Monday, July 4, 2011

USAID’s intervention and Rwandan coffee exports

Easterly and Reshef (2010) argue that foreign aid can boost exports but only if projects are implemented carefully in consultation and working with producers and exporters in the country. For instance, after the 1994 genocide in Rwanda, USAID funded two projects to educate local business people in agribusiness. Local officials convinced the agency to figure out which efforts could improve local incomes, and it hit upon specialty coffee. The aid projects helped to form grower coops, taught coffee-washing techniques, contacted potential buyers, and provided the initial capital to build coffee-washing stations. The result is that Rwanda has become a source for high-quality specialty coffee that is sold in the United States.

They also argue African exports are not as dismal as has been portrayed in the media and by researchers. In the 15-year period from 1994 to 2008, sub-Saharan Africa saw its per capita exports of goods rise an average of 13 percent per year. That average is less than China's export growth rate of 19 percent, but on a par with India, and far above Germany's 8 percent and the 4 percent rate for the United States. Given the well known difficulties in exporting from Africa (let alone running business there), 13 percent annual growth rates of exports per capita are no small feat, they argue.

A summary of the paper in July 2011 edition of NEBR digest:


The exports of sub-Saharan African nations include some "big hits" -- that is, exports that dominate national trade. These exports change over time in a way that can't be easily explained by commodity prices or other global factors. And, although the sub-Saharan nations use conventional measures to boost their export revenues, such as moving up the quality ladder, concentrating on comparative strengths, and liberalizing trade rules, part of their success is idiosyncratic: entrepreneurial persistence, luck, and cost shocks can lead to big hits, even where the anticipated probability of success was low.

Sub-Saharan Africa has a relatively low share of manufacturing exports and a much higher share of agriculture, food, fuel, ores, and metals. There is considerable variation within categories, however, with some nations able to export high-value food exclusively to Europe or to the United States. Export successes are rare, but when nations do get a big hit, sales of that good tend to skyrocket. For example, the average share of the top export from 37 African nations is 47.6 percent of all of that nation's exports. The second largest export, by comparison, accounts for only 13.7 percent of exports on average. This pattern is somewhat more extreme than that of non-African nations. The top export share among 130 non-African nations averages 27.5 percent, and the second strongest export averages 11.6 percent.

The big hits also vary widely over time. In Ghana, for example, coconuts, Brazil nuts, and cashew nuts were No. 67 on the list of top exports in 1996 but had climbed to No. 4 by 2008. Meanwhile, unwrought aluminum fell from No. 6 to No. 132 in that same 12-year period. In Ethiopia, fresh vegetable exports rose from No. 182 to No. 5, while buckwheat and other cereals fell from No. 6 to No. 229. These rises and falls are primarily attributable to changes in the quantity exported. Price changes only account for 10 percent of the changes in shares for the median country.

Persistent entrepreneurs, timing, and happenstance also play a role in export success. Gahaya Links, founded in 2003 by two sisters, now sells Rwandan woven baskets to Macy's and other U.S. retailers, despite the problems that typically plague handicrafts ventures in the developing world. A Canadian-trained chemical engineer in Tanzania entered the prawn business after a London-based acquaintance requested the product. The big breakthrough came, however, when he moved into catching white fish in Lake Victoria to supply a European market hungry for his product.


Friday, July 1, 2011

Costs and benefits of remittances in Nepal

Remittances now account for almost 23 percent of Nepal’s GDP. About one-third of working male population is estimated to be outside the country remitting money back home, making remittances the largest foreign currency earner. Here is a discussion on how remittances performed during the global economic crisis. Here is more.

Remittances, US$ millions
Year Workers remittances Compensation of employees Migrants' transfer Total inward remittances flows
2003 744 27 - 771
2004 793 30 - 823
2005 1126 85 - 1212
2006 1373 80 - 1453
2007 1647 87 - 1734
2008 2581 146 - 2727
2009 2858 127 1 2986
2010 (e) - - - 3513

Below are findings from the latest WB report. I have not received the full report yet, but these points are extracted from presentation slides of the authors (here and here). (It is strange that the WB Nepal office did press conference about the study and then not release the full report immediately.)

