For example, Asian Development Bank and World Bank now provide loans only, although technical assistance is principally a grant. And that most bilateral donors may not increase aid allocations given their priority to boost domestic economies ravaged by the pandemic. The government is projecting to receive a 134 percent growth in foreign grants over the 2020-21 revised estimate, which is unrealistic.

Fifth, the non-contributory allowance for the elderly, a sort of a guaranteed universal basic income, hopes to support individual or household consumption demand. However, it directly increases the government’s liability as well, because it needs to be continued for years to come. Normally, such schemes are reasonable when the economic pie is growing and there are enough resources to fund populist schemes. Increasing social protection liability by borrowing or by cutting down capital spending is not a good policy.

Finally, the real GDP growth target of 6.5 percent of GDP may a bit optimistic, given that the pandemic will continue to affect lives, livelihoods and economic activities well into the next year. There is no likelihood of sharp V-shaped recovery. Agricultural output growth might be higher than in 2020-21 with a forecast for a normal monsoon and the availability of inputs such as chemical fertilisers. Industrial output may not fully recover because capacity utilisation will not drastically increase amidst subdued demand and investment. Travel and tourism activities are unlikely to recover anytime soon without adequate healthcare measures and mass vaccination. Elections-related spending, if it happens, will add to consumption demand. Overall, GDP growth may hover around 4 to 5 percent in 2021-22.

Tuesday, June 1, 2021

Quick thoughts on Nepal’s FY2022 budget

On 29 May 2021, Finance Minister Bishnu Prasad Paudel presented FY2022 budget (mid-July 2021 to mid-July 2022). The FY2022 budget is introduced through an ordinance since the parliament was dissolved and fresh federal elections were announced for November 2021. The budget focuses on addressing healthcare challenges due to the Covid-19 pandemic— particularly testing, vaccination, and healthcare infrastructure—, social security, elections, infrastructure investment, and pandemic-related relief measures for individuals and businesses. The priority is stabilization and recovery of economic activities by addressing the immediate healthcare challenges, continuation of existing projects, and tax relief for individuals and businesses.

The budget is rolled out when the country at a critical juncture that has widely disrupted lives, livelihoods, and economic activities. In fact, economic activities are estimated to have contracted by 2.1% in FY2020 and will likely grow at around 2% (lower than 4% CBS’s provisional estimate) in FY2021, most of which will be base effect anyway. 

Much of the focus is on stabilization measures, especially for households and businesses. Increase in allowance by 33% including those for 70 and plus years old, allocation for free vaccination, continuation of refinancing facility and business continuity fund for businesses, scrapping of constituency development fund (or local infrastructure partnership program) and poverty alleviation fund, income tax relief for individuals and businesses, and promotion of electrical vehicles are some of the notable features of the budget. Some of these measures are continuation of last year’s budget. However, there are also signs of redistributive nature of the budget, without ascertaining resources, with a view of influencing voter base ahead of the federal parliamentary elections. Resources have also been allocated for preparation of detailed project reviews or feasibility studies of prospective projects such as hydropower projects and river diversion projects. That said, larger increase in federal budget (30.1%) than the increase in federal receipts (14.5%) point to a challenging fiscal management task going forward, especially fiscal consolidation and higher revenue mobilization to lower widening fiscal deficit. 

More on these later. But, let us first look at the macro-fiscal specifics:

Expenditure outlay

The total expenditure outlay for FY2022 is NRs 1647.6 billion, which is 30.1% higher than FY2021 revised estimate and 11.7% higher than FY2021 budget estimate. The government expects to spend 85.9% of NRs 1474.6 billion allocated in FY2021. However, given the expenditure trend so far, it is highly unlikely as public works have also been affected by the pandemic, especially in the last quarter of FY2021—the time when most of the work accelerates. 

FY2022 expenditure outlay comprises of NRs 1004.4 billion as recurrent expenditures (61% of the total outlay), NRs435.2 billion as capital expenditures (26.4%), and NRs208 billion as financial provision. From this year’s budget the government started reporting recurrent and capital grants to subnational governments (SNGs) separately. The earmarked recurrent and capital transfers to SNGs are NRs325.7 billion and NRs 60.9 billion, respectively. If the previous accounting was followed, i.e. all transfers in recurrent heading, then recurrent and capital expenditure in FY2021 are estimated at NRs 867.5 billion and NRs 251.2 billion, respectively. It means recurrent budget is up by 15.8% and capital budget by 73.1% over the revised estimate for FY2021. Without previous accounting (capital transfers being a part of recurrent spending), then recurrent and capital expenditures are estimated to increase by 17.1% and 48.8%, respectively. In any case, there is a large increase in capital budget. However, without a viable implementation plan and the effect of lockdowns on labor mobility and availability of supplies, it is most likely to be underspent as before.

As a share of GDP, total budget amounts to 35.1%, including 21.4% of GDP as recurrent spending and 9.3% of GDP as capital spending. As per FY2020 revised estimates, the government now expects to spend just 81.9% of planned recurrent budget and 71.3% of planned capital budget. 

