Saturday, June 11, 2011

State of Nepali banking system & a case for new BFI relief program

The Nepal Rastra Bank, Nepal’s central bank, acting as a lender of last resort, extended short-term loan of Rs 500 million to the troubled Vibor Development Bank. This is the latest saga of troubled banks in Nepal. Earlier, six BFIs landed were in the red: Gorkha Development Bank, Samjhana Finance, United Development Bank, Nepal Share Markets, Nepal Bangladesh Bank, and Nepal Development Bank were in trouble. The central bank liquidated Nepal Development Bank, restructured Nepal Bangladesh Bank, and is taking corrective management measures in others. These kinds of episodes are going to pop up again if decisive measures are not taken soon.

Status of bank and financial institutions (BFIs)

There are over 295 BFIs, including 31 commercial banks, 78 development banks, 79 finance companies and 18 microfinance institutions. While deposits at commercial banks stand at around Rs 642 billion (as of April 2011), development banks and finance companies have deposits around Rs 56 billion and 67 billion respectively (as of mid-July 2009). Loans and advances of development banks stand at Rs 52 billion and that of finance companies at 70 billion (as of mid-July 2009).

As of April 2011, the estimated total deposit in commercial banks was Rs 642 billion. Of this demand deposits, savings deposits, and fixed deposits account for 12%, 36%, and 52% respectively. The commercial banks have borrowed Rs 15.8 billion. They have liquid funds of Rs 114 billion (cash in hand is just 16.2 billion and deposits with NRB Rs 39.3 billion). Meanwhile, loans and advances of commercial banks stand at Rs 655 billion. Of this claims on government and on private sector account 12.7% and 84.3% respectively.

Commercial bank’s deposit rate ranges from 2-12 percent as of April 2011, and loan from 7-18 percent. Interbank transaction rate is as high as 10.2 percent.

Over 72 percent of commercial bank’s credit flows against fixed assets. Lending to land and buildings sector account for over 58 percent of total loans.

Total loans was around 52 percent of GDP (at producer’s current prices) as of mid-July 2009.

------

What is the problem?

There is liquidity crunch in the market. Interest on inter-bank lending has been above 10 percent. Overall, over 50 percent of total loans is going to land and housing sector. This is a huge risk. Loan portfolio of the BFIs is in terrible shape, with concentration in a few sectors. As the number of BFIs multiplied unnaturally (it was not matched by the growth rate of customer base--according to a 2006 survey, only 26% of households have bank account), there was and is intense competition to entice individual, institutional and government deposits. This means that there is an informal war of offering high interest rates on deposits. Many outlandish deposit schemes were invented. The Nepal Banker’s Association (NBA) even tried to cap interest rates with a “gentlemen's agreement”.

Meanwhile, loan was doled out to few sectors as there wasn’t (and isn’t) much investment opportunities. Since deposit rates were already high, the lending rates had to be higher to make up for ever-increasing profit target. This was assuaged by NRB’s easy monetary policy, lax supervision (by near-retiring officials who had expectations of moving into private sector banking) and inflow of remittances, which is approximately one-fourth of GDP right now. Easy loans and financing measures led to real estate and housing bubbles in urban centers. But, real estate bubble started to lose air since the end of last year. Borrowers could not payback interest and principal in time, which meant increase in lending interest rates as penalty and doling out more new loans to pay previous loans.

The BFIs are in trouble because each time they had to provide additional loans to cover up previous interest and principal payments. At some point there won’t be enough deposits and money circulating around to dole out new loans to cover up previous ones. Profits get squeezed and depositors can’t get their own money when bank’s vaults are empty. Thus there is (and will be)  a crisis, whose cause is perceived to be liquidity crunch instead of fundamental mismatch among deposits, lending, risk management and available stock of money.

In principal, there was both adverse selection and moral hazard. First, since lending interest rate is too high, the pool of borrowers are always those that play with high risk. So, BFIs lent money to a lot of borrowers without assessing if they can payback loans to the banks. This was a gamble they played because of their incompetence and lack of banking knowledge (especially board of directors and management who ran after short term profits against long term viability). Second, after the loan was given on certain terms and conditions, borrowers simply reneged on those. The BFIs cannot control that. Borrowers simply default if things get nasty. Also, some borrowers were simply not able to payback due to decline in real estate and housing prices.

BFIs mushrooming in Nepal

The initiation of formal banking system in Nepal commenced with the establishment in 1937 of Nepal Bank Limited (NBL), the first Nepalese commercial bank.The country's central bank, Nepal Rastra Bank (NRB) was established in 1956 by Act of 1955, after nearly two decades of NBL’s existence. A decade after the establishment of NRB, Rastriya Banijya Bank (RBB), a commercial bank under the ownership of the Government of Nepal was established. After the financial liberalization in the 80s, a third commercial bank in Nepal, or the first foreign joint venture bank, was set up as Nepal Arab Bank Ltd( now called as NABIL Bank Ltd ) in 1984. Following this , two foreign joint venture banks, Nepal Indosuez Bank Ltd (now called as Nepal Investment Bank) and Nepal Grindlays Bank Ltd (now called as Standard Chartered Bank Nepal Ltd.) were established in 1986 and 1987 respectively.

