Sunday, November 20, 2011

Crisis and creative destruction

Well, economic crisis does not necessarily mean exit of uncompetitive firms and entry of competitive ones. This is shown by Hallward-Driemeier and Rijkers in a new paper whose abstract is as follows:


Using Indonesian manufacturing census data (1991-2001), this paper rejects the hypothesis that the East Asian crisis unequivocally improved the reallocative process. The correlation between productivity and employment growth did not strengthen and the crisis induced the exit of relatively productive firms. The attenuation of the relationship between productivity and survival was stronger in provinces with comparatively lower reductions in minimum wages, but not due to reduced entry, changing loan conditions, or firms connected to the Suharto regime suffering disproportionately. On the bright side, firms that entered during the crisis were relatively more productive, which helped mitigate the reduction in aggregate productivity.


Saturday, November 19, 2011

Analytical framework of the economic crisis in the US and the EU

Mohamed A. El-Erian explains what happened and what needs to happen in the Western economies:


Each development, and certainly their occurrence in tandem, points to the historic paradigm changes shaping today’s global economy – and to the anxiety that comes with the loss of once-dependable anchors, be they economic and financial or social and political.

Restoring these anchors will take time. There is no game plan as of now, and historic precedents are only partly illuminating. Yet two things seem clear: different countries are opting, either by choice or necessity, for different outcomes; and the global system as a whole faces challenges in reconciling them.

Some changes will be evolutionary, taking many years to manifest themselves; others will be sudden and more disruptive. Yet, as complex as all of this sounds – and, by definition, paradigm changes are complicated affairs that, fortunately, seldom occur – a simple analytical framework may help shed light on what to look for, what to expect and where, and how best to adapt.

The framework relies on an often-used analytical shortcut: identifying a limited set of explanatory variables in what statisticians call “a reduced-form equation.” The objective is not to account for everything, but rather to pinpoint a small number of variables than can explain key factors, albeit neither perfectly nor fully.

Using this approach, it is possible to argue that the future of many Western economies, and that of the global economy, will be shaped by their ability to navigate four inter-related financial, economic, social, and political dynamics.

The first relates to balance sheets. Many Western economies must deal with the nasty legacy of years of excessive borrowing and leveraging; those, like Germany, that do not have this problem are linked to neighbors that do. Faced with this reality, different countries will opt for different de-leveraging options. Indeed, differentiation is already evident.

Some, like Greece, face such a parlous situation that it is difficult to imagine any outcome other than a traumatic default and further economic turmoil; and Greece is unlikely to be the only Western economy forced to restructure its debt. Others, like the United Kingdom, have moved quickly to take firmer control of their destiny, though their austerity drives will inevitably involve considerable sacrifices.

A third group, led by the US, has not yet made an explicit de-leveraging choice. Having more time, they are using the less visible, and much more gradual, path of “financial repression,” under which interest rates are forced down so that creditors, including those on modest fixed incomes, subsidize debtors.

De-leveraging is closely linked to the second variable – namely, economic growth. Simply put, the stronger a country’s ability to generate additional national income, the greater its ability to meet debt obligations while maintaining and enhancing citizens’ standards of living.

Many countries, including Italy and Spain, must overcome structural barriers to competitiveness, growth, and job creation through multi-year reforms of labor markets, pensions, housing, and economic governance. Some, like the US, can combine structural reforms with short-term demand stimulus. A few, led by Germany, are reaping the benefits of years of steadfast (and underappreciated) reforms.

But growth, while necessary, is insufficient by itself, given today’s high unemployment and the extent to which income and wealth inequalities have increased. Hence the third dynamic: the West is being challenged to deliver not just growth, but “inclusive growth,” which, most critically, involves greater “social justice.”

Indeed, there is a deep sense that capitalism in the West has become unfair. Certain players, led by big banks, extracted huge profits during the boom, and avoided the deep losses that they deserved during the bust. Citizens no longer accept the argument that this unfortunate outcome reflects the banks’ special economic role. And why should they, given that record bailouts have not revived growth and employment?

Calls for a fairer system will not go away. If anything, they will spread and grow louder. The West has no choice but to strike a better balance – between capital and labor, between current and future generations, and between the financial sector and the real economy.

This leads to the final variable, the role of politicians and policymakers. It has become fashionable in both America and Europe to point to a debilitating “lack of leadership,” which underscores the extent to which an inherently complex paradigm change is straining traditional mindsets, processes, and governance systems.

Unlike emerging economies, Western countries are not well equipped to deal with structural and secular changes – and understandably so. After all, their histories – and certainly during what was mislabeled as the “Great Moderation” between 1980 and 2008– have been predominantly cyclical. The longer they fail to adjust, the greater the risks.

Those on the receiving end of these four dynamics – the vast majority of us – need not be paralyzed by uncertainty and anxiety. Instead, we can use this simple framework to monitor developments, learn from them, and adapt. Yes, there will still be volatility, unusual strains, and historically odd outcomes. But, remember, a global paradigm shift implies a significant change in opportunities, and not just risks.


