Thursday, December 16, 2010

LDCs fact sheet on climate change

[A draft version of a short article I wrote for Trade Insight magazine, vol.6, No.3-4, 2010. Here is the published version, p.4]


The 49 Least Developing Countries (LDCs) will suffer disproportionately from the impact of climate change. Given the level of contribution to inducing climate change relative to the size of economies and the level of fossil fuels used by LDCs, they will suffer relatively more than larger economies, which are also high emitters of green house gases. While some LDCs will experience extreme temperature patterns, affecting not only human habitat but also altering fundamentals of ecosystems, others will be exposed to the risk of inundation, loss of livelihoods, and erratic rainfalls. It is expected to affect weather pattern, health, agriculture and fisheries, ecosystem and biodiversity, and coastal zones among others. Since the LDCs lack adequate resources to cope with negative impacts of climate change, they should be assisted with adequate adaptive capacity.

Typically, LDCs have a three-year average per capita GNI of less than US$ 905; low levels of capital, human and technological development; and high economic vulnerability. They have a combined population of around 785 million. At least 470 million are projected to live in extreme poverty by 2015.[1] On top of the existing economic and social vulnerabilities, LDCs also face increasing level of climate-related incidents such as droughts, floods, declining agricultural productivity, and unusual weather patterns. A substantial portion of LDCs population who depend on agriculture and forestry for livelihood will experience higher level of vulnerability.

Most of the LDC’s consumption, production and exports are not well diversified, exposing them to greater risk from global economic shocks associated with climate change. It will affect growth and development related sectors such as health, water supply and sanitation, energy, transport, mining, construction, trade, tourism, agriculture, forestry, fisheries, environment protection and disaster management.

The IPCC’s 2007 4th Assessment Report states that global temperature rise of 4 degree Celsius would raise sea level to such an extent that it would submerge low-lying island states (and also LDC) like Tuvalu, Kiribati, and the Maldives. The LDCs in Africa and Asia would see flooding of low-lying coastal areas, scarcity of water, decline in agriculture production and fisheries, and a loss of biological resources. The IPCC estimates that yields from rain-fed agriculture in Africa could be reduced by as much as 50 percent by the next decade. Water shortages and shrinking of arable land would not only reduce production but could trigger social and political disruption.

It notes that Africa is the most vulnerable continent to climate change. Agricultural production and food security is most likely to be severely compromised, and water stress heightened. The available stock of productive land is decreasing.[2] Note that over 70 percent of LDC’s population resides in rural areas and depend on agriculture, which employ 68.8 percent of the economically active population, for living. This sector alone contributes 28 percent of the LDCs’ GDP.

One-third of African people live in drought-prone areas. Add the miseries associated with drought and floods to the impact of water-borne diseases such as malaria, cholera and diarrhea, the final outcome could be devastating. Furthermore, as a result of climate change, the geographic distribution of malaria is likely to alter, as the existing favorable malaria regions might be unfavorable and vice versa. For instance, relatively malaria-free areas in Ethiopia, Rwanda, Somalia and the Angolan highlands might experience malaria incidences by 2050. This could reach epidemic scale as communities in these relatively malaria-free areas lack immunity to newly intruded communicable diseases.[3]

As much as 75 to 250 million people will be exposed to increasing water stress in Africa by 2020. Africa is also expected to experience a reduction in soil moisture in the sub-humid zones. Southern Africa will see a decrease in rainfall. It will affect natural water reservoirs. For instance, Lake Chad has already lost 50 percent water in the last four decades. The LDCs along the Niger River Basin such as Benin, Guinea, Mali and Niger are expected to experience a ten percent change in precipitation, evaporation and runoffs. Similar, or even worse, trend is expected in LDCs along the Zambezi River and the Gambia River.

The IPCC report has predicted that South Asia will experience temperatures above the global average. The melting of snow and glaciers in the Himalayas will likely increase flooding and avalanches by 2030. Nepal and Bangladesh are at risk of increasing flood disasters and are expected to be hit by flash floods. Meanwhile, rainfall is expected to increase during summer as well. The increasing frequency of heat waves in Asia might increase elderly mortality, especially among the urban poor population. Arid and semi-arid, and tropical Asian regions will see an increase in patients with respiratory and cardiovascular diseases. As in the case with Africa, communicable water-borne diseases might cause water-related stress in LDCs in Asia.