  • It is estimated that there are 2.02 million migrants (stock total), of which 867000 (43.73%) are in India, 810000 in the Gulf, 245000 in Malaysia, 186000 in various other destinations, and 29000 in “unknown” destinations. [Others say, between 1993/94 and 2009/10, there were 569667 migrants in Malaysia, followed by 481748 in Qatar. Malaysia tops the destination for male migrants (569169) and Lebanon for female migrants (9389)].
  • Most women (58%) go through individual channel and face problems. About 78.9% male go through institutional channel. Overall, 77.6% go through institutional channel.
  • About 8.36% of migrants were female and 91.64% male.
  • A bulk (about half) of the remittances come from the Gulf, followed by India (19.2%) and Malaysia (10.5%).
  • Most of the migrants of the age groups 20-30. Almost all kinds of households migrate, but those with the lowest income bracket migrate the most.
  • Migrant destinations differ by their place of origin. A large number of migrants from Far-Western and Mid-Western (and Western) regions go to India; those from Western and and Eastern regions go to the Gulf; and those from Western and Eastern regions go to Malaysia.
  • About 48% of migrants originate from Terai, 45% from the Hills, and 7% from the Mountain.
  • Over 30 percent of household income in the Western region is accounted by remittances. In Syangja, Kaski, and Tanahu, it is 25.5%, 28.2% and 34% respectively. About 43.4 percent of household income in Argakhashi came from remittances. It was 7% in Jumla.
  • Jhapa (16.8), Morang (13.2), Chitawan (10), Nawalparasi (11.8), Solukhumbu (10.7) got remittances over NRs 10 billion. Agarkhashi and Jumla got 7.5 and 0.4 billion respectively.
  • In 2008, most of the returnees were from India, followed by the Gulf and Malaysia.
  • About 37% of the returnees would “very likely” go back abroad soon. About 34% would “very unlikely” go back soon.
  • Most returnees would return to either agriculture (48%) or stay inactive (20%--employment wise) or daily wage workers (10%). These are the ones who are “very likely” to migrate again.

Benefits

  • Household level: Poverty reduction, decline in inequality, jobs to those who could not have otherwise obtained, more income and consumption, more leisure (males from remittance receiving households reduced labor supply by 15%), better education to children, better healthcare, improvement in housing condition, investment in real estate,
  • Macro level: Increase in foreign exchange and BOP stability but induce more imports, helps maintain pegged exchange rate with India, increase in disposable income and higher aggregate consumption

Costs

  • Household level: Family separation, exploitation by recruitment agencies, expensive remittance services
  • Macro level: Dutch Disease effect on manufacturing sector as there is loss of external competitiveness and people import more (increase in demand of nontradables increases prices and wages throughout the economy and later on loss of competitiveness of tradables, leading to decline in manufacturing activities), laxity in policy reforms, increase in wages, higher prices of real estate, and high cost of a decline in growth rate of remittances.

The WB report argues Dutch Disease effects are seen in the economy. It shows that while remittances are increasing, manufacturing (% of GDP) and exports (% of GDP) is declining. 

It says that there is a “vicious policy cycle”: more remittances leading to laxity of policymakers, then inadequate investment climate, then low private investment, then low growth, then limited job opportunities, then more migration, then more remittances, then … the cycle revolves.

Recommendations:

  • . Reduce cost of remitting income: Enhance dialogue between governments of India, the Gulf state, and Malaysia and enforce mutual laws and guidelines for migrant recruitment; bilateral agreements with more countries; strengthen role of Nepali embassies; raise awareness among migrants; provide effective orientation/training programs; effective monitor of recruitment agencies; simplify and systematize the process;
  • Improve remittance services: Develop efficient electric transfer mechanism; introduce mobile phone banking and prepaid cards; improve legal regulatory frameworks; improve communication with destination country authorities; pre-departure orientation
  • Dealing with Dutch Disease: Can’t overturn the situation easily so enact prudent macroeconomic management (fiscal) and improve investment climate (to increase job opportunities at home); channeling remittances into productive sectors.