In 1983 and 1993 there were two and eight commercial banks respectively, and by January 2006 there were 17, including joint ventures. There were 4 development banks in 1993, which swelled to 29 in 2006. Finance companies came into existence in 1992 and by January 2006, they numbered 63.

Now, there are over 295 BFIs, including 31 commercial banks, 78 development banks, 79 finance companies and 18 microfinance institutions.

This is like Nepali BFIs on steroids and the NRB being its doctor just waited to cure the disease instead of preventing it from happening at the first place.

What about delay in development expenditure?

Since fiscal budgets have been coming out late for two years now, there has not been proper and normal flow of money from MoF and other ministries to the respective corners of the country via the banks. It is reducing liquidity in banking system. But, this itself is not a prime cause of liquidity crunch. This is a minor stimulant to the liquidity problem. We simply have way too many BFIs catering to too few customers, meaning that in order to survive and meet higher profit targets, they have to have constant flow of money from all sources that also in HIGHER proportion than previous flows. The problem largely is of the BFIs themselves, not the delay in budget and development expenditures.

What about the NRB?

The NRB definitely made a mistake initially by letting way too many BFIs pop up and by not complementing this with strengthening of regulatory and supervisory capabilities. It was already too little, too late when it started clamping down on the errant BFIs and correcting the course of the banking system. That being said, credit has to be given to the present governor Dr. Yuba Raj Khatiwada for his active and decisive role in righting the deviants.

Why is it happening now?

Because of cutthroat and dirty competition. There are too many BFIs (some A category banks are too big given their loan portfolio) and not a proportional increase in depositor base and investment opportunities. High profit targets meant that lending rates shot up the roof (that also arbitrarily jacking up rates via SMS and phone calls) and loans were doled out without properly assessing creditworthiness. The main source of income for BFIs is real estate and housing sector loans. Loans were doled out without properly differentiating junk and subprime loans from not-so-risky loans. Loan and risk portfolios of BFIs were and are not adequately diversified.

But, real estate and housing sectors are cooling off right now, especially in major urban centers. Borrowers are finding difficult to honor interest and principal in time. The BFIs are seeing squeeze in profits, making shareholders and board of directors angry for not meeting profit targets. Already, inter-bank lending is close to the mean of various lending rates. The BFIs with limited deposits but excessive exposure to one or two sectors are feeling the heat as big banks with comfortable deposits and loan portfolios are refusing to lend them more money. Hence, the crisis that was bubbling underneath is surfacing, unnerving the banking sector and the NRB. The failure to borrow money from banks themselves despite high inter-bank rates is acute now, and the big institutional depositors are pulling money out of B and C category BFIs and putting them in A category banks. This happened at the same time and is the problem is precipitating now. This was to happen sooner or later.

Were we warned before?

Yes. The warning bell rang when the issue of willful defaulters and excessive NPL popped up in 2006. Then came successive banking fiascos with excessive risk taking and liquidation of Nepal Development Bank (in fact, NDB’s financial position was a headache a decade before it was liquidated). Then came the ceiling of salary of CEOs and real estate loans. It was followed by a warning about the impending financial disaster. The NRB knew it better than anyone else. But, it still waited too long to take decisive action. Now, the governor is showing strong resolution to tackle this issue. There will be pains in BFIs but ultimately gains to the country, if corrective actions are taken.

What have the central bank and government done so far?

It liquidated Nepal Development Bank and forced management changes and restructuring in couple of other troubled banks. It extended Rs 500 million loan against good loans and assets of Vibor. It capped real estate and housing loans. It regulated salary of CEOs to dampen excessive risk taking. Now, it has opened a special refinancing facility for 120 days with 7 percent interest rate (below the inter-bank lending rate). The commercial banks, development banks and finance companies can now receive refinancing facility up to 60 percent of their core capital to manage liquidity. Previously, the central bank was providing refinancing (up to 40 percent of core capital) only to facilitate lending in the productive sector at lower interest rate.

In 2006, major commercial banks were rattled by loan defaults, especially by big business groups and businessmen. Six banks identified 80 businessmen that had defaulted Rs 12 billion. They were blacklisted and various measures were taken to recover loans.

Is this enough?

No, it is not. The latest moves by the central bank is geared toward restoring market confidence and to calm down worried depositors, whose increasing anxiety might lead to run on of not only fragile BFIs, but also banks with strong deposit and loan portfolio management. The latest NRB move is just a band aid to a deeper problem. Such refinancing, whose ultimate guarantor is the taxpayer if the central bank fails to recover loans, is going to, hopefully, avert systemic risk posed by the failure of a handful of B and C category financial institutions. The core of the problem is that Nepal has way too many BFIs, which mushroomed like malls around the country.This came without a proportional increase in depositors base (according to a 2006 survey, only 26% of households have bank account). It meant cutthroat competition to entice the same customers  (depositors and borrowers) nastily and disastrously playing with interest rates.

What is the solution?

I think short term refinancing schemes are not going to solve the core problem.  Nepal will see many BFIs (especially B, C and D categories) going belly up in the coming days. This might be systemic and could engulf even the BFIs with healthy balance sheets. There are too many junk and subprime loans in the banking sector. Risks are not adequately diversified. It is a recurrent problem and is going to resurface within weeks of dry up of refinancing facilities. The Nepali banking sector needs a clean up and the janitor cannot be BFIs themselves who mistakenly believe that a refinancing would give them a chance to restructure their loan portfolio within a quarter; it has to be the NRB and the MoF.