FY2022 budget overview

GDP growth target (%)

6.5

 

Inflation target (%)

 

 

Budget allocation for FY2022

Rs billion

%

Projected total expenditure

1647.6

Recurrent

1004.4

61.0

Capital

435.2

26.4

Financial provision

208.0

12.6

 

Projected total receipts

1088.3

Revenue

1024.9

94.2

Foreign grants

63.4

5.8

 

Projected budget surplus (+)/deficit (-)

-559.3

 

Projected deficit financing

559.3

Foreign loans

309.3

55.3

Domestic borrowing

250.0

44.7

Receipts

A total revenue target of NRs 1025 billion (21.8% of GDP) has been set for FY2022 (or NRs 1151 billion if revenue sharing with subnational governments is included—24.5% of GDP). Foreign grants are expected to be NRs 63.4 billion (1.4% of GDP). Total federal receipts (total revenue plus foreign grants less sharing of revenue with subnational governments) turns out to be NRs 1088 billion (23.2% of GDP). The central government shares, based on monthly collections, 30% of VAT and internal excise duty, and 50% of royalties from natural resources with subnational governments. The revised estimate for federal revenue mobilization (including grants) in FY2021 is 22.3% of GDP. 

Compared to the revised estimate, revenue growth target for FY2022 is about 20%, which is ambitious in the first place due to the expected low nominal GDP growth. The government missed revenue target in FY2018, FY2019 and FY2020. In FY2021, it is expecting revenue growth of 20.9% as economic activities partially normalized and imports recovered. With an assumption of 10% nominal GDP growth for FY2022, revenue buoyancy comes to be about 2.

Given that the GDP growth target itself is a bit optimistic, and revenue administration reforms along with tinkering of excise duty on tobacco, alcohol, beer, and petroleum fuel has its own limits, it needs to be seen how this government plans to achieve the revenue target. 

Nepal’s revenue mobilization is already one of the highest among low-income countries and about 45% of it comes from taxes on international trade (primarily imports). Tax revenue is projected to be around 22.1% of GDP in FY2022, up from an estimated 20.4% of GDP in FY2021. Non-tax revenue is projected to be 2.4% of GDP. The government expects to mobilize 95% of tax revenue target for FY2021. In FY2020 it was just 75.5%.

Deficit financing

Considering the federal government’s expenditure and its share of revenue in total revenue mobilization, budget deficit turns out to be NRs 559.3 billion, which is to be financed by foreign loans equivalent to NRs 309.3 billion and domestic borrowing of NRs 250 billion. So, government’s projected revenue is able to fund only 66% of its projected expenditure for FY2022. The government expects foreign aid (grants and loans) to cover about a quarter of its expenditure needs. Domestic borrowing will cover 15% of its financing needs. 

Large domestic borrowing tends to affect market liquidity and interest rates if the government borrows aggressively to fund expenditure commitments just when economic activities start to normalize after the ebbing of infections from the second wave. The government had a plan to raise NRs 225 billion internally and NRs 299.5 billion externally in FY2021. The latest estimates show that while the goal of domestic borrowing will be met, only 55.1% of the external borrowing target will likely be realized. 

Compared to the revised estimate for FY2021, the government is planning to double net foreign borrowing (5.8% of GDP) and net domestic borrowing by 27% (4.3% of GDP). Again, without substantial improvement in budget execution capacity, it is unlikely that the government will be able to borrow the targeted amount. 

Overall, fiscal deficit (revenue incl grants minus expenditure incl net lending) is projected to increase to about 7% of GDP in FY2022, up from about 5% in FY2021. Primary deficit (fiscal deficit before interest payments) is projected to about 4% of GDP. The FY2021 budget estimate put fiscal deficit at around 7% of GDP in FY2021, but lower budget execution (both recurrent and capital spending) and near-target revenue mobilization resulted in lower deficit. When actual numbers are reported, it will probably be revised down further.

Where is recurrent budget going?

About 45.1% of planned recurrent budget of NRs 1004.4 billion is going to subnational governments (SNGs) in the form of recurrent fiscal transfer (fiscal equalization, conditional, complementary and special grants) and unconditional recurrent grants. The other big-ticket item is social security, which takes up about a quarter of the recurrent budget. Social security includes allowances, social assistance (scholarship; rescue, relief and rehabilitation, medical); social benefit of employees (pension and disability allowances, retirees related gratuity and medical assistance). The increase in allowances for 70 years and above elderly people by NRs 1000 to NRs 4000 has drastically increased allocation under this heading. Allocations for social security has been increased by 50%. About 15% of recurrent spending is earmarked for compensation of employees. Interest payments on foreign and domestic debt has drastically increased in recent years as borrowings increase to plug in widening fiscal deficit. Allocations for it increased by 27% and is estimated to be about 1% of GDP. Given the high fiscal deficit and accumulation of outstanding public debt due to the 2015 earthquake and fiscal profligacy during elections time, interest payments have been rising fast. Interest payments have more than tripled since FY2015.

The government has earmarked NRs 64.8 billion (1.4% of GDP) for use of goods and services, which also includes some of the pet projects of politicians and government. Use of goods and services consists of (i) rent & services; (ii) operation and maintenance of capital assets; (iii) office materials and services; (iv) consultancy and other services fee;(v) program expenses; (vi) monitoring, evaluation and travel expenses; (vii) recurrent contingencies; and (viii) miscellaneous. 

Where is capital budget going?