That said, a true picture of remittances use and abuse and the stock of migrants is still in estimation phase. The true picture will come out with the completion of Census 2011. Numbers on stock of migrant, destination, channeling of income through informal means, those in India and the total sum they sent, and more will be clear once the Census 2011 data are crunched.

Meanwhile, the approximation of the migrants stock and various estimates will be convincing once the entire report is published. The claim of full fledged Dutch Disease effect might be a little over stretched. I think there are symptoms but it is not in a full fledged mode. Remittances have definitely increased imports and consumption, pushing up demand. But, the increase in demand is mostly of durables, which are usually imported and not manufactured in Nepal. The erosion of manufacturing capacity has got more to do with adverse political and investment climate (which in turn has little to do with increasing remittances). There is low appropriability of private returns to investment. Supply side issues are contributing to increasing general prices, which then led to adjustment of wages in the annual budget. Anyway, I think the symptoms of Dutch Disease are definitely there, but it in itself in full effect is doubtful. I will have to see the full reasoning in the report when it comes out.

A little more on the Dutch Disease effect: As domestic income increases due to remittances, aggregate demand and spending goes up as well. This puts pressure on nontradables in the domestic market, leading to rise in demand and output. But, due to high demand wages also tend to increase in all the sectors, both tradable and nontradable. It will increase cost of production throughout the economy, leading to squeezing profits in the nonresource tradables sector (manufacturing), whose prices are pretty much fixed in the international market. This means customers will look for substitutes at cheaper price, thus reducing domestically produced nonresource tradables. This gradually erodes the existence of the whole sector itself. Note that price of nontradables are set in the domestic market, but the price of tradables are set in the international market. Meanwhile, since incomes are higher from migration, capital and labor are attracted to this sector from other sectors of the economy, reducing output and labor supply in the latter ones.


UPDATE (2011-07-08): Well, I just got a summary of the report (forthcoming). It clarifies that Dutch Disease symptoms are seen (not exactly Dutch Disease effect). Here are main points from the summary.


Thursday, June 30, 2011

Cost of MGNREGA is decreasing

It looks like cost of Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (MGNREGA), the largest employment guarantee public works program in the world, is coming down. Its cost as a share of GDP, total expenditure and revenue receipts is decreasing and is expected to be 0.45 percent, 3.19 percent, and 5.08 percent respectively in fiscal year 2011-2012. Here is more on MGNREGA.

NREGA budget (Rs Crore)
2006-07 2007-08 2008-09** 2009-10** 2010-2011* 2011-2012*
GDP, current prices# 4,293,672 4,986,426 5,582,623 6,550,271 7,877,947 8,980,860
Total expenditure 583,387 712,671 900,953 1,020,838 1,108,749 1,257,729
Revenue receipts 434,387 541,864 562,173 614,497 682212 789892
NREGA allocated budget 11,300 12,000 30,000 39,100 40,100 40,100
NREGA/GDP 0.26 0.24 0.54 0.60 0.51 0.45
NREGA/Exp 1.94 1.68 3.33 3.83 3.62 3.19
NREGA/Rev 2.60 2.21 5.34 6.36 5.88 5.08

Source: Union Budgets; *estimate; **revised estimate'; # Economic Survey 2010-11

The main reason for the expected decline is that GDP, expenditure and revenue are estimated to increase but the budget allocation for MGNREGA is kept the same as during the previous fiscal year.

In FY 2010-2011, 5.49 crore households were provided employment (100 days employment  on demand to each household during lean season). The total persondays of employment created was 257.15 persondays (crore). Of this, the share of SCs, STs, and women accounted for 30.63%, 20.85%, and 47.73% respectively.

Wednesday, June 29, 2011

Two main barriers to economic integration in South Asia

Former finance minister Rameshore Prasad Khanal argues that the two main barriers to trade integration in South Asia are poor cross-border transport and customs infrastructure, and difficulties in swapping currencies, especially for small producers. Here is my take on regional economic integration growth in Nepal.


