Inclusive growth is one of the most talked about issues in developing countries, especially those in transition, these days. It has been pretty much widely accepted that growth alone is not sufficient; it has to be followed by wider access to economic opportunities and provision of social protection for those left out of the growth process.
ADB has come up with a framework for inclusive growth, which has three main components: (i) High and sustainable growth; (ii) Access to economic and social development opportunities; and (iii) Stronger social protection. It also has a list of 35 indicators to quantify (either directly or via proxies) inclusive growth.
The policies for inclusive growth are supported by good governance and institutions, which are quantified by looking at two components of Worldwide Governance Indicators (voice and accountability, and government effectiveness) and the corruption perception index. The information and data in this blog come from ADB’s FIGI 2012 and the related dataset (Nepal only; for other countries, see this one).
| GOOD GOVERNANCE AND INSTITUTIONS | 1990 or Nearest Year | 2010 or Latest Year |
| Voice and accountability | −0.1 | (1996) | −0.5 | |
| Government effectiveness | −0.4 | (1996) | −0.8 | |
| Corruption Perceptions Index | 2.2 | (2010) | 2.2 | (2011) |
The first two components of WGI are presented in standard normal units of the governance indicator, ranging from –2.5 to 2.5 with higher values corresponding to better governance outcomes. In the CPI,
scores relate to perceptions of the degree of corruption and ranges from 10 (very clean) to 0 (highly corrupt).
Here (ungated version here) is an abstract from an interesting paper on fiscal decentralization and foreign direct investment in India and China. Yong Wang argues that “endogenous policies toward FDI are favorable only when both central and local governments benefit”. Fiscal decentralization has a non-monotonic and significant impact on FDI.
A political-economy model is developed to explain why fiscal decentralization may have a non-monotonic effect on FDI inflows through endogenous policies. Too much fiscal decentralization hurts central government incentives, whereas too little fiscal decentralization renders the local governments vulnerable to capture by the protectionist special interest groups. Moreover, the local government's preference for FDI can be endogenously polarized; therefore, a small change in fiscal decentralization across certain threshold values may lead to a dramatic difference in equilibrium FDI inflows. Empirical investigations support that the difference in fiscal decentralization is an important reason for the nine-fold difference in FDI per capita between China and India. Cross-country regression results also support the inverted-U relationship.
Inverted-U relationship between FDI per capita and fiscal decentralization (measured by sub-national government’s overall revenue share).
China’s central and local governments are more aggressive in enticing FDI inflows than India’s. China’s central government encourages FDI inflows by offering fiscal incentives (tax holidays and tariff waiver on imported inputs to foreign-invested firms). Furthermore, the local governments as well offer favorable policies (simple license application, lower fees for land use, provision of infrastructure, etc).
Inclusive growth is one of the most talked about issues in developing countries, especially those in transition, these days. It has been pretty much widely accepted that growth alone is not sufficient; it has to be followed by wider access to economic opportunities and provision of social protection for those left out of the growth process. ADB has come up with a framework for inclusive growth, which has three main components: (i) High and sustainable growth; (ii) Access to economic and social development opportunities; and (iii) Stronger social protection. It also has a list of 35 indicators to quantify (either directly or via proxies) inclusive growth. This follow up to an earlier blog post sheds some light on the third pillar of inclusive growth, i.e. stronger social protection. It focuses on stronger social protection to prevent extreme deprivation and reduce the effects of shocks. It components include strengthened: - Labor market policies and programs
- Social insurance programs
- Social assistance and welfare schemes
- Child protection programs
- Disaster management
- Public sector management
The table below shows the quantifiable indicators for the third pillar of inclusive growth.The information and data in this blog come from ADB’s FIGI 2012 and the related dataset (Nepal only; for other countries, see this one). | Social protection | 1990 or Nearest Year | 2010 or Latest Year | | Social protection and labor rating | 3.0 | (2005) | 4.0 | (2011) | | Social security expenditure on health as a percentage of government expenditure on health | 3.6 | (2001) | 4.6 | (2009) | | Government expenditure on social security and welfare as a percentage of total government expenditure | 3.1 | (1995) | 3.2 | (2011) | In the social protection and labor component, a rating of “1” corresponds to a very weak performance, and a “6” rating to a very strong performance.
