Friday, September 9, 2011

Remittance 2.0 in Nepal

Trailokya Raj Aryal digs into an old book and finds an uncanny similarity during the Rana regime and the present day. It relates to how people depend on remittances, spend an import induced consumption filled lifestyle, and stagnate the economy.

Remittance 1.0


The signing of Versailles Treaty in 1919 officially ended the First World War, and some 200,000 Nepali soldiers who went to fight for the British Empire returned home with money and foreign ways. As Sardar Bhim Bahadur Pandey explains in the first volume of his brilliantly written book, “Tyas Bakhatko Nepa: Ranakalin Akhiri Teen Dashak” (Nepal at that time: The last 3 decades of Rana rule), suddenly impoverished villages of Nepal’s hilly region were awash with cash, almost 130 million Indian currency, equivalent to 13 billion rupees at the time of writing the book some 25 years ago, and 68. 41 billion Rs in today’s prices.

With nowhere to invest their money on, many soldiers invested on real estate, and some spent it all on merry-making. Their use of foreign products impressed the simple-minded villagers who until then had not even imagined those things existed, and their tales of faraway lands, customs and battlefields, not to mention the social prestige accorded to them made many young men dream of going abroad to work.  Similarly, the taste for foreign goods naturally resulted in an increase in imports, a trend encouraged by the Rana oligarchy as it led to an increase in customs revenue, which in turn killed the local industries as they could not compete with the cheaper and finer imports from abroad. Had the money been spent on Nepal’s industrialization and had the ways been devised to save the cottage industry, late Mr Pande argued, Nepali villages would have been no less wealthy than the Swiss villages. Alas, Nepal’s industrialization was doomed even before it started, marking the beginning of the age of Remittance 1.0 in which our able-bodied young men went abroad, sent or brought money home and then spent most of that money on sustaining the costly habit of foreign goods. The country gained nothing.


Remittance 2.0


One would expect that the economic blunder of the Rana regime to be corrected after more than 60 years since we bade adieu to the oligarchy, but no leaders, irrespective of the regime (democratic, Panchayat and the post-Panchayat) did anything about it, and call it our sheer misfortune, the leaders of New Nepal too do not seem bothered by it. Just like an upgraded computer virus, Remittance 2.0 is now affecting the country in a scale far bigger and deadlier than its predecessor.

If the figures released by the Ministry of Labor and Transport Management are to be believed, more than 42,000 of our youths went abroad to work in countries other than India, in the month of Shrawan (July17-August 17) alone. With thousands of youths going abroad for work each month, the flow of remittance has also increased and has become the mainstay of our economy with Nepal receiving with an estimated $ 3.5 billion in 2010 sent by some two million Nepali workers abroad.

However, instead of it going to productive sectors, a significant chunk of it is being spent on imports and real estate, just like in the year 1920 and as such our manufacturing capacity is going down each day. One would expect that the inflow of money would lead to industrialization which in turn would make it possible for the youths to find employment in their own country, but exactly the opposite is happening. What the economists call the Dutch disease effect, ie, reliance on one sector leading to decline in manufacture sector, is clearly visible in Nepal’s case. 

What’s more amazing is, at a time when we are witnessing a mass exodus of youths in search of employment abroad, the militant labor unions affiliated with various political parties are closing down whatever industries we have with their unreasonable demands, the recent example being the closure of Surya Garments. And at a time when other countries are negotiating trade terms and signing free trade agreements with each other, we are left requesting foreign governments to increase the quota of Nepali workers, rather than making investors, both domestic and foreign, feel secure enough to invest in Nepal.


Check this and this (and the links within) for a detailed look at remittances. Here are two cools charts (this and this) depicting district-wise remittance distribution and the results shown by NLSS III. Here is former finance secretary Rameshore Prasad Khanal arguing how migration is leading to low fertility rate in Nepal and could stall population growth rate.