Almost 58% of the planned capital budget of NRs 435.2 billion is going for civil works, 14% as capital grants to SNGs, 13.4% for construction or purchase of buildings, and 4.1% for land acquisition. Compared to the FY2020 revised estimate, capital budget has been increased by 48% (including capital grants, it will be about 67%). 


Major takeaways from FY2022 budget

First, the budget has been designed keeping in mind two objectives: (i) addressing the immediate health crisis, particularly testing, treatment and vaccination, and (ii) upcoming parliamentary elections. The validity of the budget itself is contested by other political parties and constitutional experts as it a full-fledged budget was unveiled through an ordinance. If the Supreme Court reinstates the house of representatives again, then the fate of this budget is undecided. The new government could either adopt it or bring out a new budget. But for now, since the budget was announced just before the elections, it includes several pork-and-barrel type projects and programs to woe voters including elderly vote through increase in allowance without ascertaining resources. The budget also has allocation for projects that probably won’t be completed till the medium-term. These include Lumbini development masterplan, industrial zones, smart and mega cities, etc. So, it has both populist as well as distributive flavor. It does not spell out overall governing macroeconomic framework.

Second, since budget deficit is widening, and outstanding public debt and interest payments are increasing, it would have been good to anchor expenditure and revenue to medium-term expenditure and revenue frameworks. It is missing in the budget. Note that outstanding public debt is rising fast in Nepal, especially after FY2015. It reached 37% of GDP in FY2020, up from 23.9% of GDP in FY2015. External debt comprises of 58% of outstanding public debt. Both internal and external debt have been rising rapidly. One also needs to tally how this budget falls in line with the 15th five-year plan and to what extent projects includes in National Project Bank are incorporated. Some projects such as tunnels in highways and industrial parks have been included without much due diligence. There has to be a fiscal consolidation strategy as a part of a medium-term budget framework. 

Third, the plan of large domestic borrowing will have implications in the financial market, and most of the foreign loans may not be realized if project implementation is not drastically overhauled (well, except for policy-based lending, whose disbursement is conditional on fulfilling pre-agreed policy and institutional reforms). Budget execution has to be improved, with limited time and cost overruns, to ensure timely disbursement by multilateral donors. Compared to revised estimate for FY2021, foreign loans are expected to rise by 87% (net foreign loans by almost 100%), which is not realistic given the budget execution capacity and the fact that if elections do happen in November, it will disrupt development activities as most of the resources will be diverted to hold elections. Meanwhile, domestic borrowing is projected to cross 5% of GDP (net domestic borrowing of above 4% of GDP). Large domestic borrowing may sound okay as of now given the ample liquidity in the banking system and lack of investment opportunities for pension funds and institutional investors. However, as situation normalizes and capacity utilization of firms improves along with demand for credit by individuals and businesses, there may be a pressure on the financial market, leading to rise in inter-bank rate and then retail interest rates. 

Fourth, revenue mobilization growth target of 20% compared to FY2021 revised estimate is a bit ambitious at the moment. In fact, revenue growth has been consistently below 20% after FY2016. In FY2021, the revenue target was 22% over FY2020 revised estimate. The government has increased excise duty on sugar-based goods, tobacco, cigarettes, alcohol, beer, and petroleum fuel, among others. Just increasing rates on some non-essential goods without much efforts to reform tax administration for better services delivery and to increase tax base is not going to yield substantive results. The authorities should be thinking of new strategies to boost domestic resources mobilization: simplification of tax code, e-filing of taxes and digitization of services, improved taxpayer compliance to control leakages, proper enforcement of property tax, etc. 

To be fair, there is a sort of growth-enhancing tax policy as the budget commits to tax imported industrial inputs lower than imported final goods. Similarly, customs duty on equipment used by tea, jute, pashmina, and agricultural firms has been waived off. There are income tax exemptions of varying degree for new businesses established after the pandemic, startups, firms operating in special and industrial zones, etc. Similar exemption commitment was made in the past budgets as well, but they hardly get implemented. There are other tax rebates and concessions such as abolition of excise duty on import of electric vehicles and substantial reduction of customs duty (to encourage domestic consumption of electricity and to ensure environment-friendly transport network). Excise duty on electric vehicles ranged from 60% to 120%. 

Fifth, projection of foreign grants seem ambitious as sources of grants are drying up (ADB and WB now provide loans only although TA is principally a grant) and that most bilateral donors may not increase aid allocations given their country’s priority to boost their economies ravaged by the pandemic. The government is projecting to receive foreign grants of about NRs 63.4 billion in FY2022—a growth of 134% over FY2021 revised estimate— which has not happened in the last decade. The largest foreign grant it received was NRs 43 billion in FY2016 after the earthquakes. In FY2021, the government expected to received NRs 60.5 billion but has revised it down to NRs 27 billion. 

Sixth, cash allowance/pension (non-contributory) for 70 years and above and other allowances have been increased by 33%. Allowance to elderly is a part of social protection scheme to support individual or household consumption demand. This is like a guaranteed universal basic income for elderly people. However, it directly increases the government’s liability as well because it needs to be continued for years to come. Normally, such schemes are reasonable when the economic pie is growing and there are enough resources to fund such populist schemes. However, increasing social protection liability by borrowing loans or by cutting down capital spending is not a good policy. Against this backdrop, this tranche of increase in elderly allowance is probably aimed at influencing the voter base for the upcoming elections. In its political manifesto ahead of 2017 elections, the CPN(UML) party committed NRs5000 per month elderly allowance.

