Friday, June 18, 2010

Export-led growth and volatility

How does export-led growth affect volatility? Here is an interesting discussion on this issue. There are four main mechanisms at play in the relationship between outward oriented growth strategy and volatility.

  • Terms-of-trade volatility and output: TOT can directly affect output and growth. Decline in exports and export prices would severely affect balance of trade and revenues.
  • Domestic market volatility and output: As export sector operates in tune with overseas market, domestic demand and supply shocks are less strongly correlated with output.
  • Diversification and volatility: As countries diversify export items in tandem with more reach in overseas market, growth volatility decreases. More on this here.
  • Specialization and volatility: Specialization in exports reduces growth volatility if the specializing and exporting nation is a high income one. The demand for their product is pretty much inelastic.

Policy lessons:


“The stabilization effects of export product diversification are noticeably more consistent than that for export market diversification. This finding suggests that developing-country policymakers should emphasize measures that help broaden their countries’ manufacturing base, and expand the range of exportable products.

There are also a number of steps that governments can take domestically to help the private sector diversify its export base. Rather than protecting domestic producers with “infant-industry” tariffs—a classic inward-oriented strategy—policymakers can remove barriers to domestic market entry, and thereby encourage innovation and development of new markets by companies at home.

There is also strong evidence that better trade facilitation (that is, the reduction of fixed and variable costs associated with moving goods across borders) can be highly effective in promoting export diversification. Practical steps—such as the removal of red tape affecting exports and imports, and developing trade-related infrastructure and services—can make a major contribution to export diversification and help manage outward orientation.”


Thursday, June 17, 2010

Women in parliament and GDP per capita


It shows the ratio of female to male members in parliament with respect to GDP per capita. See Nepal (NPL) there, close to 50 percent despite low GDP per capita!

Source: Michael Clemens' presentation at ABCDE 2010 conference

Wednesday, June 16, 2010

Asia in 2030

At a time when the developed countries are bearing the burnt of economic crisis and an increasing market uncertainty due to mounting debt and deficit,  the Asian economies (save the very low income ones) are on a different track. They are helping in global growth recovery. Also, they have strong domestic demand and pretty resilient exports sector. If this trend continues, then Asia will be the largest economic region by 2030, according to Anoop Singh's piece in the latest Finance & Development magazine.



For this to happen, Singh argues, Asia needs to continue good policy reform and watch out for few issues thorny issues:

  • Surge in capital flows need to be managed to prevent overheating and to decrease vulnerability
  • Shocks in the developed countries might transmit to the Asian economies (exports decline and credit tightening)
  • Needs to keep on building domestic demand to make it a main source of growth
  • Strengthen social safety nets
  • Development of national and regional infrastructure to reduce transportation costs and foster regional integration

Monday, June 14, 2010

The role of inventory adjustment in the Great Trade Collapse of 2008-09

This paper examines the role of inventories in the decline of production, trade, and expenditures in the US in the economic crisis of late 2008 and 2009. Empirically, we show that international trade declined more drastically than trade-weighted production or absorption and there was a sizeable inventory adjustment. This is most clearly evident for autos, the industry with the largest drop in trade. However, relative to the magnitude of the US downturn, these movements in trade are quite typical. We develop a two-country general equilibrium model with endogenous inventory holdings in response to frictions in domestic and foreign transactions costs. With more severe frictions on international transactions, in a downturn, the calibrated model shows a larger decline in output and an even larger decline in international trade, relative to a more standard model without inventories. The magnitudes of production, trade, and inventory responses are quantitatively similar to those observed in the current and previous US recessions.

For more see this paper.

Thursday, June 10, 2010

The transformation of development thinking

David Lindauer and Lant Pritchett discuss the transformation of development thinking, development policy making, and the next big idea for growth. Though this is an old paper, it is quite interesting. May be they should update it considering the ideological shift economics fraternity has seen after the global economic crisis starting 2008.

How has the thinking on economic development changed after 2002 (and before 2008)? It might take different forms depending on several factors that affect the global and local markets. But one thing is certain: “The road to development is extremely complex, and the ultimate guide to that path must therefore be more complex than an arrow pointing confidently in one direction.”

Growth experience between 1980 and 2002:

  • The enormous slowdown in growth that has occurred throughout the developing world: the so-called lost decade(s) in Latin America has its counterpart on other continents. The median growth rate in low- and middle-income economies fell from 2.5 percent in 1960–79 to 0.0 percent (zero!) in 1980–98.
  • The long-awaited transition from stagnating Marxist central planning to a capitalist economy has gone horrifically worse than anyone would have dared predict. While the consensus was that the economies would experience a dip in income as they restructured and as resources were reallocated from old to new activities, no one predicted in 1992 that income in many newly capitalist countries in 2002 would be less than half the level under the Communists.
  • The financial crises—or perhaps the single rolling financial crisis—of the 1990s: Mexico in 1994; Thailand, Korea, and Indonesia in 1997; Russia and Brazil in 1998; Ecuador in 1999; Turkey in 2000; and Argentina today. In each case, something caused a near or actual debt default or a large depreciation (or both).
  • The collapse of sub-Saharan Africa, which has by now become so complete as to force itself into world consciousness. Nearly all of sub-Saharan Africa has been transformed from the heady optimism and enormous promise of early independence to almost unspeakable suffering. The only relatively consistent success cases—Botswana and Mauritius—do not give much hope for an entire continent. The AIDS crisis is so severe that the only historical analogue is the Black Death.
  • The world’s two most populous countries, India and China, have grown rapidly. This is somewhat puzzling because in many ways these countries are slow, cautious reformers that remain among the more closed and restricted economies in the world. Both India and China accelerated by more than 2 percentage points, while the rest of the world decelerated by more than 2 percentage points.

This gives a mixed signal to what and what kind of political and economic system propel growth. So, what should be the agenda for post-Washington Consensus economic growth?

Lindauer and Pritchett argue that a new agenda should “acknowledge the complex, state-dependent, contingent relations between policies and growth.” While doing that there is also a need to recognized that growth regressions have failed to give a clear picture of the different growth experiences of similar and dissimilar countries.

The basic flaw in growth regressions is that they confuse partial correlations with (stable) parameters and confuse empirical variables(that might be associated with policies) with feasible actions to promote growth.

By now, there are thousands of papers that put economic growth on the left-hand side and other stuff on the right-hand side. This research produces empirical findings that are translated, more or less crudely, into policy recommendations: a partial correlation of lagged enrollment rates and subsequent growth is interpreted as proof that education is good for growth, which is then used as the basis for recommending more public spending on education; a partial correlation of trade and growth outcomes indicates that openness is good, which becomes a recommendation to reduce tariffs; a partial correlation of inflation and growth shows that low inflation is good, which leads to the adage that fiscal austerity will promote growth. Sadly, many of these recommendations have not worked in practice, in part because nearly all of the growth regression research is essentially irrelevant to policymaking and policy implementation. The findings do not constitute a credible basis for meaningful development advice, since they are not empirically stable and they are not about policy.

It is not surprising that growth regressions are unstable across countries and over time, because any model in which growth is linearly (or log-linearly) related to any given variable across countries, time periods, levels of development, and circumstances is almost certainly misspecified.

Even growth regressions with right handside variables under direct policy control—say, the budget deficit or tariffs— are still describing a relationship between policy actions and outcomes, not policies and outcomes. A policy is a mapping from states of the world to policy actions.

What is next after the terrible performance and use of growth regressions? They list some better ideas to study growth.

  • A number of intriguing leads suggest future directions for research. One branch of such literature is episodic analysis, in which researchers examine episodes of more or less discrete changes in policy or intermediate outcome variables.
  • A second approach is to examine economic growth directly, either to
    attempt a close reading of the factors that initiated a growth boom or bust or to undertake cross-sectional work explaining changes in growth rates.
  • Although growth regressions are inherently hopeless, a few authors work from the growth partial correlations to plausible microeconomic mechanisms that explain the growth correlation, and then to the actual policy variables that could alter outcomes.

(They argue that economics profession does not need any new great idea in economic growth. It just needs to, as Rodrik says, “figure out how to turn sound economic thinking into useful, context-contingent policy recommendations.”)

For policy advice they propose a diagnostic tree of policy options. They branches they propose are (i) current level of income, (ii) current status of growth, (iii) linkages with the world economy, (iv) government strength, and (v) government capacity.

The Evolution of Agricultural Trade Flows

Earlier research showed that during the 1980s and 1990s most of the global agricultural trade expansion took place among the industrial countries and among countries within trade blocs. These were also periods of declining agricultural prices. These prices increased during the 2000s, there were continuous trade reforms, and many developing countries started to support their agricultural sectors. This paper analyzes trade flows during the past two decades, and tries to measure whether all these developments have changed the trade balances and the share of different groups within the global trade flows. In addition, it looks at the trade balances on food to see the impact of these changes on net food importing countries. In conclusion, unlike the case with manufacturing, developing countries have not been able to increase their export shares in agriculture as significantly. They have maintained their trade shares by primarily expanding exports to other developing countries.

A link to the full paper by Ataman Aksoy and Francis Ng here. The conclusion is not surprising!

No more isolated, finally!

Caption: Locals of Martadi in Bardiya welcome a tractor that reached the district headquarters for the first time on Wednesday. With the road network touching Martadi, all district headquarters in the far-western region of Nepal now have road connectivity. (Source: Republica, June 10, 2010)

It is never too late. Now, five (or four) districts headquarters are left to be connected by roads. After connecting district headquarters, the next public investment should be in expansion of roads within districts so that villages are connected each other. One of the few sectors where donor’s money is making some headway in Nepal!