Chart source: NepalStats

Thursday, September 8, 2011

Public works plus unconditional transfer program in Ethiopia: A review of PSNP

Lieuw-Kie-Song reviews Ethiopia’s Productive Safety Net Programme (PSNP)-- which includes employment through public works as well as transfer component-- and argues that the integration of the two commonly used social protection strategies creates synergies and much better outcome than implementation of the two programs independently.

For instance, it covers labor-constrained households by the safety net (transfer) program, which public works program that uses labor from each household cannot cover. But, it also employs non labor-constrained households in public works that focuses on natural resource rehabilitation and maintaining rural infrastructure, which transfer programs cannot do. Labor-constrained households (due to sickness, maternity, household size, disability, old-age, or death) can switch partially or fully to the direct unconditional transfer component of the program. This switch can be either permanent or temporary depending on the nature of the constraint faced by households.

The combination of these two components-- public works and direct transfers-- in the same program has resulted in a more “coherent framework of enhancing productivity and providing social protection”, argues Lieuw-Kie-Song . The author argues that PSNP is providing regular and predictable income and employment, fostering decent work environment; introducing a formal set of rights for participating households, including an appeals process to address grievances; allowing flexible working hours for women; and integrating a high degree of local and participative decision making.

PSNP targets chronically food insecure households in famine-prone areas in rural Ethiopia. It has around 8 million beneficiaries from around 1.5 million households. So far, the cost of the program is 1.2 percent of Ethiopia’s GDP. It provides transfers (15 kilos of cereal per household member per month for six months a year) to food insecure households. For households that are required to work, which is guaranteed, to get this transfer must work for five days to receive the transfer for one person.

The objective of the program is to provide households with enough income (cash/food) to meet their food gap and to build community assets to contribute to addressing the root causes of food insecurity. A review of the program by Anna McCord found that the program faces significant problems in identifying, designing, and implementing the scale of infrastructure projects required to absorb the levels of workers anticipated.

Wednesday, September 7, 2011

Improvement in competitiveness of Nepali economy in 2011-2012?

Seems like Nepal’s ranking in competitiveness has improved, according to the latest Global Competitiveness Report. Nepal’s ranking has improved by five position, reaching 125 (out of 142 countries) in 2011-12 from 130 in 2010-11 in the Global Competitiveness Index (GCI) 2011-2012. But, Nepal’s ranking is still the lowest in South Asia. Sri Lanka is the most competitive economy in South Asia. In South Asia, ranking of Nepal, Pakistan, Sri Lanka improved while that of India and Bangladesh declined.

The GCI comprises 12 categories – the pillars of competitiveness – which together gives a picture of a country’s competitiveness landscape. The pillars are: institutions, infrastructure, macroeconomic environment, health and primary education, higher education and training, goods market efficiency, labor market efficiency, financial market development, technological readiness, market size, business sophistication and innovation.

South Asia GCI 2011-2012 GCI 2010-2011 Change
Rank Score Rank
Sri Lanka 52 4.33 62 10
India 56 4.30 51 -5
Bangladesh 108 3.73 107 -1
Pakistan 118 3.58 123 5
Nepal 125 3.47 130 5

Switzerland tops the overall rankings. Singapore overtakes Sweden for second position. Northern and Western European countries dominate the top 10 with Sweden (3rd), Finland (4th), Germany (6th), the Netherlands (7th), Denmark (8th) and the United Kingdom (10th). Japan remains the second-ranked Asian economy at 9th place, despite falling three places since last year.The United States continues its decline for the third year in a row, falling one more place to fifth position. In addition to the macroeconomic vulnerabilities that continue to build, some aspects of the United States’ institutional environment continue to raise concern among business leaders, particularly related to low public trust in politicians and concerns about government inefficiency.

Top five countries GCI 2011-2012 GCI 2010-2011 Change
Rank Score Rank
Switzerland 1 5.74 1 0
Singapore 2 5.63 3 1
Sweden 3 5.61 2 -1
Finland 4 5.47 7 3
United States 5 5.43 4 -1

The bottom five countries in the ranking are Chad, Haiti, Burundi, Angola and Yemen.

