Sunday, December 26, 2010

The Doha Round and services trade


Negotiating the liberalisation of services is complicated. Adequate national regulation and international regulatory cooperation will often be necessary. A concerted effort is needed to help countries strengthen and improve service sector regulation and implementing institutions, as well as to cooperate with each other where there are significant regulatory externalities.

Much of what remains to be done to remove developing nation barriers to trade in services will be conditional on such regulatory improvements. An important element of any Doha package on services should therefore be agreement to create mechanisms to promote pro-competitive domestic regulatory reform and thus support liberalisation in the future.

Although comprehensive liberalisation of service markets in all 153 members in the Doha round is neither possible nor at this point in time desirable, the largest services economies (a “G25”) can and should go further.

But the larger players may also need to pursue domestic regulatory reforms before opening up some services sectors to foreign competition, and will need to strengthen regulatory cooperation to facilitate trade in some services.A pre-commitment approach will allow such conditions to be put in place and ensure that there is an agreed timetable to open markets to greater competition. Explicitly recognising that services liberalisation cannot – and should not be – divorced from services regulation will do much to help harness the potential that trade agreements have to expand services trade and investment.


More on services trade and the Doha Round by Bernard Hoekman and Aaditya Matto here

The path to prosperity: How countries become rich?


Becoming a rich country requires the ability to produce and export commodities that embody certain characteristics. We classify 779 exported commodities according to two dimensions: (1) sophistication (measured by the income content of the products exported); and (2) connectivity to other products (a well-connected export basket is one that allows an easy jump to other potential exports). We identify 352 “good” products and 427 “bad” products. Based on this, we categorize 154 countries into four groups according to these two characteristics. There are 34 countries whose export basket contains a significant share of good products. We find 28 countries in a “middle product” trap. These are countries whose export baskets contain a significant share of products that are in the middle of the sophistication and connectivity spectra. We also find 17 countries that are in a “middle-low” product trap, and 75 countries that are in a difficult and precarious “low product” trap. These are countries whose export baskets contain a significant share of unsophisticated products that are poorly connected to other products. To escape this situation, these countries need to implement policies that would help them accumulate the capabilities needed to manufacture and export more sophisticated and better connected products.


Here is a paper by Felipe, Kumar and Abdon. Their analysis is based on Hidalgo et al. (2007) and Hausmann et al. (2007)’s concept of product space, which is an application of network theory that yields a graphical representation of all products exported in the world. Products are linked through lines that represent their proximity, defined as the conditional probability of exporting one products given that they also export the other one. Countries change their export mix by jumping to products that are nearby, in the sense that these other products use similar capabilities to those used by the products in which they excel (those products in which they have revealed comparative advantage [RCA]). A country’s position within the product space signals its capacity to expand to more sophisticated products, thereby laying the groundwork for future growth. Countries that export products that have few linkages with other products or countries that have not accumulated sufficient capabilities to jump to other products cannot generate sustained long-term growth.

The focus is on manufacture and export of sophisticated and better connected products (PRODY) so that structural transformation-- whereby the economy moves from traditional, low wage sector to sophisticated, high wage sector—takes place in the developing countries. Here is more on their ranking of countries based on an “index of opportunities”. Here is a blog about Nepal’s export sophistication. The basic idea behind the whole analysis is that what countries products and export determines who they are in the world. Countries with a more sophisticated export basket growth faster.

So how does structural transformation occur? Basically, the major determinant of a country’s comparative advantage, and its trade pattern, is the relative factor endowment. Changing comparative advantage based on factor accumulation dictates a country’s export basket. If prices are right for the various factors of production so that firms select the most appropriate techniques for production, then factor accumulation leads to factor price changes, leading to changes in the techniques of production.  Countries growth by accumulating physical or human capital or by improving the way various factors of production are mixed (TFP). This brings about a change in the composition of export basket. So, structural transformation is the results of changes in underlying fundamentals such as education, financial resources, and overall productivity. That said, export diversification is not easy.

Those firms that engage in “self discovery” face cost of discovery, leading to a situation where there might be high social returns but high private costs. If new products discovery fails, then the firm incurs the cost. But, if it succeeds, then other enter the market following the discovery. This is where government intervention might be required to offset private costs if there is high social return from any venture. Similarly, export diversification requires large initial investments (high fixed costs), which the government should own up. The government could facilitate information and coordination externalities.