The existing banking problem is not the usual yada yada about the banking sector troubles and refinancing schemes. It is much more serious than that. I think Nepal should have something like ‘Troubled BFI Relief Program’. It should be a unit under the NRB and the MoF with initial capital equivalent to total loan of BFIs in the two most exposed sectors or the total value of junk and subprime loans of BFIs. The NRB and government should chip in 90 percent and the BFIs 10 percent to the fund (may be it can be taxed on such loans; the source and amount of fund for this program has to be adequately discussed as it might be equivalent to half the annual fiscal budget if it is made equivalent to the amount of loan in the two most exposed sectors). The main purpose would be to rescue and restructure troubled BFIs so that the problem is not systemic and depositors are not induced to run on a bank.

If troubled BFIs seek help from the NRB or the government, then they should be directed to use the facilities provided through this program. When they do, they will be forced to undergo structural changes. The program could have authority to sell assets, change management, force merger or acquisition, hold majority of shares until it returns to a healthy state, and so on AFTER the BFIs knock on its doors for assistance. It should eventually lead to fewer and healthy BFIs (note that oligopolistic competition in the banking industry fosters stability and innovation) and averting a situation where profits are private but losses are social.The program can be made profitable if designed and operated properly. It won’t and shouldn’t be a burden to taxpayers.

A program like this one is needed because the NRB cannot simply extend loans and refinancing at the expense of taxpayers’ money and by increasing money supply. Meanwhile, the BFIs also cannot inflict damage to third party due to their own shortcomings. This could be a permanent solution to the recurring problem. It should last as long as the BFIs and banking system are not cleaned. Later on it could be given more teeth such as supervisory or advisory role on fine-tuning of banking sector. Unless a program like this is created Nepal will continue to see troubled BFIs and worried depositors anxious to pull their deposits out of the banks and purchase commodities like gold and silver. The refinancing schemes cannot solve the recurrent problem.

Sounds like a crazy idea, but something like this is needed in Nepali banking sector. We can’t afford to play cat-and-mouse game time and again.

Vibor Development Bank gets rescued

The Nepal Rastra Bank, Nepal’s central bank, acting as a lender of last resort, extended short-term loan of Rs 500 million to the troubled Vibor Development Bank. The bank itself asked for either a liquidity injection or management takeover by the central bank just two days ago.

NRB has instructed Vibor to take a number of corrective actions such as appointment of separate individuals as chairman and chief executive; to send VBB into forced merger and asked it to sign a merger MOU with some other financial institution within the next three months; to downsize staff; to not offer salary to executive chairman until the bank is reformed; and to reform within one-and-a-half month and pay loan within six months. Along with agreeing to these set of tough conditions, the troubled VBB has pledged a number of collaterals for the loan, including good loans worth Rs 700 million and a plot of land worth Rs 350 million at Kamalpokhari, according to media reports. Vobor’s deposits presently stand at around Rs 3.06 billion, whereas its loans and advances total Rs 2.26 billion; real estate loan amounts to Rs 1.40 billion. It has investments in about half a dozen assets-related projects.

This is the latest saga of troubled banks in Nepal. Earlier, six BFIs landed in red: Gorkha Development Bank, Samjhana Finance, United Development Bank, Nepal Share Markets, Nepal Bangladesh Bank, and Nepal Development Bank were in trouble. The central bank liquidated Nepal Development Bank, restructured Nepal Bangladesh Bank, and is taking corrective management measures in others.

I will post detail discussion about state of Nepali banking sector in later posts.

Thursday, June 9, 2011

Vibor Development Bank is in trouble


In yet another spate of financial turmoil, Vibor Bikas Bank (VBB) -- a national level development bank -- has become the latest financial institution to seek emergency management takeover by the central bank, Nepal Rastra Bank (NRB) to avert a looming financial meltdown.

A delegation of Nepal Bankers Association and Vibor Bank´s CEO Ajaya Ghimire formally approached two Deputy Governors of NRB Gopal Kafle and Maha Prasad Adhikari on Wednesday and requested for management takeover.

Refusing to take over the troubled bank, the NRB suggested to the members of the NBA to help Vibor by resuming stalled inter-bank lending.

The bankers refused to buy the idea. “The bank is seriously in crisis. Who will risk themselves by providing loans to it against land or house, which are not selling these days?” said a banker.


Here is the full story. Someone named Sam Clifford is placing the whole blame on “acute liquidity crunch”. While Sam chides at the reporter for not checking Vibor’s balance sheet at the office, he does not deny the fact that the bank’s CEO and NBA officials knocked on the doors of NRB for help. This means, plain and simple, Vibor is in trouble right now. You can’t blame liquidity crunch to justify your imprudent investment portfolio that is putting the entire institution in troubled waters. Why are other development banks not pleading for NRB’s assistance? Why is Vibor knocking NRB’s door NOW? It is because it is in trouble and does not have confidence on its own balance sheets. No doubt.