Irrigation-fed agriculture in Asia will be impacted as well. Rice growing areas will see a decline in production, severely impacting economic growth and development goals. It will also impact agricultural production and access to food, exacerbating malnutrition and hunger in some LDCs. By 2020, there might be a reduction of up to 50 percent of rain-fed agriculture. [4]The West and Central African countries might see production decline to the tune of 2-4 percent of GDP. That said, production of certain crops that flourish under relatively higher temperature (such as millet) than normal might increase. Unfortunately, it does not include major staple crops like rice, wheat, corn, bean and potato.

Climate change will also impact land, water ecosystems, and biodiversity. Coral reefs in costal Africa and Asia will be affected. It will also alter the migration of birds, increasing risk of their extinction. By 2080, 25-40 percent of African mammals might fall under the World Conservation Union’s list of critically endangered or extinct categories, assuming that there is no migration of mammals. Similarly, in Asia, climate change will affect the distribution, productivity and health of forests and its inhabitants. It is estimated that with one meter rise in sea level, Bengal tigers, estuarine crocodiles and mud crabs might be extinct. With high temperatures and increasing number of forest fires, Nepal might lose red pandas, leopards, monkeys and other wild animals. Additionally, temperature increase of about 2-3 degree Celsius and a decrease in rainfall might diminish grassland productivity in Asia by 40-90 percent.

Meanwhile, it is projected that the costal zones in the Gulf of Guinea will face destruction due to rising sea levels. Massawa, one of Eritrea’s port cities, could see inundation of infrastructure and economic installations from a one meter rise in sea level, resulting in cost of over US$ 250 million. In Asia, Bangladesh, Myanmar and Cambodia would be hit hard by rise in sea level, which will affect not only the coastal infrastructure but also fishery industry and livelihoods.

The damage to the environment is already done. We have to live up with the impact of excessive emissions even if it is scaled down to 1990 levels. This warrants the necessity of building adaptation capacities of LDCs to help them cope with and mitigate the negative impacts of climate change. For adaptation measures, the LDCs will require substantial funding, both financial and technological. Innovative and novel water management strategies are required to help South Asia cope with rising incidence and intensity of floods during monsoon and decrease in water level during dry season.

Adaptation practices such as diversification of livelihood activities, institutional reforms like rules and governance structures that are geared to address emerging concerns about climate change, adjustment in farming operations, and greater flexibility in labor migration for income purposes, among others will be helpful to LDCs. Other adaptation measures include early warning system, malaria research, promotion of biotechnology especially of seeds that are drought- and insect-resistant crops, creation of national and regional grain stock/food bank, better and affordable crop insurance mechanism, conditional/unconditional cash transfers, and food price subsidies. Furthermore, to give increased momentum and weight to adaptation, climate change agenda has to be incorporated into development priorities at the national and regional levels in LDCs.


[1] http://www.unohrlls.org/UserFiles/File/Publications/Factsheet.pdf

[2] LDC Report 2009, UNTCAD: http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/ldc2009_en.pdf

[3] The Impact of Climate Change on the Development Prospects of the Least Developed Countries and Small Islands Developing States, UN-OHRLLS 2009. Unless cited otherwise, most of the statistics mentioned in this article are sourced from this paper.

[4] IPCC 2007, Climate Change Impact, Vulnerability and Adaptation, Summary for Policymakers. http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/wg2/ar4-wg2-spm.pdf

Tuesday, December 14, 2010

Exports and Imports within SAARC

 SAARC Exports Matrix, 2009 (US$ millions)
Reporting Countries\Partner Countries AFG BGD IND MDV NPL PAK LKA
Afghanistan   1.0 109.7   0.0 108.5 0.0
Bangladesh 4.1   268.2 0.0 10.6 77.4 8.9
India 469.2 2181.1   107.5 1417.3 1449.4 1732.9
Maldives   0.0 2.9   0.0 0.0 14.0
Nepal 0.0 41.9 388.3 0.0   0.8 0.1
Pakistan 1357.6 365.2 231.9 3.6 0.7   213.1
Sri Lanka 0.0 18.8 298.2 50.8 0.2 50.8  
SAARC Imports Matrix, 2009 (US$ millions)
Afghanistan   4.6 516.1   0.0 1493.3 0.0
Bangladesh 1.1   2748.6 0.0 46.1 282.8 20.7
India 120.7 234.9   3.2 427.1 273.8 328.0
Maldives   0.0 118.3   0.0 3.9 55.9
Nepal 0.0 11.7 1559.0 0.0   0.8 0.2
Pakistan 119.4 75.8 1079.9 0.0 0.8   55.8
Sri Lanka 0.0 9.7 1906.2 15.4 0.1 234.4  