There are two more main barriers to effective trade within the region. The cross-border transport and customs infrastructure in the region is very poor. If SAFTA is to yield any result, improvement in trade infrastructure is a must. Asian Development Bank (ADB) through South Asian Sub-Regional Economic Cooperation (SASEC) has been focusing on improvement of transport infrastructure in the quadrangle of Bhutan, Bangladesh, India and Nepal but the actual move on critical infrastructure has been slow.

The other barrier for trade between small producers in the region is currency. Trade between most of the countries are carried out in US dollars, as a result there is little preference for goods originating from within the region. A simple mechanism of currency swap would help small producers in the individual countries find market within the region. If countries agree to allow trade of up to a certain range in the currency of respective countries and central banks swap such currency reserves periodically, then the trade within the region can get a boost even without making much improvement in the other non-tariff barriers. A simple currency swap arrangement can, in course of time, lead to full convertibility of currencies in the region. If a currency swap arrangement is agreed upon by all central banks of South Asia, then currencies would not be required to move physically as most of the settlements will take place in the books. The net differentials may only be moved physically once in agreed period framework. Exchange rates between the two currencies may be allowed to move as the market conditions demand, except in cases where two currencies are pegged with each other.

Currency swap arrangement would also open up two other potential areas in the region, namely, tourism and education. If a Bangladeshi needs to cough up US dollar to come to Nepal, he/she might choose to go to Thailand in place, so does a Nepali. Many Sri Lankans would like to come to Nepal to visit Lumbini and Nepalis would just as love to go to Kandy in Sri Lanka. Many Nepalis each year travel to New Delhi but few think of going to Lahore or for that matter Karachi. Countries in South Asia have world-class educational institutions but because of currency restrictions many good Pakistani, Bangladeshi or Nepali institutions do not receive South Asian students. If one has to procure US dollars for foreign education, the natural choice would be a country outside South Asia. Currency swap arrangements would also promote students mobility in the region. Visa restrictions have not been such a problem for many in the region, but in critical cases, this has been an issue. It is reported that the recently established South Asian University, funded by all member countries on the basis of an agreed formula, has been facing difficulty receiving Pakistani students and academicians due to visa-related problems.


Saturday, June 25, 2011

Can you separate the WTO from the Doha Round?


The prolonged standoff over “new” market access, by preventing the WTO from fulfilling these objectives, is causing serious damage to the global trading system. The solution to the WTO’s problems, therefore, lies not in decoupling the WTO from the Doha Round, but in enabling it to achieve an ambitious Doha outcome based on its development mandate.

[…]Doha is a symptom of the deeper crisis in the WTO which is essentially due to the changed political economy of the organisation. Only when WTO members arrive at a shared political understanding regarding the future role of the organisation can we begin to see light at the end of the tunnel. Without such an understanding, arguments for decoupling the WTO from Doha have little meaning.


So argues Ujal Singh Bhatia here.

Thursday, June 23, 2011

Update on the state of labor market in Nepal

According to this news piece that quotes Labor Standard Survey 2008:

  • Labor force (15-59 years): 15.4 million
  • Employed: 11.7 million
  • Annual new entrants in the labor market: 0.425 million (0.3 million go abroad for employment)


Meanwhile, there are 0.21 million child workers working in legally prohibited sectors. The sector-wise distribution is as below:
  • Agriculture: 1,861,000
  • Industrial houses: 33,000
  • Hotel, restaurant: 30,000
  • Manufacturing: 29,000
  • Construction: 6,000
  • Others: 3,000
  • Wage earners: 138,000


By the end of this decade, the number of people in the age range 15 to 34 is expected to be about 14 million, which is approximately 40 % of the estimated total population in 2020.The number of people in the age group 15-24 will peak in 2017 and the 15-34 segments will peak in 2023. They will be the agents of change and a catalyst to the engine of growth.


Also, it is estimated that there are about 50,000 foreign workers in Nepal working without employment authorization (you have to pay Rs 10,000 yearly if you are registered). This excludes Indian nationals because according to Nepal-India Treaty of 1950 Indians can work in Nepal without such authorization (likewise for Nepalese citizens in India). Foreigners are usually working in projects, INGOs, banks, MNCs, tourism, aviation, hotel, and beverage sectors.