Bottom five countries GCI 2011-2012 GCI 2010-2011 Change
Rank Score Rank
Yemen 138 3.06 n/a n/a
Angola 139 2.96 138 -1
Burundi 140 2.95 137 -3
Haiti 141 2.90 n/a n/a
Chad 142 2.87 139 -3

The report argues that “while competitiveness in advanced economies has stagnated over the past seven years, in many emerging markets it has improved, placing their growth on a more stable footing and mirroring the shift in economic activity from advanced to emerging economies.”

The People’s Republic of China (26th) continues to lead the way among large developing economies, improving by one more place and solidifying its position among the top 30. Among the four other BRICS economies, South Africa (50th) and Brazil (53rd) move upwards while India (56th) and Russia (66th) experience small declines. Several Asian economies perform strongly, with Japan (9th) and Hong Kong SAR (11th) also in the top 20.

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Nepal’s case:

Though the five position improvement in ranking looks like good news, it actually is regaining the same ranking as in 2009-2010 (though an improvement in overall score by 0.5 points). Also, the inclusion of new countries with lower competitiveness might have pushed down (or improved) Nepal’s ranking. In 2009-10, Nepal’s ranking was 125 out of 133 countries; in 2010-11, the ranking was 130 out of 139 countries; and in 2010-11, the ranking is 125 out of 142 countries. But still, this is an improvement over last year’s ranking.

Nepal is still a factor-driven economy but its macroeconomic environment is better than that of other factor-driven economies. Its labor market efficiency is below the standard of other factor-driven economies (given the series of labor unrest, it is expected). Nepal still has a long way to go to become an efficiency-driven and then innovation-driven economy.

In basic requirements (institutions, infrastructure, macroeconomic environment, and health and primary education), Nepal’s ranking is 121 out of 142 economies. In efficiency enhancers (higher education and training, goods market efficiency, labor market efficiency, financial market development, technological readiness, and market size), Nepal’s ranking is 127. In innovation and sophistication factors (business sophistication and innovation), Nepal’s ranking is 132.

Nepal’s macroeconomic environment is ranked as 50 most competitive out of 142 economies. Similarly, its market size is ranked 98 out of 142 countries. Innovation in Nepal is ranked 134 out of 142 economies. Nepal’s infrastructure ranking is the second worst, 141 out of 142 economies. Research has also shown infrastructure as the most binding constraint to growth in the Nepali economy.

The other rankings are: institutions (124), infrastructure (141), macroeconomic environment (50), health and primary education (115); higher education and training (129), goods market efficiency (125), labor market efficiency (128), financial market development (100), technological readiness (130), market size (98); business sophistication (125) and innovation (134).

In the survey of business sector, government instability is identified as the most problematic factor of doing business in Nepal. It is followed inefficient government bureaucracy, policy instability, corruption, inadequate supply of infrastructure, and restrictive labor regulation, among others.

Tuesday, September 6, 2011

Balance of payments surplus at Rs 2.93 billion in FY2010/11

The latest update from the central bank shows that Nepal had a balance of payments (BoP) surplus of Rs 2.93 billion in fiscal year 2010/11 after two years of negative BoP. BoP is an accounting record of all monetary transactions between a country (Nepal) and the rest of the world. The reasons for this positive news are an increase in government capital transfers and external loans and decrease in the current account deficit, which came down to to Rs 11.91 billion.

Nepal’s BoP is composed of three sections: Current account, capital account and financial account (there is ‘balancing item’ as well to account for statistical errors). Current account is the sum of balance of trade (exports minus imports of both merchandise goods and services), net factor income (such as interests and dividends), and net transfer payments (such as remittances, foreign aid, and pensions). This is the most important section in the BoP.

