Sunday, July 10, 2011

Political instability and economic growth in Nepal

Here is Prem Khanal’s take on the relationship between political instability and economic growth. Here is what I argued about frequent political change (democracy and autocracy only-- not political instability) and growth.


Political instability saps economic growth

PREM KHANAL

Nepal´s economic growth rate slid to 3.5 percent this year, the lowest in the last three years, raising a pertinent question: Is this poor performance linked to our political instability?

Analyses of Nepal´s growth data for the last 20 years and the political situation clearly indicate that the economy and politics are intricately linked and economic growth and political stability have a strong positive correlation. 

The major political changes and election of majority governments are always followed by robust economic growth. Likewise, political instability and hung parliaments often lead to weak performance by the economy.

Nepal attained high economic growth of 7.9 percent in fiscal year 1993/94, following the election of a majority government under the leadership of the Nepali Congress in the first general election held after Jananadolan-I. During the subsequent three and half years under NC rule, the economy grew by 5.3 percent on average.

However, the mid-term election held in November 1994 produced a hung parliament and the CPN-UML took leadership of a minority government. Nepal´s first communist government, which was headed by Manmohan Adhikari, lasted only nine months. The country then saw four more governments in as many years, led in turn by Sher Bahadur Deuba, Lokendra Bahadur Chand, Surya Bahadur Thapa and the late Girija Prasad Koirala.

During these years of political instability the economy teetered. The average growth rate in those five years was hardly 4 percent and in fiscal year 1997/98 it dipped to 3.3 percent.

The general election held in May 1999 once again produced a majority government led by the Nepali Congress and the economic growth rate bounced back to 6.1 percent in 1999/2000 and remained relatively high at 5.4 percent the following year.

By the end of the 1990s the Maoist insurgency has begun to peak and economic growth again started to falter. The year 2001/02 saw the highest single-year insurgency toll of over 5,000 and not surprisingly the economic growth rate sank to 0.16 percent and the economy was in the doldrums in successive years.

The growth rates remained pessimistic, averaging slightly over 3 percent, even during the king´s 15-month direct rule.

The success of Janaandolan-II that humbled the king´s rule and ended the insurgency provided an immediate boost to the economy. It grew by over 5.8 percent in 2007/08.

As the Janandolan euphoria gradually receded and political uncertainty crept back, the economy started to falter again. In the last three years economic growth rate has slid steadily, culminating in this year´s 3.5 percent.


Nice article. It would be even more revealing if we look at growth rate, political instability, and investment rate/capital formation. The reason is that the fruits of some investment projects is seen after some years of inception or completion. The effects are not immediately visible. For instance, during FY 2059/60 budget, the then finance minister Dr. Ram Sharan Mahat pumped in large amount of money into infrastructure projects. I think its positive impact helped sustain growth (though low) rate during the insurgency period. Without the investment it would not have been possible to sustain even that low growth rate during the insurgency period. Al least, local economies remained buoyant during insurgency as well. A lagged effect (few years) of capital expenditure/formation might reveal a truer relationship.

Friday, July 8, 2011

More on remittances study in Nepal by the WB

This blog post supplements an earlier detailed blog post about a recent report (forthcoming) based on Nepal Migration Survey (NMS) 2009. After reading the presentation slides I had summarized the main points and put forth my comments on few issues, especially regarding the exact estimates and Dutch Disease effect of high remittance inflows. A detailed summary now addresses these concerns in detail. (Still waiting for the full report).