Inclusive growth is one of the most talked about issues in developing countries, especially those in transition, these days. It has been pretty much widely accepted that growth alone is not sufficient; it has to be followed by wider access to economic opportunities and provision of social protection for those left out of the growth process. ADB has come up with a framework for inclusive growth, which has three main components: (i) High and sustainable growth; (ii) Access to economic and social development opportunities; and (iii) Stronger social protection. It also has a list of 35 indicators to quantify (either directly or via proxies) inclusive growth. This follow up to an earlier blog post sheds some light on the second pillar of inclusive growth, i.e. access to economic and social development opportunities. The second pillar emphasizes broader access to economic and social development opportunities, especially for the poor and disadvantaged. Its components include improvements in: -
Basic services including health, education, water and sanitation, and electricity -
Urban development for the poor -
Rural development -
Inclusionary reforms -
Public sector management The table below shows the quantifiable indicators for the second pillar of inclusive growth. The information and data in this blog come from ADB’s FIGI 2012 and the related dataset (Nepal only; for other countries, see this one). | Social Inclusion to Ensure Equal Access to Economic Opportunity | 1990 or Nearest Year | 2010 or Latest Year | | Access and Inputs to Education and Health | | School life expectancy (primary to tertiary) years | 8.8 | (2000) | 8.9 | (2002) | | by Sex | | | | | | Male | 10.0 | (2000) | 9.9 | (2002) | | Female | 7.5 | (2000) | 7.9 | (2002) | | Pupil-teacher ratio (primary) | 39 | | 30 | (2011) | | Diphtheria, tetanus toxoid, and pertussis (DTP3) immunization coverage among 1-year-olds percent | 43 | | 82 | | | by Residence | | | | | | Urban | ... | | 93 | (2006) | | Rural | ... | | 88 | (2006) | | Urban-to-rural ratio | ... | | 1.1 | (2006) | | by Wealth Quintile | | | | | | Lowest | ... | | 75 | (2006) | | Highest | ... | | 96 | (2006) | | Highest-to-lowest ratio | ... | | 1.3 | (2006) | | Physicians, nurses, and midwives per 10,000 population | ... | | 6.7 | (2004) | | Physicians | ... | | 2.1 | (2004) | | Nurses and Midwives | ... | | 4.6 | (2004) | | Government expenditure on education as a percentage of total government expenditure | 14.0 | (1995) | 17.9 | (2011) | | Government expenditure on health as a percentage of total government expenditure | 4.1 | (1995) | 7.2 | (2011) | | Access to Basic Infrastructure Utilities and Services | | Population with access to electricity percent | 15.4 | (2000) | 43.6 | (2009) | | by Residence | | | | | | Urban | ... | | 89.7 | (2008) | | Rural | ... | | 34.0 | (2008) | | Urban-to-rural ratio | ... | | 2.6 | (2008) | | Share of population using solid fuels for cooking percent | 88.3 | (2001) | 83.3 | (2006) | | by Residence | | | | | | Urban | 39.1 | (2001) | 39.1 | (2006) | | Rural | 94.1 | (2001) | 92.3 | (2006) | | by Wealth Quintile | | | | | | Lowest | ... | | 100.0 | (2006) | | Highest | ... | | 31.3 | (2006) | | Population using improved drinking water sources percent | 76 | | 89 | | | by Residence | | | | | | Urban | 96 | | 93 | | | Rural | 74 | | 88 | | | Population using improved sanitation facilities percent | 10 | | 31 | | | by Residence | | | | | | Urban | 37 | | 48 | | | Rural | 7 | | 27 | | | Gender Equality and Opportunity | | Gender parity in education | | | | | | Primary | 0.63 | (1991) | 0.86 | (2002) | | Secondary | 0.46 | (1991) | 0.89 | (2006) | | Tertiary | 0.33 | (1991) | 0.40 | (2004) | | Antenatal care coverage of at least one visit percent of live births | 15.4 | (1991) | 58.3 | (2011) | | by Residence | | | | | | Urban | ... | | 84.6 | (2006) | | Rural | ... | | 37.5 | (2006) | | Urban-to-rural ratio | ... | | 2.3 | (2006) | | by Wealth Quintile | | | | | | Lowest | ... | | 17.7 | (2006) | | Highest | ... | | 84.1 | (2006) | | Highest-to-lowest ratio | ... | | 4.8 | (2006) | | Antenatal care coverage of at least four visits percent of live births | 8.8 | (1996) | 29.4 | (2006) | | by Residence | | | | | | Urban | ... | | 51.9 | (2006) | | Rural | ... | | 26.0 | (2006) | | Urban-to-rural ratio | ... | | 2.0 | (2006) | | by Wealth Quintile | | | | | | Lowest | ... | | 11.0 | (2006) | | Highest | ... | | 60.0 | (2006) | | Highest-to-lowest ratio | ... | | 5.5 | (2006) | | Gender parity in labor force participation (Aged 15 and over) | 0.88 | | 0.92 | (2011) | | Percentage of seats held by women in national parliament | 6.1 | | 33.2 | (2012) | In the next blog post, I will share information about the third pillar of inclusive growth (stronger social protection).
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