Apparently, India has the lion’s share of both exports and imports within the SAARC region. Data is not available for Bhutan. Nepal trades with only four members in SAARC, which has a total of eight members. India and Bangladesh are the two most important export destinations in South Asia for Nepal. (Source: IMF’s DOTS database)

Prem Khanal on CEO's salary ceiling in Nepal

[This article, authored by Prem Khanal, was published in Republica daily, 2010-12-12. Here is my take on the same issue published in Republica daily two months ago.]


CEO's salary ceiling

Barely a week after the announcement of the much-delayed budget for the current fiscal year, Nepal Rastra Bank came up with a harsh policy that for the first time checks perks and remunerations of CEOs of banks and financial institutions. Perks and salary of CEOs have been a matter of debate for some time worldwide, particularly after the 2008 global financial crisis. There are numerous examples in the Western countries where greedy chief executives were recklessly found engaged in incentive-guided risk-taking lending, which put their entire institutions at high risk of collapse and ultimately compelled the government to use huge amount of taxpayers’ money to save those troubled institutions. In Nepal, such a scenario can’t be ruled out. Undoubtedly, there is a sea difference between closure of a local grocery store and a bank and the government can’t be a silent spectator when a bank meltdowns and general people lose their lifetime’s savings.

Agreed, as the existing pay scales of chief executives, in some cases, are difficult to justify, a mechanism forged in consultation and participation of stakeholders was in fact an urgent need. More than their salaries, which the banks have to publish in their annual reports, the problem lies in perks that come in terms of vehicles, housing and entertainment costs for chief executives. Since most of such perks are opaquely hidden in account sheets beyond understanding of general shareholders, it is perceived that they are grossly misused for personal benefits.

Having said that, my impression of the directive is that it is too rapid and does more harm by contributing to weakening competition and discouraging innovation in addition to barring best performing employees to enjoy prosperity. Sorry to say, but going by the directive, particularly the first two pages containing the concept of the directive, one gets a sense that Nepal’s chief executives of private banks are being punished for being innovative and for being able to generate healthy returns to investors and corporate tax to the state. Already shaken by a slump in realty sector, fears deepen for the banking sector that the directive can halt the development of one of the most successful and transparent businesses of Nepal.

Till date, Nepal doesn’t have a single incident where the financial health of a financial institution had been problematic just because of high perks and salary of chief executives. In fact, we do have a glaring example of how the fully state-owned and largest Rastriya Banijya Bank and partially state-owned Nepal Bank Limited slipped into a deep financial problem when we relied on cheap and uncompetitive chief executives to lead those institutions for decades. The result: Both institutions were declared technically insolvent and the country had to take a hefty loan of over Rs 5 billion to renovate their financial health but even after a decade of reforms they are still fragile enough to spark a financial meltdown.

Having belatedly woken up to waning credibility of the central bank, the measure seems to have been taken to secure quick popularity and restore the tarnished reputation of the central bank. But bear in mind that the latest effort made by the central bank is not at all a foolproof remedy to deal with what it calls ‘a looming problem in Nepal’s financial sector.’

The NRB seems to be rejoicing on its successes that it has patched up one hole in the financial sector but it seems unaware of the fact that the new measure has opened new big holes for the ‘innovative’ chief executives to continue securing hefty pay in the future. The NRB directive mandated that the perks and salary of chief executive of banks and financial institutions should either be less than 5 percent of the three-year average of employees’ expenditure of the concerned institution or less than 0.025 percent of the total assets recorded a year earlier, whichever low.

One of the ways to raise their earnings will be to raise the volume of staff expenses. For that, they will either try to persuade board of directors to raise the volume of employee expenditures or show soft corner when staffs demand higher pay. Even sometimes the board might find itself helpless in resisting proposals to raise staff expenses in order to retain competent chief executives by raising their pay. Another way will be to increase the volume of total assets so that the chief executive can secure more pay in the coming year. For that matter, chief executives will be encouraged to extend more loans and investments, the two components that command a lion’s share in the assets of a financial institution so that they can claim more remuneration next year. The ultimate consequences of such risk-taking attitude, if it starts showing in Nepal’s financial system, will be far devastating than risk posed by the existing pays to them.