  • On the estimates of number of migrants, the NMS shows there are 2.1 million migrants, particularly in India (867000, 41%), the Gulf countries (810000, 8.7%), Malaysia (245000, 12%), and other developed countries (186000, 8.7%). Meanwhile, other estimates put the number of migrants to India between 1.5 to 3 million. The study notes that this discrepancy might be because the survey was carried out at the peak of farming season (May-June), when many migrants return home from India to work on the farms. [The number of non-work migrants, mostly with student visas, is estimated at 1.2 million.]
  • The survey estimates that foreign remittance in FY 2009 was US$ 2.5 billion (20% of GDP). Excluding flows from India, remittances amount to 16% of GDP. The NRB’s estimate of total remittances for the same fiscal year was US$ 2.7 billion (22% of GDP). Earlier, WB’s Migration and Development Brief 13 estimated it to be US$ 2.986 billion. [If you include remittances flowing in via informal channel, then it might go well beyond 25% of GDP.]
  • Of the US$ 2.5 billion, US$ 1.2 billion came from the Gulf, US$ 530 million from other destinations (21%), US$ 467 million from India (19%), and US$ 260 from Malaysia (10%).
  • Internal migrants sent about 2% of GDP.
  • The report notes that symptoms of Dutch Disease effect are seen in the economy (not outright Dutch Disease effect due to remittances) due to high consumption demand, high imports, and appreciation of real exchange rate (due to increase in the price of nontradables with respect to the price of tradables), and erosion of manufacturing sector and its competitiveness.
  • Migrants destination vary according to wealth status. Households with least wealth go to India but its attractiveness declines with increase in wealth. In other developed countries, migration increases as wealth and education level goes up. In Malaysia, migration goes up as wealth goes up and peaks at the fourth wealth quintile before declining to the wealthiest quintile.
  • Ethnically, the probability of migration, in descending order, is above average for Muslims/others (mainly to the Gulf), Hill Dalits (mainly to India), Hill Janajatis (mainly to the Gulf), and Brahman/Chhetri (to all India, the Gulf and Malaysia).
  • Migrants are abroad are mostly employed in manufacturing (32%), construction (16%), and hotel/catering (16%).
  • Per capita receipt of remittances generally increases with recipients’ household wealth (skilled and educated migrants send more).
  • Western Hills and Eastern Terai receive the most remittance. The Western Hills sends the largest number of migrants (20%). For Eastern Terai the number is 17%.
  • Returnees generally come back to agriculture and inactivity. Some go to “others” category, indicating a slight increase in entrepreneurial activities and acquired skills. Meanwhile, returnees choose occupation similar to those they held before migration. A returnee who was active before migration is 17.5 percentage points more likely to remain active upon return (this after controlling for a “full” set of observable characteristics).
  • “Real” returnees, those that are not likely to migrate, are involved in more professional and entrepreneurial activities.
  • In FY 1996-2004, poverty decline from 42% to 34% and more than half of this was attributed to remittance. The survey analysis showed that between FY 2004-2010 (but the survey was completed in 2009??), the poverty incidence declined to 21% due to increasing remittance (in the absence of remittances, poverty would have declined to 27%, according to the study).

Read the summary and this blog post for more details. For even more details, wait for the full report to be released.


Below are some of the charts from the report.






Thursday, July 7, 2011

How large is the government spending multiplier?


This paper proposes a novel method of isolating fluctuations in public spending that are likely to be uncorrelated with contemporaneous macroeconomic shocks and can be used to estimate government spending multipliers. The approach relies on two features unique to many low-income countries: (1) borrowing from the World Bank finances a substantial fraction of public spending, and (2) actual spending on World Bank-financed projects is typically spread out over several years following the original approval of the project. These two features imply that fluctuations in spending on World Bank projects in a given year are in large part determined by fluctuations in project approval decisions made in previous years, and so are unlikely to be correlated with shocks to output in the current year. World Bank project-level disbursement data are used to isolate the component of public spending associated with project approvals from previous years, which in turn can be used to estimate government spending multipliers, in a sample of 29 aid-dependent low-income countries. The estimated multipliers are small, reasonably precisely estimated, and rarely significantly different from zero.


More by Aart Kraay here.

