The emergence of India as a donor

India is planning to set up its own aid agency to distribute its own US$11 billion over the next five to seven years, according to The Economist. South-South aid is increasing and the aid dynamics is changing. Here is a post on South-South aid to Nepal (India being the largest donor).

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For decades, India was the world’s biggest aid recipient. Now, it is likely to join Brazil, Russia and China in using aid to win friends and influence people abroad. The rules of aid are being turned inside-out and long-standing donors—governments and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) alike—must change, too.

[…] But India’s proposal shows that donors, like generals, are still fighting the last war. The old binary division of the world—between rich countries which give aid and poor ones which get it—is gone. Fewer countries are poor and eligible for cheap loans. Two-thirds of the world’s poorest people—those with less than $1.25 a day—live in middle-income countries, such as India, which increasingly are donors as well as recipients.

[…] As India also shows, middle-income countries no longer need financial transfers to help their own people. That was clear before: India has a space programme and $300 billion of foreign reserves. A new aid agency would ram the point home. Once, Westerners could say they needed to help India’s poor because India’s own government could not afford to. Not now.

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Now, the Southern and the Northern donors should focus on their comparative advantage—the former in infrastructure and the latter in promoting good governance.

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In this new world the justification for aid and the behaviour of donors must change. For India and others, it is far from clear why the government should send aid abroad when it has so many poor people at home. No doubt, aid will be defended as a boost to global influence. The risk for India is that, just like the West did in the 1960s, it will pour money into grand projects which fail—and encourage bad government.

For Westerners, justifying aid will be harder. But there is a reason to give: like trade, aid benefits from specialisation and comparative advantage. Emerging countries, with recent experience to draw upon, might do a better job of infrastructure spending. The West should focus more on policies and good governance (something many poorer Indian states are crying out for). There is a new world of aid but over a billion people remain poor; they still need help, even if some of them live in countries that now give aid as well as get it.

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Costs and benefits of remittances in Nepal: Findings from two household surveys

This is published in Republica, August 13, 2011, p.6. It discusses the pros and cons of remittances at household and national level in Nepal. It is based on two key surveys, namely Nepal Living Standard Survey III and Nepal Migration Survey. Read my earlier posts on remittances here and here.

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Remittances account for 23 percent of the total value of goods and services produced in the country (generally termed as gross domestic product—GDP), according to estimates by World Bank economists. Remittances have been the backbone of our economy, especially after 2000 when remittance inflows started to skyrocket. So far the extent of its impact has been discussed based on anecdotes and observations. Lately, its true reach and impact at household and national levels are estimated in two forthcoming studies based on surveys, namely Nepal Living Standard Survey (NLSS) III and Nepal Migration Survey (NMS) 2009. The findings are startling, both positively and negatively, and they indicate the laxity of our politicians and policymakers in enacting the needed reforms for structural transformation.

First, let us start with NLSS III, whose full version is not released yet, and the blessing of remitters in helping to bring about the positive changes. Over the last six years absolute poverty declined to 13 percent of total population, down from 31.5 percent in 2003/04—an incredible 18 percentage point decline in poverty, or three percentage point decline each year. Nominal average household income and nominal average per capita income have increased by 153 percent and 175 percent respectively. Furthermore, nominal per capita consumption of the poorest households has increased by 165 percent while that of richest households by 66 percent only. Also, average household income of the poorest and richest 20 percent households has increased by 297 percent and 133 percent respectively. It has contributed to a decline in income inequality, measured by Gini coefficient, to 0.35 from 0.41 recorded in the second NLSS. The average daily wage in agriculture sector has increased by 127 percent between the two surveys, but that of non-agriculture sector by 98 percent only. Access to other facilities has also improved.

What has led to such an astounding positive results at the household level at a time when the major macroeconomic variables are either stagnating or deteriorating amidst increasing political uncertainty? The only convincing factor you can think of is remittance, which has increased by 327 percent (574 percent if you use NLSS data) between 2004 and 2010. These positive changes have not come about due to hard work of our policymakers and political leaders. They are due to high remittance inflows directly to households sent by hardworking Nepalese sweating and risking their lives in various employment destinations abroad.