Trade deficit increased by 5.4 percent to Rs 330.34 billion during the year (almost two-thirds of it with India). Exports in 2010/11 grew by 6.1 percent while imports grew at a slower rate of 5.5 percent.

Remittance inflows amounted to Rs 253.55 billion, a growth of 9.4 percent over last year´s receipt. A total of 354,716 workers went abroad (an increase of 20.61% over last year). Imports from India increased by 20.5 percent (the previous fiscal year it was 33.7 percent).

FDI inflows amounted to Rs 6.44 billion last fiscal year. A total of 171 joint ventures were approved by the Department of Industry.

The country´s gross foreign exchange reserves increased by 1.2 percent to Rs 272.10 billion in mid-July 2011. The reserves were at Rs 268.91 billion in mid-July 2010.

The annual average inflation remained at 9.6 percent in 2010/11. Despite a 14.7 percent rise in food prices, the annual average consumer price index moderated because prices of non-food items and services grew at a low rate of 5.4 percent. Annual average salary and wage rate index rose by 18 percent in 2010/11.

Briefly:

  • Balance of payments: Rs 2.93 billion
  • Current account: –Rs 11.91 billion
  • Balance of trade: –Rs 330.34 billion (growth of 5.4%; exports grew by 6.1% and imports grew by 5.5%; exports amounted to Rs 64.56 billion and imports Rs 394.90 billion)
  • Net transfers (grant, pension, remittance and duty refund): Rs 307.86 billion (growth by 8.9%)
  • Remittance inflows: Rs 253.55 billion (growth of 9.4%)
  • FDI inflows: Rs 6.44 billion (FDI commitment was Rs 10.05 billion)
  • Forex reserve (as of mid-July 2010): Rs 272.10 billion (growth of 1.2%)
  • Inflation: 9.6%
  • Petroleum import: Rs 75.07 billion (almost Rs 10 billion higher than total export revenue)
  • Gold import: Rs 11.35 billion
  • Revenue mobilization: Rs 200.79 billion
  • Budget deficit: Rs 50.63 billion

Quick comments:

While it is good news that BoP is in surplus, there isn’t much to cheer about looking at the positive figure. The fundamentals of our economy have not changed to make a positive impact on economic growth, manufacturing sector and export potential. This is evident from the fact that trade deficit is continuing to increase (though at a bit slower rate). Remittances (precisely net transfers) helped a bit in reducing current account deficit (which came down to –Rs 11.91 billion from –Rs 28.14 billion the year before) and eventually BoP situation.  A lot of previously unsettled transfers has taken place, pushing up the BoP account in the positive territory. Inflation has remained sticky at nearly double digit level.The monetary policy for last fiscal year targeted to attain a BoP surplus of Rs 7 billion, which was tagged as ambitious target.

The growth rate of exports was higher than that of imports not because of an increase in manufacturing capacity; it was increasing at this modest rate in previous years as well. The low imports growth last fiscal year was due to curb in gold imports. Again, nothing much to cheer about on this front as well except for the fact that BoP was in the positive territory.

The broader point here that is that despite a marginal increase in exports, which was higher than growth of imports, and balance of payments surplus last fiscal year, we still are in a deep trench. Our economic fundamentals have not changed. The same problems that have been plaguing our exports sector are obstinately persistent. Supply-side constraints such as intermittent blockades, labor disputes, and lack of adequate infrastructures (primarily road transport and electricity) are further eroding our competitiveness. These constraints are mostly exogenous in nature. They are making our exports uncompetitive and are also preventing diversification of exports basket.

That said, some endogenous factors such as the lack of entrepreneurship and innovation in exports sector, the ignorance about the rapidly changing and globalizing market, and the inability to embrace a change in restructuring production, marketing and distribution structures of firms are some of the other factors ailing the growth of industrial and export sectors.