The NRB seems to have tactfully averted a possible confrontation with the powerful and influential CEOs by allowing the incumbent chief executives to continue enjoy their existing earnings even after renewal of their contract of hiring in the same institution. So, established banks and financial institutions will not have to face any serious impact of the new directives as they will continue to have the incumbent chief executives as long as they want. But upcoming financial institutions will face a major problem in finding competent executives. As the staff expenses and total assets of upcoming banks will be in small volume, no experienced chief executive will think of joining a new institution. That sort of situation will discourage new financial institutions coming into operation, thereby limiting competition.

Despite all the above agreements, my objection to the directive is only that the measures are too rapid and too harsh and provides “one-fits-all” prescription to all banks and financial institutions, irrespective of their financial health and past performances. Instead, I think all the banks and financial institutions should have been first divided into two categories – financial institutions having negative and positive capital adequacy ratios (CAR) – and different set of directives put in place for them. The recent NRB’s directive and parameters devised to cap the executives´ pay is perfect to those institutions having negative CAR. However, among the financial institutions having positive CAR, the capping should be slightly relaxed to those institutions that make normal profits, say having return on assets (ROA) up to 2 percent.

However, there should be no restrictions on perks and salaries for chief executives of those institutions that are making healthy returns, say ROA of more than 2 percent on average for the last three years. What ultimately matters at the end of the day is not the chief executives´ salary and benefits per se but how they are performing and how healthy is the financial condition of their institution. If a financial institution makes an impressive return by sincerely obeying all the directives of central bank and prudently meeting all standard parameters, and its CEO ensures good returns to shareholders, the chief executives of such institutions should be allowed to enjoy higher rewards. This is how a state is supposed to promote innovations and entrepreneurship.

(Published in Republica, December 12, 2010,p.6)

Sunday, December 12, 2010

Will Nepal’s fiscal budget 2010-2011 increase inflation?

(My latest op-ed is about Nepal’s fiscal budget 2010-2011 and its impact on inflation. Here is an article about sticky inflation I wrote last year. Here and here are my take on the fiscal budget.)


Inflationary arguments

Will the budget increase inflation?

Immediately after fiscal budget 2010-11 was announced, the public was bombarded with analysis by ‘experts’ on a range of issues. Likewise, various institutions released statements expressing grudges not only with sectoral budgetary allocations, but also the underlying motives of doing so. Citing the expansionary budget, several experts trumpeted the unfounded risks of further rise in general prices of goods and services, i e inflation, which apparently is one of the least understood macroeconomic variables in the Nepali economy.

Given the unique way prices are sticky at high level, I think this budget will have minimal impact on inflation. The argument that the existing budget, despite all the goodies and shortcomings (see Big budget, big incentives, Republica, November 23, 2010), will push inflation up does not hold much ground. Mind you, I am not saying inflation will not increase. It might go up due to other factors, but not the size of the budget itself.

The vague admonition of surge in prices will increase inflation expectations, which in fact might artificially push prices up rather than the impact of the inflated budget. Also, comment like “inflation has become a corollary to recession” is perfunctory and speculative, and just because trade deficit is widening does not mean our economy is heading toward a depression. Preposterous and unfounded comments from economists and commentators do not do any good to our struggling economy. We have more urgent issues such as export and industrial promotion, employment, and economic growth to talk about rather than spreading the fear of inflation and depression.

In the long term, inflation is primarily affected by money supply. In the short term, it is affected by demand and supply pressures, which in turn are dictated by relative elasticity of wages, prices and interest rates. The inflationary pressure in the short term could drag into medium term and long term, leading to high inflation for an extended period of time. It happens if prices and wages are too sticky at high level, i.e. once prices and wages rise either due to demand or supply pressure, or both, even if pressures subside, they continue to remain at high levels. This is happening in the economy since 2007.