Seventh, grants or transfers to local bodies are reported under recurrent and capital grants. Earlier, grants were clubbed under recurrent expenditure only and the government used to argue that real capital spending is much higher than just capital spending because grants or transfers to local bodies under recurrent spending included conditional and unconditional capital grants as well. That said, there are still conditional and unconditional grants to government agencies, committees and boards under recurrent spending, but these are not that large (about 5% of recurrent expenditure). 

Eighth, revised budget estimate for FY2021 is optimistic given the setback in project implementation due to COVID-19 pandemic related restriction on mobility and economic activities after April 2021 (second wave) and in the first quarter of FY2021 (tail end of first wave). So, most of the numbers will be revised downward when the government presents actual numbers in the next budget.  

Ninth, real GDP growth target of 6.5% of GDP may a bit optimistic given that the pandemic will continue to affect lives, livelihoods and economic activities well into the next year. There is no likelihood of sharp V-shaped recovery. Agricultural output growth might be higher than in FY2021 given the forecast of a favorable monsoon and likely availability of inputs such as chemical fertilizers. Industrial output may not fully recover and capacity utilization may also not be drastically higher as both consumption demand and investment remain subdued. Mining and quarrying activities and construction will be slow to pick up, and manufacturing activities will also likely be at a modest pace. New addition of hydroelectricity to the national grid will jack up its growth rate. In the services sectors, travel and tourism activities are unlikely to recover anytime soon as both domestic and foreign visitors remain cautious of travel without adequate vaccination. International travel may continue to get disrupted in countries with less vaccination rates and rising covid-19 infections. Elections-related spending, if it happens, will add to consumption demand. Overall, GDP growth may hover around 4-5% in FY2022.  

Tenth, as in the previous years, the main challenge is budget execution. This will be a bit challenging during an election year, the risk of another wave of infections disrupting labor and capital mobility, slow vacation drive, and the apparent disconnect between MOF’s budget implementation directives to lines ministries and the latter’s pace and nature of work. For instance, several promises made in the previous budget were never realized. One such case is that the government promised a separate 300 bed infectious diseases hospital in Kathmandu, additional 250 intensive care unit beds at government hospitals in Kathmandu and provincial capitals, and separate infectious disease hospital in the provincial capitals. These were promised even before the deadly second wave hit the country. They remained unfulfilled. High staff turnover, political interference at management and operational levels, lack of consultant and contractor management capability, hurdles in inter-ministry and intra-ministry coordination, governance shortcomings, and a lack of project readiness will continue to impact capital spending.

So, a likely scenario at the end of the year will be that recurrent budget will be almost spent (over 90%), and capital budget will be under-spent. The government will try to borrow the full amount domestically. But, both foreign grant and loan will fall short of the target. Revenue mobilization growth will be short of target but still high enough. Eventually, fiscal deficit will be lower than projected and that the government will have treasury savings at the NRB. 

FYI, I have assumed FY2022 nominal GDP growth to be 10% and inflation to remain at around 5-6%.

Friday, May 21, 2021

A Proposal to End the COVID-19 Pandemic

Abstract from a latest IMF Staff Discussion Note by Ruchir Agarwal and Gita Gopinath:


Urgent steps are needed to arrest the rising human toll and economic strain from the COVID-19 pandemic that are exacerbating already-diverging recoveries. Pandemic policy is also economic policy as there is no durable end to the economic crisis without an end to the health crisis. Building on existing initiatives, this paper proposes pragmatic actions at the national and multilateral level to expeditiously defeat the pandemic. The proposal targets: (1) vaccinating at least 40 percent of the population in all countries by the end of 2021 and at least 60 percent by the first half of 2022, (2) tracking and insuring against downside risks, and (3) ensuring widespread testing and tracing, maintaining adequate stocks of therapeutics, and enforcing public health measures in places where vaccine coverage is low. The benefits of such measures at about $9 trillion far outweigh the costs which are estimated to be around $50 billion—of which $35 billion should be paid by grants from donors and the residual by national governments potentially with the support of concessional financing from bilateral and multilateral agencies. The grant funding gap identified by the Access to COVID-19 Tools (ACT) Accelerator amounts to about $22 billion, which the G20 recognizes as important to address. This leaves an estimated $13 billion in additional grant contributions needed to finance our proposal. Importantly, the strategy requires global cooperation to secure upfront financing, upfront vaccine donations, and at-risk investment to insure against downside risks for the world.


Thursday, May 20, 2021

Nepal's economic performance in FY2021 and outlook for FY2022

It was published in The Kathmandu Post, 17 May 2020. 


The economy has been eroding

Given the rapid spread of Covid-19, CBS’s growth projection will most likely be an overestimation.

With the deadly second wave of Covid-19 spreading throughout the country, the likelihood of a quick economic recovery as expected by the government, which until recently was insisting on achieving a 7 percent growth target, is almost nil. Economic scarring, or the persistent effect of the pandemic on economic activities, has deepened, and already weak economic fundamentals have exacerbated.