Tuesday, July 5, 2011

Nepal’s policies and programs for 2011-2012 (FY 2068-2069)

The Ministry of Finance has released Nepal’s policies and programs for the next fiscal year starting July 16, 2011 and ending July 15, 2012. The fiscal budget in the past three years have come late. It stresses that real change can only happen through economic prosperity, which can then sustain the political gains achieved so far. See my brief comment at the end of the summary of the document. I will write a detailed one later on.


Major priorities:

  • Peace process and constitution writing to be high priority.
  • Socio-economic transformation through high economic growth, controlling inflation, just distribution of the fruits of growth with a view of reducing poverty and inequality, inclusive development, increase employment, and production and productivity increase in agriculture and industrial sectors.
  • Prioritize those projects that yield fast return; accelerate completion of ongoing infrastructure projects
  • Allocate enough resources to implement the programs outlined when the government announced energy crisis
  • Promote cooperatives to utilize unutilized personal, natural and economic sources
  • Priority to increase capital accumulation and productive capacity
  • Improvement in services delivery and governance
  • Programs aimed at women, indigenous communities, and marginalized groups and communities.


Economic appraisal (till Baishak 2068—May 14 2011-- of the fiscal year):

  • GDP targeted at 4.5% but will be only 3.5-4%. Performance of non-agricultural sector is below expectation.
  • Inflation targeted at 7% but will be above 10%.
  • BoP deficit is around Rs 11 billion.
  • Total exports amounted Rs 52.67 billion, but total petroleum imports amounted Rs 59.53 billion.
  • Foreign exchange reserves can sustain 7.1 months of imports.


Upcoming budget and principles

  • Public, cooperatives, and private sectors to be the foundations of economic prosperity.
  • To be focused on Interim Three Year Plan, particularly employment focused and inclusive growth.
  • Relief package to civil war victims, martyr, and disappeared households.
  • Agriculture sector to be commercialized and modernized.
  • Supervisory, governance and facilitator roles to be strengthened.
  • Cooperatives to be a solid foundation of the economy. Marginalized communities and groups to be promoted thorough cooperatives.
  • Special efforts to enhance confidence of private sector and to create investor friendly climate.
  • Big infrastructure projects to be prioritized. Private sector to be encouraged to participate through BOOT principle.
  • Concessions to be given to investors investing in energy sector.
  • Import substitution for petroleum imports by promoting alternative sources of energy.
  • Take advantage of rising neighbors—India and China—by accelerating expansion of infrastructure, industry, service, and trade sectors.
  • Budget deficit to be limited within a certain limit. Unproductive government expenditure to be curtailed and capital expenditure to be increased.
  • Implement monetary policy to curb rising prices. Public goods delivery system to be structured and carteling to be banned.