Here are few recommendations (adapted from the same paper) for countries with low product sophistication to escape “low-product trap” :

  • Many of the products exported by these countries are nature-made and subject to decreasing returns. Only industrialization can create an effective agricultural sector. None of these countries will ever get rich without an industrial and an advanced service sector.
  • In the traditional trap literature (à la Nelson and Myrdal) there were two ways to escape from the low-level equilibrium trap. First, per capita income must be raised, in one go, to the point where the trap would not force income per capita down again to the subsistence level. Second, the growth rate of population must decline (e.g., reduction in the birth rate or emigration), and/or that of national income increase (e.g., through technical progress or capital from abroad).Industrialization greatly increases a country’s ability to sustain a large population.
  • To a certain extent and under this view, some of these countries may need a “big push,” that is, a planned large-scale expansion of a wide range of economic activities and achieve a “critical minimum effort” (investment requirements to raise per capita income to the level beyond which the further growth of per capita income will not be associated with income-depressing forces exceeding income raising forces).
  • The above will not be enough: simply “pumping money” will not help unless a critical mass in an increasing returns sector is created. These countries will need their governments to take “strategic bets” by getting directly involved in the development of new sectors (big leaps). This, however, will be difficult for many countries in this group, as, by definition, they lack the required capabilities. These capabilities are: (i) human and physical capital, the legal system, institutions, etc. that are needed to produce a product (hence, they are product-specific, not just a set of amorphous factor inputs); (ii) at the firm level, they are the “know-how” and working practices held collectively by the group of individuals comprising the firm; and (iii) the organizational abilities that provide the capacity to form, manage, and operate activities that involve large numbers of people.
  • For this reason, it is imperative that these countries focus their efforts on accumulating new capabilities. This will require: (i) human capital to acquire skills, technology, and knowledge (in many cases, basic management, accounting, and record keeping); (ii) a higher drive to diversify and to increase sophistication by embracing a realistic industrial vision; and (iii) improvement in organizational abilities (e.g., firm-level organization).

Saturday, December 25, 2010

Openness and growth: Mexico versus China


Following its opening to trade and foreign investment in the mid-1980s, Mexico’s economic growth has been modest at best, particularly in comparison with that of China. Comparing these countries and reviewing the literature, we conclude that the relation between openness and growth is not a simple one. Using standard trade theory, we find that Mexico has gained from trade, and by some measures, more so than China. We sketch out a theory in which developing countries can grow faster than the United States by reforming. As a country becomes richer, this sort of catch-up becomes more difficult. Absent continuing reforms, Chinese growth is likely to slow down sharply, perhaps leaving China at a level less than Mexico’s real GDP per working-age person.


Full paper by Kehoe and Ruhl here.

Here is an earlier post about why Mexico isn’t rich? Hanson argues that “Mexico’s underperformance is overdetermined”. Though faulty provision of credit, persistence of informality, control of key input markets by elites, continued ineffectiveness of public education, and vulnerability to adverse external shocks each may have a role in explaining Mexico’s development trajectory, we don’t yet know the relative importance of these factors for the country’s growth record, he asserts.

Friday, December 24, 2010

Poverty, Entrepreneurship, and Development

Despite having far more people in developing countries (in proportional terms) engaged in entrepreneurial activities, and having their entrepreneurial skills frequently and severely tested than those of their counterparts in the rich countries, why are these more entrepreneurial countries poorer, wonders Ha-Joon Chang. The answer lies in the poor’s inability to channel the individual entrepreneurial energy into collective entrepreneurship.


Many people believe that the lack of entrepreneurship is one of the main causes of poverty in developing countries. However, anyone who is from or has lived for a period in a developing country will know that developing countries are teeming with entrepreneurs. On the streets of poor countries, you will meet men, women, and children of all ages selling everything you can think of, and things that you did not even know could be bought—a place in the queue for the visa section of the American Embassy (sold to you by professional queuers), the right to set up a food stall on a particular corner (perhaps sold by the corrupt local police boss), or even a patch of land to beg from (sold to you by the local thugs).

In contrast, most citizens of rich countries have not even come near to becoming an entrepreneur. They mostly work for a company, doing highly specialized and  narrowly specified jobs, implementing someone else’s entrepreneurial vision.

The upshot is that people are far more  entrepreneurial in the developing countries
than in the developed countries. According to an OECD study, in most developing countries, 30-50 per cent of the non-agricultural workforce is self-employed (the ratio tends to be even higher in agriculture). In some of the poorest countries, the ratio of people working as one-person entrepreneurs can be way above that: 66.9 per cent in Ghana, 75.4 per cent in Bangladesh, and a staggering 88.7 per cent in Benin (see 1 under further reading). In contrast, only 12.8 per cent of the non-agricultural workforce in developed countries is self-employed. In some countries, the ratio does not even reach one in ten: 6.7 per cent in Norway, 7.5 per cent in the USA, and 8.6 per cent in France. So, even excluding the farmers (which would make the ratio even higher), the chance of an average developing country person being an entrepreneur is more than twice that for a developed country person (30 per cent versus 12.8 per cent). The difference is 10 times, if we compare Bangladesh with the USA (7.5 per cent versus 75.4 per cent). And in the most extreme case, the chance of someone from Benin being an entrepreneur is 13 times higher than the equivalent chance for a Norwegian (88.7 per cent versus 6.7 per cent).