This is reflected in the recent national account data released by the Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS), which projected the country’s GDP to grow at 4 percent in 2020-21, up from a 2.1 percent contraction in 2019-20. Given the assumption behind the estimation and the rapid spread of Covid-19, CBS’s growth projection will most likely be an overestimation. The onus to stabilise economic activities and chart out a viable recovery path is now on the government, as consumption demand and private investment remain subdued.

Slower than expected

The bureau projected agricultural, industrial and services output to grow at 2.6 percent, 5 percent and 4.4 percent respectively in 2020-21. This is a reversal from industrial and services sector contraction last year. These projections are based on eight to nine months of data and the assumption that economic activities will gradually pick up from mid-May 2021 as lockdowns ease and accommodation and food service activities (basically, travel and tourism) quickly bounce back.

Agricultural output, especially paddy, is projected to increase due to a favourable monsoon and a surge in agricultural labour, thanks to reverse migration from cities due to the lockdowns. Within the industry sector, electricity, gas and utility supplies are projected to increase by 7.7 percent, substantially down from the 25.6 percent growth in 2019-20 as new hydroelectricity addition to the national grid slowed down. This is partly due to the repeated delay in the completion of the Upper Tamakoshi project.

Mining and quarrying activities are estimated to grow at 7.5 percent, up from 2.2 percent contraction in 2019-20 as mining and quarrying of stones, sand, soil and concrete affected by the lockdowns were allowed to operate after the substantial easing of lockdown restrictions in September 2020. Moreover, a boost in the construction of housing and infrastructure projects is expected to positively affect mining and quarrying activities.

Construction activities are projected to increase by 5.6 percent, up from a 5 percent contraction in 2019-20 as household, commercial and infrastructure projects pick up pace after a slack last year. Manufacturing activities, which are projected to increase by 3.9 percent from 8.6 percent contraction last year, continue to be affected by lockdowns and containment measures in addition to low private sector investment and high costs of production. Manufacturing activities might actually remain subdued at least till the medium-term.

Within the service sector, which accounts for about 54 percent of GDP, there is an expectation that high-contact activities will recover quickly. Wholesale and retail trade, transport and storage, and accommodation and food service activities are projected to increase by a rate of over 5 percent. These activities contracted the most last year. The CBS is especially bullish about the resumption of domestic tourism activities starting this month and is expecting accommodation and food service activities to grow by 11.2 percent, the highest amongst all subsectors.

Stabilisation and recovery

The latest growth projections indicate an economy that was losing steam even before the pandemic. Growth was already decreasing since a high of 9 percent in 2016-17, which itself was largely due to base effect, as economic activities came to almost a standstill in 2015-16 owing to crippling border blockade. The base effect refers to the tendency of achieving an arithmetically high rate of growth when starting from a very low base. This time, in addition to weak economic fundamentals and unrealised political and peace dividends, the inadequate infrastructure provision and a collapsed healthcare sector have laid bare economic and social vulnerabilities. Economic scarring is going to be deep, due to diminishing labour force participation, impending household and firm bankruptcies, and disruption of production networks both domestically and externally.

Given the lack of preparedness for a surge in cases (due to the overwhelmed healthcare system and a lack of adequate fiscal and monetary lifelines during the second wave) disruptions to labour, capital and product mobility, supplies disruptions, and political instability, economic activities may not actually recover beyond the base effect in 2020-21. Capacity utilisation of firms will be hit due to lockdowns, and supplies and market uncertainties will dissuade private investment, which is also being affected by political instability, bureaucratic hassles, bad governance, and low public capital spending.

A lack of employment opportunities both in the formal and informal sectors will curtail household income and consumption. Similarly, the inability of the government to boost capital spending will also affect mining and quarrying, and construction activities—thus impacting industrial growth. Manufacturing and exports are not expected to recover anytime soon. Against this backdrop and that lockdowns happened in the third and fourth quarters—the time when most economic activities take place—the economy might hardly grow. Or, it may even contract for the second year in a row.

Unfortunately, there is hardly any fiscal space left to launch temporary social protection schemes and relief measures targeted at households and businesses because the fiscal deficit is projected to hit around 6-7 percent of GDP in 2020-21. If the government allocates funds for new elections, then it might lead to a decrease in public spending as revenue mobilisation slows down in tandem with the expected decline or muted growth in economic activities.

It might also affect the banking sector, which might see demand for new credit decrease after a slight increase in the first half of the year. Firm bankruptcies due to cashflow problems and a subsequent rise in non-performing assets are real possibilities, particularly after the regulatory forbearance on loan payments is lifted and refinancing opportunities dry up. Micro, small and medium enterprises, which do not have much cash reserves to cushion against negative shocks, will bear the brunt of the crisis. It means economic and employment outlook over the medium-term do not look promising.

The upcoming budget needs to squarely focus on relief and recovery measures, and scaling up investment in the healthcare system. Given the tight fiscal conditions, only projects that can be completed in the next two to three years should be prioritised for capital investment. Furthermore, operations and maintenance of existing assets should be prioritised so that the impact on employment generation and growth is quick. This requires active reprioritisation and reallocation of spending. All expenses related to the pandemic should be listed as a separate heading in the budget so that this could be mobilised quickly and accounted for properly. This is the time for economic and livelihoods stabilisation measures. Economic recovery strategy anchored on medium-term expenditure and revenue frameworks should be included in subsequent budgets.