Policies and programs of the upcoming budget

  • Budget to implement comprehensive peace agreement and constitution making.
  • Relief, reconstruction and rehabilitation of martyrs and disappeared people and destroyed infrastructure.
  • Ease public service delivery system: food security in rural areas, decrease in power outages, normal supply of petroleum products, proper management of  urbanization in Kathmandu valley, water supply and traffic jam.
  • Employment focused inclusive high economic growth: additional labor intensive economic activities, vocational training, youth self-employment program, foreign employment, channeling money into productive sectors
  • Physical and economic infrastructure development: roads network to be expanded, rural infrastructure, all district headquarter to be linked by roads within two years, Mid-Hill highway to be opened by 2069, accelerate work on Kathmandu-Terai Fast Track highway
  • Electricity generation and transmission line expansion: accelerate ongoing works, promote small and medium sized projects to increase supply in short and medium term, expansion and repair of transmission lines, reduce electricity leakage, rural electrification, Energy Development Bank to be established, reform of NEA
  • Commercialization and modernization of agriculture: food security, employment, exports, import substitution to be the focus; commercialization of self-reliant agriculture; increase subsidies in fertilizer, seeds and supply; establish agricultural farm with the help of cooperatives; ‘one village, one product’ program to be launched as; livestock development; herbs farming in all development regions
  • Land reform; expansion of irrigation facilities
  • Cooperatives development and expansion: launch ‘cooperatives in every village, employment in each household’ as national program; livestock development; meat and fish products focus; herbs production and processing; vegetables and fruits farming;
  • Social development: education, health, water supply; primary health care to be made free gradually, health insurance to be launched, primary education to be made mandatory (gradually); water supply to all citizens
  • Tourism development: infrastructure development, training in this sector; NTY 2011 to be prioritized and effectively implemented; second international airport in Nijgarh, Bara under BOOT principle; upgrade existing airports
  • Private sector development, investor friendly climate and industrial revival: attract private sector investment to stimulate high economic growth; investment security, illegal trade, and investor friendly taxation regime to be addressed; resuscitation of sick industries and industrial peace;
  • Export promotion and import substitution: special programs to be launched to increase exports and encourage import substitution; incentives (cash and others) given for export promotion to be systematized and further encourage exporters; pass law regarding SEZs
  • Rural infrastructure and model village: at least one model village in each district (all facilities and infrastructure to be provided)
  • Various party related pet projects (afno gaun, afai banau) to be made effective by addressing shortcomings
  • Rural focused programs: Continuity to ‘one household, one employment’ program in Karnali; marginalized groups and communities focused programs
  • Communication: increase access to communication (TV, telephone, radio, and internet); accelerate laying of optical fiber in rural areas
  • Financial sector reform and increase financial penetration: special program to resolve liquidity crisis; enhance regulatory and supervisory roles; encourage merger; increase financial penetration in rural areas; deposit insurance of small depositors
  • Foreign aid: effective mobilization of foreign aid; no aid to be accepted without compliance with the government’s rules and regulations
  • Fiscal stability: limit budget deficit within a limit; enhance capacity of revenue department by establishing Revenue Board; increase tax base, decrease leakage, administrative reform; 


Comment: Seriously, there is no concrete agenda and acknowledgement of the major economic problems—low economic growth and high youth unemployment, surging trade deficit, BOP deficit, high and sticky inflation, liquidity crisis, slump in manufacturing sector, proper management of remittances and foreign employment sector, and disruption in supply chains– faced by the nation. The binding constraint to economic growth, i.e. infrastructure is not getting adequate and specific attention, though some long term programs in expanding road network is mentioned.

Most of the programs on employment will yield little result as they are designed to distribute money to party loyalists and local contractors that are faithful to a given party. Cooperatives in everything and in every village is a joke of the very concept of having cooperatives in the first place. It will actually legitimize doling out easy money to loyalists in every VDC. The role of private sector is very minimal in the whole list. Importantly, there is no mention of the fact the Nepali economy is seeing manufacturing slump and without it sustainable growth and employment are unimaginable. I have very little confidence that the budget will address the major economic challenges faced by the nation.

The size of the budget and expenditure programs are ever-increasing. The expected size of the budget is around Rs 385-390 billion (up from Rs 337.9 billion last fiscal year). Development budget (capital expenditure) is expected to be Rs 150 billion  (up from 129.54 billion last fiscal year). Recurrent expenditure is expected to be Rs 210 billion (up from Rs 190.32 billion last fiscal year). The government plans to mobilize about Rs 246 billion in revenue, Rs 75 billion in foreign grants, Rs 26 billion in foreign loans and about Rs 35 billion in domestic borrowing to finance the next fiscal year´s spending. The figures were Rs 216.64 billion, Rs 65.34 billion, Rs 22.23 billion, and Rs 33.68 billion last fiscal year. Education sector (Rs 61 billion) will get the highest amount, followed by infrastructure (Rs 44 billion), local development (Rs 43 billion), and health sector (Rs 25 billion).