It means that monetary measures to tame inflation, mainly increase in interest rates and decrease in money supply, are largely ineffective. In fact, the growth of M2, a broad measure of money supply and a key indicator used to forecast inflation, has been inconsistent with the rise in general prices of goods and services for a long time. For instance, in the last five decades, the highest inflation of 19.8 percent was recorded in 1974 with a 17.1 percent growth of M2. The lowest inflation of negative 3.1 percent was recorded in 1976 with a 28.5 percent growth of M2. It indicates that inflation rate is not entirely consistent with the growth of M2. This is expected because our financial sector and transmission of monetary policy into the real economy have not yet developed as economic theory warrants for this mechanism to work. Additionally, with pegged exchange rate and free flow of goods and services with India, we basically have outsourced monetary policy to Reserve Bank of India, thus reducing traction of domestic policies to control inflation. This is underscored by the fact that there is an extremely weak correlation between growth of M2 and inflation in Nepal. Even if the central bank wants, it cannot fully tame the existing inflationary pressure.

What could be the other causes? Well, inflation is also caused by an excessive rise in consumption, and private and government spending on goods and services produced in the economy. The budget does not promote additional consumption, which has been on average 90 percent of GDP, and private spending is unlikely to be drastically affected as well. Likewise, it does not allocate substantial additional sum for government expenditure to influence the existing prices. Compared to last year, recurrent expenditure has been increased by less than capital expenditure (25.8 percent and 44.8 percent, respectively). The recurrent expenditure is just enough to cover normal government expenditure, which is unlikely to push up consumer prices. Meanwhile, the increase in capital expenditure is unlikely to affect consumer prices immediately.

Given large scale latent unemployment and unutilized resources, the additional increase in development budget will comfortably be absorbed by local and regional economies, if the funds are timely disbursed and properly spent. There still is a huge output gap, which is the difference between potential and actual GDP, reflecting the unexploited absorption capacity of our economy. Hence, the possibility of a demand-pull inflation attributable to the jumbo budget is pretty low.

Also, since the budget has not hiked wages of public servants like the Maoist party did when they were in government—which contributed to push inflation higher— it is unlikely to add further wage-induced inflationary pressure. Note that the increase in tax rates and potentially tax revenue will partially absorb the increase in expenditure. Again, the existing budget itself is unlikely to push general prices higher.

Does this mean inflation will not increase from approximately 10 percent right now? No. Inflation might increase even higher if the same forces, both domestic and foreign, come into play like they did during the third quarter of FY 2007/08, when the economy started feeling relatively stronger external and internal shocks on general prices.

First, the global economy was struck by a rapid rise in commodity and food prices in 2007, severely affecting net food importing developing countries like Nepal. Several countries, including India, banned export of key agricultural items imported by Nepal. The shortage of agricultural goods led to rapid rise in domestic prices. Then came a sudden rise in global fuel prices in 2008, leading to a drastic increase in petroleum prices in the domestic market. This directly reduced real disposable income because a substantial portion of the population banks on petroleum products for daily need. It also shot up cost of production of domestic producers, resulting in rising prices of consumer goods and services. The combined effect of the rise in food, commodity, and fuel prices led to spiraling prices starting 2007.

Unfortunately, when fuel, commodity and food prices cooled down in the international market, the hangover persisted in our economy. Prices stubbornly remained sticky at high levels. Exogenous factors such as supply bottlenecks due to extended periods of bandas and strikes led to shortage of essential items. Additionally, hoarding, black marketeering, deliberate withholding of supplies and inventory, and agricultural trade hurdles imposed by our neighbors contributed to keeping prices higher even after the normalization of market forces.

These series of events contributed to higher inflationary expectations, leading to a situation where workers, employers, producers, wholesalers and retailers started inflating wages and prices on expectation that inflation will go up. The final outcome was a permanently higher inflation. It might go even higher if the supply side constraints and inflationary expectations are not timely and adequately addressed.

That said, making high pitch publicly about the inflationary risks posed by this budget is poor analysis and judgment, which will do nothing but fuel inflationary expectations. The probability of further inflationary pressures is higher from supply side constraints than from the recently announced budget. Let’s be serious, honest, and not criticize policies for the sake of doing it!

[Published in Republica, November 13, 2010, pp.6]

Saturday, December 11, 2010

Impact of financial crisis on global agriculture

Will Martin and Justin Lin argue that the financial crisis affected developing countries through higher interest rates, sharp changes in commodity prices, and decline in investment, collapse in trade, decrease in migration and reduction in remittances. On one hand due to declines in key food prices associated with the crisis, poverty reduced in low-income countries. On the other hand, declining trade, investment, and remittance flows had adverse impacts on the poor. To deal with reductions in aggregate demand, and the particular vulnerabilities of poor people, Martin and Lin argue that policies should focus on dealing with financial sector problems and set up better social safety net policies that can offset the adverse impacts of a wide range of different shocks on poor people without creating costly market distortions.

