Is monetary policy relevant in Africa?

John Weeks, Professorial Research Associate, Center for Development Policy Research (CEPR), SOAS, argues that the IMF is mistaken in emphasising the reliance on monetary policies in sub-Saharan Africa because few countries have viable domestic markets for government bonds or commercial banking sectors interested in lending for private-sector investment. As a result, central banks often have to offer high rates of interest on government bonds to induce banks to buy them. Thus, a significant share of the public budget is diverted into debt servicing that ends up fattening banking profits.

In most sub-Saharan countries the demand by commercial banks for bonds does not readily respond to changes in the interest rate. One reason is that there is little competitiveness in domestic bond markets and another is that the bonds of African governments have extremely low credit ratings from Standard and Poor’s or Moody’s—if they are rated at all.

The main impact of the central bank’s raising of the bond interest rate will be to induce commercial banks to replace loans to the private sector with government bonds because the relative return from the former has fallen. This is a perverse result because when bonds increase the assets of commercial banks, they should expand their creation of credit. But because of the high yields received by banks on government securities, it is profitable for them to hold excess reserves instead of lending. 

This process is fundamentally different from the so-called ‘crowding out’ of private investment, about which the IMF repeatedly warns national policymakers. But the ultimate effect is the same. ‘Crowding out’ allegedly occurs when government borrowing to cover public expenditures competes with private borrowing. The dynamic that we are describing is different because the increase in the central bank rate does not originate from a need to cover public expenditure, but from the false expectation that the higher rate would appreciate the exchange rate and reduce inflationary pressure. 

The conclusion is pretty surprising (at least if we consider standard economic theories): "The reality in sub-Saharan Africa is that, with very few exceptions, monetary policy has no meaningful impact on inflation or the real exchange rate."

State of the Nepalese economy in FY 2009/10

Prem Khanal's has an excellent piece about the state of the Nepalese economy in fiscal year 2009/10. Khanal is one of the very few journalists whose pieces about the economy makes sense to me. There is a lot of chatter about the state of the Nepalese economy but very few can articulate the right issues from the right angle as Khanal does. To get updated about the present state of the Nepalese economy, this piece (copied below) by Prem dai is highly recommended!

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Bumpy Economic Road Brings No Cheer

 

Amid deepening political uncertainty, fiscal year 2009/10 is ending on Friday on a pessimistic note. Worse still, grim economic data coming out of both the real and financial sectors deepen fears that a much-needed economic revival is anything but certain.

Along with some ´incurable chronic syndromes´ like yawning growth gap, stagnant manufacturing and agriculture sectors, dwindling exports, sustained high inflation and rising recurrent expenditures, the impoverished economy has lately been exposed to a set of new and unexpected challenges coming mainly from the financial sector.

Financial sector

The stomach-churning mismatch between the inflow and outflow of foreign currency reflected in terms of deficit in the Balance of Payments (BOP) fuelled mainly by a breathtaking rise in trade deficit, slowing remittance growth and shortage of liquidity in the banking system was the distressful financial problem that hit the country this year.

However, worries created by the alarming deficit in BOP towered above all else, as it has shaken the economy to its very foundations.

The country experienced a stunning squeeze in foreign currency reserves, which is crucial for settling international payment obligations like repaying loans and financing imports, among other things. As a result, import capacity declined to 6.6 months from almost 10 months recorded at the beginning of the fiscal year.

Though the BOP deficit is shrinking slowly to come down to Rs 17 billion, it can anytime reemerge to spark a financial crisis, as the government has not taken concrete steps toward correcting a widening trade deficit.

According to latest central bank data, the trade deficit recorded till mid-May surpassed total remittances that the country received during the period. Even more, the mismatch between imports and exports is so big that Nepal´s total export finances only 16 percent of imports.

It is a fact that the country has limited options for dealing with the problems. After the collapse of Nepal´s traditional export pillars, woolen carpets and readymade apparel, it has neither competitive exportable products nor a convincing plan to develop such products in the medium term.

The alarming disparity between bloated consumption that is fueling imports on one hand and squeezing exports on the other is the root cause of present economic problems, says Keshab Acharya, chief economic advisor at the Ministry of Finance.

Since boosting exports is not possible in the near future, curbing consumption by means of both tariffs and non-tariff measures is the most suitable treatment for the problem, he added.

Similarly, Nepal´s financial sector, one of the few sectors that had enjoyed virtually uninterrupted expansion during the last decade, faced another problem of liquidity shortage. Though the problem was detected around September, it quickly escalated into something chronic by February, pushing the inter-banking lending rate to a record 13 percent.