Migration

Emigration, 2010

  • Stock of emigrants: 982.2 thousands

  • Stock of emigrants as percentage of population: 3.3%

  • Top destination countries: India, Qatar, the United States, Thailand, the United Kingdom, Saudi Arabia, Japan, Brunei Darussalam, Australia, Canada

Skilled emigration, 2000

  • Emigration rate of tertiary-educated population: 5.3%

  • Emigration of physicians: 40 or 3.3% of physicians trained in the country

Immigration, 2010

  • Stock of immigrants: 945.9 thousands

  • Stock of immigrants as percentage of population: 3.2%

  • Females as percentage of immigrants: 68.2%

  • Refugees as percentage of immigrants: 13.8%

  • Top source countries: India, Bhutan, Pakistan, China, Australia, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Maldives, New Zealand

Tuesday, June 21, 2011

Nepal's banking and liquidity crises explained

Here is my latest article on the banking and liquidity crisis in Nepal. For earlier pieces on the same issues, check out this and this. 


Nepal’s banking bubble troubles

When Vibor Bikas Bank (VBB) knocked on the doors of Nepal Rastra Bank (NRB), our central bank, to either inject money in the development bank or to take over management, it rattled the banking industry and the already suspicious depositors. There were rumors and anticipation that due to excessive loan exposure to real estate, housing and construction sectors bank and financial institutions (BFIs) will land in the red sooner or later.

The sudden move by Vibor made depositors panic and policymakers scurry to find a way to avert a ‘Lehman moment’—the day when US investment bank Lehman Brothers collapsed (September 15, 2008) and triggered the global financial crisis that was ensued by the global economic crisis. In Nepal’s banking history, the rescue of Vibor is a ‘Northern Rock moment’—the day when the Bank of England extended emergency financial support to the trouble mortgage lender on September 17, 2007 and saved it from collapsing.

Without deep structural changes in the banking industry, Nepal will definitely see many ‘Northern Rock moments’ and eventually a disastrous ‘Lehman moment’ as well. The tendency to seek short term, quick returns against long term viability and sustainability is leading the BFIs in a path of self-destruction. For a healthy banking industry, Nepal needs fewer but stronger BFIs with sound corporate governance. Furthermore, there has to be an enhancement of regulatory and supervisory capabilities of NRB.

Mushrooming BFIs

In Nepal, formal banking commenced with the establishment of Nepal Bank Limited (NBL) in 1937. The central bank was established in 1956 after nearly two decades of the start of commercial banking by NBL.Then a decade later, Rastriya Banijya Bank (RBB) was established by the government.

Following the financial liberalization in the 1980s, Nepal Arab Bank Ltd (now NABIL Bank Ltd) was established, making it the first foreign joint venture (JV) bankin Nepal. Then two foreign JV banks, Nepal Indosuez Bank Ltd (now Nepal Investment Bank) and Nepal Grindlays Bank Ltd (now Standard Chartered Bank Nepal Ltd.) were established in 1986 and 1987 respectively.

After mid-1990s, the number of BFIs increased multifold. In 1983 and 1993 there were two and eight commercial banks respectively; and by 2006, there were 18. Meanwhile, there were three development banks in 1995, which increased to 28 in 2006. Finance companies came into existence in 1992, and by 2006, they numbered 70. Currently, there are over 292 BFIs, including 31 commercial banks, 78 development banks, 79 finance companies, and 18 microfinance institutions.

The growth in number of BFIs is unprecedented and not warranted by the economic and banking fundamentals of the past decade. It was facilitated by near-retiring NRB officials, who turned a deaf ear to calls for clamping down on BFI growth, in hopes of landing on lucrative private-sector banking jobs.

Status of BFIs

While total deposits at commercial banks stand at around Rs 642 billion (as of April 2011), development banks and finance companies have deposits around Rs 56 billion and 67 billion respectively (as of mid-July 2009). Of the total commercial banks’ deposits, demand deposits, savings deposits, and fixed deposits stand at 12%, 36%, and 52% respectively.