The massive jump in average household income—particularly that of the poorest households which make up the most of the 55.8 percent of households that receive remittances—has nothing to do with the policies that were implemented in the last six years. So much resources and efforts have been invested to reduce poverty but its effect seems to have faltered in the face of the impact of remittance at the household level. In reality, the NLSS III results indicate a policy failure and a resounding victory of remitters in reducing income poverty and inequality directly and most efficiently than any initiative carried out in the past six years. Now, some might argue that access to roads, services (education and health) and wage increase might have led to that. But, the impact of these factors is not as fast and as deep as that of remittances, which directly bumped up household income. Also, since these factors have not contributed to boosting economic growth, it appears poverty has decreased without a convincing growth rate. May be it is about time to change policy strategies to fight poverty in Nepal.

Unfortunately, the positive changes in the short run have masked a dangerous trend at policy and macroeconomy levels. First, rising remittances and increase in income of the poorest lot have made politicians and policymakers, especially at Ministry of Finance (MoF) and National Planning Commission (NPC), complacent about the automatic changes at the household level. They should not claim credit for the positive changes outlined above because no substantial policy level initiative has been carried out over the last six years to reduce poverty expect for the customary efforts through Poverty Alleviation Fund (PAF). The only credit they should take is for their contribution to the exodus of remitters to destination abroad because of their failure to create enough employment opportunities at home. Meanwhile, equal blame goes to the insensitive, visionless, and selfish political leaders who have created a mess that has led to closure of factories, capital flight, and loss of employment and entrepreneurial opportunities, triggering migration of youths.

Second, the MoF and the NPC have been increasing the size of fiscal budget without any substantial impact on the economy, where still 76.3 percent of households depend on agriculture. In the last six years, the economy saw economic growth above 5 percent in 2007/08 only. This was not the result of any miraculous policy intervention, but due to blessing of monsoon that boosted agriculture production. The laxity in enacting real reforms has triggered consumption binge (only 2 percent of household remittance is spent on capital formation). Worse, since domestic production is insufficient to satisfy domestic demand, we are forced to import goods and services, resulting in ballooning trade deficit. Now, the increase in labor costs will further increase cost of production and make our products even more uncompetitive, forcing us to import even more. Note that the exodus of workers has created a shortage of labor and an increase of average daily wage in agriculture sector by 127 percent and that of non-agriculture by 98 percent between the two surveys.

There is even more dangerous trend directly attributed to remittances, as revealed by NMS 2009, at the macroeconomy level: symptoms of Dutch disease in the Nepalese economy. Simply, a Dutch disease occurs when an economy depends on one sector so much that it leads to decline in manufacturing sector. In Nepal, increasing remittances at the household level have led to high consumption demand, high imports, and appreciation of real exchange rate, resulting in the erosion of manufacturing sector and its competitiveness.

Allow me to simplify it further. As income increases due to remittance inflows, aggregate demand and spending goes up as well. This puts pressure on nontradables in the domestic market, leading to rise in demand and output. But, due to high demand wages also tend to increase in all the sectors, both tradable and nontradable. It increases cost of production throughout the economy, leading to squeezing of profits in the nonresource tradables sector (manufacturing), whose prices are pretty much fixed in the international market (prices of nontradables are fixed in the domestic market). This means customers will look for substitutes at cheaper price, thus increasing imports and reducing domestically produced nonresource tradables. This gradually erodes the existence of the whole manufacturing sector. Meanwhile, since incomes are higher from migration, capital and labor are attracted to this sector from other sectors of the economy, resulting in reduced output and labor supply in the latter ones. As mentioned above and as corroborated by both NLSS III and NMS, we are seeing all of these undesirable changes happening in the Nepali economy.

While we applaud the findings of NLSS III let us also not forget that the positive results, which might be short-lived, are primarily due to the remitters assiduously working and sweating outside the country, and not due to policy interventions by MoF, NPC and the political leaders. Kudos to the remitters. Congratulations to all for the positive results. Good luck to policymakers and politicians to manage the messy fallout from the overdependence on remittances in the days ahead!

[Published in Republica, August 13, 2011, p.6]

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For those who blindly say free trade is always good for all

I am reading Dani Rodrik’s latest book (The Globalization Paradox) and the more I proceed forward, the more interesting it gets. Just wanted to put up this one where Rodrik lists preconditions required for trade to be always good for all.