The liquidity shortage, which has now eased to some extent, has already resulted in a rise in both lending and deposit interest rates. It is good that the deposit rate has increased, providing some relief to depositors who have been reeling under negative interest rates for years.

However, rapid rise in lending rates has raised concern as such a rise can discourage investors. Many of them are unable to withstand the heat of a five percentage point increment in lending rates within less than a year.

Many industries have lost their financial viability even before coming into operation. Such developments, if allowed to go unchecked for some time, will slow down both investments and consumption and eventually drag down an already sluggish growth.

Sustained high inflation continues to be another challenge. Though it has eased lately, it still hovers at over 10 percent - three percentage points more than target. And the latest fuel price increment is likely to aggravate inflation further.

Real sector

The glum outlook in the real sector continued this year. Economic growth rate was squeezed to 3.5 percent, lower than last year´s growth, as the economy continued to be the victim of a murky business environment, power shortage and insecurity.

Like in past years, agricultural production that grew by 1.05 percent against an annual population growth of 2.27 percent not only dragged down the overall growth but also increased dependency on imported food grain. A decline of 11 percent in paddy production, the mainstay of Nepal´s agro-production, was the most frustrating development.

Gloomy performance by the agricultural sector that provides a livelihood to two-thirds of the population and commands a one-third contribution to the national economy, means the poverty situation is likely to worsen this year.

However, per capita income recorded an impressive 16.7 percent growth to Rs 41,851--US$ 562 -- thanks to continued healthy growth in incomes from overseas, including workers´ remittances. Similarly, domestic savings as a percentage of GDP declined slightly to 9.36 percent, fueling consumption and widening the savings- investment gap.

Fiscal balance

With widening mismatch between expenditure and revenue, cracks have appeared in fiscal management, as the budget deficit by the third week of June soared to Rs 15 billion compared to Rs 4.7 billion recorded last year.

The terrific growth in revenue mobilization seen in the first half of the fiscal year has now lost steam and hovers around 24 percent, a growth level almost equal to the rise in total expenditure.

However, an impressive growth of over 35 percent, more than the recurrent expenditure growth rate, in capital expenditure remained one of the few achievements of the year. The total capital expenditure on cash basis has touch Rs 50 billion, which is 71 percent of the revised estimate.

The Ministry of Finance is hoping to hit the revised capital expenditure target of Rs 84.71 billion this year. The increased expenditure capacity at major projects was mainly due to the adoption of a multi-year contract awarding system and electronic bidding procedures.

Foreign aid

Low absorption of foreign aid continued to be a major problem, as disparity between the realized and committed amounts of foreign aid continued to widen.

As of the third week of June, the government has mobilized around Rs 27 billion whereas commitment in foreign aid is more than double that. Of the amount, the government received Rs 23 billion as grant against a revised target of Rs 42.7 billion while Rs 4 billion was received as loan, against the target of Rs 15 billion.

NTIS 2010 & Comparative Advantage II

Jainendra Jeevan dissects some parts of the recently released Nepal Trade Integration Strategy (NTIS) 2010. For my take on the same issue, see this blog post. I focused on the technical part of the report and how it failed to look into comparative advantage of Nepali goods. Jeevan also looks into the same issue but delves into product-level comparative/alternative analysis. A good read!

He is a little bit more pessimistic than I am.

Well that is a different story; coming back to CA, lack of vision and political will along with weak administrative structure have resulted in poor implementation of all agricultural plans and programs so far, including the ‘20-year Agricultural Perspective Plan’ (APP). Therefore, in all likeliness, NTIS 2010 too will meet the fate of APP as capabilities and intention of politicians and bureaucrats haven’t changed any. Therefore, investing single-mindedly on products that have natural competitiveness and fixed cost advantages and on infrastructure and social sectors like education, health and food security should be our focus as diverting resources (both public and private) elsewhere is simply a misuse of the scarce means.

Soft industrial policy for developing countries

Industrial policy is used to encourage exports, attract FDI, promote innovation and pick winners in selective industries with high export potentials. How can the government best intervene so industrial policy can achieve its intended goals? Harrison and Rodriguez-Clare argue that this can be done by pursuing “soft” industrial policies, “which aim to develop a process whereby government, industry, and cluster-level private organizations can collaborate on interventions that can directly increase productivity.” Here is the full paper. They have an extensive list of papers (with summaries) on industrial policy, trade and growth.

In some instances, the impact of industrial policy might take a long time to see real changes. Researchers who study the impact of industrial policy shortly after an industrial policy is implemented usually find a negative correlation between industrial policy (protection) and growth. They argue that “there are no studies that attempt to go behind correlations and show causal links.”