They have liquid funds of Rs 114 billion (cash in hand is just 16.2 billion, and deposits with NRB Rs 39.3 billion). More than Rs 110 billion is invested in real estate by the commercial banks alone. Over 72% of commercial banks’ credit flows against fixed assets.

Loans and advances of commercial banks (without claims on government) stand at Rs 572 billion (as of April 2011). Meanwhile, loans and advances of development banks and finance companies stand at Rs 52 billion and 70 billion respectively (as of mid-July 2009).

As a share of gross domestic product (GDP), total deposit, total credit (including claims on government) and private sector credit are 51%, 54.9% and 43.6%, respectively.

Commercial banks’ deposit rate ranges from 2-12% and loans 7-18%. Interbank lending rate is as high as 10.2%. Right now, the interest spread, which is the difference between lending and deposit rates, is also high. The wider it is, more worrisome the state of BFIs. Likewise, the high inter-bank rate shows that the banks themselves are reluctant to lend money to each other. Some of the BFIs are yet to meet the revised capital adequacy ratio, which is the ratio of a bank’s capital to its risks, laid out by the NRB, keeping in mind their increasing vulnerability to excessive loan exposure to just a few sectors.

Banking troubles

Without a proportional increase in depositor base and diversification of investment portfolios, the unnatural growth in the number of BFIs led to intense cutthroat competition in enticing depositors (institutional, government and individual) and borrowers.

Buoyed by rising remittances, the former were incentivized to deposit cash at high interest rates rather than looking for alternative sources of investment.

Meanwhile, the BFIs doled out easy loans to real estate and housing sector borrowers without assessing their capacity to honor interest and principal payments in time. It led to rapid rise in real estate and housing prices in urban areas.

When the abnormally high prices started to fall, the borrowers were unable to pay back interest and principal in time, leading to a shortfall of liquidity in the banking industry.

Simultaneously, category B, C and D BFIs were finding it hard to borrow more from category A BFIs because the inter-bank lending rate was almost above the average of BFIs’ normal lending rates. Worse, some BFIs have prepared a negative list to not lend money to BFIs which they think are on the verge of collapse.

It was, to a minor extent, compounded by the government’s inability to mobilize development expenditure, the big institutional depositors’ decision to pull out mature deposits from fledging BFIs, and a slowdown in deposits growth rate. The combined effect of all these factors hit hard banks such as Vibor that had substantial loan exposure to a few sectors, compelling them to seek NRB’s intervention. In effect, we are seeing a serious erosion of confidence in our banking system, and a surge in demand for commodities like gold and silver.

Two bubbles

By overlooking the need for having a limited number of BFIs, the evolving depositor base, and financial penetration over the years, the NRB let too many BFIs to pop up. This created a BFI bubble. This was followed by intense competition of not only between banks in the same category but also between BFIs in different categories, leading to an informal war in offering high deposit rates and lending without differentiating markets, products, and borrowers’ creditworthiness. It reflected bad corporate governance, and a lack of innovation and R&D in the sector. The resulting lending surge in real estate and housing markets unnaturally swelled their prices, leading to a real estate and housing bubble.

Causes

There have been misleading and incongruous arguments floating around about the causes of the ongoing liquidity and banking crisis. They are made by stakeholders who fail to see how their vested interests and incompetence is jeopardizing the future of the banking industry, and is potentially derailing an already unstable economy.

First, bankers and businessmen are arguing that delayed budget and disbursement of development expenditures are causing liquidity crisis. This argument does not hold much water. It is true that budgets have been coming out late for two years now, and there has not been normal flow of money from the Ministry of Finance and other Ministries to the respective corners of the country via BFIs. This has definitely limited liquidity in the banking system. But it in itself is not the main cause. Instead, it is a minor stimulant to the liquidity crisis. If delay in development expenditure is the cause, then why did we not have liquidity crisis when similar episodes occurred in the past?

