Sunday, May 22, 2011

Food crisis: Simulation versus self-reporting

Derek Headey doubts the existing literature and analysis on food crisis and argues that the negative impacts of higher food prices in 2007-08 was more-than-compensated by economic growth (and insufficient coverage of China and India), something the existing models don’t take into account. Here is a paper (Was the global food crisis really a crisis?) by Headey.

Heady shows that global self-reported food insecurity fell during 2005 and 2008, with 60 million to 250 million fewer food-insecure people. The main reasons for this are rapid economic growth and very limited food price inflation in the world’s most populous countries, particularly China and India. Hence, he argues that food insecurity outcome shown by simulations do not match up with self-reported food insecurity level by countries. So, if the existing estimates are incorrect, then are the policy interventions designed to counter food insecurity misplaced?

Estimates of global trends in self-reported food insecurity, 2005/06 to 2007/08 (million)
Estimation scenarios Estimated change
Raw results, 70 countries -408
Raw results, 70 countries, plus assumptions for 16 omissions -326
Raw results, 68 countries, after excluding China and India 9
Raw results, 69 countries, after excluding China -132
Raw results, China and India trends adjusted by error margins -250
Raw results, China and India reductions=3 percentage points -63
Predicted change with econometric model, 88 countries -87

Source: Headey (2011) estimates from Gallup World Poll data.


In a new IFPRI discussion paper I show that these simulations suffer from serious flaws, and that their results are largely contradicted by self-reported food insecurity trends from the Gallup World Poll. The poverty simulations are often quite nice studies, but they are partial equilibrium studies with no wage adjustments, no changes in other commodity prices (like fuel, cotton, coffee, minerals), and no changes in incomes (which were growing all around the developing world from 2000-2008). Hunger simulations have more fundamental problems. Basically they count calorie availability, but the problem with a food or a financial crisis is that it is an access shock, not a production shock. Hence the FAO had to rely on a USDA model (which included reduced "calorie imports") to provide estimates of changes in hunger during the crisis. Yet in my paper I show that USDA's estimates of calorie availability (from early 2008) seem to be contradicted by USDA's own historical data on cereal availability.


[Note that self-reported food insecurity varies from country to country: in Colombia it is 67 percent, but in Nepal it is just 9 percent. The figures discussed here are global level data, not country-specific.]

Friday, May 20, 2011

Impact of climate change on food prices

Duncan Green cites a new paper that shows that changes to the climate (higher temperatures, changed rainfall, increased CO2 concentration) has meant:

  • global food prices have risen by 6.4%
  • the world has spent an additional $50bn per year on food
  • crops equivalent to one year’s production of maize in Mexico and wheat in France have been lost

Here is the abstract from David Lobell and Wolfram Schlenker’s (2011) paper:


Efforts to anticipate how climate change will affect future food availability can benefit from understanding the impacts of changes to date. Here we show that in the cropping regions and growing seasons of most countries, with the important exception of the United States, temperature trends for 1980-2008 exceeded one standard deviation of historic year-to-year variability. Models that link yields of the four largest commodity crops to weather indicate that global maize and wheat production declined by 3.8% and 5.5%, respectively, compared to a counter-factual without climate trends. For soybeans and rice, winners and losers largely balanced out. Climate trends were large enough in some countries to offset a significant portion of the increases in average yields 16 that arose from technology, CO2 fertilization, and other factors.


Green adds:


These may seem like relatively small numbers so far, but the key driver identified in the study – temperature rises – is projected to increase at significantly faster rates in the coming decades than occurred in the period of this study (global average temperatures have risen by 0.13C per decade since 1950, and are projected to rise by 0.2C per decade over next 2-3 decades, according to IPCC, with higher rises likely in areas of cultivated land – so local impacts in food growing areas will be more extreme, even assuming that there are no tipping points along the way).


Thursday, May 19, 2011

NREGA wages first converging and then diverging

Full story here. The tussle between center government and state government might affect the performance of one of the most extensive and successful (so far) safety net interventions.  More about NREGA here. In short, the program offers 100 days of guaranteed employment per annum to at least one member of rural household; unemployment benefits are given if the state fails to provide jobs within 15 days of work demanded by workers; and wage is equal to minimum unskilled agricultural wage.

Wednesday, May 18, 2011

Fight of the Century: Keynes vs. Hayek Round II

Very interesting. This is Round II.

Here is Round I.