Monday, May 10, 2021

CBS projects Nepal's GDP to grow at 4.0% in FY2021

On 30 April 2021, Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS) estimated that Nepal’s economy will likely grow by 4% in FY2021, up from 2.1% contraction in FY2020 (this is revised estimate). The projected growth rate is far less than the government’s target of 7% owing to the severe impact of COVID-19 pandemic on economic activities and mobility of labor and capital. If we factor in the base effect, there is hardly any steam left in the economy in FY2021. The data is based on latest rebased national accounts, which are now reported in FY2011 prices instead of FY2001 prices.  FYI, fiscal year (FY) starts from mid-July of t-1 year and ends on mid-July of t year (for instance, FY2021 refers to the period between mid-July 2020 and mid-July 2021). 

According to FY2020 revised data, while industrial and services output contracted by 3.7% and 4.0%, respectively, agricultural output increased by 2.2%, which is lower than 5.2% in FY2019, owing to delayed monsoon, shortage of chemical fertilizers, use of substandard seeds, and an armyworm invasion. A country-wide lockdown in Nepal started on 24 March 2020 (which was towards the end of second month of third quarter) and lasted well into the fourth quarter. Lockdown was relaxed in September 2020. The country did not fully open at least until the end of 2020 (international travel remains restricted though).

Overall, in FY2021, agricultural, industrial and services sectors are projected to grow at 2.6%, 5.0% and 4.4%, respectively. Agricultural sector will likely contribute 0.8 percentage points, industrial sector 2.4 percentage points, and services sector 2.4 percentage points to the overall projected GDP growth of 4.0%. These projections are based on eight to nine months data and the assumption that economic activities will gradually pick up from mid-May 2021. 

Several local administrations imposed lockdown in April 2021 in response to the increasing number of Covid-19 cases as the second wave sweeps the nation. The CBS made the latest projections based on the (unrealistic) assumption that lockdowns and economic activities will ease after two weeks and that there will be substantial improvement in accommodation and food service activities (basically, domestic tourism). Given the unrealistic nature of this assumption and that most of the economic activities typically happens in the last two quarters of fiscal year, the actual growth estimate will likely be revised downward in subsequent revisions. In fact, it may actually either show contraction or near zero growth.

Agricultural output is projected to grow at 2.6%, up from 2.2% in FY2020, largely due favorable monsoon and a surge in agricultural labor (lockdowns forced reverse migration and contributed to more migrant workers’ engagement in agricultural work) having a positive effect on paddy output. 

Industrial output is projected to grow at 5.0%, up from a contraction of 3.7% in FY2020. Within industrial sector, electricity, gas and air conditioning subsector is expected to grow by 7.7%, down from 25.6% growth in FY2020 (this was due to substantial addition of new hydroelectricity to the national grid). All other industrial activities are expected to grow at a modest pace, mainly thanks to the base effect. 

Mining and quarrying activities are estimated to grow by 7.5%, up from a contraction of 2.2% in FY2020 as mining and quarrying of stones, sand, soil and concrete affected by the lockdowns were allowed to operate as restrictions eased. A boost in construction activities is expected to positively affect mining and quarrying as well. Construction activities are projected to grow by 5.6%, up from 5.0% contraction in FY2020 as supplies of construction materials normalize, and households, commercial and infrastructure projects pickup pace after a slack last year. 

Manufacturing activities are projected to increase by 3.9%, up from 8.6% contraction in FY2020. In addition to the COVID-19 related lockdowns and containment measures, manufacturing sector has been suffering from low private sector investment, and loss of both domestic and external markets due to eroding cost and quality competitiveness. Stable supply of electricity and improved industrial relations were not sufficient to drastically boost manufacturing output as expected. Manufacturing activities may not actually recover to the pre-pandemic level in the short-term. 

Electricity, gas, steam and air conditioning supply is expected to increase by 7.7%, down from 25.6% growth in FY2020, on expectation that a part of Upper Tamakoshi hydroelectricity projects will come online by mid-July 2021. Water supply, sewerage, waste management and remediation activities are expected to increase by 1.6%, down from 2.1% growth in FY2020, thanks to the expected supply of drinking water to households from the Melamchi water supply project. Both Upper Tamakoshi and Melamchi proejcts have faced multiple time and cost overruns. 

Services output is projected to grow at 4.4%, up from 4% contraction in FY2020. Last year, wholesale and retail trade; transport and storage; and accommodation and food service activities within services sector contracted as these high-contact activities were severely affected by lockdowns and social distancing rules. There was also a drastic drop in import and sale of agricultural and industrial goods. In FY2021, however, the CBS is projecting these subsectors, which together account for 22% of GDP, to bounce back (although much of it will be base effect, which refers to the tendency of achieving an arithmetically high rate of growth when starting from a very low base). Wholesale and retail activities are expected to increase by 5.6%, up from a contraction of 5% in FY2020, as supplies disruptions ease and consumer demand pickup. The CBS is also projecting transportation and storage activities to pickup pace, growing by 6.1% from a contraction of 13.4% in FY2020. This as well hinges on the assumption that travel and tourism activities will gradually recover. Accommodation and food service activities are expected to increase by 11.2%, making it the fastest growing subsector in FY2021, as domestic tourism picked up pace after the FY2020 lockdowns were eased. 