In short, the financial crisis resulted in declines in commodity prices, decline in migration (both between regions and between countries), reduction in remittance flows, increase in the cost of finance for production and trade (affecting both producers and consumers in poor countries), and a reduction in lending to developing countries. Decline in the demand for labor due to reductions in investment and in exports decreased employment and wages for unskilled labor in many poor countries. An increase in interest rates, particularly for trade credit, raised the costs of production and trade. The paper provides a very nice, compact review of how the financial crisis brewed and exploded, affecting pretty much everything that matters to the poor people.

The figure presents the relationship between the New York Stock Exchange Composite index and the IMF composite indexes, in US$, for food and agricultural raw materials. Over much of the period considered, the three price indexes appear to have responded to some common determinants, with the price of raw materials being much more strongly correlated with the stock market index than is the food price. Two sections of the graph are of particular interest. The first is the period after the stock market decline from late 2001, and the second the rise, decline and subsequent partial recovery in all three prices after 2005. In the first period, it appears that the decline in stock market prices was associated with a rise in agricultural commodity prices. In the second period, the three series moved in similar directions, although the turning points in the food market were slightly different, and food prices rose considerably more than the other series in 2007-8, and remained higher afterwards.

Friday, December 10, 2010

Dutch disease and its impact on the economy

How does a sudden favorable shock to the economy affect productivity dynamics and volatility? The favorable shock can be thought in terms of a large natural resource discovery, a rise in the international price of an exportable commodity, or the presence of sustained aid or capital inflows—all of which are hallmarks of Dutch disease. In a brief paper, Brahmbhatt, Canuto and Vostroknutova explore how natural resource wealth (or a Dutch disease) affects the economy. This blog post is largely based on their brief paper.

When there is a favorable shock to the economy, then a sort of structural changes take place though an expansion of the sector that favorably shocks the economy and a contraction or stagnation of other tradable sectors of the economy, which is usually accompanied by an appreciation of the country’s real exchange rate (note that real exchange rate is defined in this context as the price of nontradables relative to the price of tradables). When the booming sector is related to natural resource (like oil or minerals), the declining nonresource tradable sectors include manufacturing and agriculture. This might have severe welfare and development impacts.

How does Dutch diseases occur and real exchange rate appreciation occur?

First, via spending effect. As domestic income increases due to the booming natural resource sector, aggregate demand and spending goes up as well. This puts pressure on nontradables in the domestic market, leading to rise in demand and output. But, due to high demand wages also tend to increase in all the sectors, both tradable and nontradable. It will increase cost of production throughout the economy, leading to squeezing profits in the nonresource tradables sector (manufacturing), whose prices are pretty much fixed in the international market. This means customers will look for substitutes at cheaper price, thus reducing domestically produced nonresource tradables. This gradually erodes the existence of the whole sector itself. Note that price of nontradables are set in the domestic market, but the price of tradables are set in the international market. Second, via resource movement effect. Since wages are higher in booming natural resource sector, capital and labor are attracted to this sector from other sectors of the economy, reducing output in the latter ones.

Both the spending effect and resource movement effect led to a decline in production of nonresource tradables relative to nontradables, and a real exchange rate appreciation (defined as a rise in the price of nontradables relative to that of tradables). The authors argue that there is “relatively robust evidence that terms-of-trade (TOT=export prices/import prices) increases cause real appreciation in natural-resource-rich countries”. This was also seen during the high commodity prices in 2007. However, the evidence on the shrinking of nontradables sector (manufacturing and agriculture) is not as clear cut as the impact of terms of trade increase on real real exchange rate appreciation in natural resource rich countries. Kareem Ismali has shown that a 10 percent increase in an oil windfall is associated with a 3.4 percent fall in value added across manufacturing sectors.