Inefficient SOEs of Nepal: The triumph of politics over economic imperatives

This article is a product of the productive usage of the banda last Friday organized by Nepal Federation of Indigenous Nationalities (NEFIN)! It is about the sorry state of three major inefficient state-owned enterprises (SOEs) of Nepal: Electricity Authority (NEA), Nepal Oil Corporation (NOC), and Nepal Airlines Corporation (NAC). The very presence and operation style of these SOEs is distorting market prices and incentives. Their condition shows the triumph of politics over economic imperatives in the public sector in Nepal. For specific sources for stats in this article, see this earlier blog post.


Inefficient SOEs

The existing product market scenario is frustrating for consumers. A majority of the people cannot get petroleum fuel even if they are willing to pay higher prices. They cannot get enough electricity despite being willing to pay more to get extra power to light up their bulbs, and cooking and cooling devices. Furthermore, even after paying nominal charge they are still seeing dry taps in their houses. Also, those willing to fly on the national carrier are not being able to do so because of the failure of Nepal Airlines Corporation (NAC) to correctly fathom the evolving airline market.

These are some of the examples of the consequences of letting inefficient state-owned enterprises (SOEs) to either fully or partially control markets on which consumers heavily bank on to meet their daily needs. Out of a total of 36 SOEs, 18 are operating in loss and even more have negative net worth. The government’s loan investment in SOEs is over Rs 80 billion annually.

Instead of resuscitating these SOEs each time they run in fiscal trouble, squandering taxpayer’s money at the cost of development activities in rural areas and services delivery in urban areas, the optimal solution would be to either purge or reform or privatize most of the loss-making SOEs that are not strategically linked to vital security and national interests. The reason why most of these SOEs are surviving is not related to economics, but vested political interests.

Let me discuss the state of three major inefficient SOEs—Nepal Electricity Authority (NEA), Nepal Oil Corporation (NOC), and NAC—that are draining state resources each year without adding much value to productive capacity of the nation. Subsidizing and keeping these mammoth SOEs alive means that our fiscal deficit, which is 3.9 percent of GDP, will further widen and budget for a number of hospitals, schools, rural roads, and food and agriculture aid curtailed. A complete structural reform—with regards to market, price, management and operation—is essential to ensure that taxpayer’s money is efficiently utilized and that these enterprises delivery what they are supposed to.

The NEA was earning profit until FY 2058/59, but is incurring loss of about Rs 19.47 billion, which is several times more than its total assets, for a decade now. It is unable to supply electricity as per market demand. During FY 2009/10 the annual peak demand reached 885.28 MW, a 8.96 percent growth over the peak demand a year ago. Of this around 30 percent was managed by load-shedding and import from India. It is expected that total electricity demand will be around 1,400 MW by 2015. With the existing pace of power generation, it is virtually impossible to keep up with the growth in demand. The market situation is so pathetic that despite being naturally endowed with rivers having potential to power the entire country and even to supply surplus to India, we are compelled to import, at a high rate, approximately 15 percent of the existing electricity supply from India.

The state of NOC is even miserable. It is running a deficit of Rs 15 billion and monthly loss of about Rs 2 billion. Its creditworthiness is so bad that none of the financial institution is willing to lend money against any guarantee to settle outstanding debt owed to Indian Oil Corporation and to procure more fuel to satisfy increasing demand in the market.

Recently, it was reported that the government had to implore Employment Provident Fund to lend Rs 2 billion and request India to give Rs 3 billion line of credit to resolve fuel shortage for two months. This comes on top of approximately Rs 1.5 billion already given to NOC by diverting funds from a rural roads development project. The market is so distorted that even when people are willing to pay high prices they are not getting fuel as demanded. Already a liter of petrol costs over Rs 125 in the black market.

The state of NAC is heartbreaking. It is supposed to be a pride of Nepal, ferry domestic and international travelers on aircrafts with the iconic Nepali flag, and assist Nepal to achieve its tourism potential. Unfortunately, it is deeply embroiled in repeated scandals related to financial theft during purchase of badly needed aircrafts, appointment of staff, repayment of loans and so forth. It has become a hiring bank for supporters of major political parties. Its total asset is worth Rs 16.80 billion, but losses are over Rs 2 billion. It has just two big aircraft and three small aircraft. Note that at one time the NAC had 21 aircraft, including eight Twin Otters, two Boeing 727s and two 757s, and was one of the biggest foreign currency earners. With mounting losses, mismanagement, and competition from private players, NAC has lost its relevance.

A noticeable question is: How come the SOEs having a healthy balance sheet a decade ago go bankrupt and lose creditworthiness? It is because of myopic financial and operations management, poor governance and accountability, and most importantly the triumph of politics over economic imperatives. The fragile financial health of SOEs and their inability to efficiently and sufficiently satisfy market demand is a recurrent problem that cannot be resolved by applying band aid (such as providing loan sufficient to resuscitate them for few months). It requires sweeping structural changes, which may involve making painful decision of firing redundant politically-appointed staff and adjusting prices upward to reflect changing market dynamics and investment costs.

