Saturday, February 26, 2011

Making fiscal policy effective

Abstracts of two latest working papers from the Levy Economics Institute.

Lessons from the Great Recession (Pavlina R. Tcherneva 2011):


This paper reconsiders fiscal policy effectiveness in light of the recent economic crisis. It examines the fiscal policy approach advocated by the economics profession today and the specific policy actions undertaken by the Bush and Obama administrations. An examination of the labor market renders the contemporary aggregate demand–management approach wholly inadequate for achieving certain macroeconomic objectives, such as the stabilization of investment and investor expectations, the generation and maintenance of full employment, and the equitable distribution of incomes. The paper reconsiders the policy effectiveness of alternative fiscal policy approaches, and argues that a policy that directly targets the labor demand gap (as opposed to the output gap) is far more effective in stabilizing employment, incomes, investment, and balance sheets.


Why aggregate demand management fails and what to do about it? (Pravlina R. Tcherneva 2011)


This paper argues for a fundamental reorientation of fiscal policy, from the current aggregate demand management model to a model that explicitly and directly targets the unemployed. Even though aggregate demand management has several important benefits in stabilizing an unstable economy, it also has a number of serious drawbacks that merit its reconsideration. The paper identifies the shortcomings that can be observed during both recessions and economic recoveries, and builds the case for a targeted demand-management approach that can deliver economic stabilization through full employment and better income distribution. This approach is consistent with Keynes’s original policy recommendations, largely neglected or forgotten by economists across the theoretical spectrum, and offers a reinterpretation of his proposal for the modern context that draws on the work of Hyman Minsky.


Wednesday, February 23, 2011

Trade & Food Security in Nepal

My latest piece is about the rising food prices in Nepal and what can be done about it. I tie up food security in Nepal with international trade (and to some extent with climate change). Nepal is a net food importer country since the domestic supply is insufficient to meet domestic demand. This production deficit is met by either imports or by food grains grant, especially via WFP. Here is an article on the same issue I wrote in 2009


Food Security in Nepal

Recently, the Food and Agriculture Organization’s (FAO) Food Price Index surpassed the upper bound reached during the peak of the food crisis in 2008. The World Bank says global food crisis has reached “dangerous levels”. In Nepal, the World Food Programme (WFP) argues that about 3.7 million people are at risk of food insecurity. Rising food prices have triggered a wave of protests across the globe and forced countries such as India, Russia and Vietnam, among other countries, to impose food grains embargo. These events directly or indirectly affect food prices and food availability in Nepal. Already, domestic food prices have reached second highest level since 1990.

As a net food importer nation, is Nepal prepared to deal with any further rise in food prices, production, and supply shocks at both domestic and global levels? The answer is uncertain, given the virtual absence of discussion about this issue at policymaking level. Meanwhile, the political leaders, who seem oblivious of the dangers of looming food crisis, are more worried about securing ministerial berths than ensuring enough food on plate for the poor, vulnerable and food insecure people. It is crucial for policymakers and selfish political leaders to realize that a further rise in food prices could not only affect economic growth and poverty, but also engender a series of protests and political instability.

Domestically, food prices are fast outstripping overall general prices. The Food Price Index (FPI) has been continuously dragging up Consumer Price Index (CPI), whose annual percentage change is a popular measure of inflation. Since Nepal does not produce enough food to satisfy domestic demand, it has to import food equal to domestic production deficit. So, shocks in production, supply and prices of agricultural goods at the global level affect food prices in our local markets as well. There was 316,000 metric tons food deficit in 2010, an increase by 139 percent from 2009, according to the WFP. In 2009, agricultural trade deficit was US$270 million, up from US$157 million in 2003. As the demand for food is fairly price inelastic, even if prices increase, Nepal will be importing at least the same amount of food, but it will have to spend substantially more, which will further widen total trade deficit.

Globally, higher temperatures, shifting seasons, more frequent and extreme weather events, flooding, wildfire, and drought in Russia, Canada, Australia, Pakistan, China, Argentina, and Kazakhstan, among others countries have created production shocks. Meanwhile, supply shocks occur when major exporting nations take precautionary measures to curb exports or impose embargos on certain agricultural products so that their own domestic demand is met and prices remain below a threshold for their citizens. For instance, it recently happened when India, Russia and Vietnam, among other nations imposed food grains embargo. Additionally, speculation by brokers and investment firms, who bet on the future price of major agricultural items based on existing production, inventory, and future expected production level, have also contributed to price shocks.