Collective nature of entrepreneurship

Our discussion so far shows that what makes the poor countries poor is not the lack of raw individual entrepreneurial energy, which they in fact have in abundance. It is their inability to channel the individual entrepreneurial energy into collective entrepreneurship.

Very much influenced by capitalist folklore, with characters like Thomas Edison and Bill Gates, and by the pioneering theoretical work of Joseph Schumpeter, our view of entrepreneurship is too much tinged by the individualistic perspective—entrepreneurship is what those heroic individuals with exceptional vision and determination do. However, if it ever was true, this view is becoming increasingly obsolete. In the course of capitalist development, entrepreneurship has become an increasingly collective endeavour.

To begin with, even those exceptional individuals like Edison and Gates became what they are only because they were supported by a whole host of collective institutions—the whole scientific infrastructure that enabled them to acquire their knowledge and also experiment with it; company law and other commercial laws that made it possible for them subsequently to build companies with large and complex organizations; educational systems that supplied highly trained scientists, engineers, managers, and workers that manned those companies; financial systems that enabled them to raise huge amounts of capital when they wanted to expand; patent and copyright laws that protected their inventions; easily accessible markets for their products, and so on.

Furthermore, in the richer countries, enterprises co-operate with each other a lot more than do their counterparts in poorer countries. For example, the dairy sectors in countries like Denmark, the Netherlands, and Germany have become what they are today only because their farmers organized themselves, with state help, into co-operatives and jointly invested in processing facilities and export marketing. In contrast, the dairy sectors in the Balkan countries have failed to develop, despite quite a large amount of microcredit channelled into them, mainly because their dairy farmers tried to make it on their own. For another example, many small firms in Italy and Germany jointly invest in R&D and export marketing, which are beyond their individual means, through industry associations (helped by government subsidies), whereas typical developing country firms do not invest in these areas because there is not such a collective mechanism.

Even at the firm level, entrepreneurship has become highly collective in the rich countries. Today, few companies are managed by charismatic visionaries like Edison or Gates, but by professional managers. Writing in the mid twentieth century, Schumpeter was already aware of this trend, although he was none too happy about it. He observed that the increasing scale of modern technologies was making it increasingly impossible for a large company to be established and run by a visionary individual entrepreneur. Schumpeter predicted that the displacement of heroic entrepreneurs with what he called ‘executive types’ would sap the dynamism from capitalism and eventually lead to its demise.


Thursday, December 23, 2010

African Exports Successes


We establish the following stylized facts: (1) Exports are characterized by Big Hits, (2) the Big Hits change from one period to the next, and (3) these changes are not explained by global factors like global commodity prices. These conclusions are robust to excluding extractable products (oil and minerals) and other commodities. Moreover, African Big Hits exhibit similar patterns as Big Hits in non-African countries. We also discuss some concerns about data quality. These stylized facts are inconsistent with the traditional view that sees African exports as a passive commodity endowment, where changes are driven mostly by global commodity prices. In order to better understand the determinants of export success in Africa we interviewed several exporting entrepreneurs, government officials and NGOs. Some of the determinants that we document are conventional: moving up the quality ladder, utilizing strong comparative advantage, trade liberalization, investment in technological upgrades, foreign ownership, ethnic networks, and personal foreign experience of the entrepreneur. Other successes are triggered by idiosyncratic factors like entrepreneurial persistence, luck, and cost shocks, and some of the successes occur in areas that usually fail.


Full paper by Easterly and Reshef here.

Wednesday, December 22, 2010

The cost of corruption in developing countries

Developing countries lose between $20 billion and $40 billion each year to bribery, embezzlement, and other corrupt practices. Over the past 15 years only $5 billion has been recovered and returned.

More on the Asset Recovery Handbook 2010

Getting investment in infrastructure right

Investment in infrastructure can raise productivity, boost growth, and help reduce poverty. And, lack of infrastructure has been one of the most binding constraints on growth in the developing countries. They need massive investments in infrastructure to connect markets, facilitate trade, reduce transaction and transportation costs, and to facilitate movement of goods and services, among others. But, how to get investment in infrastructure right? Here is brief piece on how to do that.

  • Stronger framework for public sector investment decisions (develop a coherent strategy for scaling up infrastructure that directly spur growth; follow through on the investment strategies—strong institutional framework, adequate budget and good governance; seek ideas on how to finance the scaling up—strong revenue base, borrowing to finance investment and not consumption, and debt within payable limits)
  • Support for capacity building (seek multilateral agencies’ help in making budgets consistent with infrastructure plans, learn from China’s experiences in infrastructure investment)
  • A bigger role for the private sector (private sector investment can work in energy and telecom sectors, incentivize the private sector by offering good tax system, governance and a sound legal framework)