Most of these are non-economic constraints. So, the set of solutions are political consensus on national agenda regarding export and industrial promotion, amicable settlement of labor disputes, and simplification of rules and procedures regarding construction of infrastructures directly related to these sectors. It should be aided by promotion of entrepreneurship in and restructuring of exports sector. Else, our exports and industrial competitiveness will continue to decline, resulting in a widening trade deficit, prolonging of BoP crisis, further slowing down of growth rate, and stagnating employment opportunities.

Monday, September 5, 2011

Can there be convergence between developed and developing countries?


The question addressed in this paper is whether the gap in performance between the developed and developing worlds can continue, and in particular, whether developing nations can sustain the rapid growth they have experienced of late. The good news is that growth in the developing world should depend not on growth in the advanced economies themselves, but on the difference in the productivity levels of the two groups of countries – on the “convergence gap” – which remains quite large. Yet much of this convergence potential is likely to go to waste. Convergence is anything but automatic, and depends on sustaining rapid structural change in the direction of tradables such as manufacturing and modern services. The policies that successful countries have used to achieve this are hard to emulate. Moreover, these policies – such as currency undervaluation and industrial policies – will meet greater resistance on the part of industrial countries struggling with stagnant economies and high unemployment.


Here is the full paper by Dani Rodrik. Convergence depends on bridging the productivity levels/gap. And exploiting it needs sustaining rapid structural change in the direction of tradables such as manufacturing and modern services.

Public investment efficiency in developing countries

Dabla-Norris et al. (2011) construct Public Investment Management Index (PIMI) that benchmarks the quality and efficiency of the investment process across 71 developing and emerging countries.

According to their findings, the 5 countries with the most efficient investment processes are middle-income (South Africa, Brazil, Colombia, Tunisia and Thailand), and the weakest performers (Belize, Congo-Brazzaville, Solomon Islands, Yemen, and the West Bank and Gaza).

More on the index here


Country efforts to “invest in the investment process” encompasses several aspects or stages – country capacity to carry out technically sound and non-politicised project appraisal and selection, appropriate mechanisms for implementation, oversight, and monitoring of investment projects, and ex post evaluation. We create sub-indices that aggregate indicators across these four stages of the investment process: project appraisal, selection, implementation, and evaluation. The first stage, project appraisal, ensures investments are chosen based on development policy priorities. The second stage captures the extent to which project selection is linked to the budget cycle – country experiences find opaque organisational arrangements result in chronic under-execution of investment budgets, rent seeking, and corruption. Project implementation covers a range of aspects, from timely budget execution and efficient procurement to sound internal budgetary monitoring and control. The last stage, ex post evaluation of projects compares the project’s costs with those established during project design.

We scored countries on each of the stages (each of the stages is made up of several individual components, 17 in total). The different components were scored and combined to construct the overall PIMI. A scale between 0 and 4 was used for each question (most data is qualitative), with a higher score reflecting better public investment management performance.

[…] In the current environment of abundant liquidity and search for yield, and the growing importance of BRICs as sources of foreign direct investment and aid, low-income countries have access to financing like never before. It will be important that they leverage it to close the infrastructure gap and increase growth. "Investing in the investment process" will ensure that the much-needed scaling-up of investment leads to future sustained prosperity rather than roads and bridges that lead to nowhere.


Friday, September 2, 2011

Trade policy, domestic agri policy and food security

Excerpts from the WTO Director General Pascal Lamy’s address to the XIIIth Congress of the European Association of Agricultural Economists.


[..]Many factors have been cited as the cause of these repeated crises, some long-term structural factors, and others short-term, such as: biofuels, rising oil prices, changing Asian diets, declining grain stocks, financial speculation, and climate change and its associated risk. Some would add that food export bans have themselves been the cause of the price hike, in particular for certain commodities such as rice. And we could debate at great length what is a “structural” phenomenon and what is merely “cyclical.” For example, biofuels policies, in particular the production of biofuels from feedstock that do not lead to significant greenhouse-gas savings, are being put into question. Will these policies persist, or will they be abandoned in future? An open question.