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The import liberalization must be complete, covering all goods and trade partners, or else the reduction in import restrictions must take into account the potentially quite complicated structure of substitutability and complementarity across restricted commodities. (So in fact a preferential trade agreement with one or a few trade partners is unlikely to satisfy the requirement). There must be no microeconomic market imperfections other than the trade restrictions in question, or if there are some, the second-best interactions that are entailed must not be too adverse. The home economy must be “small” in world markets, or else the liberalization must not put the economy on the wrong side of the “optimum tariff.” The economy economy must be in reasonably full employment, or if not, the monetary and fiscal authorities must have effective tools of demand management at their disposal. The income redistributive effects of the liberalization should not be judged undesirable by society at large, or if they are, there must be compensatory tax-transfer schemes with low enough excess burden. There must be no adverse effects on the fiscal balance, or if there are, there must be alternative and expedient ways of making up for the lost fiscal revenues. The liberalization must be politically sustainable and hence credible so that economic agents do not fear or anticipate a reversal.

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This alone will not raise the level of aggregate real income. Nothing can be said definitely about growth even with the above preconditions are fulfilled. Here is why

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In our standard models with exogenous technological change and diminishing returns to reproducible factors of production (e.g. the neoclassical model of growth), a trade restriction has no effect on the long-run (steady-state) rate of growth of output. This is true regardless of the existence of market imperfections. However, there  may be growth effects during the transition to steady state. (There transitional effects could be positive or negative depending on how the long-run level of output is affected by the trade restriction). In  models of endogenous growth generated by non-diminishing returns to reproducible factors of production or by learning-by-doing and other forms of endogenous technological change, the presumption is that lower trade restrictions boost output growth in the world economy as a whole. But a subset of countries may experience diminished growth depending on their initial factor endowments and levels of technological development. It all depends on whether the forces of comparative advantage pull resources into growth-generating sectors and activities, or away from them.

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Now, it indicates the answer to the question “Is trade good?” is not as simple as “Yes, trade is always good to all”. It is much more complex than that.

Employment guarantee scheme in Nepal

The Nepalese policymakers have drafted Employment Guarantee Act promising to provide a job to all the households living below the poverty line (BPL), reports Ashok Thapa in Republica daily.

• Guaranteed job as a critical part of socio-economic security and fundamental rights of citizens, and promises a job of at least 100 days per year to at least a member of poor families.
• At least one member of families living below the poverty line will enjoy a job, fetching income equivalent to minimum wage fixed by the government.
• Jobs will be provided in sectors like construction, infrastructure and other development projects.
• In case the state failed to provide jobs, the draft says the government will pay unemployment allowance to those families.
• Based on VDC-level data, the committee, which is drafting the Act, has suggested the government to issue cards to the beneficiary households.
• In order to ensure the effectiveness of the program, the draft Act asks the local bodies to hold public hearings every four months to dig out grievances and other anomalies.
• VDC, DDC and NPC to control possible leakage.

It seem the existing plan is almost fully in line with India’s Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (MGNREGA), the largest employment guarantee public works program in the world.Its cost as a share of GDP, total expenditure and revenue receipts is decreasing and is expected to be 0.45 percent, 3.19 percent, and 5.08 percent respectively in fiscal year 2011-2012. This social welfare program guarantees one hundred days of employment per year at the prevailing minimum wage rate for unskilled labor. When NREGA was implemented in 2006, eleven states saw a rise in minimum wages. The new revised wages, to be adjusted with CPI, is set to increase wages in twenty states.

Similar programs (public works) have been launched in the US, Ethiopia, Sengeal, Ireland and Bangladesh among other countries. I have batted for this kind of program to solve unemployment problems in the rural areas and to boost infrastructure work. Few things to keep in mind before enacting such program:

• Without strong local level institutions (VDCs) and representatives manning the local offices leakages will be pretty high. Else, fudging of muster rolls and manipulation of accounts will occur.
• It should be demand-driven by nature.
• It is necessary to identify the households below poverty line and then provide employment to one adult members from each household for a maximum of three months (usually during lean agriculture season).
• Public works should be carried out to boost local level infrastructure that can increase agriculture productivity and promoting local markets.
• The fiscal cost is a major issues. In India it costs around 0.5 percent of GDP. Almost 53 million households were provided employment in 2009-10. Around 2826 million persondays of employment was created. Women and those from indigenous and backward groups secured most of the employment.