Monday, July 4, 2011

USAID’s intervention and Rwandan coffee exports

Easterly and Reshef (2010) argue that foreign aid can boost exports but only if projects are implemented carefully in consultation and working with producers and exporters in the country. For instance, after the 1994 genocide in Rwanda, USAID funded two projects to educate local business people in agribusiness. Local officials convinced the agency to figure out which efforts could improve local incomes, and it hit upon specialty coffee. The aid projects helped to form grower coops, taught coffee-washing techniques, contacted potential buyers, and provided the initial capital to build coffee-washing stations. The result is that Rwanda has become a source for high-quality specialty coffee that is sold in the United States.

They also argue African exports are not as dismal as has been portrayed in the media and by researchers. In the 15-year period from 1994 to 2008, sub-Saharan Africa saw its per capita exports of goods rise an average of 13 percent per year. That average is less than China's export growth rate of 19 percent, but on a par with India, and far above Germany's 8 percent and the 4 percent rate for the United States. Given the well known difficulties in exporting from Africa (let alone running business there), 13 percent annual growth rates of exports per capita are no small feat, they argue.

A summary of the paper in July 2011 edition of NEBR digest:


The exports of sub-Saharan African nations include some "big hits" -- that is, exports that dominate national trade. These exports change over time in a way that can't be easily explained by commodity prices or other global factors. And, although the sub-Saharan nations use conventional measures to boost their export revenues, such as moving up the quality ladder, concentrating on comparative strengths, and liberalizing trade rules, part of their success is idiosyncratic: entrepreneurial persistence, luck, and cost shocks can lead to big hits, even where the anticipated probability of success was low.

Sub-Saharan Africa has a relatively low share of manufacturing exports and a much higher share of agriculture, food, fuel, ores, and metals. There is considerable variation within categories, however, with some nations able to export high-value food exclusively to Europe or to the United States. Export successes are rare, but when nations do get a big hit, sales of that good tend to skyrocket. For example, the average share of the top export from 37 African nations is 47.6 percent of all of that nation's exports. The second largest export, by comparison, accounts for only 13.7 percent of exports on average. This pattern is somewhat more extreme than that of non-African nations. The top export share among 130 non-African nations averages 27.5 percent, and the second strongest export averages 11.6 percent.

The big hits also vary widely over time. In Ghana, for example, coconuts, Brazil nuts, and cashew nuts were No. 67 on the list of top exports in 1996 but had climbed to No. 4 by 2008. Meanwhile, unwrought aluminum fell from No. 6 to No. 132 in that same 12-year period. In Ethiopia, fresh vegetable exports rose from No. 182 to No. 5, while buckwheat and other cereals fell from No. 6 to No. 229. These rises and falls are primarily attributable to changes in the quantity exported. Price changes only account for 10 percent of the changes in shares for the median country.

Persistent entrepreneurs, timing, and happenstance also play a role in export success. Gahaya Links, founded in 2003 by two sisters, now sells Rwandan woven baskets to Macy's and other U.S. retailers, despite the problems that typically plague handicrafts ventures in the developing world. A Canadian-trained chemical engineer in Tanzania entered the prawn business after a London-based acquaintance requested the product. The big breakthrough came, however, when he moved into catching white fish in Lake Victoria to supply a European market hungry for his product.


Friday, July 1, 2011

Costs and benefits of remittances in Nepal

Remittances now account for almost 23 percent of Nepal’s GDP. About one-third of working male population is estimated to be outside the country remitting money back home, making remittances the largest foreign currency earner. Here is a discussion on how remittances performed during the global economic crisis. Here is more.

Remittances, US$ millions
Year Workers remittances Compensation of employees Migrants' transfer Total inward remittances flows
2003 744 27 - 771
2004 793 30 - 823
2005 1126 85 - 1212
2006 1373 80 - 1453
2007 1647 87 - 1734
2008 2581 146 - 2727
2009 2858 127 1 2986
2010 (e) - - - 3513

Below are findings from the latest WB report. I have not received the full report yet, but these points are extracted from presentation slides of the authors (here and here). (It is strange that the WB Nepal office did press conference about the study and then not release the full report immediately.)