Information and communication is expected to grow by 1.5%, down from 2.3% growth in FY2020.  Financial intermediation is projected to grow by 5.8%, higher than 4.8% in FY2020, reflecting improved income of NRB, BFIs, insurance board and companies, securities board, EPF and CIF. Real estate activities are expected to increase by 2.6%, marginally up from 2.4% in FY2020. Human health and social work activities are expected to increase by 6.5%, up from 5.3% in FY2020. The other services sector activities are also expected to grow at a rate higher than in FY2020. 

On the expenditure side, consumption is expected to increase by 5.2%, up from 3.6% in FY2020. Public and private fixed investment are expected to increase by 1.6% and 8.3%, respectively, up from contraction of 4.2% and 15.1%, respectively, in FY2020. Net exports are expected to grow at 5.1%, thanks to muted imports growth but a further contraction in exports. 


Here are quick takeaways from the latest GDP projection.

First, lockdowns, supplies and travel disruptions, and social distancing rules affected almost all sectors, especially industrial and services activities. Consumption increased marginally but investment bounced back from a contraction by 29.5%. In FY2021, lockdowns in many parts of the country started in the last quarter of fiscal year. Note that most of the economic activities happen in the second half of the fiscal year, more so in the last quarter (except for in FY2019 and FY2020). 

Second, given the lack of preparedness for a surge in cases; overwhelmed healthcare system; lack of adequate fiscal and monetary lifelines during the second wave that is ravaging lives and livelihoods; slow vaccination drive; disruptions to labor, capital and product mobility; supplies disruptions; and political instability, economic activities may not actually recover beyond the base effect in FY2021. Capacity utilization of firms will be hit due to lockdowns, supplies disruption and market uncertainties. It will affect private investment. A lack of employment opportunities both in formal and informal sectors will curtain household income and consumption. Similarly, the inability of the government to boost capital spending will also affect mining and quarrying, and construction activities -- affecting the growth of industry sector. Manufacturing and exports are not expected to recovery anytime soon. Against this backdrop, the economy might hardly grow (or it may even contract for second year in a row). So, the CBS’s assumption that economic activities may not be affected much after two weeks of lockdown, i.e., mid-May 2021 (it has already been extended for two weeks more in Kathmandu valley and other parts of the country) is unrealistic. It floated the same assumption when it released provisional national accounts estimate last year. 

Third, agricultural output would have grown higher than 2.6% if it were not for the shortage agricultural inputs, mainly chemical fertilizers. Procurement of chemical fertilizers has been mired in decision-making delays and lack of advanced planning. 

Fourth, the government does not have much fiscal firepower to launch temporary social protection schemes targeted at households and businesses affected by the deadly second wave of COVID-19 that started from mid-April 2021. There is hardly any fiscal space left with fiscal deficit projected to hit around 6-7% of GDP in FY2021. If the government allocates funds for new elections, then it might lead to scaling back of public spending as revenue mobilization slows down in tandem with the expected decline or muted growth in economic activities. It might also affect the banking sector, which might see demand for new credit decrease after a slight increase in the first half of FY2021. Firm bankruptcies due to cashflow problems, and a subsequent rise in non-performing assets of BFIs are real possibilities, especially after the regulatory forbearance on loan moratorium is lifted and refinancing opportunities dry up. MSMEs, which do not have much cash reserves to cushion against negative shocks, will bear the brunt of the crisis.

Fifth, the size of Nepali economy is estimated at USD 36.1 billion. Per capita GNI of USD 1196 and per capital GDP of USD 1191. GNDI (GNI + net current transfers incl remittances) is estimated to reach 124.8% of GDP. Gross domestic savings (GDP – consumption) is around 6.6% of GDP, reflecting high level of consumption. The country’s population in FY2021 is estimated to be 30.3 million. 

Friday, April 16, 2021

COVID-19 related economic scarring

The IMF’s WEO April 2021 includes a chapter on the possible persistent effects of the pandemic on economic activities (scarring). It notes that the emerging markets and low-income countries are expected to face greater scarring due to their limited policy space to launch relief measures for struggling households and firms. It argues that the crisis could result in substantial and persistent damage to supply potential and extend scarring due to diminishing labor force participation, bankruptcies, and disruption of production networks. The longer the recession, the more likely the effects will be permanent, especially in countries with the prevalence of small firms and shallow capital markets. Persistent supply disruptions could result from the loss of economic ties in production and distribution networks as job destruction and firm bankruptcies increase— these tend to lower productivity growth and slowdown capital accumulation. These could dampen investment and employment, and cripple productivity growth for an extended period of time. 

The IMF states that although financial instabilities have been largely avoided this time and the spillovers of the pandemic’s initial impact on high contact-intensive service sectors are limited, the scale of the impact could still represent a large shock to the economy. It estimates that the global output in 2024 could be 3% lower than the anticipated pre-pandemic output. However, the degree of scarring varies by country. Policymakers could limit scarring by providing support to the most-affected sectors and workers while the pandemic is ongoing. To address long-term GDP losses, countries need to focus on remedial policies for the setback to human capital accumulation, boost investment, and support reallocation of workers and firms (retraining, reskilling, and insolvency procedures).