Below I have calculated a rough cost estimate of employment guarantee scheme in Nepal. Based on the latest NLSS III results and assuming population of 30 million, the number of BPL population in Nepal is 3.9 million. If an adult member (working age population of 15-59 years) of BPL household is given employment, then around 4.3 lakhs persons will demand employment at the minimum agriculture wage rate of NRs 170 per day. The wage cost of such scheme per day would be at least Rs 0.07 billion. If employment is provided only during lean agriculture season (which means three months), then wage cost per year would be at least Rs 6.60 billion. If we assume that administrative cost to carrying out such scheme to be 25 percent of total wage cost, then the total cost (wage plus administrative) would be around Rs 8.25 billion. Administrative cost is aimed at 20 percent of total cost in India. In Nepal, it should be higher as we lack many functioning local level institutions and representatives.

Preliminary cost estimate of employment guarantee scheme
Number of BPL population (million)	3.9
Minimum agri wage per day (NRs)	170
Average household size	4.9
Number of households BPL	795,918
Potential employment demand (15-59 years)	431,388
Wage cost per day, billion	0.07
Wage cost per year (3 months of employment), billion	6.60
Administrative cost (25 percent of wage cost), billion	1.65
Total cost (wage plus administrative), billion	8.25
Total cost (share of budget for FY 2011-12)	2.14
Total cost (share of real GDP in producers prices, 2010-11)	1.29

This would be around 2.14 percent of budget (considering FY 2011-12 budget) and 1.29 percent of GDP in producers prices of 2010-11. This cost is higher than in India, where the cost is below one percent of GDP. The program should cost lower if administrative cost is lowered. Considering budget deficit of about 3.8 percent of GDP in 2010-11, enacting employment guarantee scheme in Nepal would increase deficit to 4.83 percent of GDP.

[Note that if you assume at least one member of each household, regardless of working age population, would get guaranteed employment, then the cost would be approximately double of what is estimated above.]

Changing pattern of global trade

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The past few decades have seen important shifts that have reshaped the global trade landscape. As a share of global output, trade is now at almost three times the level in the early 1950s, in large part driven by the integration of rapidly growing emerging market economies (EMEs). The expansion in trade is mostly accounted for by growth in noncommodity exports, especially of high-technology products such as computers and electronics. It is also characterized by a growing role of global supply chains and an ongoing shift of technology content toward EMEs. These developments in global trade have been associated with growing trade interconnectedness and carry important implications for trade patterns, in particular in response to relative price changes. The aim of this paper is to outline the factors underlying these changes and analyze their implications for the outlook for global trade patterns.

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Here is the full paper. The paper states that the expansion of global and regional trade was driven by trade liberalization, followed by vertical specialization and income convergence. Lower trade barriers and technology-led declines in transportation and communication costs facilitated regional and global supply chains. Meanwhile, convergence in income levels and factor endowments across countries pushed up trade, especially that of intra-industry trade.

The expansion in global (merchandise) trade is characterized by three trends

• The rise of EMEs as systemically important trading partners
• The growing importance of regional trade
• The shift of higher technology exports toward dynamic EMEs

Note that there is a difference in export contents of advanced and emerging market economies: advanced economies have less foreign (import) content in their exports and contribute towards other countries’ exports content, but EMEs tend to have relatively large shares of imported content in their exports (especially of those that involve heavily in assembly and processing trade). This affects sensitivity of trade patterns to relative price changes. The paper states that Asian supply chain is more dispersed compared to those in North America or Europe, rendering it more vulnerable to disruptions in trade flows. Also, check out the argument for judging trade and competition based on value-added during each step of manufacturing process than total value of final products imported or exported from countries.

 

The figure below shows trade interconnectedness between Japan and China and other countries from where it imports contents for its exports. The emergence of China as a global trade hub (and its prominence over Japan in over a decade) is clearly visible.