Research generally neglects to identify whether interventions were motivated by industrial policy reasons or rent-seeking considerations. In fact, there is no evidence to suggest that intervention for industrial policy reasons in trade even exists. Instead, existing evidence suggests that protective measures are often motivated by optimal tariff considerations, for revenue generation, or to protect special interests (see Broda et al. 2008, Gawande et al. 2005, Goldberg and Maggi 1999, and Mobarak and Purbasari 2006). Tariff protection is also frequently granted to less successful firms or declining industries that have political power (Beason and Weinstein 1996 and Lee 1996).

They argue that trade and FDI policies are most successful when they are associated with increasing exposure to trade, i.e. interventions that increase exposure to trade (such as export promotion) are likely to be more successful than other types of interventions (such as tariffs or domestic content requirements). FDI promotion policies are successful than intervention in trade because it focuses on new activities rather than on protecting (possibly unsuccessful) incumbents.

If such measures are part of a broader effort to achieve technological upgrading then they may be helpful, whereas if they are implemented in isolation they are likely to fail.

Rather than deliberately picking winners, governments could subsidize private efforts to “discover” new areas of comparative advantage (what Hausmann & Rodrik call “self-discovery”) or by working with existing industries and clusters to deal directly with coordination failures that limit their productivity and expansion.

Instead of blanket subsidies for exports and FDI, one can try to attract multinationals to produce key inputs or to bring specific knowledge needed by clusters with the ability to absorb them. As Chandra and Kolavalli (2006) have put it, “without host-country policies to develop local capabilities, MNC-led exports are likely to remain technologically stagnant, leaving developing countries unable to progress beyond the assembly of imported components” (p. 19).

“Soft” industrial policy: They propose “soft” industrial policy for developing countries. It basically seeks to directly address coordination failures that keep productivity low in existing or promising sectors rather than engage in direct interventions that might distort prices. This is like facilitating the process that already looks promising but is not realizing its full potential, rather than instituting one all anew whose success is unclear. Efforts could be of varying range such as helping particular clusters by increasing the supply of skilled workers, encouraging technology adoption, and improving regulation and infrastructure. It avoids tariff protection, export subsidies, and tax breaks for foreign corporations. They acknowledge that “hard” industrial policy might be easier to implement than “soft” industrial policy but there are high possibility of manipulation by vested interest groups in case of “hard” industrial policy.

First, soft industrial policy reduces the scope for corruption and rent seeking associated with hard industrial policy such as protection or selective production subsidies. Second, soft industrial policy is much more compatible with the multilateral and bilateral trade and investment agreements that many LDCs have implemented over the last decades.

NTIS 2010: A Strategy Without A Comparative Advantage

My latest op-ed is about the recently released Nepal Trade and Integration Strategy (NTIS) 2010. As I argue here, there is a good deal of workable ideas in the report, which identifies 19 products that have “export potentials”. Good. Nepal desperately needed a coherent analysis of the messy trade sector so that future policies are in line under one unified theme. My biggest concern with this report is that people are wrongly trying to take it as a “constitution” for exports and integration strategy.

The report does not say if the 19 products can be exported with comparative advantage. It only says that they have “export potential” based on the product’s revenue share in Nepal’s exports basket and their overall market size outside the country. For sustainability of our exports sector, we need products that are price and quality competitive. Just identifying markets and exportable goods is not the final point. Period. That being said the report is excellent. A good contribution to escorting the directionless exports sector in the right direction.

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NTIS 2010: A Strategy Without A Comparative Advantage

Recently the Ministry of Commerce and Supplies released a report, Nepal Trade Integration Strategy (NTIS) 2010, which identified products with “export potential” and market destinations for them. Six years ago a similar report – Nepal Trade and Competitiveness Study (NTCS) 2004 – was released. It did not help much in uplifting exports and diversifying export basket. The new report has reignited the hope of reviving the lost glory of Nepal’s export industry, which has nosedived since 1997.

NTIS 2010 is probably one of the most clear-cut reports so far that delves into product level analysis to identify promising exportable products and market destinations for them. But, it does not say much about the potential to export the products with comparative advantage. Just identifying markets and products does not mean much if we cannot export them with comparative advantage.

The report identifies 19 key commodities and services with ‘export potentials’ that could potentially revitalize Nepal’s export sector. The identified products are cardamom, ginger, honey, lentils, tea, noodles, and medicinal herbs/essential oils in agro-product category; handmade paper, silver jewelry, iron and steel, pashmina, and wool products in craft and industrial goods category; and tourism, labor services, IT and BPO services, health services, education, engineering, and hydro-electricity in services category. Furthermore, five more potential export products/sectors pointed out in the report are transit trade services, sugar, cement, dairy products and transformers. There are numerous recommendations for the government to fine-tune and address non tariff barriers (NTB), and to take advantage of Aid for Trade (AfT) and Trade Related Technical Assistance (TRTA) facilities offered by various international agencies.