All of these events have not only affected demand, supply, and prices of agricultural goods at the global level, but also, to some extent, in our own economy. Note that a Nepali spends, on average, 59 percent of his income on food. Of this about 58 percent and 15 percent are spent on breads and cereals, and fruits and vegetables, respectively. Since food prices are already high in the domestic market, any further price rise will force more people to scale back discretionary expenditures and savings, which will directly affect investment and economic growth.

What options do we have to mitigate the negative impact of rising food prices on the economy?

First, there should be higher investment geared towards increasing agricultural production and productivity so that domestic production deficit can at least be narrowed down. Meanwhile, domestic production of climate resilient varieties of food grains should be encouraged. Equally important are state subsidies on appropriate varieties of seeds and fertilizers, plus some sort of guarantee to facilitate transport of surplus production of each household to the market. The government and development agencies should provide sufficient infrastructure and policy structure to make this happen.

Second, to facilitate unhindered distribution of agricultural items in the market, carteling should be checked. The agricultural traders, who are mostly affiliated to one party or the other, purchase food items (especially veggies) from farmers at dirt cheap rates and sell them in the market with a wide margin. If prices start to come down, then they restrict supply to put upward pressure on prices. This sends deceptive, undervalued price signals to farmers, who are neither encouraged to produce more nor are motivated to seek innovative methods to produce improved varieties of food items crucial for food security and for putting downward pressure on prices. The supply-side bottlenecks have to be adequately addressed to not only encourage farmers to produce more and motivate them to seek innovative farming methods, but also to curb price manipulation and hoarding of agricultural goods.

Third, smooth regional agricultural trade is crucial to meet Nepal’s food demand. Since agricultural imports from India constitute over 40 percent of total agricultural goods imported by Nepal, it is in our interest to convince India—a net exporter of agricultural goods— to make an exception, or at least ensure a quota that is enough to meet our domestic needs, for food supply to Nepal even if it imposes ban on export to other countries. Since Nepalis and Indians consume pretty much the same kind of food items and the two countries share an open border with free flow of pretty much all goods and services, it is in both countries’ interest to smoothen trade. Else, the negative political and economic spillovers and black marketing will further haunt the regions on both sides of the border. Moreover, greater cooperation on agricultural trade among South Asian countries could also help to ease food deficit.

Fourth, a fully functional regional food bank is needed for emergency purposes. The 14th SAARC Summit held in New Delhi in 2007 agreed to establish SAARC Food Bank, which is expected to serve as a regional food security reserve for SAARC member countries during normal food shortages and emergencies. The food bank was authorized to start functioning with a total reserve of 0.24 million tons of food grains. Since this amount is not enough to ensure regional food security, Bangladesh recently proposed to raise the strategic reserve to 4 million tons. Sadly, the whole concept of SAARC Food Bank is yet to become functional. There is a need to address the issue of price incentive and access threshold to enable the release of grains from the reserve.

Fifth, and most importantly, it is high time political leaders, and officials at National Planning Commission, Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Agriculture & Cooperatives, and Ministry of Commerce & Supplies woke up and acknowledged the fact that rising food prices and a potential food crisis pose a real economic threat and could engender political instability. They have to plan and work in tandem to eschew a potential food crisis and its spillover on the economy and political front. Remember, in 2008 and early this year riots have broken hell loose and regimes have fallen around the world partly because of the hardship inflicted by rising food prices. We cannot discount similar fate in the Nepali economy if domestic food crisis spirals out of control.

[Published in Republica, February 22, 2010, p.7]

Tuesday, February 22, 2011

Trade balance in South Asia

In South Asia, Maldives has the highest trade deficit (% of GDP), followed by Nepal, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, and India. Bhutan is the only country having trade surplus in South Asia. My wild guess is that the countries that have negative trade balance have high trade complementarity, i.e. they produce the same kind of goods and services and compete in the same section of the global market for customers. Bhutan stands out because of its high electricity export to India (something other countries are not doing despite having the potential. E.g. Nepal). It is high time governments thought about diversification of both products and markets. Exploring of products with comparative advantage based on resource endowment, and industrial and trade policies to steer production in that direction is needed. May be following the lead of India (and China) and getting on board its growth trajectory would help (definitely for Nepal).

