Total illicit financial outflows from South Asia (USD million) | ||||
HMN + GER | 2007 | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 |
Afghanistan | 0.00 | 0.00 | 41.24 | 110.19 |
Bangladesh | 2737.35 | 848.42 | 648.94 | 2367.17 |
Bhutan | 136.56 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
India | 4922.82 | 26819.56 | 279.42 | 1613.34 |
Maldives | 4.02 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
Nepal | 584.15 | 883.29 | 1551.31 | 1883.95 |
Pakistan | 505.17 | 727.80 | 298.14 | 729.00 |
Sri Lanka | 165.16 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 880.65 |
Friday, December 21, 2012
Illicit financial outflows from Nepal 2001-2010
Monday, December 17, 2012
Nepal has the highest minimum wage in South Asia? - Part II
Saturday, December 15, 2012
How globally connected is Nepal?
Wednesday, December 12, 2012
The state of energy security and access in Nepal
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Policy initiatives, especially clear rules, price signals and risk-return incentives
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Technology and infrastructure to address specific challenges in the value chain
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Market structures that enables producers to meet consumers’ needs efficiently
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Human capital to constantly innovate and stay competitive
Friday, December 7, 2012
Confidence on the Indian rupee in Nepal
“We accent IC only from our customers. It might be surprising for people of other places but it’s a common practice here,” Ram Datta Yadav, a vegetable vendor at a local fair, said. he further said that other traders are also using IC in local markets.
Ram Udgar Yadav, a local customer also said local people use IC to purchase goods as they trust Indian currency more than Nepali banknotes. “Even if we wish to exchange Nepali rupees, we have a compulsion to pay high exchange rate,” he said.
Nabin Yadav of Bharanwarajpur of Siraha also said that all the transactions from real estate to household goods takes place through Indian currency. “Traders also expect IC from the buyers and buyers also find it more convenient to make purchases in IC,”added he.
Average annual growth rate, 1992/93-2009/10
| ||
Nepal | India | |
Real GDP | 4.39 | 7.03 |
Agriculture | 3.14 | 3.03 |
Industry | 4.13 | 7.30 |
Services | 5.26 | 8.61 |
Exports | 9.50 | 14.05 |
to India | 22.27 | |
Imports | 15.24 | 14.35 |
from India | 18.31 | |
Inflation |
6.90
|
7.10
|
Nepal's trade with India (Rs billion)
| ||
1992/93 | 2009/10 | |
Exports | 1.62 | 39.99 |
Imports | 12.54 | 217.11 |
Trade deficit | 10.92 | 177.12 |
Exchange rate (NRs/IRs)
| ||
Nominal
|
1.6 | 1.6 |
Real | 1.36 | 1.92 |
Tuesday, December 4, 2012
Article IV Consultation 2012: Assessment of the Nepali economy by the IMF
In this year’s Article IV Consultation, the IMF has warned that the political uncertainty is complicating macroeconomic management in Nepal. The usual narrative about economic growth, expenditure concerns, and greater reliance on remittances for financing consumption and imports holds.
The IMF projects real GDP growth to decline to 3.8% in FY2013, thanks to unfavorable monsoon which affected agriculture production, slower services activity due to a potential decline in remittance growth, and a slowdown in growth in India (lower export demand, weaker inward investment, and possibly less remittances). The IMF’s latest growth projection exactly matches the ADB’s latest projection in ADO Update. But, while ADB projected inflation to be at 8.5%, the IMF projects it to be 8.3%.
Some notable observations and suggestions include:
- Quasi-fiscal liabilities continued to rise through financial losses at the Nepal Electricity Authority and Nepal Oil Corporation. Build political consensus to adopt an automatic price adjustment mechanism while putting in place well-targeted subsidies to protect the vulnerable.
- Significant restructuring of the financial system has yet to emerge, and balance sheet risks from concentrated exposure to a moribund real estate market are high.
- Focus on sound policies and structural reforms should be maintained. In 2011, the IMF suggested to enact structural reforms to raise productivity and potential growth.
- Enact a full budget and strengthen public management to ensure full executive of capital budget.
- Enhance revenue mobilization efforts but saw work on further tax and customs administration reforms.
- Targeted and well sequenced acceleration of financial sector reforms, including the amendment of NRB Act to improve the governance of the financial sector.
- A tightening of monetary policy may be used to signal commitment to price stability and support exchange rate peg.
- Open market operations and regular auction of T-bills good to mop up excess liquidity.
- Enhance the business environment, remove infrastructure bottlenecks, increase transparency, and improve governance.