The objective of the report sounds like an effort to seek export-led ‘inclusive’ growth strategy with the identification of key products based on Nepal’s existing production capacity. The identification is based on the change in composition of Nepal’s export basket and the growth in exports of key products between 2004 and 2008. It does not say if we can export the key products with comparative advantage. Also, there is no explanation to how the growth in exports will make development inclusive. Just promoting a few agricultural products whose production structure and capacity is not yet fully known will not lead to an inclusive trade-led growth. Nepal has to consolidate and harmonize production structure and capacity in all sectors to exploit economic of scale and to make products competitive right from factor market to product market.

If our focus is to revive the exports sector, then we should be looking for products that could be exported with comparative advantage, be it small or niche or large markets. Products with high relative comparative advantage matters more than the mere identification of exportable goods and services. The growth of revenue generated from, say, iron and steel products by 52.6 percent between 2004 and 2008 does not mean that it will continue to grow linearly in the same fashion. The export value of iron and steel products was low in 2004. During the prosperous periods before the recent economic crisis in the overseas markets, exports of this item increased sharply, leading to a high growth rate of exports revenue. It does not mean that Nepal is enjoying comparative advantage in export of this product.

A ‘product space’ analysis, which is a network of relatedness between products, is necessary to figure out what products Nepal is exporting and can export with comparative advantage. It will show how Nepal can move up the value chain, and identify potential products to successfully upgrade production facilities and technologies so that transition from the production of one comparatively advantageous good to another (“nearby” goods) is easy.

A series of product space studies show that Nepal has very few agricultural goods that could be exported with comparative advantage (see “Is Nepali export passe?” Republica, March 14, 2010). There is more proximity (connectedness) between products in the non-agricultural sector, i.e. product upgrading is easier. In fact, Nepal’s product space of 1985, 2000, and 2007 shows that the agricultural sector did not contribute new exportable product with comparative advantage both in 2000 and 2007.

The report recommends the government to pay “instant attention” to four agricultural products namely tea, lentils, cardamom and ginger. These are agro-based products, whose prices are volatile in the international market. Putting down too much emphasis on agricultural products would invite increased volatility not only in the market of specific items but the whole economy as the value added contribution of the agriculture sector is around 34 percent of GDP and it employs around 66 percent of the population. The promotion of agricultural products should be based on domestic demand, which is higher than the supply as is indicated by food deficit of 316,465 tons in 2009/10.

Less volatile are the industrial and services sectors. Nepal should lay more emphasis on these two sectors than the agricultural sector, if the main objective is to boost exports sustainably and to narrow balance of trade deficit. The agricultural products are usually of low-value added ones when compared to industrial and service sector products.

A change in export composition, based on revenue fetched by individual products, does not mean that these products have more export potential. We really don’t know if they are comparatively price and quality competitive. The change in composition of products in the export basket has not made any noticeable difference in the aggregate export revenue. The growth rate of our total exports is still declining.

That said emphasis on regional integration is commendable. India is by far the most important export destination for Nepali goods and services. Around 60 percent of total trade happens with India. Similarly, China is also an important and expanding market, which has recently offered zero-tariff facility to 4,721 exportable goods. The SAARC and MENA regions could be attractive markets apart from the US and the EU. Around 64 percent of Nepal’s total merchandise trade happens within the SAARC nations. Promoting more regional integration could help the exports sector.

NTIS 2010 is an important contribution to steer the exports sector in the right direction. However, the job is not done yet. It has just begun.

[Published in Republica, July 3, 2010, pp.6]

South-South trade good for Africa; More trading in manufactured goods needed

A new UNCTAD report (Economic Development in Africa Report 2010) backs South-South trade, especially between Africa and other fast growing developing countries, namely China, India and Brazil. For Africa to grow and integrate more with the growing economies, it has to export manufactured goods. Traditionally, it has been exporting low-valued agricultural products and raw materials.

The study warns that so far, trade and investment flows with the South are reinforcing a longstanding trend in which African countries export farm produce, minerals, ores, and crude oil, and import manufactured goods. This situation should be reversed while the South-South trend is still in its early stages. A repeat of the traditional pattern will not help African countries to reduce their traditional dependence on exports of commodities and low-value-added goods.