Sunday, February 20, 2011

Monopsony in factor market and monopoly in product market

What happens if traders directly purchase vegetables from farmers and then they themselves sell it in the market (and deprive of others from doing so, including the farmers)? Three things happen: (i) farmers either lose or gain; (ii) traders usually gain; and (iii) customers either lose or gain. Farmers will see gains if the traders pay high price for vegetables in the factor market (or they lose if the opposite happens). Traders mostly gain. Customers will see gains if traders purchase in bulk and sell it at a low price, largely accruing from economies of scale (or they lose if traders form a cartel and jack up prices in the product market).

What usually happens in a developing country is that traders pay low price to farmers, don’t let farmers directly sell produce in designated wholesale market set up by the government in cities, and traders form a cartel and jack up prices in the product market. Welfare of both farmers and consumers is reduced by traders by creating monopsony in factor market and monopoly in product market (they play with the quantity supplied in the product market to keep up high prices). This is what happens in Nepal and in other South Asian countries.

But, the story from Ghana is different. Traders in Ghana purchase tomatoes from rural farms and bring them to the large urban markets. A research by Robinson and Ngeleza 2011 shows that, in Ghana, the traders do operate a cartel but that farmers who sell to them receive higher prices than if they sell to the local market, even though there is little difference in quality compared with tomatoes sold to the local market.


This suggests that traders share cartel rents with these farmers, resulting in lower prices in rural areas, higher prices in the cities, and a greater constriction of total market volume. Our paper suggests that policymakers would do better to focus on the full value chain and on opening up the urban markets rather than on strengthening farmers’ bargaining power with the traders, which restricts market volumes and harms farmers unable to sell to traders.


What about the loss in welfare of consumers (due to high prices) in the product market? Does the welfare gains to farmers in the factor market offset the potential welfare losses to consumers in the product market?

Thursday, February 17, 2011

The political J-curve

What happens when countries move from closed to open societies? Ian Bremmer argues that you get a “powerful political phenomenon” called the J-curve.


The theory goes like this. If you plot the relationship between a country’s stability (on the vertical axis) and its social and political openness (on the horizontal axis) the points that mark every possible combination of openness and stability will produce a pattern that resembles the letter J. Most countries start off closed and stable (think: North Korea). Many end up open and stable (like Britain). But in between there is a turbulent transition. Some governments, such as post-apartheid South Africa, survive this transition. Others – the Soviet Union, Iran under the shah and the former Yugoslavia – do not.

The J-curve is a controversial idea. When I first floated it in 2006, it was used – in some ways hijacked – by those seeking to explain the unstable postwar environment in Iraq. But an intervention bringing democracy by force was always a poor example of the theory. The current upheavals in the Middle East, the result of internal dynamics of populations trapped between economic hardship and increasing political openness, make a much better test.


There is a J-curve in economics as well. It refers to a situation when after a currency is devalued, the short-term relatively inelastic demand for imports persists and consumers pay more for the same goods and services. Meanwhile, exports become expensive for a short time, leading to worsening balance of trade. After some adjustments, the volume of exports will start to rise because of their lower more competitive prices to foreign buyers, and domestic consumers will buy fewer of the costlier imports. Eventually, the trade balance should improve on what it was before the devaluation. If there is a currency revaluation or appreciation there may be an inverted J-curve.

Wednesday, February 16, 2011

Trade in intermediates

Shim and Uri write: “The imported intermediate input content accounts for about one-quarter of OECD economies’ exports, and the European Central Bank (ECB) estimates that such imports accounted for about 44 percent of EU exports (or 20 percent for imports from outside of the EU) in 2000, ranging from about 35 percent in Italy to about 59 percent in the Netherlands. In the United States, imported intermediate input content in exports reached about 10 percent in 2005. Among emerging economies, imported content’s share in exports is particularly high in China―about 30 percent, or twice that for India and Brazil.”