Meanwhile, this is what I wrote in January:


While the latter (NRB) ignored the unhealthy development in financial sector, let new BFIs prop up without even evaluating if our economy needs so many of them, and took damage control measures of late, the former (BFI) is in desperation to survive amidst cutthroat competition, which is getting nasty by the day. The BFIs’ inability to effectively cope with the existingpressure on deposit and lending, and to attain unsustainable profit targets might lead to a situation where all profits are private but losses are social, i.e. taxpayers pay the cost of reckless behavior of few sectors in the economy.

Looking at the existing business structure of the real estate and housing sector and the BFIs, it is very likely that their unjustified growth will end soon, raising fear of destabilizing not only the very conduit from where the public is facilitated with credit but also derailing the entire economy. The existing path on which these two sectors are hurtling toward bears the hallmark of the recent housing, financial, and economic crises in the West. It all starts with pumping of too much money in one sector, which after few years of unnatural and unsustainable growth crashes down and puts pressure on the BFIs, leading to defaults, extremely vulnerable financial institutions, and squeezing of credit to all sectors in general.

[…]

The development in the housing and real estate sector and the ad hoc decisions of the BFIs do not augur well for the economy. We might end up with empty apartments and ‘ghost’ houses if things continue to go the way they are going right now. Playing with interest rates on loans and savings is just an attempt to buy time before the inevitable disaster hits the BFIs. It is good to acknowledge and rectify mistakes before it is too late.

The tendency to seek short term gains over long term sustainability is a recipe for disaster with severe negative externalities, i.e. it will not only affect the BFIs, but also the public who are not a direct party to the activities of financial sector, and real estate and housing sector. Before these two sectors put the entire economy at risk, strong safeguards should be put in place. It might mean making painful decision of letting some BFIs to either fail (remember Nepal Development Bank?) or forced to merge, and help to rapidly cool down the urban-centric real estate and housing sector.


I see as situation where profits are private and losses are social in the Nepali banking system. The fault squarely lies in the BFIs (and some to NRB) itself. The financial crisis will deepen further without NRB’s activism to mitigate fears and clamps down on BFI’s indiscipline to manage their own books. Expect more troubled time in the Nepali banking sector.

Wednesday, June 8, 2011

Endeavour shuttle docked to the ISS

This amazing picture shows Endeavour shuttle docking to International Space Station (ISS), which is moving across the surface of the Earth at a speed of 27,000km/h (17,000mph) and at an altitude of approximately 355km (220 miles).

Here are more amazing pictures.

Caption: This image of the International Space Station and the docked space shuttle Endeavour, flying at an altitude of approximately 220 miles, was taken by Expedition 27 crew member Paolo Nespoli from the Soyuz TMA-20 following its undocking on May 23, 2011 (USA time). The pictures are the first taken of a shuttle docked to the International Space Station from the perspective of a Russian Soyuz spacecraft.

Tuesday, June 7, 2011

Value-added as a better measure of trade

With the rise in global value chains (international supply chains) it seems more reliable to judge trade and competition based on value-added during each step of manufacturing process than total value of final products imported or exported from countries. Pascal Lamy argues that concluding on the scale of competition from existing volume of imports overstates the competition between trading countries’ factors of production. Focusing on total value of exports or imports gives a distorted picture of trade imbalances. We need to look at domestic value addition to gauge that. It would change the debate on macroeconomic imbalances and exchange rate changes.


[…] The question of “who produces what for whom”, and “where the value added is accruing” are perhaps as important as the traditional concept of country of origin, which guides not only custom statistics, but the application of the core WTO principle of Most Favoured Nation.

[…] with the fragmentation of production, the share of value added by factors of production of the origin country in traded products is considerably lower than in the past. This growth in the trade of parts and components means that import statistics will overstate the degree of competition that comes from one’s trade partners.

[…] by focusing on gross values of exports and imports, traditional trade statistics also gives us a distorted picture of trade imbalances between countries. The picture would be different if we took account of how much domestic valued added is embedded in these flows.

[…]correcting macroeconomic imbalances does not pass through correcting bilateral trade deficits, as the use of trade statistics in value added clearly reveals.

[…]When products include many parts made in many other countries, the effect of an isolated exchange rate appreciation or depreciation to the selling price in export markets will be reduced to the domestic content of these exports, to its “value added content”.  This may explain why empirical studies about the impact of exchange rate changes on imbalances tend to show they only have limited or ambiguous effects.


Here is a webpage related to analyzing trade in value added. Below is the trade balance in iphones for the US (US$ million). With traditional measure the trade balance concerns only with China. But, with value added measure, US trade deficit with China in iphone is very low and is spread across many countries (US trade deficit with Japan is the highest in iphone).

US trade balance in iphones
(US$ million, 2009)

China

Japan

Korea,
Rep. of

Germany

Rest of
world

World

Traditional measure

-1,901.2

0

0

0

0

-1,901.2

Value added measure

-73.5

-684.8

-259.4

-340.7

-542.8

-1,901.2

Source: Miroudot, S., Global Forum on Trade Statistics, 2-4 April 2011 (*)

Sunday, June 5, 2011

Incentives matter: In defense of Nepalese civil servants

A majority of Nepali people have the habit of blaming the civil servants, bureaucrats and public institutions for their miseries. They are partially right. The day-to-day operations of public institutions are run by civil servants and bureaucrats. The public has to deal with them to get past red tapes and to basically get anything done that requires the Government of Nepal’s seal. The civil servants are at times rude and openly speak of ‘fast track services’ involving unethical practices. This is prevalent in pretty much every public institution you can think of.