The COVID-19 pandemic resulted in a combination of supply and demand shocks. Pandemic-induced lockdowns reduced effective productive capacity as some firms were forced to close or operate at below capacity than usual times, and some had to reorganize production on account of physical distancing between workers, which in turn lowered productivity. The initial supply shocks spilled over to other sectors through production networks. Meanwhile, demand decreased due to reduced mobility and as precautionary savings increased amidst heightened uncertainty. The initial supply shock also led to a decline in demand as workers earned either less or were laid off outright, which decreased private savings.  

After recessions or health shocks in the past, technology adoption, employment, and capital accumulation suffered, leading to extended period of economic slowdown. For instance, unemployment continued to remain high and lowered labor force as discouraged workers exited the labor market. Extended period of unemployment affects skills deterioration, delays labor market entry for young workers, negatively affects educational achievement in the long-term (especially, parental job losses adversely affect children’s schooling and future labor market outcomes)— all affecting human capital accumulation. Similarly, recessions also dampen investment, slowing down physical capital accumulation, which affects productivity though slower technology adoption. Also, business bankruptcies permanently affect productivity due to the loss of firm-specific know-how. Decline in research and development, and increase in resource misallocation also affect productivity permanently. 

The pandemic has already caused some form of supply-side scarring from lower productive capacity and demand-side persistent preference shits. The report three particular features of the crisis on scarring:

1. Although lower than after the global financial crisis in 2008, the prospects for scarring from COVID-19 are substantial. This time there is relative financial stability following the COVID-19 shock thanks to large-scale fiscal and monetary measures. Previously, financial crisis resulted in deep recessions, which then led to persistent output losses. However, this time financial stress could easily build up as loan defaults increases after debt service moratoriums and several regulatory forbearances are phased out. These affect productivity, and efficiency of labor and capital inputs. 

Lower-skilled workers have seen a disproportionately large decline in employment and business exits of small businesses are increasing. 

2. Some sectors have not recovered after productivity shocks in the past and that the spillovers from COVID-19 shocks are still sizable (despite high-contact sectors are less central to production networks). Scars become persistent due to lower productivity growth and slower capital accumulation. 

Note that scarring in the labor market may be larger than in previous recessions because of permanent shrinkage of some high-contact sectors. For instance, some student in low-income countries may not be fully able to switch to virtual learning and this could have devastating implications on human capital accumulation. Similarly, physical capital shrinkage could also amplify scarring because of sector-specific idle capital in the case of high-contact sectors, and large corporate debt buildup that lowers investment by more leveraged firms. 

The pandemic related disruptions to upstream (from customers to focal sector of interest) and downstream (from suppliers to focal sector of interest) production networks could have knock-on effects on productivity of connected firms. Productivity could also suffer if small businesses close down in high-contact sectors but large companies strengthen their market power. The increased digitization and innovation in production and delivery processes could offset some of the adverse productivity shocks though. 

The report finds that adverse productivity shock (supply shock) in own sector results in 5% lower total gross value added for up to five years after the shock. Government spending shock is not statistically significant on total GVA. For spillover shocks, downstream effects are dominant, highlighting the importance of supply shocks arising from COVID-19. The ‘own effect’ is larger for high-contact sectors such as wholesale and retail trade, hotels and restaurants, entertainment and personal services, transportation, education, healthcare, and construction.  

3. Global losses are smaller than during the global financial crisis largely due to unprecedented policy support and contained financial stability risks. That said, medium-term output losses from the shock are still sizable, but they exhibit significant variation across economies and regions. The IMF estimates that the COVID-19 shock will lower world output by 3% in 2024 compared to the pre-pandemic projections (over the same period, output losses were 10% in the case of global financial crisis). However, emerging and developing economies will likely have deeper scars than advanced economies, thanks partly due to the larger pandemic-related fiscal responses in the latter and faster access to vaccines. Particularly, economies more dependent on travel and tourism, and those with larger service sectors, are expected to experience more persistent losses.  

Medium-term scarring is contingent on: (i) the path of the pandemic and associated containment measures, (ii) impact of the pandemic shock on high-contact sectors, (iii) adaptation capability of firms and workers to a lower-contact working environment and lower-contact transaction, and (iv) the effectiveness of policy response to limit economic damage.  

Depending on the level of fiscal space, the IMF recommends countries to 

  • Reverse setbacks to human capital accumulation and encourage employment by ensuring adequate resources for healthcare, early childhood development programs, education, worker retraining and investment in digital literacy, expansion of social safety nets, and support for displace workers.
  • Support productivity by allowing exit of nonviable firms, active labor market policies (help workers transition between jobs by retraining, public employment services, public work schemes, wage subsidies, and support for self-employment/micro-entrepreneurs), and facilitate resource reallocation (to improve labor mobility and reduce product market rigidities). Other measures include promotion of competition, innovation and technology adoption. 
  • Boost investment in infrastructure, particularly green infrastructure to help crowd-in private investment. Repairing corporate balance sheet to reduce debt overhand will also promote investment. Improved bankruptcy and debt restructuring mechanisms help to reallocate productive capital.