With this sheer volume of trade in intermediate goods, they argue that (i) The importance of bilateral trade balances is exaggerated. Focusing just on bilateral trade imbalances would not address the underlying causes of imbalances as doing so would just redistribute trading costs across different partners; (ii) The importance of export-led demand is overestimated and that of trade as a source of efficiency (specialization) is underestimated. Policymakers fail to recognize that imported inputs feed into exports; (iii) Trade has become more volatile and a larger source of shocks as countries source intermediates from different destinations and are interlinked, magnifying the final impact of a shock. Fluctuations in trade is more volatile than that in GDP; and (iv)  The cost of protection is higher. Trade in intermediates means the cost of protectionism is higher than is generally understood, and rising.

Tuesday, February 15, 2011

Are services exports competitive than merchandise exports in Nepal?

The governor of Nepal Rastra Bank, Dr. Yuba Raj Khatiwada, argues that services exports are more competitive than merchandise exports in the context of Nepal. At a program organized by SAWTEE yesterday, he said that his confidence in merchandise exports is waning and that just looking at more market access in and preferences from the West will not be fruitful.

Well, he is right that focusing on more and more market access and surviving on preferential treatments offered by the West is not making our merchandise exports competitive. In fact, they are becoming increasing uncompetitive and are being displaced by competitive players in the international market. But, this does not mean that our service exports are competitive than merchandise exports. The former might have a larger market potential, but they might not be more competitive than the latter. The reason: the same constraints that ail merchandise exports persists in services exports sector as well.

Rising labor cost, high interest spread rate, power shortages, and lack of adequate infrastructures  are not the problems of merchandise exports sector only. These are very much obstinately persistent in the services sector (tourism, labor, IT, health, and education) as well. Meanwhile, high inflation and rise in real exchange rate (and the constraints that come with a pegged exchange rate regime) are also affecting both the sectors. High inflation domestically means that in nominal terms prices are expensive here. It means hotels, food, traveling and all other related services are relatively expensive here as compared to periods when there was low inflation. Furthermore, our services sector (except for low skilled labor) are not that competitive when compared to regional partners as of now.

To make them competitive, the government has to invest a huge amount of money in installing the prerequisites needed for these industries to take off. We do not have qualified human resource (or appropriate incentives in place) to take charge of the IT industry and spearhead cutting edge innovation. Meanwhile, the quality of our domestic educational system is far below the regional standard. Evidence: Just look at the number of students going to India and beyond for higher education. Remember how it took millions of dollars of investment in IITs and IIMs for almost a decade before they produced the kind of human resource needed for the Indian IT and management industries. Can Nepal emulate this success story given the existing political and economic constraints? May be, and may be not (look at the failure of the IT Park in Banepa). But, it still does not mean that services exports are competitive than merchandise exports.

As a whole, it sounds all good. The global services market are expanding and recent innovations in technology is facilitating this. But, the question is: how far can Nepal tap this given our domestic capacity right now? I believe not much. So, services exports might have the potential, if tapped rightly and timely, but it is not wholly competitive than the merchandise exports, which is, by the way, performing pretty bad since 1997. The belief that services exports is more competitive than merchandise exports is like plump fruit which one thinks of is sweet, but does not know if it is sweet or bitter without tasting it. Sometimes, perception and reality might differ.

What does data show?

Nepal has been having deficit in trade of goods for a long time. But, we are having deficit in services trade since 2005. We are importing more services than we are exporting in the the last five years. Also, the size of services trade deficit is also fluctuating, but still is negative. Competitiveness of services sector is not very strong than that of merchandise sector as of now. It might have the potential, but not right now.

In terms of employment, 65.7% of total employed are in agriculture sector, 13.4% in industrial sector, and 20.1% in services sector (data as of 2001). The value addition of agricultural sector, as percent of GDP, was 33.8% in 2009, with annual value added growth of 2.2%. The industrial sector value added (% of GDP) was 15.9% with annual value added growth of 1.78%. The manufacturing sector value added (% of GDP) was 7% with annual value added growth of –0.5% in 2009 (it was 2.6% in 2007). The services sector value added was 50.2% with annual value addition growth of 5.9% in 2009. Now, look at the employment being generated. Though the services sector contributes more than 50% of our GDP, it employs only 20% of the total employed.