Why are such tendencies rampant within our public institutions? The answer lies in the way they were/are built and governed, insufficient public sector wages, and unwarranted political interference. The last one is the worst of all evils, which is killing all incentives to perform better, instilling a culture of inefficiency, and treating consumers as slaves when they should be treated as kings.

These factors are eroding the morale of civil servants and making them inefficient. The initially honest civil servants, who struggle hard to pass the Public Service Commission examination, plunge headlong into corrupt and illogical environment where they find it hard to live by their principles and morals. They get consumed by the corrupt institutional structure, evil machinations of political leaders and union bosses. Those brave enough to challenge the system are faced with a situation where they are forced to quit; others succumb to it until they retire.

Let me give an example of how the state of our public institutions erodes incentives and efficiency of civil servants. Take a tour of the Department of Mines and Exploration, which comes under the Ministry of Industry (MoI). The building looks like it has never been painted since being constructed. The hallway leading to the office of the undersecretary stinks horribly bad, probably because the toilet has not been cleaned for days. Water is dripping from pipes hung on the ceiling. The walls are dilapidated and floors are not properly swept. The smart, energetic undersecretary is given a room that has an old computer which takes minutes to boot up. It consists of a simple desk with a Nepali language newspaper, few documents and a telephone on it. It is irrational on our part to expect professionalism and efficiency from this civil servant when his working space is worse than that of a receptionist in a private firm or I/NGO.

The sorry state of office used by this undersecretary is not an isolated case. Visit offices inside Singha Durbar itself. The first floor occupied by the Ministry of Commerce and Supplies and the MoI stinks of dirty toilet nearby while the parking area is littered with broken bricks and torn papers. The floors of the building have not been properly wiped, and the civil servants’ offices are cramped, messy with inadequate lights. Some workers do not even have computers. They are surrounded by piles of documents improperly stacked in folders. The staffs are not properly dressed and look perennially disconsolate and listless. Under such conditions, how on earth will the morale of civil servants be high and how can we expect them to be professional?

No wonder the productivity of our civil servants and corruption in public institutions are one of the worst in South Asia. The regretful state of our public institutions and the facilities in there are a big disincentive for civil servants to work hard and be efficient. That being said, do not make the mistake of jumping down to the conclusion that all public institutions are like this. Some of the offices that get loads of donor money and good yearly budget allocations are no less well-off and equipped than private sector offices. But, that is a different story for later.

While the sorry state of our public buildings and inadequate facilities are part of the story accounting for inefficiency of our civil servants, insufficient wage is another major incentive-killer. The salary and benefits of civil servants do not even come close to the one received by their counterparts in private sectors and I/NGOs. It is hard for a civil servant to live in major urban areas with just, on an average, Rs 15,000 a month. Since inflation is already pretty high, their real purchasing power is decreasing. This means it is even harder for them to keep up with normal household expenses, coupled with health and education costs of their children. Given such conditions, civil servants have every incentive to earn extra money from other means, which usually constitutes unethical practices like taking bribes. This partially explains the inefficiency and delay to get anything done from our public institutions.

The biggest evil of all is political interference by selfish and uneducated politicians who have no idea about the value of and respect for competent civil servants and meager salary they earn with respect to their workload. Instead, our civil servants are humiliated by the politicians time and again. Some politicians slap high-level district officials for not sending comfy vehicles to pick them up from district airports; some place unqualified and incompetent party cadres to high-level positions in public institutions, while honest civil servants work for years to get promoted; some forcefully take luxurious vehicles from virtually bankrupt institutions; some arbitrarily transfer civil servants to offices that have nothing do with their acquired knowledge and experience; and some send receipts of personal expenses to be paid by insolvent state-owned enterprises.

The civil servants are compelled to comply with and adjust to these kinds of undeserved demands. It is imprudent on our part to expect that the balance sheets and public sector books be clean when the devils of disasters are prying on the efficacy of our civil servants.

Blaming them for all the wrongs in public institutions is injudicious and bigoted analysis. The blame should be directed to the working condition and those who are disinclined to change it for good, paltry wage and excessive politicization of bureaucracy.

[Published in Republica, June 4, 2011, p.6]


Friday, June 3, 2011

Food insecurity and trade in South Asia

[This was published in Trade Insight, Vol.1, No.7, 2011, pp.20-24]


Food Insecurity: Can Trade Address It?

Chandan Sapkota

Food insecurity is a major national as well as regional issue in South Asia. Most of the countries in the region are reeling under high food prices, which are pushing up overall inflation, and deficit food production. Food-price inflation is having a negative impact on poverty reduction[1], progress in achieving the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), and overall macroeconomic balance. Given this mounting problem closely linked to the livelihood and survival of mil- lions of people in the region that has the largest number of poor people in the world, ensuring food security is a pressing concern.

Solving the problem of food insecurity has become even more imperative in South Asia because the region’s total population is expected to be 2.3 billion in 2050 (up from 1.6 billion in 2011), but the area would remain the same (4.8 million sq.km).[2] This is equivalent to about one–fourth of the total projected world population in 2050. Furthermore, by 2050, South Asia will have the highest population density (486.8 persons per sq. km) of all the regions in the world. Increasing agriculture productivity and smoothening supply within and across borders are vital to ensuring food security for such a large population.

