Monday, November 21, 2011

Food deficit and insufficient inputs


Food deficit in Nepal is mainly the result of insufficient inputs in the production process, conversion of food grain into animal feed, erratic rainfall, delayed monsoon and poor land husbandry. The crop yield data show big yield gaps (the gap between attainable yield and the national average yield). The gap is three tons per hectare for wheat, three tons per hectare for maize and two tons per hectare for rice. Thus, over a million hectares of cultivable land yield below average. Agro scientists in Nepal often complain that there is not enough money for research and awareness programs aimed at farmers, which would be of enormous help in reducing these gaps. Unavailability of quality seeds, fertilizers and plant-protection chemicals for the crops are other important factors. Moreover, the government does not have enough space to store all of the food grain produced in the country; instead traders across the border store Nepali harvest, thus leading to seasonal shortages. If the farmers are supported with proper inputs in time and storage facilities are improved, we can attain the goal of food sufficiency in a not too distant future. Also, if the farmers could store rainwater during monsoon for its use in the dry season, millions of tons of additional yield can be achieved. None of these measures require genetic manipulation of seeds, which is Monsanto’s forte. 


Read more by Krishna Bahadur Karki here.

My take on food security in Nepal here (research brief) and here. Here is a link to a detailed paper on high food prices in South Asia.

Sunday, November 20, 2011

Crisis and creative destruction

Well, economic crisis does not necessarily mean exit of uncompetitive firms and entry of competitive ones. This is shown by Hallward-Driemeier and Rijkers in a new paper whose abstract is as follows:


Using Indonesian manufacturing census data (1991-2001), this paper rejects the hypothesis that the East Asian crisis unequivocally improved the reallocative process. The correlation between productivity and employment growth did not strengthen and the crisis induced the exit of relatively productive firms. The attenuation of the relationship between productivity and survival was stronger in provinces with comparatively lower reductions in minimum wages, but not due to reduced entry, changing loan conditions, or firms connected to the Suharto regime suffering disproportionately. On the bright side, firms that entered during the crisis were relatively more productive, which helped mitigate the reduction in aggregate productivity.


Saturday, November 19, 2011

Analytical framework of the economic crisis in the US and the EU

Mohamed A. El-Erian explains what happened and what needs to happen in the Western economies:


Each development, and certainly their occurrence in tandem, points to the historic paradigm changes shaping today’s global economy – and to the anxiety that comes with the loss of once-dependable anchors, be they economic and financial or social and political.

Restoring these anchors will take time. There is no game plan as of now, and historic precedents are only partly illuminating. Yet two things seem clear: different countries are opting, either by choice or necessity, for different outcomes; and the global system as a whole faces challenges in reconciling them.

Some changes will be evolutionary, taking many years to manifest themselves; others will be sudden and more disruptive. Yet, as complex as all of this sounds – and, by definition, paradigm changes are complicated affairs that, fortunately, seldom occur – a simple analytical framework may help shed light on what to look for, what to expect and where, and how best to adapt.

The framework relies on an often-used analytical shortcut: identifying a limited set of explanatory variables in what statisticians call “a reduced-form equation.” The objective is not to account for everything, but rather to pinpoint a small number of variables than can explain key factors, albeit neither perfectly nor fully.

Using this approach, it is possible to argue that the future of many Western economies, and that of the global economy, will be shaped by their ability to navigate four inter-related financial, economic, social, and political dynamics.

The first relates to balance sheets. Many Western economies must deal with the nasty legacy of years of excessive borrowing and leveraging; those, like Germany, that do not have this problem are linked to neighbors that do. Faced with this reality, different countries will opt for different de-leveraging options. Indeed, differentiation is already evident.

Some, like Greece, face such a parlous situation that it is difficult to imagine any outcome other than a traumatic default and further economic turmoil; and Greece is unlikely to be the only Western economy forced to restructure its debt. Others, like the United Kingdom, have moved quickly to take firmer control of their destiny, though their austerity drives will inevitably involve considerable sacrifices.

A third group, led by the US, has not yet made an explicit de-leveraging choice. Having more time, they are using the less visible, and much more gradual, path of “financial repression,” under which interest rates are forced down so that creditors, including those on modest fixed incomes, subsidize debtors.

De-leveraging is closely linked to the second variable – namely, economic growth. Simply put, the stronger a country’s ability to generate additional national income, the greater its ability to meet debt obligations while maintaining and enhancing citizens’ standards of living.

Many countries, including Italy and Spain, must overcome structural barriers to competitiveness, growth, and job creation through multi-year reforms of labor markets, pensions, housing, and economic governance. Some, like the US, can combine structural reforms with short-term demand stimulus. A few, led by Germany, are reaping the benefits of years of steadfast (and underappreciated) reforms.

But growth, while necessary, is insufficient by itself, given today’s high unemployment and the extent to which income and wealth inequalities have increased. Hence the third dynamic: the West is being challenged to deliver not just growth, but “inclusive growth,” which, most critically, involves greater “social justice.”

Indeed, there is a deep sense that capitalism in the West has become unfair. Certain players, led by big banks, extracted huge profits during the boom, and avoided the deep losses that they deserved during the bust. Citizens no longer accept the argument that this unfortunate outcome reflects the banks’ special economic role. And why should they, given that record bailouts have not revived growth and employment?

Calls for a fairer system will not go away. If anything, they will spread and grow louder. The West has no choice but to strike a better balance – between capital and labor, between current and future generations, and between the financial sector and the real economy.