  • It is estimated that there are 2.02 million migrants (stock total), of which 867000 (43.73%) are in India, 810000 in the Gulf, 245000 in Malaysia, 186000 in various other destinations, and 29000 in “unknown” destinations. [Others say, between 1993/94 and 2009/10, there were 569667 migrants in Malaysia, followed by 481748 in Qatar. Malaysia tops the destination for male migrants (569169) and Lebanon for female migrants (9389)].
  • Most women (58%) go through individual channel and face problems. About 78.9% male go through institutional channel. Overall, 77.6% go through institutional channel.
  • About 8.36% of migrants were female and 91.64% male.
  • A bulk (about half) of the remittances come from the Gulf, followed by India (19.2%) and Malaysia (10.5%).
  • Most of the migrants of the age groups 20-30. Almost all kinds of households migrate, but those with the lowest income bracket migrate the most.
  • Migrant destinations differ by their place of origin. A large number of migrants from Far-Western and Mid-Western (and Western) regions go to India; those from Western and and Eastern regions go to the Gulf; and those from Western and Eastern regions go to Malaysia.
  • About 48% of migrants originate from Terai, 45% from the Hills, and 7% from the Mountain.
  • Over 30 percent of household income in the Western region is accounted by remittances. In Syangja, Kaski, and Tanahu, it is 25.5%, 28.2% and 34% respectively. About 43.4 percent of household income in Argakhashi came from remittances. It was 7% in Jumla.
  • Jhapa (16.8), Morang (13.2), Chitawan (10), Nawalparasi (11.8), Solukhumbu (10.7) got remittances over NRs 10 billion. Agarkhashi and Jumla got 7.5 and 0.4 billion respectively.
  • In 2008, most of the returnees were from India, followed by the Gulf and Malaysia.
  • About 37% of the returnees would “very likely” go back abroad soon. About 34% would “very unlikely” go back soon.
  • Most returnees would return to either agriculture (48%) or stay inactive (20%--employment wise) or daily wage workers (10%). These are the ones who are “very likely” to migrate again.

Benefits

  • Household level: Poverty reduction, decline in inequality, jobs to those who could not have otherwise obtained, more income and consumption, more leisure (males from remittance receiving households reduced labor supply by 15%), better education to children, better healthcare, improvement in housing condition, investment in real estate,
  • Macro level: Increase in foreign exchange and BOP stability but induce more imports, helps maintain pegged exchange rate with India, increase in disposable income and higher aggregate consumption

Costs

  • Household level: Family separation, exploitation by recruitment agencies, expensive remittance services
  • Macro level: Dutch Disease effect on manufacturing sector as there is loss of external competitiveness and people import more (increase in demand of nontradables increases prices and wages throughout the economy and later on loss of competitiveness of tradables, leading to decline in manufacturing activities), laxity in policy reforms, increase in wages, higher prices of real estate, and high cost of a decline in growth rate of remittances.

The WB report argues Dutch Disease effects are seen in the economy. It shows that while remittances are increasing, manufacturing (% of GDP) and exports (% of GDP) is declining. 

It says that there is a “vicious policy cycle”: more remittances leading to laxity of policymakers, then inadequate investment climate, then low private investment, then low growth, then limited job opportunities, then more migration, then more remittances, then … the cycle revolves.

Recommendations:

  • . Reduce cost of remitting income: Enhance dialogue between governments of India, the Gulf state, and Malaysia and enforce mutual laws and guidelines for migrant recruitment; bilateral agreements with more countries; strengthen role of Nepali embassies; raise awareness among migrants; provide effective orientation/training programs; effective monitor of recruitment agencies; simplify and systematize the process;
  • Improve remittance services: Develop efficient electric transfer mechanism; introduce mobile phone banking and prepaid cards; improve legal regulatory frameworks; improve communication with destination country authorities; pre-departure orientation
  • Dealing with Dutch Disease: Can’t overturn the situation easily so enact prudent macroeconomic management (fiscal) and improve investment climate (to increase job opportunities at home); channeling remittances into productive sectors.