Foreign demand for Nepalese coffee outstrips supply

The National Tea and Coffee Development Board (NTCDB) argues that foreign demand for Nepalese coffee is far higher than supply. It maintains that the annual demand for Nepali coffee is more than 4,000 tonnes but production is only 400 tonnes. If this is true, then here is an export potential product that won’t require export potential study! And, the contribution of donors working in the promotion of this product is commendable. Nepal is exporting coffee mainly to Japan, the US, and the EU.


With increasing demand, international agencies and local people have been attracted to investing in the sector. “With aid from INGOs, coffee production is projected to reach 8,000 tonnes within a decade,” said Bhandari. INGOs like Helvetas, Winrock and PACT Nepal have been supporting coffee farming.

There are more than 26,000 people engaged in coffee production. Syangja, Palpa, Lalitpur, Ramechhap, Ilam and Gulmi have been identified among 40 coffee growing districts as the main producers of coffee in the country.

Good prospects have led to expansion of coffee farming. According to the NTCDB, the area under coffee cultivation increased to 1,752 hectares in 2010-11 from 1,630 hectares in 2009-10.

Similarly, increasing domestic production has resulted in a decline in imports. Annual coffee imports plunged to Rs 12.51 million from Rs 84.40 million three years ago.

Executive director of the board Raman Prasad Pathak said that demand for Nepali coffee was on the rise due to its better taste and production system which does not use chemicals.

Despite massive demand, the country exported a mere 279.76 tonnes of coffee worth Rs 93.08 million in the last fiscal year. However, the figure is more than double compared to the previous year when exports amounted to 120 tonnes worth Rs 67.5 million.


Coffee Production
Fiscal year Plantation area (Hectares) Production (M.T.)
1994/95 135.7 12.95
1995/56 220.3 29.2
1996/97 259 37.35
1997/98 272.2 55.9
1998/99 277.1 44.5
1999/00 314.3 72.4
2000/01 424 88.7
2001/02 596 139.2
2002/03 764 187.5
2003/04 952 217.5
2004/05 1078 250
2005/06 1285 391
2006/07 1396 460
2007/08 1145 265
2008/09 1531 334

Friday, November 18, 2011

Corruption (rate) at Raxual custom

Corruption at custom check points between Nepal and India border is an accepted practice now—just ask the traders how much they have to pay extra money per truck. Now, it looks like the cost of import of goods has increased because the commission rate on 71 products entering Nepal via Raxual custom has been increased. It is reported that almost 60 percent of goods imported from India come through this custom point. Almost 1000 truck enter through this point each day.

According to this media report, Indian agents revealrf that commission (corruption) money is added to the normal fare for truck/vehicle service. It is reported that around 50 lakhs Indian rupee per day is collected as commission by Indian officials, who then let trucks enter the Nepal side of the border. This means Nepalese consumers will have to pay even for the amount illegally raked in by Indian border officials because the final retail price of imported goods includes all formal and informal costs incurred by importer.

Here are the rates:

  • Corruption rate for import using cart, truck and rail is different.
  • For small quantities, the corruption rate is IRs 800 per cart.
  • For each truck full of potatoes, the corruption rate is IRs 2000, onion IRs 3000, and maize IRs 3500. For coal it is IRs 3000.
  • Commission equivalent to one percent of total cost of machinery.

These are institutional non tariff barriers to trade!

Return to investment in education

Using Indonesia Family Life Survey, this WB policy research working paper shows that return to upper secondary schooling in Indonesia is as high as 50 percent per year of schooling for those very likely to enroll in upper secondary schooling, or as low as -10 percent for those unlikely to do so. Furthermore, returns to the marginal student (14 percent) are well below those for the average student attending upper secondary schooling (27 percent).

Meanwhile, the chart below shows returns to investment in education by level in few countries. The estimation for Nepal is that of 1999. More on why education is not a binding constraint to growth in Nepal is explained here.

Thursday, November 17, 2011

Labor growth and finance


This paper combines firm-level data from 89 countries with updated country-level data on financial structure, and uses two estimation approaches. It finds that in low-income countries, labor growth is swifter in countries with a higher level of private credit/gross domestic product; the positive effect of bank credit is especially pronounced in industries that depend heavily on external finance; and banking development is positively associated with more physical and human capital investment. These findings are consistent with predictions from new structural economics. In high-income countries, labor growth rates are increasing in the level of stock market capitalization, which is also consistent with predictions from new structural economics, although the analysis is unable to provide evidence that the association is causal. It finds no evidence that small-scale firms in low-income countries benefit most from private credit market development. Rather, the labor growth rates of larger, capital-intensive firms increase more with the level of private credit market development, a finding consistent with the history-based political economy view that banking systems in low-income countries serve the interests of the elite, rather than providing broad-based access to financial services.


Read the full paper by Cull and Xu (2011).