[…]International trade, if properly instrumentalized, though should help us exit these repeated crises. And, to my mind, the Doha Round remains an opportunity for vital agricultural reform.


Domestic agriculture policies are vital


[…]no matter how sophisticated our trade policies are, if domestic policies do not themselves incentivize agriculture, and internalize negative social and environmental externalities, we will not be satisfied with our agricultural systems.

[…]Land management, water and natural resource management, property rights, storage, energy, transportation and distribution networks, credit systems, and science and technology, are all key elements of a successful agricultural policy and food security system.


Trade policy cannot address each and every challenge in agriculture. But, it can help us “exit repeated crises”.


[…]global integration allows us to think of efficiency beyond national boundaries. It allows us to score efficiency gains on a global scale by shifting agricultural production to where it can best take place. It can also allow for a more efficient sourcing of the inputs to agricultural production.

[…]The efficiency gains brought about by international trade are also vital in light of the environmental challenges that we face. As I often say, if a country such as Egypt were to aim for self-sufficiency in agriculture, it would soon need more than one River Nile. International trade in food is water-saving. And, with the impending climate crisis, international trade in food will rise further in importance as we come to the aid of drought-stricken countries.

[…]international trade was not the source of the food crises. If anything, international trade has reduced the price of food over the years through greater competition, and enhanced consumer purchasing power. International trade has also brought about undisputable efficiency gains in agricultural production.

[…]International trade in agriculture is less than 10% of world trade. Furthermore, whereas 50% of the world's production of industrial goods enters international trade, it is important that you know that only 25% of the world's agricultural production is traded globally. In the case of rice, this figure drops to 5-7%, making for a particularly thin international rice market. In addition, of the world's 25% of food production that enters international trade, the vast majority (two-thirds) is processed food, and not rice, wheat, or soya as some would like to claim. To suggest that less trade, and greater self-sufficiency, are the solutions to food security, would be to argue that trade was itself to blame for the crisis.

[…]It is because of how little international trade there is in rice, that rice prices reacted so dramatically to export restrictions. The limited international trade in rice made rice prices more, and not less, volatile. Deeper international commodity markets are less prone to crises.

[…]international trade, and indeed improvements to international trade rules through the Doha Round, would be only one component of better agricultural policy globally. Agricultural policy starts at home, and not at the international level. However, the reform of global trade rules and a better functioning international transmission belt for food, are vital components of an enhanced food security picture.


Agriculture has been treated differently and relatively more protected.


[…]the world's trade-weighted average industrial goods tariff is about 8%, in agriculture it is 25%. Not to mention tariff peaks, which in agriculture still rise up to 1000%!


Agriculture trade policy after the food crises and “land grabs”


[…]In response to the crises, some started looking further inwards, and we saw a whole host of export restrictions flourish. These export restrictions had a domino, market-closing, effect, with one restriction bringing about another, as the world started to anticipate a global food shortage.

[…]Yet others started looking further outwards in response to these food crises; namely, the world's net-food importing countries. Countries that are dependent on international trade to feed themselves. They asked that food export restrictions be immediately lifted. Surprising about this situation was that countries sitting on opposite sides of the export barrier fence all complained of the same thing — namely, hunger. And hence the phenomenon of the purchase of agricultural land abroad — dubbed “land grabs” by some, that we now witness. An attempt to overcome the problem of export restrictions by buying land abroad and cultivating it for the importing country's use. As though export restrictions would respect land ownership rights!


Safety-nets needed in case of high prices and volatility.


[…]But we must ask ourselves why there is such widespread resentment to trade opening, if such opening is indeed vital to global food security. To me the answer is clear. It is because we have yet to build robust safety-nets for the world's poor. Each and every government must turn its attention to this issue, urgently, in my view. In the absence of such safety nets, there will always be resentment at a time of crisis to a country's food supply going abroad.