The projection of major macroeconomic indicators for FY2013 are shown in the table below.
Indicator | 2009/10 | 2010/11 | 2011/12e | 2012/13f |
Real GDP growth | 4.8 | 3.9 | 4.6 | 3.8 |
CPI (period average) | 9.5 | 9.6 | 8.3 | 8.3 |
Total revenue and grants (% GDP) | 18 | 17.7 | 18.3 | 18.1 |
Expenditure (% GDP) | 18.8 | 18.6 | 18.2 | 18.6 |
Broad money (%change) | 14.1 | 12.3 | 22.7 | 12.5 |
Domestic credit (%change) | 16.8 | 14.6 | 8 | 14.4 |
Private sector credit (%change) | 14.2 | 13.9 | 11.3 | 13 |
Gross investment (%GDP) | 37.1 | 32.5 | 32.8 | 32.9 |
Private investment (%GDP) | 30 | 25.3 | 25.7 | 26 |
Central government (%GDP) | 7.1 | 7.3 | 7.1 | 6.9 |
Gross national saving (%GDP) | 34.7 | 31.6 | 37.5 | 33.5 |
Current account (%GDP) | -2.4 | -1 | 4.7 | 0.6 |
Trade balance (%GDP) | -25.6 | -23.6 | -23.7 | -27.3 |
Gross official reserves (US$ million) | 2,844 | 3,085 | 4,307 | 4,595 |
Public debt (%GDP) | 35.4 | 33.3 | 33.3 | 31.3 |
GDP at market prices (Rs billion) | 1,193 | 1,368 | 1,557 | 1,750 |
GDP at market prices (US$ billion) | 16 | 19 | 19.4 | 20.3 |
Here is the IMF’s preliminary assessment released on September. The assessment in 2011 is here.
Friday, November 30, 2012
Does debt relief to indebted farmers boost investment and productivity?
According to a new WB policy research working paper by Martin Kanz, the debt relief to indebted farmers (given by the Indian government) didn’t increase investment and productivity. In June 2008, the Indian government waived debt owed by poor farmers (US$14.4 billion = 1.6% of GDP) to commercial and cooperative banks between 1997 and 2007. The small and marginal farmers owning less than two hectares of land got 100% debt waiver and farmers owning over two hectares got 35% debt relief if the remaining 75% was settled (in drought-affected districts, 25% or Rs 20,000 relief, whichever is greater, if the remainder is settled).
The three major findings of the study that should be considered while unveiling similar programs in the coming days are:
- Debt relief failed to reintegrate recipient households into formal lending relationships. Kanz found that the households that had all of their debt cancelled borrowed, on average, 6 percentage points less from formal sector sources than households in the control group.
- Debt relief doesn’t increase investment or productivity of beneficiary households. The productivity of debt relief households after end of the program declined in absolute terms and lagged up to 14 percentage points behind the productivity of households in the control group.
- Debt relief strongly affects the expectations of households regarding the reputational consequences, i.e. they get singled out in the market and might face borrowing constraints in the future. It might lead to decline in investment (risk profile of debt relief households goes up).
Below is the abstract from the paper:
This paper studies the impact of a large debt relief program, intended to attenuate investment constraints among highly-indebted households in rural India. It isolates the causal effect of bankruptcy-like debt relief settlements using a natural experiment arising from India's Debt Relief Program for Small and Marginal Farmers -- one of the largest debt relief initiatives in history. The analysis shows that debt relief has a persistent effect on the level of household debt, but does not increase investment and productivity as predicted by theories of debt overhang. Instead, the anticipation of future credit constraints leads to a greater reliance on informal financing, lower investment and a decline in productivity among bailout recipients. The results suggest that one-time settlements may be insufficient to incentivize new investment, but can have significant real effects through their impact on borrower expectations.
Repeated bail out of indebted households could induce moral hazard and deteriorate rural credit markets (plus investments).These debt reliefs are usually politically motivated and serve to boost popular rating and perception while impacting budget balance. Here, I am not saying that there shouldn’t be debt relief at all of heavily indebted farmers. The issue is that if such reliefs are to be repeated or voters expect one from their elected representatives, then it might promote a dangerous trend where households keep on piling up debt beyond their means on expectations that one day it will be waived by a populist leader. Debt relief of indebted farmers has to be highly targeted and it shouldn’t have any whiff of popularity.
In 2008, the then finance minister of Nepal also introduced debt relief (following the Indian example) of poor and indebted farmers. Even though the money is already spent (via the state-backed BFIs), the effectiveness of this one-off intervention is yet to be evaluated.