The scale of African and non-African developing countries trade:

• Africa’s total merchandise trade with non-African developing countries increased from US$ 34 billion in 1995 to $97 billion in 2004 and then jumped to $283 billion in 2008.
• While Africa´s total merchandise trade with China increased from $25 billion in 2004 to $93 billion in 2008, Africa´s total merchandise trade with India increased over the same period from $9 billion to $31 billion, and its trade with Brazil increased from $8 billion to $23 billion.
• The number of "greenfield" foreign direct investment (FDI) projects by investors from non-African developing countries climbed from 52 in 2004 to 184 in 2008. (A "greenfield" investment is an investment in a manufacturing, office, or other physical company-related venture where no previous facilities exist.)
• It is estimated that official aid to the region from developing countries was US$ 2.8 billion in 2006. And it has risen substantially since, as China, which is estimated to contribute over 83% of that aid, committed to double its assistance to Africa by 2009.
• Available evidence suggests that Chinese infrastructure finance commitments in sub-Saharan Africa soared from $470 million in 2001 to $4.5 billion in 2007. An estimated 54% of China’s support to Africa over the period 2002-2007 went to infrastructure and public works.

Share of Africa’s total trade accounted for by selected partners, 1980-2008

MGNREGA so far...

This post is a summary of Amita Sharma's discussion paper (Rights-based legal guarantee as development policy), April 2010. I could not find a link to the full discussion paper but here is a presentation on the same. NREGA (they renamed it to Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act [MGNREGA] this fiscal year) is doing a phenomenal job in rural India at a cost below one percent of GDP. Specifically, the cost was around 0.6 percent of GDP last year. The total number of employment provided to households was over 45 million. Here is major highlights of NREGA. Intro here.

How the districts under different phases were selected?

Districts under phase I, II, and III were 200, 130, and 285 respectively. Mahatma Gandhi NREGA was implemented in phase I districts on February 2, 2006, phase II on April 2007, and phase III on April 1, 2008. The phase implementation was based on a criterion of backwardness, which included a mix of demographic, social and economic indices, formulated by the NPC.  This ranking was used to select 150 districts for the National Food for Work Programme (NFFWP) launched in 2004. However, the districts selected for phase I were not selected serially but to represent all states under NREGA. The districts chosen for phase I were dominantly tribal, low productivity districts, among which almost 50 percent are designated as Drought Prone Areas Programme (DPAP).

Early trends and outcomes

• Increase in employment: SRGY and NFFWP together generated 0.82 billion persondays. Mahatma Gandhi NREGA generated 2.16 billion person-days in 2008-09. Around 50 million households have got employment. Also, a large number of skilled manpower is employed as engineers, village assistants (22063), IT personnel (6056), and accountants (5000) at the block level.
• Enhancing income: Increase in minimum wages of unskilled agricultural workers. The average wage rate rose from INR 65 (US$1.4) per day to INR90 (US$2) per day from 2006 to 2010.
• Targeting: Participation of women has been above 33 percent as required. This year women participation was close to 50 percent. Women have been drawn to work due to equal wages for men and women, flexibility to drop in and out of the program, availability of work in their locality, and no work requirement except willing to do ‘unskilled manual labor.’ Incomes from NREGA have been used to support food and consumer goods needs of households and education of children. Participation of women in local meeting has been increasing. In Kerala, savings of women have increased from US$14.97 million to US$25.61 million between 2008 and 2010. Furthermore, participation of SC/ST has increased. Most of them come from the backward classes.
• Stemming migration: There is evidence of decrease in out-migration in places such as Narmada, Dang, Banaskantha, Dahod, Sabarkantha and Panch Mahals of Gujarat. A study (Will NREGA ensure security against hunger?) conducted by Paulomee Mistry and Jaswal Anshuman (2007) shows that migration from Dungarpur and Udaipur (Rajasthan), Jhabua and Dhar (Madhya Pradesh) and Nandurbar and Dhule (Maharashtra) declined from 1650 persons per year to 682 per year.
• Augmenting productivity: By focusing on natural resource regeneration, NREGA is augmenting productivity. Survey respondents agreed that NREGA had led to increased water availability and a positive impact on agriculture through improved access to irrigation. Moreover, problems of drinking water scarcity have been addressed by NREGA works to some extent. There has been an increase in areas of land used for production. There has been restoration of ecological assets.
• Expanding connectivity: Roads have connected markets, schools and health services. There has been increasing financial inclusion as workers are being paid through banks and postal offices. So far, around 88 million people have opened ban and post office accounts under NREGA. Meanwhile, ICT expansion in rural areas has increased transparency and accountability.