Unfortunately, this has not happened yet. The NOC is not allowed to adjust market prices. As of last week, it was incurring loss (per liter) of Rs 8.10 in petrol, Rs 23.42 in diesel, Rs 13.61 in kerosene, and Rs 322.6 in a cylinder of LPG gas. Its monthly loss is over Rs 1.96 billion. Similarly, NEA is not allowed to adjust market prices depending on market dynamics and investment costs. At present, per unit investment is Rs 8.97, but power is sold at Rs 6.57 per unit (a loss of Rs 2.40 per unit). Its total annual income is about Rs 1.5 billion but yearly operating expense is Rs 1.65 billion.

The country cannot afford to repeatedly bail out SOEs by slashing development expenditures. Worse, most of the subsidies meant for the poor are captured by the well-offs in urban centers. Effective market and product differentiation is one aspect of goods and services delivery to the targeted group. But, there is no simple fix to the inefficiencies of SOEs except for increasing ownership by management and exposing them to competitive market forces. The consumers should be the king, not the political leaders who dictate the SOE’s board to play to its pricing tunes, whose pitch depends on mood of party cadres.

Apart from stopping leakages and ensuring efficiency, allowing these institutions to adjust prices is one option in the short run to restructure their financial position, and facilitate adequate and timely delivery of goods and services. In the long run, political meddling in all SOEs should cease. They should be allowed to operate freely and competitively. If some of them fail to perform then we should let them exit the market. Meanwhile, NOC and NEA should be broken up into independent units responsible for procurement, production, distribution and retailing. It would help facilitate the entry of private players as well. They should not hold monopoly (market characterized by one seller, many buyers) and monopsony (market characterized by one buyer, many sellers) powers.

That said, subsidizing some SOEs that are vital to maintaining national and security interests are justifiable. But, NEA, NOC and NAC do not fall in this category. The more we bail them out of their financial mess and let politics overcome economics, the more inefficient will be our economic and public goods delivery systems.


[Published in Republica, May 16, 2011, p.7]

Sunday, May 15, 2011

Per capita GDP and dependent population in 2050 in South Asia

In a new ADB report (Asia 2050—Realizing the Asian Century), Nepal’s per capita GDP (PPP) in 2050 is estimated to be US$3400 and 65 plus population is expected to be 10.6 percent of the total population in 2050. See the table below for corresponding figures of other South Asian countries.

South Asian per capita GDP and 65+ population in 2050
Country per capita GDP (PPP, US$) 65+ population
Bhutan 48,600 15
India 41,700 13.7
Sri Lanka 34,700 21.4
Bangladesh 14,200 14.9
Pakistan 7,900 10
Nepal 3,400 10.6
Afghanistan 2,800 3.6

Nepal is one of the “Young Asia” that will have a large working age population compared to other nations in 2050, thus increasing potential for reaping demographic dividends. One of the lowest per capita income and one of the highest number of working age population would mean that it will have potentially cheaper factors of production. It indicates a good reason for investors to plan their investment strategy of investing in Nepal and other young South Asian nations accordingly. Additionally, Nepal’s geopolitical location (between China and India) will be attractive as well because as these nations become richer, wages will increase and markets will expand. Nepal will become the perfect location to manufacture and provide services to the Indian and Chinese population.

Wednesday, May 11, 2011

Land grabs in Africa

An interesting article about land grabs in The Economist:


Land grabs have been strikingly popular. Preliminary research by the International Land Coalition, a non-governmental organisation, reckons almost 80m hectares have been subject to some sort of negotiation with a foreign investor, more than half in Africa (see chart). This estimate is far higher than a previous one, by the World Bank, which last year said that foreign investors had expressed interest in 57m hectares. It is higher still than one by the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) which put the figure in a 2009 study at 15m-20m hectares. It would be wrong to draw a line between these numbers so as to conclude that land deals have grown fourfold. Since most are secret, knowing what to count is difficult, and the figures refer to different periods.


Note that when land deals are initially proposed four main benefit0s are offered to the host countries (apart from the benefits to the deal seeker): more jobs, new technology, better infrastructure and extra tax revenues. None of these promises seems to have been fulfilled according to the article.


So why are land deals popular? That is surprisingly easy to answer: strong demand and willing suppliers. The big investors tend to be capital-exporting countries with large worries about feeding their own people. Their confidence in world markets has been shaken by two food-price spikes in four years. So they have sought to guarantee food supplies by buying farmland abroad. China is by far the largest investor, buying or leasing twice as much as anyone else.


Here is info about conference related to land grabbing and related papers.