While there are many factors that are causing food prices to rise at the national, regional and global levels, one of the ways to mitigate the impact—with regard to access, availability and price volatility—is to facilitate agriculture trade by removing trade restrictions and by enhancing cooperation on smoothening the flow of agriculture goods from surplus to food deficit nations. It should, however, be realized that achieving food security is a multidimensional task that involves international trade as well as, inter alia, new technology and input availability, environmentally sustainable farming and appropriate supply management practices.[3]

This article examines the extent of agriculture trade, food insecurity and agriculture trade restrictions in South Asia.

Agriculture trade

Intra-regional trade in South Asia is low when compared to other regional blocs such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the European Union. South Asia’s intra-regional merchandise exports (imports) were about 5.6 percent (2.5 percent) of its total world merchandise exports (imports) in 2009. However, the share of intra-regional trade in agriculture goods is higher. In 2009, agriculture exports within South Asia were around 12.8 percent of the region’s total world agriculture exports.[4]

Specifically, intra-regional exports of food stuffs—that is, meat products, sugar, cocoa, cereal products, vegetable products, beverages, and residual and waste from food industries—were 17.2 percent of South Asia’s total food stuff exports to the world. Likewise, South Asia’s intra-regional agriculture imports accounted for 8.5 percent of its total global agriculture imports. Notably, intra-regional imports of animal and animal products made up 22.2 percent of the region’s total world imports of such products (Table 1).

Table 1: Agriculture exports and imports within South Asia (percentage of region's export & import to world)* [5]
Intra regional exports
Commodity group 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Animal & animal products 3.78 4.25 3.98 4.32 4.73
Vegetable products 17.52 14.87 16.04 15.95 13.92
Food stuff 14.95 26.41 17.33 16.46 17.2
Intra regional imports 
Commodity group 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Animal & animal products 20.83 19.68 16.77 21.22 22.18
Vegetable products 11.67 10.98 10.82 7.86 6.67
Food stuff 11.3 33.64 35.73 37.29 15.61

Source: Author’s computation using UN Comtrade database; *UN Comtrade database (HS 2002 classification). Animal & animal products (Chapters 1–4); vegetable products (Chapters 6–15); and food stuff (Chapters 16–23).

As a share of the country’s total agriculture trade with the world, Bhutan mostly exports to and imports from South Asia. The figures are also high for Afghanistan and Nepal. The other countries trade less with South Asian neighbours relative to their total trade with the world (Table 2). While Afghanistan trades mostly with Pakistan, Bhutan and Nepal trade mostly with India. The low share of intra-regional agriculture trade for other countries suggests that either there is low complementarity in agriculture trade within the region or the market structure with regard to price, quality and volume is unattractive.

Table 2: Intraregional agriculture trade (share of world trade), 2009
Country Export Import
Afghanistan 66.78 14.04
Bangladesh* 4.35 19.46
Bhutan 94.03 97.49
India 9.83 3.92
Maldives** 9.67 36.27
Nepal 79.2 37.76
Pakistan 18.71 9.58
Sri Lanka 7.99 21.74

Source: Author’s computation using UN Comtrade database; *2007; **2008

Overall, India and Sri Lanka have trade surplus in agriculture goods. Bhutan had surplus in 2008, but a deficit of about US$5 million the following year. While agriculture trade deficit of Afghanistan, Bangladesh, the Maldives and Nepal is increasing, Pakistan saw a decrease in deficit in 2009 when compared to the previous year (Table 3).

Table 3: Total agriculture trade balance (million US$)
Country 2008 2009
Afghanistan -18.01 -30.94
Bangladesh* -190.03 -306
Bhutan 16.19 -4.95
India 1086.6 340
Maldives** -7.01 -8.94
Nepal*** -15.71 -27
Pakistan -113.88 -54.85
Sri Lanka 19.13 41.43

Source: Author’s computation using UN Comtrade database (Chapters 1-23 considered as agriculture goods); *Figures for Bangladesh correspond to 2006 and 2007;**Maldives 2007 and 2008; ***Nepal 2003 instead of 2008

Food security

Food prices have been surging in all South Asian countries since 2007, not only impacting macroeconomic stability, but also pushing millions of people below the poverty line. Food prices have been rapidly increasing in most of the countries following a convergence in their growth rate in 2003 (Figure 1). In the recent period, food price inflation in Pakistan, followed by Nepal, is the highest in South Asia. Apart from adversely affecting poverty reduction efforts in the region, rising food prices also slow down the progress being made in achieving the MDGs.

Figure 1: Growth rates of food price index in South Asia (%)

Source: ADB. 2010. Key Indicators for Asia and the Pacific 2010. Manila: Asian Development Bank

It is estimated that a 10 percentage increase in food prices will increase the number of poor people (millions) living below US$1.25-a-day by 3.8, 0.01, 22.8, 6.7, 0.6, 3.5, and 0.2 in Bangladesh, Bhutan, rural India, urban India, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka, respectively.[6] The impact of higher food prices is severe because South Asian people, on average, spend more than half of their income on food consumption. Higher prices/price instability without a corresponding purchasing power, reduce savings and increase vulnerability. It is estimated that an average person in Bangladesh, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka spends, respectively, 56.05 percent, 57.88 per- cent, 46.99 percent and 63.55 percent of his/her total expenditure on food.[7] With total South Asian population projected to reach 1.9 billion in 2025 and 2.3 billion in 2050, food insecurity will intensify if agriculture production does not keep pace with population growth.