Second, the withdrawal of large amount of money by institutional depositors, especially NRB and Nepal Army, has drastically reduced reserves in BFIs’ vaults and squeezed available liquidity. This again is a stimulant to the liquidity problem, not its main cause. If just by pulling out a few millions of mature deposits by institutional depositors puts the BFIs in trouble, then there is something wrong with the way they are doing business. It points to bankers’ incompetence and inability to run BFIs.

Third, while some argue that people are either stashing money at home or are investing in commodities like gold and silver, others assert that the compulsion to divulge source of income on transactions above Rs one million is restricting deposits. Again, both are not the real causes, but stimulant to the liquidity crisis. These arguments are trumpeted by certain businessmen who are afraid of divulging their sources of income and dutifully pay taxes to the government.

Fourth, some argue that a decline in reserves, precisely monetary base (which is equal to currency in circulation and reserves of banks held in central bank), due to a slowdown in growth of remittances, led to a situation where credit growth was higher than deposit growth. They assert that it is resulting in a liquidity crisis, and to return to normal, the NRB should purchase bonds and treasury bills and lower cash reserve ratio and the already high capital requirements (all of which will help increase liquidity). Of all the arguments, this holds some truth. But increasing liquidity without correcting the distorted market would only postpone the inevitable.

The NRB cannot afford to play such a cat-and-mouse game each time the BFIs irresponsibly increase credit without assessing the creditworthiness of borrowers and their deposit growth.

The main cause is that we have too many BFIs catering to too few customers, meaning that in order to survive and meet ever-increasing profit target, they have to have constant flow of money from all sources, that also in higher proportion than previous flows. The higher the number of BFIs, the intense will be competition to attract deposits and the need for higher liquidity. It also means doling out more loans to earn quick returns to meet profit target before the annual general meeting of shareholders and directors.

Were we warned?

Many financial and economic analysts failed to perceive the rapid changes happening in the banking sector. Similarly, business journalists utterly failed to even read clues of troubles starting more than a decade ago when the now liquidated Nepal Development Bank (NDB) was put under management review, and when the number of BFIs increased multifold in a matter of just five years.

It might be unsurprising because a majority of business journalists in Nepal do not actually have training in economics and business. They take on-the-job training on business reporting and are behind the curve in fathoming the economic fundamentals and troubles. Ironically, the same analysts who fail to comprehend the evolving troubles are given platforms in the media and civil society, leading to circulation of incongruous ideas and illogical interpretations.

That being said, some observers, journalists, analysts, and bankers (including yours truly) did perceive the looming crises. The warning bell rang when the issue of willful defaulters and excessive non-performing loans of BFIs popped up in 2006.

What next?

The existing banking and liquidity crisis is not the usual yada yada about the banking sector troubles and refinancing schemes. It is much more serious than that. Some of the troubled BFIs will go belly up in the coming days and some will find ways to merge with others. There might be runs on some of the struggling BFIs when depositors lose confidence on them.

Lets us be clear that repeated introduction of refinancing facilities will not resolve the recurrent problem; it will only defer the inevitable restructuring of the entire banking sector. Meanwhile, one way or the other, the costs of such refinancing facilities will have to be paid by taxpayers. It is tantamount to bailing out troubled BFIs who got into the mess due to their own incompetence, not due to the public’s desire to withdraw deposits and invest in commodities like gold and silver, and durables.

For the short term, the NRB should use all its tools to increase liquidity so that anxious depositors are calmed down. This should be followed by concrete steps to consolidate our banking system.

I think Nepal should have something like a “Troubled BFI Relief Program.” It could be a powerful body within NRB whose main purpose would be to rescue and restructure troubled BFIs so that the problem is not systemic, and depositors are not induced to run on banks. It should bail out depositors, but not sinking BFIs. Moreover, it could be given the authority to sell assets, change management, force merger or acquisition, and hold the majority of shares of troubled BFIs until they return to a healthy state. It would consolidate the banking sector, and potentially lead to fewer but healthier BFIs that are innovative in providing services to the public, and also not take excessive risks to derail the entire economy.

Published in The Week, Republica, June 17, 2011, p.6]