That said, a true picture of remittances use and abuse and the stock of migrants is still in estimation phase. The true picture will come out with the completion of Census 2011. Numbers on stock of migrant, destination, channeling of income through informal means, those in India and the total sum they sent, and more will be clear once the Census 2011 data are crunched.

Meanwhile, the approximation of the migrants stock and various estimates will be convincing once the entire report is published. The claim of full fledged Dutch Disease effect might be a little over stretched. I think there are symptoms but it is not in a full fledged mode. Remittances have definitely increased imports and consumption, pushing up demand. But, the increase in demand is mostly of durables, which are usually imported and not manufactured in Nepal. The erosion of manufacturing capacity has got more to do with adverse political and investment climate (which in turn has little to do with increasing remittances). There is low appropriability of private returns to investment. Supply side issues are contributing to increasing general prices, which then led to adjustment of wages in the annual budget. Anyway, I think the symptoms of Dutch Disease are definitely there, but it in itself in full effect is doubtful. I will have to see the full reasoning in the report when it comes out.

A little more on the Dutch Disease effect: As domestic income increases due to remittances, aggregate demand and spending goes up as well. This puts pressure on nontradables in the domestic market, leading to rise in demand and output. But, due to high demand wages also tend to increase in all the sectors, both tradable and nontradable. It will increase cost of production throughout the economy, leading to squeezing profits in the nonresource tradables sector (manufacturing), whose prices are pretty much fixed in the international market. This means customers will look for substitutes at cheaper price, thus reducing domestically produced nonresource tradables. This gradually erodes the existence of the whole sector itself. Note that price of nontradables are set in the domestic market, but the price of tradables are set in the international market. Meanwhile, since incomes are higher from migration, capital and labor are attracted to this sector from other sectors of the economy, reducing output and labor supply in the latter ones.


UPDATE (2011-07-08): Well, I just got a summary of the report (forthcoming). It clarifies that Dutch Disease symptoms are seen (not exactly Dutch Disease effect). Here are main points from the summary.


Thursday, June 30, 2011

Cost of MGNREGA is decreasing

It looks like cost of Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (MGNREGA), the largest employment guarantee public works program in the world, is coming down. Its cost as a share of GDP, total expenditure and revenue receipts is decreasing and is expected to be 0.45 percent, 3.19 percent, and 5.08 percent respectively in fiscal year 2011-2012. Here is more on MGNREGA.

NREGA budget (Rs Crore)
2006-07 2007-08 2008-09** 2009-10** 2010-2011* 2011-2012*
GDP, current prices# 4,293,672 4,986,426 5,582,623 6,550,271 7,877,947 8,980,860
Total expenditure 583,387 712,671 900,953 1,020,838 1,108,749 1,257,729
Revenue receipts 434,387 541,864 562,173 614,497 682212 789892
NREGA allocated budget 11,300 12,000 30,000 39,100 40,100 40,100
NREGA/GDP 0.26 0.24 0.54 0.60 0.51 0.45
NREGA/Exp 1.94 1.68 3.33 3.83 3.62 3.19
NREGA/Rev 2.60 2.21 5.34 6.36 5.88 5.08

Source: Union Budgets; *estimate; **revised estimate'; # Economic Survey 2010-11

The main reason for the expected decline is that GDP, expenditure and revenue are estimated to increase but the budget allocation for MGNREGA is kept the same as during the previous fiscal year.

In FY 2010-2011, 5.49 crore households were provided employment (100 days employment  on demand to each household during lean season). The total persondays of employment created was 257.15 persondays (crore). Of this, the share of SCs, STs, and women accounted for 30.63%, 20.85%, and 47.73% respectively.