Major findings of Nepal Living Standard Survey III

Key findings of Nepal Living Standard Surveys
	NLSS I	NLSS II	NLSS III
Survey year	1995/96	2003/04	2010
Absolute poverty (% of population)	41.8	30.8	25.2 13
Demography (%)
Population aged 0-14 years	42.4	39.6	36.7
Population aged 15-59 years	50.8	52.8	54.2
Population aged 60+ years	6.8	7.6	9.1
Sex ratio (male to every 100 female)	95.5	92.3	85.6
Female headed households	13.6	19.6	26.6
Housing and household facilities (% of household)
House owner	93.8	91.6	89.7
House renter	2.2	5.4	7.8
Access to power	14.1	37.2	69.9
Access to drinking water	70.4	81.2	83
LPG for cooking	1	8.2	17.7
Access to toilet	21.6	38.7	56
Education
Literacy (6 + years)	37.8	50.6	60.9
Attendance in private school/collage	7.5	16.7	26.8
Remittances
Percentage of househoold receiving remittances	23.4	31.9	55.8
Total amount received (Rs billion)	13	46	310
From within Nepal	6	11	120
From outside Nepal	7	35	208
Use of remittance (%)
Daily consumption	-	-	78.9
Household property	-	-	4.5
Repay loans	-	-	7.1
Education	-	-	3.5
Capital formation	-	-	2.4
Income
Nominal avg household income (Rs)	43,732	80,111	202,374
Nominal avg per capita income (Rs)	7,690	15,161	41,659
Share of farm income in household income (%)	61	47.8	27.7
Consumption
Nominal per capita consumption (Rs)
All Nepal	6,802	15,848	34,829
Poorest (first decile)	2,152	4,183	11,093
Average (fifth decile)	4,777	9,230	24,238
Richest (tenth decile)	20,263	62,037	102,772
Consumption expenditure (share of total)
Food	-	59	61.5
Housing	-	9.5	11
Education	-	2.8	5.3
Other non-food items	-	28.7	22.2
Wage employment
Share of agriculture sector in wage employment	53	37	35
Mean daily wage (Rs)
Agriculture	40	75	170
Non-agriculture	74	133	263
Loans (% of total household)
Borrowing loans	61.3	68.8	65
Having standing loans	58.4	66.7	62.6
Loans from banks	16.2	15.1	20
Loans from money lenders	39.7	26	15.1
Loans from relatives	40.8	54.5	51.1

This table is sourced from Republica (2011-08-06). My initial comments on the findings are here.

Notice that all the changes are remittance- and migration-driven. More remittance money is spent on consumption than in any other heading. Only 2.4 percent of remittance money is spent in capital formation.

Households that owned houses have decreased while those renting houses have increased. Access to power has substantially increased. So, are households with safe drinking water and toilet. (One can guess the supply thought-- prolonged power cuts and taps running dry!). Households with LPG for cooking has also increased (which explains why the NOC is loosing out the most money on LPG).

Working group population has increased. But, those dependent (60+) has also increased. Dependent population below 14 years has decreased.

Nominal average household income and nominal average per capita income have increased by 153 percent and 175 percent respectively between NLSSII and NLSS III. In the same time period, nominal per capita consumption of the poorest households (first income decile) has increase by 165 percent while that of richest households (tenth income decile) has increased by 66 percent. The nominal per capita consumption of median households (fifth decile) increased by 166 percent.

Consumption expenditure on food, housing and education has increased but on other non-food items it decreased.

The average daily wage in agriculture sector has increased by 127 percent between the two surveys, but that of non-agriculture sector increased by 98 percent only.

More households are now borrowing from banks and curtailing loans from money lenders.

Absolute poverty declined to 13 percent in Nepal in six years

This is incredible. Prem Khanal writes that a forthcoming study based on Nepal Living Standard Survey (NLSS) 2010 shows that absolute poverty declined to 13 percent, a 18 percentage point decline in absolute poverty in the six years between 2003/04 and 2009/10. That is like three percentage point decline each year. The NLSS II conducted in 2003/04 showed 31.5 percent of the population was under absolute poverty. The first NLSS in 1995/96 showed 42 percent of the population under absolute poverty. The latest survey is based on 7,200 samples of households selected randomly nationwide.

Findings of NLSS III:

• 13 percent Nepalis below the poverty line fixed at 2,200 calorie consumption per day per person and access to essential non-food items.
• Based on current market prices, a person needs an income of at least Rs 14,430 per year to manage food items equivalent to 2,200 calorie per day and other essential non-food items.
• Households receiving remittance increased to 55 pc from 31.9 percent reported in NLLS 2003/04 (24 percent households received remittance in FY95/96). Of this income, 79 percent is used for daily consumption while only 2.4 percent is invested for capital formation.
• Sex ratio decreased to 85.6 from 92.6 in 2003/04.
• Average household size decreased to 4.9 persons from an earlier 5.3 persons.
• The Gini-coefficient has fallen to 0.35 from 0.41 recorded in the second NLSS. The nominal average per capita income of the poorest 20 percent of the population has increased nearly fourfold to Rs 15,888 from Rs 4,003 registered in the second NLLS. However, such income of the richest 20 percent of the population merely doubled, to Rs 94,419 from Rs 40,486 over the period.
• Households headed by females has increased to 26.6 percent from 19.6 percent recorded in the second NLLS.
• The per capita consumption share of the poorest 10 percent, according to the survey, is Rs 11,093 whereas the share for the richest 10 percent is Rs 102,772.
• The nominal average household income has seen a 2.5-fold increment to Rs 202,374 from Rs 80,111 six years ago.
• Households using cooking gas has doubled to 17.7 percent.
• Households taking loans from banks have gone up to 20 percent from 15 percent whereas households taking loans from local money lenders has gone down to 15.1 percent from 26 percent six years ago.
• More than 62 percent of households have outstanding loans as against 66.7 in 2003/04.
• The expenditure on cereal food has declined by a whopping 16 percentage points to 52.3 percent whereas expenditures on meat and vegetables have increased considerably.
• Kathmandu Valley has the lowest poverty incidence of less than 5 percent while Taplejung, Khotang and Sankhuwasabha have the highest -- up to 23 percent.

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COMMENTS:

The survey showed everything positive happening at the household level right now. This has come about when the major macroeconomic variables are deteriorating and political uncertainty increasing. Something other than the economic variables are at play. The only exogenous factor I can think of are remittance and migration. It looks like it is a remittance- and migration-led decline in absolute poverty.

More households received more remittance money, increasing their income and consumption. The first two deciles household on the income scale got a bump in their income due to remittance money, decreasing income inequality. This also means that the marginal increase in growth of remittance received by poorest households is higher than the marginal increase in growth of income of richest households. I am surprised by this. Also, it means an increase in female headed households as men leave to sweat outside the country.

Sex ratio, the ratio of male to female, has decreased. It is like Nepal is having more females than males (just opposite in India—where the latest census showed 940 girls for every 1000 males)? Or am I reading the number incorrect?

About the astounding decrease in poverty, the impact is not only due to remittances. NLSS III shows that absolute poverty declined to 13 percent. If we account for the impact of remittances, the poverty incidence has declined to 21 percent. What accounts for the eight percentage point decline in absolute poverty? Increase in real wage in agriculture sector? Increase in the number of population moving from low productivity to high productivity sectors?? Decrease in fertility??

A three percentage point decline in poverty each year for six years is quite incredible. More incredible would be to know the reasons behind this. Also, compare this one with Multidimensional Poverty Index, which showed that the percentage of people who are MPI poor (headcount) is 84.7 percent. The World Bank estimated that 55.10 percent (15.59 million) of the population living below income poverty line of $1.25 a day (2005 PPP US$). Again, the 13 percent national poverty figure is very surprising. The National Planning Commission must have a good answer to this. Isn’t 2,200 calorie per day (Rs 14430 per year including food and access to basic non-food items) per person too low to sustain given high inflation?

The increase in remittances has led to a consumption binge. Since most the consumed goods are not produced in Nepal (for various reasons related to labor dispute, political instability, policy inconsistency, loss of competitiveness both in domestic as well as foreign markets), they are imported, leading to huge trade deficit. Interestingly, the increase in household income has led to consumption of more dietary goods like meat and vegetables.

The increase in average household income and remittance inflows has led to decline households in debt as well. But, loans from banks are increasing and from nonbank lenders decreasing. Is creditworthiness of Nepali households increasing?

At the policy level, it seems like without any substantive policy reform absolute poverty has declined in Nepal. We have dangerously outsourced the reform need of our economy to remittances. How long can it last? What’s up, Ministry of Finance and National Planning Commission? It comes amidst stagnation in manufacturing sector and even growth rate.

The all-positive results of NLSS III should not blind the MoF and NPC from enacting reforms. I would be reluctant to applaud the outcome shown by this survey unless the NPC comes up with good and convincing explanation. There are way too positive results amidst too many inconsistencies. Basking on the good results of NLSS III survey and doing nothing substantive to revive the economy like in previous years is going to be dangerous. For now, the remitters (not the policymakers and political leaders) should be applauded for brining about this change.

I am eagerly waiting for the full report (and possibly the raw data so that I can play with it and look for other stuff).