Food insecurity and price instability affect hunger and malnutrition. Though the state of hunger in South Asia has improved when compared to the level in 1990, it is still high. According to Global Hunger Index 2010[8], the hunger situation in Bangladesh and India has improved from “extremely alarming” to “alarming”, and in Pakistan and Sri Lanka from “alarming” to “serious”. The state of hunger in Nepal, however, has remained the same: “alarming”. Overall, hunger in South Asia is “alarming” and worse than in Sub-Saharan Africa.

Undernourishment is also a major concern in the region. Almost 26 percent of the population in Bangladesh is undernourished. The figures (percentage of the population that is undernourished) for India, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka are 22, 16, 23, and 21 respectively. Similarly, a large proportion of children under five years are underweight. It is as high as 43.5 percent in India and as low as 21.1 percent in Sri Lanka. Ensuring reliable, adequate and nutritious food items is essential to address malnutrition in the region. Hunger and undernourishment have long-term economic implications as they reduce people’s capacity to work efficiently and fight against diseases by undermining the immune system.

Regional cooperation

Realizing the urgency to address food insecurity through regional cooperation after the food crisis of 2007–2008, South Asian leaders, during the 15th Summit of the South Asian Association of Regional Cooperation (SAARC) held in Colombo, agreed to expedite the operationlization of the SAARC Food Bank, which is expected to serve as a regional food security reserve for SAARC member countries during normal food shortages and emergencies. The Food Bank’s reserve of food grains has been raised from 241,580 metric tons (MT) to 486,000 MT. But the SAARC Food Bank is yet to become fully functional. If properly designed and implemented, it could help relieve pressure on some countries facing urgent food shortages.

Increased agriculture productivity and production is crucial to having enough stock for trade in the region. Agriculture production has been consistently increasing in all countries but arable land has remained the same. This means that productivity has risen, and needs to rise further to feed an increasing population. For instance, the Maldives has one of the highest cereal yields but the lowest arable land in South Asia (Table 4). Since its population is expected to increase by over 13 percent between 2011 and 2050 and rising sea level is expected to inundate large swathes of its land, it will find difficult to ensure food security, let alone generate surplus production for trade. In such circumstances, exports from countries such as India and Pakistan that have a relatively high level of production and area of arable land become crucial.

Table 4: Arable land and cereal yield in South Asia
Country Arable land (million hectares), 2007 Cereal yield (1000 kg per hectare), 2008
Afghanistan 8.53 1.34
Bangladesh 7.97 3.97
Bhutan 0.13 1.95
India 158.65 2.65
Maldives 0.004 3.92
Nepal 2.36 2.36
Pakistan 21.5 2.67
Sri Lanka 0.97 3.66

Source: World Development Indicators, World Bank

India produces the lion’s share of the total South Asian food production. In 2009, it produced 748.84 million of food, three times higher than the total production by other South Asian countries combined (Figure 2).

Figure 2: Total food production in South Asia (million MT)

  * India on right y-axis and others on left y-axis

Source: Author’s computation using FAOSTAT database (Total food production = Sum of total production of cereals, citrus fruit, coarse grain, fibre crops primary, fruit excl melons, jute & jute-like fibers, oilcake equivalent, oil crops primary, pulses, roots and tubers, treenuts, and vegetables & melons).

That said, since arable land is expected to be the same (or decline in the worst case scenario), it is imperative to increase agriculture yield by adopting new technologies and novel farming techniques, and using improved quality seeds.

India is the world’s second biggest producer of wheat, sugar and rice and has a sizable surplus, which is beyond the limit set by the government, in domestic stock. Currently, the Indian government is ready to export surplus food grains, especially when grain prices are record high, but is waiting to assess the total domestic demand that will be mandated by the upcoming Food Bill.[9] After the food crisis of 2007–2008, India had restricted exports of major food items. It is yet to relax those restrictions.

While it is politically justified to restrict exports when there is domestic production deficit, following the same policy even when there is surplus is not a smart move and represents a wasted opportunity for alleviating regional food insecurity. It is estimated that restrictions on rice exports explained almost 40 percent of the increase in global rice price in 2007–2008.[10]

The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations argues that agriculture trade liberalization acts as a catalyst for change and promotes conditions in which the food-insecure are able to raise their income, live healthier and be more productive. But not all will gain from liberalization. Those that are hurt and are increasingly vulnerable have to be taken care of by implementing appropriate safety net programmes such as food-for-work, school feeding and in-cash or in-kind transfers. For instance, Bangladesh extended its work-for-food programme in response to damages caused by natural disasters and rise in food prices.[11]

Trade barriers and food crisis

Food security is a multidimensional issue and agriculture trade is one tool to address food shortages. Though intra-regional trade in agriculture goods is higher, in relative terms, than total intra-regional merchandise trade in South Asia, a host of barriers constrain such trade.