Regarding natural resource abundance and development, while the discovery of natural resources and exploitation of it, and an increase in TOT is good as it provides a crucial source of revenue to government to fund development activities, it also affects long term growth dynamics of the economy because of the resulting weak development nonnatural resource tradable and nontradable sectors (especially after the natural resources are depleted). Regarding growth, Some argue that natural resource abundance has a strong negative impact on growth via a decline in manufacturing sector productivity, while others show a positive effect by questioning if manufacturing sector productivity is any inferior to that in services or natural resource sector productivity.

Regarding appreciation of exchange rate and growth, it is generally accepted that exchange rate overvaluation has a strong negative impact on growth. If investors think that the rise in terms of trade due to favorable natural resource shock to the economy is permanent, then it will affect growth negatively for a long time. (Subramanian and Rajan argue that aid tends to make a country less competitive, reflected in an overvalued exchange rate, which in turn depresses the prospects of a the more exportable sector). Regarding volatility, the concentration in one particular natural resource (Dutch disease) exposes the economy to greater price and demand fluctuations, thus affecting investment and growth.

Overall, commodity price boom has a positive short-term impact on growth and negative long-term impact on growth. The negative impact is restricted for natural resources like oil and minerals and in countries with bad governance. For more see this working paper by Collier and Goderis (2007). This does not mean that natural resources directly worsen governance or institutional quality. If there is bad governance, then natural resources would affect long-term growth. But, natural resource would not necessarily bring about bad governance. For instance, Botswana (large natural resource, good governance and good economic growth) and DPR Congo (large natural resource, bad governance and bad economic growth).

So, the impact of natural resources on economy will depend on the kind of policies in place. Fiscal policy should be designed in such a way that there is smoothening of spending by keeping in place a sound spending mechanism out of the revenue from natural resource sector. Also, institutional arrangement should favor judicious management of revenue from natural resource sector. Strict fiscal discipline is a must. Also, direct spending towards tradables rather than nontradables would help slow the impact through the spending effect. Policies aimed at improving productivity in nontradable sectors should also be instituted. Also, trade liberalization would help reduce pressure on the nontradables sector. Instituting a mechanism to channel revenue from resource abundance sectors to developmental activities would help in judicious redistribution.

Owen Brader has a very useful policymakers’ guide to Dutch disease. Contrary to some of the studies, he argues that “it is unlikely that a long-term, sustained and predictable increase in aid would, through the impact on the real exchange rate, do more harm than good, for three reasons.”


First, there is not necessarily an adverse impact on exports from Dutch Disease, and any impact on economic growth may be small. Second, aid spent in part on improving the supply side--investments in infrastructure, education, government institutions and health--result in productivity benefits for the whole economy, which can offset any loss of competitiveness from the Dutch Disease effect. Third, the welfare of a nation's citizens depends on their consumption and investment, not just output. Even on pessimistic assumptions, the additional consumption and investment which the aid finances is larger than any likely adverse impact on output. However, the macroeconomic effects of aid can cause substantial harm if the aid is not sustained until its benefits are realized. The costs of a temporary loss of competitiveness might well exceed the benefits of the short-term increase in aid. To avoid doing harm, aid should be sustained and predictable, and used in part to promote economic growth. This maximizes the chances that the long-term productivity and growth benefits will offset the adverse effects--which may be small if they exist at all--that big aid surges may pose as a result of Dutch Disease.


Thursday, December 9, 2010

Car Transport in Nepal in 1948

Source: Patan Museum


“Instead of cars carrying workers, Nepal has workers carrying cars on the rocky, hilly trails of the country. Here automobiles, stripped of wheels and bumpers, are shoulder-borne to and from Kathmandu, the only Nepalese city with modern roads. Some 80 coolies, moving to the rhythm of a chant, balance it on long poles, heavier than the car itself.”

“This German-made Mercedes Benz is of the same series, made between 1936 and 1940, as the one given to King Tribhuvan by Adolf Hilter, which is now at the Narayanhiti Palace Museum.”


Since the luxurious lifestyle, at the expense of poor Nepali people, of the autocratic Rana regime, the country has come a long way. There are better roads, though still in short supply. However, it seems vehicles are not in short supply. The supply of vehicles has not matched with the supply of road infrastructure, i.e. the growth rate of vehicles plying on the roads of Nepal is far higher than the growth rate of new road infrastructure. This disequilibrium has led to traffic congestion and created supply bottlenecks. Note that infrastructure has been one of the most binding constraints to economic activities in Nepal. Well, things are changing now. Hopefully, the policymakers will properly address the binding constraints in the coming days.