This leads to the final variable, the role of politicians and policymakers. It has become fashionable in both America and Europe to point to a debilitating “lack of leadership,” which underscores the extent to which an inherently complex paradigm change is straining traditional mindsets, processes, and governance systems.

Unlike emerging economies, Western countries are not well equipped to deal with structural and secular changes – and understandably so. After all, their histories – and certainly during what was mislabeled as the “Great Moderation” between 1980 and 2008– have been predominantly cyclical. The longer they fail to adjust, the greater the risks.

Those on the receiving end of these four dynamics – the vast majority of us – need not be paralyzed by uncertainty and anxiety. Instead, we can use this simple framework to monitor developments, learn from them, and adapt. Yes, there will still be volatility, unusual strains, and historically odd outcomes. But, remember, a global paradigm shift implies a significant change in opportunities, and not just risks.


Foreign demand for Nepalese coffee outstrips supply

The National Tea and Coffee Development Board (NTCDB) argues that foreign demand for Nepalese coffee is far higher than supply. It maintains that the annual demand for Nepali coffee is more than 4,000 tonnes but production is only 400 tonnes. If this is true, then here is an export potential product that won’t require export potential study! And, the contribution of donors working in the promotion of this product is commendable. Nepal is exporting coffee mainly to Japan, the US, and the EU.


With increasing demand, international agencies and local people have been attracted to investing in the sector. “With aid from INGOs, coffee production is projected to reach 8,000 tonnes within a decade,” said Bhandari. INGOs like Helvetas, Winrock and PACT Nepal have been supporting coffee farming.

There are more than 26,000 people engaged in coffee production. Syangja, Palpa, Lalitpur, Ramechhap, Ilam and Gulmi have been identified among 40 coffee growing districts as the main producers of coffee in the country.

Good prospects have led to expansion of coffee farming. According to the NTCDB, the area under coffee cultivation increased to 1,752 hectares in 2010-11 from 1,630 hectares in 2009-10.

Similarly, increasing domestic production has resulted in a decline in imports. Annual coffee imports plunged to Rs 12.51 million from Rs 84.40 million three years ago.

Executive director of the board Raman Prasad Pathak said that demand for Nepali coffee was on the rise due to its better taste and production system which does not use chemicals.

Despite massive demand, the country exported a mere 279.76 tonnes of coffee worth Rs 93.08 million in the last fiscal year. However, the figure is more than double compared to the previous year when exports amounted to 120 tonnes worth Rs 67.5 million.


Coffee Production
Fiscal year Plantation area (Hectares) Production (M.T.)
1994/95 135.7 12.95
1995/56 220.3 29.2
1996/97 259 37.35
1997/98 272.2 55.9
1998/99 277.1 44.5
1999/00 314.3 72.4
2000/01 424 88.7
2001/02 596 139.2
2002/03 764 187.5
2003/04 952 217.5
2004/05 1078 250
2005/06 1285 391
2006/07 1396 460
2007/08 1145 265
2008/09 1531 334

Friday, November 18, 2011

Corruption (rate) at Raxual custom

Corruption at custom check points between Nepal and India border is an accepted practice now—just ask the traders how much they have to pay extra money per truck. Now, it looks like the cost of import of goods has increased because the commission rate on 71 products entering Nepal via Raxual custom has been increased. It is reported that almost 60 percent of goods imported from India come through this custom point. Almost 1000 truck enter through this point each day.

According to this media report, Indian agents revealrf that commission (corruption) money is added to the normal fare for truck/vehicle service. It is reported that around 50 lakhs Indian rupee per day is collected as commission by Indian officials, who then let trucks enter the Nepal side of the border. This means Nepalese consumers will have to pay even for the amount illegally raked in by Indian border officials because the final retail price of imported goods includes all formal and informal costs incurred by importer.

Here are the rates:

  • Corruption rate for import using cart, truck and rail is different.
  • For small quantities, the corruption rate is IRs 800 per cart.
  • For each truck full of potatoes, the corruption rate is IRs 2000, onion IRs 3000, and maize IRs 3500. For coal it is IRs 3000.
  • Commission equivalent to one percent of total cost of machinery.

These are institutional non tariff barriers to trade!

Return to investment in education

Using Indonesia Family Life Survey, this WB policy research working paper shows that return to upper secondary schooling in Indonesia is as high as 50 percent per year of schooling for those very likely to enroll in upper secondary schooling, or as low as -10 percent for those unlikely to do so. Furthermore, returns to the marginal student (14 percent) are well below those for the average student attending upper secondary schooling (27 percent).

Meanwhile, the chart below shows returns to investment in education by level in few countries. The estimation for Nepal is that of 1999. More on why education is not a binding constraint to growth in Nepal is explained here.

Thursday, November 17, 2011

Labor growth and finance


This paper combines firm-level data from 89 countries with updated country-level data on financial structure, and uses two estimation approaches. It finds that in low-income countries, labor growth is swifter in countries with a higher level of private credit/gross domestic product; the positive effect of bank credit is especially pronounced in industries that depend heavily on external finance; and banking development is positively associated with more physical and human capital investment. These findings are consistent with predictions from new structural economics. In high-income countries, labor growth rates are increasing in the level of stock market capitalization, which is also consistent with predictions from new structural economics, although the analysis is unable to provide evidence that the association is causal. It finds no evidence that small-scale firms in low-income countries benefit most from private credit market development. Rather, the labor growth rates of larger, capital-intensive firms increase more with the level of private credit market development, a finding consistent with the history-based political economy view that banking systems in low-income countries serve the interests of the elite, rather than providing broad-based access to financial services.


Read the full paper by Cull and Xu (2011).