Climate Change, Agriculture and Poverty
Although much has been written about climate change and poverty as distinct and complex problems, the link between them has received little attention. Understanding this link is vital for the formulation of effective policy responses to climate change. This paper focuses on agriculture as a primary means by which the impacts of climate change are transmitted to the poor, and as a sector at the forefront of climate change mitigation efforts in developing countries. In so doing, the paper offers some important insights that may help shape future policies as well as ongoing research in this area.
How do governments respond to food price spikes? Lessons from the past
Food prices in international markets spiked upward in 2008, doubling or more in a matter of months. Evidence is still being compiled on policy responses over the following two years, but lessons can be learned from the price spike in 1973, the magnitude and speed of which were similar to those experienced around the 2008 spike. In developing countries, policy responses to the earlier spike lowered the (negative) nominal assistance coefficient for agriculture by one-third between 1972 and 1974 before it was returned to the same level by 1976. That was twice the extent of the fall and recovery of the (positive) nominal assistance coefficient for high-income countries. However, the trade and welfare effects of those changes were much less for developing than high-income countries, suggesting the dispersion of distortion rates among farm industries decreased in developing countries. The adjustments were virtually all due to suspension and then reinstatement of import restrictions, with changes in export taxation by developing countries playing an additional (but minor) role during 1972-74. This beggar-thy-neighbor dimension of each government’'s food policies is worrying because it reduces the role that trade between nations can play in bringing stability to the world’'s food markets. More effort appears to be needed before a multilateral agreement to desist can be reached.
The Economic Consequences of “Brain Drain” of the Best and Brightest
Brain drain has long been a common concern for migrant-sending countries, particularly for small countries where high-skilled emigration rates are highest. However, while economic theory suggests a number of possible benefits, in addition to costs, from skilled emigration, the evidence base on many of these is very limited. Moreover, the lessons from case studies of benefits to China and India from skilled emigration may not be relevant to much smaller countries. This paper presents the results of innovative surveys which tracked academic high-achievers from five countries to wherever they moved in the world in order to directly measure at the micro level the channels through which high-skilled emigration affects the sending country. The results show that there are very high levels of emigration and of return migration among the very highly skilled; the income gains to the best and brightest from migrating are very large, and an order of magnitude or more greater than any other effect; there are large benefits from migration in terms of postgraduate education; most high-skilled migrants from poorer countries send remittances; but that involvement in trade and foreign direct investment is a rare occurrence. There is considerable knowledge flow from both current and return migrants about job and study opportunities abroad, but little net knowledge sharing from current migrants to home country governments or businesses. Finally, the fiscal costs vary considerably across countries, and depend on the extent to which governments rely on progressive income taxation.