Monday, November 14, 2011

The sources of food and nonfood inflation in Nepal

Inflation rate in Nepal reached double-digit for three consecutive years now and is now just above 9 percent. What are sources of inflation in Nepal? Is it following Indian price level? Is it being affected by demand side or supply side or both? How much is it affected by food prices? How much traction M2 (money supply) has on inflation in Nepal? In order to bring down the persistently high and sticky price level, policymakers need to first know the sources of inflation and then devise policies accordingly. The IMF recently published a study that looks into the sources of inflation in Nepal.

Using a VAR model to estimate the impact of external spillovers from India, international oil prices, nominal effective exchange rate, and domestic monetary factors, the study finds that inflation (both food and non-food) in Nepal is mainly driven by inflation in India and movements of international oil prices. These two factors account for more than one-third of the variability in domestic inflation. Since inflation in Nepal have been historically following inflation in India but not after 2007/08, the analysis uses two datasets: full dataset ranging from 2001 to 2011 and a sub dataset ranging from 2007 to 2011. The latter dataset shows that inflation in Nepal is deviating from India’s inflation and is becoming more responsive to oil prices. Note that Nepal has open border and pegged its currency with India.

Overall inflation

  • Monetary factors matter more for nonfood price inflation than for food price inflation. But, its effects fade out quickly. (Earlier I wrote that M2 does not have traction on inflation). Monetary tools have not been used to manage inflation.
  • The appreciating nominal effective exchange rate has a negative and lagged impact on inflation only between 2007 and 2011 dataset. [It might be due to rising imports in recent years.]
  • Responsiveness to international oil prices and exchange rate has increased lately. That is why international oil prices show a stronger effect in the 2007-2011 dataset.
  • Food price increases have contributed about three-fourths of overall CPI inflation, while nonfood prices contributed the remaining one-fourth. Food price inflation has been more volatile than nonfood price inflation.

Food price inflation

  • The responsiveness of food price inflation is significant and quick to spillovers from India’s food inflation and oil price movements. Furthermore, the impact of oil prices is more persistent than India’s food inflation. It intensified in recent years. It might be because the price of petroleum products gets reflected faster in the price of chemicals and fertilizers used in agriculture production, transportation cost of agriculture products and use of energy in irrigation, says the report.
  • Nominal effective exchange rate has a negative effect on food inflation with a lag of about three months in 2007-2011 dataset only.
  • Monetary responsiveness to food price inflation is significant in 2007-2011 dataset, but the effect fades out quickly.

Nonfood price inflation

  • Monetary responsiveness to nonfood price inflation is strong in both full and subset dataset series (with largest impact on the full dataset). But, the effects are short.
  • Nonfood price inflation responds to Indian food and nonfood inflation as well as international oil prices (strongly since 2007).
  • Nominal effective exchange rate has a negative effect on nonfood price inflation between 2007-2011 dataset only.


In a study of similar nature in 2007, Edimon Ginting shows that inflation in India and inflation in Nepal tend to converge in the long run, but the pass through of inflation from India to Nepal take about seven months. Now, this seems to have been violated especially after 2007 due to the strong impact of petroleum prices.

Here is how there is disconnect between Indian and Nepalese inflation rates. I wrote this one last year and is still valid. 

  • In the long term, inflation is primarily affected by money supply. In the short term, it is affected by demand and supply pressures, which in turn are dictated by relative elasticity of wages, prices and interest rates. The inflationary pressure in the short term could drag into medium term and long term, leading to high inflation for an extended period of time. It happens if prices and wages are too sticky at high level, i.e. once prices and wages rise either due to demand or supply pressure, or both, even if pressures subside, they continue to remain at high levels. This is happening in the economy since 2007.
  • One of the reasons why prices remain sticky at high levels (i.e. domestic prices do not come down even when market conditions normalize) is because of various non-economic factors constraining the functioning of markets.
  • The global economy was struck by a rapid rise in commodity and food prices in 2007, severely affecting net food importing developing countries like Nepal. Several countries, including India, banned export of key agricultural items imported by Nepal. The shortage of agricultural goods led to rapid rise in domestic prices. Then came a sudden rise in global fuel prices in 2008, leading to a drastic increase in petroleum prices in the domestic market. This directly reduced real disposable income because a substantial portion of the population banks on petroleum products for daily need. It also shot up cost of production of domestic producers, resulting in rising prices of consumer goods and services. The combined effect of the rise in food, commodity, and fuel prices led to spiraling prices starting 2007.
  • Unfortunately, when fuel, commodity and food prices cooled down in the international market, the hangover persisted in our economy. Prices stubbornly remained sticky at high levels. Exogenous factors such as supply bottlenecks due to extended periods of bandas and strikes led to shortage of essential items. Additionally, hoarding, black marketeering, deliberate withholding of supplies and inventory, and agricultural trade hurdles imposed by our neighbors contributed to keeping prices higher even after the normalization of market forces.
  • These series of events contributed to higher inflationary expectations, leading to a situation where workers, employers, producers, wholesalers and retailers started inflating wages and prices on expectation that inflation will go up. The final outcome was a permanently higher inflation. It might go even higher if the supply side constraints and inflationary expectations are not timely and adequately addressed.

Here is another piece I wrote in 2009 and the arguments still hold true.