Some countries have not relaxed exports restrictions despite having a surplus of food grains. Furthermore, most countries are imposing high tariff, para-tariff and non-tariff barriers in agriculture trade.[12] Most countries protect most agriculture goods under the Agreement on South Asian Free Trade Area (SAFTA) by putting them on their sensitive lists. Tariffs on goods on the sensitive lists do not have to be cut as per SAFTA’s Tariff Liberalization Programme. The most-favoured-nation (MFN) applied tariff on agriculture goods in South Asia is higher than in some other regions. It was 29 percent during 2006–2009, com- pared to just 9.93 percent in ASEAN. High trade barriers—both export restrictions and import barriers—are complicating efforts to mitigate food insecurity in the region.

Theoretically, agriculture trade liberalization leads to, inter alia, a reduction in the price of agriculture imports in the importing country and helps increase agriculture output by providing attractive price signals to farmers in the exporting country. However, as noted above, not all will be winners from liberalization. The losers will have to be taken care of by implementing appropriate social safety net programmes.

During the recent food crisis, Afghanistan increased food supply by using buffer food stock grains, targeted food aid to the most vulnerable population, and gave subsidies on agriculture inputs. Pakistan relaxed import tariff on sugar, released grains from its buffer stocks, and provided subsidies on food stuff sold through state-owned food depots. Bangladesh and India also followed similar policies, but imposed restrictions on rice and sugar exports. Nepal released food stocks from government depots and subsidized food items at fair price shops. Sri Lanka reduced import tariff and implemented non-targeted subsidies.

Increasing production and productivity is key to addressing the availability of adequate food. Without surplus production and trade complementarity, it is hard to increase agriculture trade aimed at addressing food insecurity. Countries like India that have surplus food stocks should take the initiative to relax export restrictions at least in the region. Meanwhile, all countries should prioritize agriculture and focus on increasing production and productivity. Inadequate investment in agriculture, irrigation, rural infrastructure, technology, better storage and packaging facilities at the farm level, and marketing process, poor trade facilitation, and restrictions on access to ports and/or inter-country roads usage, among others, are the major hurdles that need to be addressed to increase agriculture trade and to ensure food security.[13] This should be supplemented by reducing, to the most reasonable extent, all forms of trade restrictions that hamper the free flow of agriculture goods in the region.

Creating a policy environment where farmers are incentivized to be more productive and engaged in agriculture activities is also crucial for food security. For this, policies should be designed in such a way that farmers are encouraged to cooperate so that there are economies of scale even when there is fragmented small-scale land holdings. Furthermore, food price stability is also an important aspect that needs to be adequately addressed to ensure food security in the region. Agriculture sector firms should be given enough incentives to produce goods that are vital to maintaining food security. Importantly, these policies have to consider the impact of climate change on agriculture production and trade as well. All of these will require greater regional coordination to reduce food security and trade policy inconsistencies.

 
References

[1] About 44 million people fell below the poverty line of US$1.25 a day due to high food prices between June and December 2010, according to Ivanic, M., W. Martin, and H. Zaman. 2011. “Estimating the short-run poverty impacts of the 2010–2011 surge in food prices.” World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 5633, Washington, D.C.

[2] Figures computed from United States Census’s international population projection available at http://www.census. gov/ipc/www/idb/region.php

[3] Karapinar, Baris. 2010. Introduction: Food crisis and the WTO. In Karapinar, Baris and Christian Haberli (eds.). Food Crisis and the WTO. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 1–22

[4] Author’s computation using UN Comtrade database (HS 2002 classification). Agriculture products include Chapters 1–23. All data unless otherwise cited are direct data computed using UNCOM- TRADE (HS 2002 classification).

[5] UN Comtrade database (HS 2002 classification). Animal & animal products (Chapters 1–4); vegetable products (Chapters 6–15); and food stuff (Chapters 16–23).

[6] Asian Development Bank. 2011. “Global food price inflation and developing Asia.” Available at www.adb.org/documents/ reports/global-food-price-inflation/food- price-inflation.pdf#page=30

[7] Estimates by Economic Research Service, using the 1996 ICP data, by United States Department of Agriculture (USDA).

[8] International Food Policy Research Institute. 2010. “Global Hunger Index 2010.” www.ifpri.org/publication/2010- global-hunger-index-background-facts- and-key-findings

[9] Mukherjee, Kritiivas. 2011. “Food rights bill holds key to India farm exports plan.” http://in.reuters.com/article/2011/05/14/ idINIndia-56866620110514

[10] Martin, Will and Kym Anderson. 2010. “Trade distortions and food price surges.” Paper presented at the World Bank- UC Berkeley Conference on Agriculture and Development- Revisited, Berkeley, 1–2 October 2010.

[11] Coady, David, Margaret E. Grosh and John Hoddinott. 2003. Targeting of transfers in developing countries: Review of Lessons and Experience. Washington, D.C.: The World Bank.

[12] See Samaratunga, Parakarma and Manoj Thibbotuwawa. 2006. “Mapping and analysis of South Asian agricultural trade liberalization effort.” ARTNeT Working Paper Series No. 26.

[13] “Agricultural Trade and Poverty: Can trade work for the poor?”, FAO Agriculture Series No. 36, 2005.